Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CHERYL D. DRESDNER, et al., No. 2:23-cv-2038 DAD CSK P

12 Plaintiffs,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 SACRAMENTO COUNTY JAIL, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiffs proceed pro se with an action claiming the wrongful death of inmate Kevin

18 Dresdner while he was incarcerated in the Sacramento County Main Jail. Plaintiffs seek relief

19 under the Eighth Amendment based on federal question jurisdiction.1

20 As discussed below, this Court finds that this action should proceed on plaintiffs’ Eighth

21 Amendment claims against defendants Dylan Schmidt and Deputy Arnold alleged in the third,

22 fourth and fifth claims in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint (ECF No. 19). (ECF No. 23.) By

23 separate order, the Court is proceeding with service of process on defendants Dylan Schmidt and

24 Deputy Arnold. These findings and recommendations address the recommended dismissal of the

25 untimely proposed third amended complaint, as well as the remaining defendants and claims

26 alleged in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint.

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1 This matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

28 § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302.

1 I. PLAINTIFFS’ PROPOSED THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

2 In this Court’s November 23, 2025 screening order, plaintiffs were granted leave to amend

3 to attempt to state cognizable claims against defendants Chris Carlson and Jim Cooper, as well as

4 the County of Sacramento. (ECF No. 23.) However, on February 12, 2026, plaintiffs filed an

5 untimely proposed third amended complaint, again naming defendants Dylan Schmidt and

6 Deputy Arnold, but now purportedly naming “Does 1-30, Unknown Names of

7 Medical/Psychiatric Staff, Correctional Officers, Warden” as defendants.2 (ECF No. 29 at 1.)

8 Plaintiffs include no names for any of these additional defendants; thus, they are all doe

9 defendants. The Ninth Circuit has held that where a defendant’s identity is unknown prior to the

10 filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to identify

11 the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the identities or that

12 the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds. Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160,

13 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). However,

14 in the third amended complaint, plaintiffs do not identify each defendant doe and his or her

15 alleged act or omission that plaintiffs contend violated federal rights. This is insufficient to put

16 prospective defendants on notice of their alleged actions or omissions that plaintiffs claim

17 violated such rights. In order to link these doe defendants to the alleged acts or omissions that

18 demonstrate a violation of federal rights, plaintiffs were required to identify the John Doe as best

19 as possible, and allege specific acts taken or not taken by each doe defendant, such as “John Doe

20 1 did X” and “John Doe 2 and 3 did Y.” Plaintiffs were required to “allege facts, not simply

21 conclusions, that show that an individual was personally involved in the deprivation of . . .civil

22 rights.” Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).

23 Thus, the Court finds that plaintiffs’ use of doe defendants in the third amended complaint

24 is problematic. See Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642. It is apparent from the plaintiffs’ prior pleadings

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2 Although the plaintiffs signed the third amended complaint on February 10, 2026, the date the

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pleading was due, the pleading was not filed with the Court until February 12, 2026. (ECF No.

27 29.) Because none of the plaintiffs are incarcerated, they are not entitled to the mailbox rule

afforded to incarcerated litigants. Plaintiffs are cautioned to mail court filings with sufficient time

28 to meet court deadlines.

1 that many of the facts surrounding the decedent’s death are currently unknown and must be

2 ascertained through discovery. Plaintiffs have now identified two individuals by name, so the

3 Court will not further delay this case by requiring plaintiffs to file yet another amended pleading.

4 Such amendment at this juncture is unnecessary because Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil

5 Procedure, not state law “Doe” pleading practices, governs whether new defendants may be

6 added and if so, whether the claims against them would relate back to the filing of the initial

7 complaint. Once defendants Dylan Schmidt and Deputy Arnold have appeared in this action,

8 plaintiffs may seek the identity of additional defendants through discovery. Should plaintiffs

9 learn the identities of the “Doe” parties they wish to serve, they must promptly file a motion to

10 amend pursuant to Rule 15 to file a third amended complaint to add the newly-identified

11 individuals as defendants. See Brass v. County of Los Angeles, 328 F.3d 1192, 1197-98 (9th Cir.

12 2003). If the timing of his amended complaint raises questions as to the statute of limitations,

13 plaintiffs must satisfy the requirements of Rule 15(c), which is the controlling procedure for

14 adding defendants whose identities were discovered after commencement of the action. Further,

15 unknown persons cannot be served with process until they are identified by their real names, and

16 the court will not investigate the names and identities of unnamed defendants.

