Opinion

Yaya-Diallo

Court
District Court, S.D. California
Filed
Jun 25, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 SAIKOU YAYA DIALLO, Case No.: 26-cv-2167-RSH-BLM

12 Petitioner,

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

13 v. ENFORCE

14 JEREMY CASEY, Warden,

[ECF Nos. 8, 9]

15 Respondent.

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18 On April 6, 2026, petitioner Saikou Yaya Diallo filed a petition for writ of habeas

19 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. Petitioner alleged that his

20 detention without a bond hearing pending removal proceedings had become unduly

21 prolonged. Id. at 2, 4. Respondents filed a return stating that they did not oppose a bond

22 hearing. ECF No. 4 at 1. On April 16, 2026, the Court granted the Petition and directed the

23 government to arrange a bond hearing within seven days at which the government bears

24 the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk.

25 ECF No. 6 at 1.

26 On April 23, 2026, Petitioner timely received a bond hearing before an immigration

27 judge, at which the immigration judge denied bond based on risk of flight. See ECF No. 9-

28 2 (order of immigration judge).

1 Thereafter, on May 26, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion to enforce the Court’s order

2 directing a bond hearing. ECF No. 9. Respondents have opposed. ECF No. 11.

3 Petitioner’s motion argues in conclusory terms that the immigration judge did not

4 correctly apply the burden of proof. ECF No. 9 at 1, 3. Petitioner states that he has no

5 criminal record and no prior immigration violations, and contends that he has a U.S. citizen

6 sponsor available. Id. at 2. He also states that he was given insufficient time to prepare for

7 his bond hearing, id., although the immigration judge’s order indicates that “[t]he Court

8 trailed this case to the final date authorized by the Order for [Petitioner] to notify his alleged

9 lawyer and alleged sponsor to provide some evidence, yet the Respondent provided

10 nothing.” ECF No. 9-2 at 2. Petitioner’s motion also states that an immigration judge “must

11 consider alternatives to detention and petitioner’s financial circumstance and that challenge

12 is properly directed to the Board of Immigration [] Appeals.” ECF No. 9 at 1. Petitioner

13 further states that he has exhausted administrative remedies in that he has appealed his

14 denial of bond to the BIA, which appeal is pending. Id.

15 The Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust

16 available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-

17 Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by

18 Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A court may require prudential

19 exhaustion when:

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(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate

21 a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the

requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the

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administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow

23 the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the need for

judicial review.

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25 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488

26 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a petitioner does not exhaust administrative

27 remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or

28 stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is

1 excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011). Nonetheless, “a

2 court may waive the prudential exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are

3 inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture,

4 irreparable injury will result, or the administrative proceedings would be void.’”

5 Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir.

6 2004)).

7 The Ninth Circuit has applied the exhaustion doctrine to circumstances similar to

8 those presented here—where a noncitizen seeks review, through a habeas proceeding, of

9 an immigration judge’s denial of bond. See Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the

10 petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s adverse bond determination before appealing

11 to the BIA. This short cut was improper. Leonardo should have exhausted administrative

12 remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s

13 decision.”). Irrespective of the prudential exhaustion doctrine, however, the Court retains

14 jurisdiction to determine whether a party has complied with its earlier habeas order. Id. at

15 1161 (“[T]he district court had authority to review compliance with its earlier order

16 conditionally granting habeas relief.”).

17 Although Petitioner’s motion argues in general terms that the immigration judge

18 misapplied the burden of proof in contravention of this Court’s order, his claims appear to

19 be routine claims of error that are properly reviewed in Petitioner’s pending appeal to the

20 BIA, the administrative tribunal established to review such claims and possessing expertise

21 in such review. The Court declines to act as a parallel appellate administrative tribunal in

22 addressing the merits of the claimed errors here, where doing so would effectively

23 encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative review process, designed to allow the

24 agency to correct its own errors. Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Leonardo,

25 the Court requires exhaustion of these issues, determines that the prudential exhaustion

26 requirement applies here, and declines to waive that requirement.

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1 For the foregoing reasons, the motion to enforce [ECF No. 9] is DENIED. The Court

2 DENIES Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 8], as Petitioner has

3 ||not shown “exceptional circumstances” warranting such an appointment here. See Palmer

4 || v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009).

5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2026 Kehut ¢ Lowe

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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