The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 GANLIN YU, Case No.: 26cv3452-LL-VET
12 Petitioner,
ORDER
13 v.
(1) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT
14 JEREMY CASEY, et al.,
OF HABEAS CORPUS UNDER
15 Respondents. 28 U.S.C. § 2241
[ECF No. 1]
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17 (2) DENYING AS MOOT MOTION
TO VACATE ORDER TO SHOW
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CAUSE
19 [ECF No. 5]
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21 Before the Court is pro se Petitioner Ganlin Yu’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
22 Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”). Respondents filed a Return. ECF No.
23 4. Respondents also filed a Motion to Vacate Order to Show Cause and Lift Stay of
24 Removal (“Motion”). ECF No. 5. For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES the
25 Petition and DENIES AS MOOT the Motion.
26 I. BACKGROUND
27 Petitioner is a citizen of China who arrived in the United States by plane on
28 March 22, 2025 with a “nonimmigrant U.S. visa B1/B2 class” and seeking asylum. ECF
1 No. 4-2 at 2–3. Petitioner was found to be inadmissible under section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of
2 the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) for lacking a valid entry document and was
3 advised that she needs a “valid U.S. visa and/or a waiver to be considered for admission
4 into the United States.” Id. at 3, 6.
5 Petitioner was detained and processed for expedited removal pending a credible fear
6 hearing. Id. at 3. An asylum officer found Petitioner demonstrated a credible fear of
7 persecution or torture. Id. at 6. On January 23, 2026, an immigration judge denied
8 Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal under section 241(b)(3) of the
9 INA, and withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture. Id. at 9. She was
10 ordered removed to China. Id. at 11. When Petitioner did not file an appeal with the Board
11 of Immigration Appeals, the order became administratively final on January 23, 2026. ECF
12 No. 4-1, Declaration of Edgar Olvera (“Olvera Decl.”), ¶ 3.
13 On June 8, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition. Pet.
14 II. LEGAL STANDARD
15 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner “is in custody
16 in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
17 § 2241(c); Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241
18 expressly permits the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those
19 aliens are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
20 States.’”). In federal habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case
21 by a preponderance of evidence. Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 (9th Cir.
22 2004); Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
23 III. DISCUSSION
24 Petitioner seeks relief from prolonged detention without a bond hearing. Pet.
25 Respondents contend that Petitioner is (1) properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231,
26 (2) her claim is unripe under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), and (3) Immigration
27 and Customs Enforcement has a valid travel document and Petitioner is scheduled to be
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1 removed from the United States in the next two weeks. ECF No. 4 at 2; Olvera
2 Decl. ¶¶ 6–8.
3 When a noncitizen has been found to be unlawfully present in the United States and
4 a final order of removal has been entered, they must be detained for up to ninety days
5 pending the government’s efforts to secure their removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)–(2).
6 This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).
7 After the removal period, this statute “limits [a noncitizen’s] post-removal-period detention
8 to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that [noncitizen’s] removal from the United
9 States” and “does not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689. A six-month
10 period of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of
11 detention.” Id. at 701. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to
12 “provide[ ] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
13 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. If the petitioner satisfies their initial burden, then the
14 burden shifts to the government to rebut that showing. Id. “[F]or detention to remain
15 reasonable, as the period of prior postremoval confinement grows, what counts as the
16 ‘reasonably foreseeable future’ conversely would have to shrink.” Id. “[O]nce removal is
17 no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.”
18 Id. at 699. In that case, the noncitizen’s release may be “conditioned on any of the various
19 forms of supervised release that are appropriate in the circumstances.” Id. at 700; see
20 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).
21 The Court finds that Petitioner’s detention of approximately five months after a final
22 order of removal—beginning on January 23, 2026—is presumptively reasonable. See
23 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701; see also, e.g., Khalilova v. Smith, No. 25-CV-2140 JLS (DDL),
24 2025 WL 3089522, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2025) (finding detention of about four months
25 after a final order of removal to be within the presumptively reasonable period). Petitioner
26 has provided no evidence to rebut the presumption and does not provide good reason to
27 believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
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1 || future. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner’s Petition is premature and there is no
2 || grounds for relief at this time.
3 CONCLUSION
4 Based on the above, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas
5 ||Corpus without prejudice. Accordingly, Respondents’ Motion to Vacate Order to Show
6 || Cause and Lift Stay of Removal is DENIED as moot. As this concludes the litigation in
7 matter, the Clerk of Court shall close this matter.
8 IT IS SO ORDERED.
9 || Dated: June 25, 2026 NO
10 Qe |
11 Honorable Linda Lopez
United States District Judge
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