17 Therefore, the Court strikes the third amended complaint as untimely, and because it

18 failed to comply with the November 3, 2025 screening order that granted them leave to state

19 cognizable claims against defendants Chris Carlson and Jim Cooper, as well as the County of

20 Sacramento, which plaintiffs did not do. By separate order, the Court is proceeding with service

21 of process on defendants Dylan Schmidt and Deputy Arnold. The Court turns next to address the

22 remaining defendants and claims alleged in plaintiffs’ second amended complaint, which the

23 Court previously found were not cognizable. (ECF No. 23.)

24 II. PLAINTIFFS’ SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT

25 A. Plaintiffs’ Allegations

26 In the second amended complaint (“SAC”), plaintiffs name seven defendants:

27 Sacramento County Jail (“SCJ”); Jim Cooper, Sacramento County Sheriff; Adult Correctional

28 Health (“ACH”); California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”); Chris

1 Carlson, Parole Officer; Dylan Schmidt, Social Worker; and Deputy Arnold. (ECF No. 19 at 2-

2 5.)

3 Decedent Kevin Dresdner was a parolee sentenced to ninety days in the Sacramento

4 County Jail for a parole violation sustained on August 10, 2021. Plaintiffs aver that decedent was

5 known to the jail facility as a high risk inmate with severe mental health issues, with a history of

6 substance and alcohol abuse. (Id. at 7.) On September 20, 2021, decedent was found

7 unresponsive in his cell, with seven fractured ribs, petechiae of his eyes, blood in his throat, and a

8 swollen tongue. (Id. at 8.)

9 In the first and second claims, plaintiffs allege that decedent’s due process rights were

10 violated by defendant Chris Carlson’s failure to provide decedent with an evidentiary hearing and

11 failure to appoint counsel at decedent’s parole hearing. (Id. at 7.)

12 In the third claim, plaintiffs allege that defendants SCJ, Dylan Schmidt, ACH, and Does

13 1-20, violated decedent’s Eighth Amendment rights as well as privacy laws under the Health

14 Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) by sharing decedent’s private

15 and sensitive health and mental health information over twelve times in non-confidential settings,

16 i.e. cell-side, exposing protected health information to other inmates, making decedent a

17 “vulnerable target in a hostile environment.” (Id.)

18 In the fourth claim, plaintiffs allege defendants SCJ, Dylan Schmidt, Deputy Arnold, and

19 Does 1-20 were deliberately indifferent to decedent’s health and safety by delaying his move and

20 returning him to an unsafe environment, ignoring his serious needs and failing to monitor and

21 observe him for his safety. (Id. at 8.)

22 In the fifth claim, plaintiffs allege that defendants SCJ, Deputy Arnold, Dylan Schmidt,

23 ACH, and “Does” failed to monitor and protect the safety of decedent, who told SCJ staff of his

24 “high level of anxiety, depression and fear” on the day he died, September 20, 2021. (Id.)

25 Plaintiffs aver that defendants’ failure to recognize suicide warning signs constituted deliberate

26 indifference to decedent’s serious medical needs. (Id.)

27 In the sixth claim, plaintiffs allege that “[i]f it weren’t for the inadequate monitoring,

28 supervision, customs, training and policies enacted under sheriff Jim Cooper, decedent’s death

1 could have been prevented.” (Id.)

2 Plaintiffs seek money damages. (Id. at 10.) Plaintiffs provided a copy of decedent’s death

3 certificate, and an affidavit pursuant to California Civil Procedure Code § 337.32. (Id. at 11-18.)

4 B. Noncognizable Claims In SAC

5 For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the SAC does not state cognizable

6 claims against defendants Chris Carlson, SCJ, ACH, Jim Cooper and CDCR, or based on a

7 violation of HIPAA. This Court recommends that these claims be dismissed, as set forth below.

8 1. Defendant Chris Carlson

9 Plaintiffs’ first two claims alleging due process violations by defendant Chris Carlson are

10 unclear. (ECF No. 19 at 7.) No context is provided for claim one; the Court is unable to tell

11 whether decedent was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Similarly, it is unclear whether decedent

12 was denied counsel at the parole violation hearing or when he was seeking parole from prison.

13 These contexts would also assist the Court in determining whether “parole officer” refers to a

14 parole agent or a member of the parole board. This distinction is important to determine whether

15 immunity applies. For example, parole board officials enjoy absolute immunity from suit “when

16 processing parole applications.” Sellars v. Procunier, 641 F.2d 1295, 1302 (9th Cir.), cert.

17 denied, 454 U.S. 1102 (1981); Brown v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 554 F.3d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 2009)

18 (“[P]arole board members are entitled to absolute immunity for parole board decisions.”).

19 Further, plaintiffs have not demonstrated that such due process claims were not extinguished

20 upon the death of decedent. Indeed, under either context, the Court could not remedy either due

21 process violation by ordering a new hearing for decedent. These due process claims against

22 defendant Chris Carlson should be dismissed without prejudice.

23 2. Defendants SCJ and ACH

24 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to whom

25 § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties

26 and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see

27 also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). Local government

28 sub-units, however, are not generally considered “persons” within the meaning of Section 1983.

1 See Vance v. County of Santa Clara, 928 F. Supp. 993, 995-96 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (stating that

2 “naming a municipal department as a defendant is not an appropriate means of pleading a § 1983

3 action against a municipality” and dismissing the Santa Clara Department of Corrections from the

4 action); see also Sanders v. Aranas, 2008 WL 268972, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008) (finding

5 that the Fresno Police Department cannot be sued under Section 1983 because it is a sub-division

6 of the City of Fresno).

7 Further, a local government may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or

8 officials under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520

9 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not on

10 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, the plaintiff must

11 allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the

12 municipality. See id.; Castro v. Cnty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc).

13 Here, the SCJ is not a proper defendant in a claim under § 1983 because it is a department

14 of Sacramento County. McCoy v. Sac Cnty. Jail, 2023 WL 1477638, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2,

15 2023). It also appears that defendant ACH is a municipal department. As such, defendant ACH

16 is also not a proper defendant in a claim brought pursuant to § 1983. See Vance, 928 F. Supp. at

17 996.

18 It is unclear whether plaintiffs can amend their pleading to state a cognizable claim

19 against Sacramento County. Local governments are “persons” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C.

20 § 1983 where official policy or custom causes a constitutional tort, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 690;

21 however, a city or county may not be held vicariously liable for the unconstitutional acts of its

22 employees under the theory of respondeat superior. See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs. of Bryan Cnty.,

23 520 U.S. at 403; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691. Local governing bodies therefore may be sued directly

24 under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief for the violation of federal rights. See

25 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690.

26 However, to impose municipal liability under § 1983 for a violation of constitutional

27 rights resulting from governmental inaction or omission, a plaintiff must show: “(1) that he

28 possessed a constitutional right of which he or she was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a

1 policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs’ constitutional

2 rights; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Oviatt By

3 and Through Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting City of Canton v.

4 Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

5 Here, plaintiffs’ policy allegations are too vague and conclusory to determine whether

6 plaintiffs can state a cognizable claim against Sacramento County.

7 The Court recommends that defendants SCJ and ACH be dismissed without prejudice, and

8 that plaintiffs’ putative claims against Sacramento County also be dismissed without prejudice.

9 3. Defendant Jim Cooper

10 In the SAC, plaintiffs’ sole allegation as to defendant Sacramento County Sheriff Jim

11 Cooper is that “[i]f it weren’t for the inadequate monitoring, supervision, customs, training and

12 policies enacted under Sheriff Jim Cooper, decedent’s death could have been prevented.” (ECF

13 No. 19 at 8.)

14 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a federal

15 constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under

16 the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d

17 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the

18 facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal

19 connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

20 See Hansen v. Black, 297 F.3d 930, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44

21 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiffs may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable

22 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

23 (2009). The requisite causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

24 violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights can be established in a number of ways, including

25 by demonstrating that a supervisor’s own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision,

26 or control of his subordinates was a cause of plaintiffs’ injury. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,

27 1208 (9th Cir. 2011). “Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely

28 provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.” Albright v. Oliver, 510

1 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2 Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of supervisory personnel in

3 civil rights violations or the failure to train or supervise are not sufficient to state a claim. Ivey v.

4 Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). “A pattern of similar constitutional

5 violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference

6 for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011) (citation omitted).

7 A supervisor’s failure to train or supervise subordinates may give rise to individual

8 liability under § 1983 where the defendant “was deliberately indifferent to the need to train

9 subordinates, and the lack of training actually caused the constitutional harm or deprivation of

10 rights.” Flores v. County of Los Angeles, 758 F.3d 1154, 1159 (9th Cir. 2014). “Under this

11 standard, the plaintiff must allege facts to show that the official disregarded the known or obvious

12 consequence that a particular omission in their training program would cause municipal

13 employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights.” Hyde v. City of Wilcox, 23 F.4th 863, 874

14 (9th Cir. 2022) (internal quotations, brackets, ellipsis, and citations removed).

15 Here, plaintiffs’ sole allegation as to defendant Jim Cooper merely concludes he is liable,

16 without setting forth specific facts or identifying particular policies. Such conclusory statement is

17 insufficient to state a cognizable Eighth Amendment violation or policy or failure to train theory

18 of supervisor liability. Plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Jim Cooper should be dismissed

19 without prejudice.

20 4. Defendant CDCR

21 Plaintiffs included no specific charging allegations against the CDCR. In any event, based

22 on plaintiffs’ allegations, a claim against the CDCR would be barred. The Eleventh Amendment

23 serves as a jurisdictional bar to suits brought by private parties against a state or state agency

24 unless the state or the agency consents to such suit. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979);

25 Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978) (per curiam); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1349-

26 50 (9th Cir. 1982). In the instant case, the State of California has not consented to suit. Thus,

27 plaintiffs’ claims against the CDCR are legally frivolous and must be dismissed.

28 ///

1 5. HIPAA Claim

2 Plaintiffs challenge the disclosure of decedent’s medical and mental health information

3 under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”). Plaintiffs are

4 correct that decedent’s medical and mental health information is private, or confidential.3

5 However, HIPAA does not provide any private right of action. U.S. v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926 (9th

6 Cir. 2009); Webb v. Smart Document Solutions, LLC, 499 F.3d 1078, 1081 (9th Cir. 2007)

7 (“HIPAA itself provides no right of action.”). Accordingly, plaintiffs’ HIPAA claim is barred.

8 The Court recommends that plaintiffs’ HIPAA claim be dismissed with prejudice.

9 III. LEAVE TO AMEND

10 On multiple occasions, plaintiffs have been put on notice of Rule 8’s pleading standard,

11 and instructed on the applicable law and pleading requirements. (ECF Nos. 6, 12, 23.) On

12 November 3, 2025, this Court screened plaintiffs’ second amended complaint and granted them

13 an opportunity to amend. (ECF No. 23.) On December 3, 2025, plaintiffs filed notices of

14 election claiming to elect to file a third amended complaint, but no proposed third amended

15 complaint was provided. (ECF Nos. 25-27.) On January 20, 2026, plaintiffs were granted 21

16 days to submit their proposed third amended complaint. (ECF No. 28.) On February 12, 2026,

17 plaintiffs filed their untimely third amended complaint. (ECF No. 29.) Despite being granted

18 leave to amend to state cognizable claims against Chris Carlson, Sacramento County, and Jim

19 Cooper, plaintiffs did not include such parties in their proposed third amended complaint.

20 This action was filed on September 20, 2023, and since then, the Court has liberally

21 granted plaintiffs multiple extensions of time to file an operative complaint that stated cognizable

22 claims. See ECF No. 9 (60 days to file amended complaint); ECF No. 15 (60 days to file second

23 amended complaint); ECF No. 17 (60 days to file second amended complaint); ECF No. 28 (21

24 days to file third amended complaint). The plaintiffs were cautioned that no further extensions of

25 time would be granted. (ECF No. 28 at 1.)

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3 “A provider of health care, health care service plan, or contractor shall not disclose medical

27 information regarding a patient of the provider of health care or an enrollee or subscriber of a

health care service plan without first obtaining an authorization. . . .” California Civil Code

28 § 56.10(a) (exceptions provided in subdivision (b) or (c) not applicable here).

] Under these circumstances, this Court finds that granting another opportunity to amend at

2 || this juncture would be futile. See Klamath-Lake Pharm. Ass’n v. Klamath Med. Serv. Bureau,

3 | 701 F.2d 1276, 1293 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that while leave to amend shall be freely given, the

4 || court does not have to allow futile amendments). The Court recommends that plaintiffs not be

5 || granted further leave to amend. Instead, this action will proceed on plaintiffs’ Eighth

6 || Amendment claims against defendants Dylan Schmidt and Deputy Arnold alleged in the third,

7 || fourth and fifth claims in plaintiffs’ SAC.

8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

9 1. Plaintiffs’ third amended complaint (ECF No. 29) be stricken as untimely.

10 2. Plaintiffs’ claims against defendants Chris Carlson and Jim Cooper, and the putative

11 claims against Sacramento County, be dismissed without prejudice.

12 3. Plaintiffs’ claims against defendants SCJ, ACH, and CDCR be dismissed with

13 prejudice.

14 4. Plaintiffs’ HIPAA claim be dismissed with prejudice.

15 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

16 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days

17 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiffs may file written objections

18 || with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

19 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiffs are advised that

20 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

21 || Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

22

23 || Dated: March 9, 2026 A aA

24 Ly {nn spe

CHI SOO KIM

25 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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27 || //dres2308.56

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