The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 AARON STANZ, individually and Case No.: 22-cv-01164-GPC-JLB
derivatively on behalf of Jet Genuis
12
Holdings, Inc., ORDER AWARDING
13 ATTORNEY’S FEES
Plaintiff,
14
v.
15
JORDAN BROWN, et al.,
[ECF Nos. 236, 238]
16
Defendants.
17
18 AND RELATED COUNTERCLAIM.
19
20 Before the Court is a Declaration of Attorney Matt Blum in support of Reasonable
21 Attorney’s Fees Incurred (“Declaration”). (ECF No. 238.) The Declaration was filed in
22 response to the Court’s January 29, 2026, Order Granting Plaintiff’s Request for Attorney’s
23 Fees. (ECF No. 236.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s
24 request for attorney’s fees in the amount of $12,595.00.
25 I. BACKGROUND
26 A. Relevant Procedural Background
27 On January 9, 2025, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel, seeking an order for the
28 production of documents and an award of attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 188.) Plaintiff sought
1 to compel responses to Plaintiff’s Requests for Production (“RFP”) (Set One) served on
2 Defendants Brown, JGH, Jet Genius Florida Holdings, Inc., Bowman Aviation, Inc., Jet
3 Agency Global, LLC, C3 Jets, LLC, and C3 Limo, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”). (Id.
4 at 2.) On January 14, 2025, Defendants filed an opposition (ECF No. 190) and Plaintiff
5 duly replied (ECF No. 191). On May 15 and May 28, 2025, the Court held hearings on
6 Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel. (ECF Nos. 207, 210.) On June 6, 2025, an Order was issued
7 granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel and setting a discovery schedule. (ECF No. 215.)
8 After the initial 10-day timeframe for compliance set forth in the Motion to Compel
9 Order passed, Plaintiff’s counsel initiated the meet-and-confer process on June 17, 2025.
10 (ECF No. 217 at 4.) During the meet-and-confer phone call, Defendants’ Counsel
11 informed Plaintiff’s counsel that “he was working on it, but made no promises,” with the
12 subsequent 14-day windows for production eventually passing without any compliance
13 from Defendants. (Id. at 4-5 (citing ECF No. 217-1 at 2, ¶ 3).)
14 On June 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for an Order to Show Cause
15 why Defendants Should not be Held in Contempt for Failing to Comply with a Court Oder
16 (“Ex Parte Motion”). (ECF No. 217.) Pursuant to the undersigned’s Chambers Rules,
17 after service of an ex parte motion, opposing counsel has until 5:00 p.m. the next court day
18 to file an opposition or to request an extension. J. Burkhardt’s Civ. Chambers R. § VII.
19 Defendants neither filed an opposition nor requested an extension.
20 On August 7, 2025, the parties lodged with the Court—pursuant to § V of Judge
21 Burkhardt’s Civil Chambers Rules—a Joint Discovery Statement, improperly styled a
22 “Joint Motion for Determination of Discovery Dispute.” Due to the substantial overlap
23 between the lodged document and the Ex Parte Motion, the Court advised the parties that
24 it would address all the issues in the context of the motion. The Court provided an
25 additional opportunity for briefing and directed the parties to address any issues not already
26 included in the initial motion in the remaining briefing. (ECF No. 223.) Specifically, the
27 Court ordered Defendants to file an opposition to the Ex Parte Motion by August 25, 2025,
28 and Plaintiff to file a reply by September 2, 2025. (Id. at 2.) Defendants again did not file
1 an opposition. Plaintiff filed a Notice of No Reply Brief, informing the Court that it did
2 not file a reply “because there [was] no opposition for Plaintiff to address.” (ECF No. 225
3 at 2.)
4 In the Ex Parte Motion, Plaintiff represented that, with one exception, Defendants
5 failed to comply with the Motion to Compel Order. (ECF No. 217 at 2.) However, a
6 review of the subsequent Joint Discovery Statement revealed that Defendants produced
7 some discovery subsequent to the filing of the Ex Parte Motion; thus, the Ex Parte Motion
8 no longer accurately reflected the current status of Defendants’ compliance or
9 noncompliance with the Order. (See ECF No. 226 at 1.) The Court therefore ordered
10 Plaintiff to supplement its Ex Parte Motion no later than October 3, 2025, “to reflect the
11 aspects of the [Motion to Compel Order] with which Plaintiff maintains Defendants have
12 still failed to comply,” and ordered Defendants to file an opposition by October 10, 2025.
13 (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff filed the Court-ordered supplement (“Supplement”) on October 3, 2025.
14 (ECF No. 228.) Defendants once again filed no opposition. As Defendants did not file an
15 opposition despite three opportunities to do so, the Court deemed Plaintiff’s Ex Parte
16 Motion unopposed. (ECF No. 236 at 10.)
17 In the Ex Parte Motion, Plaintiff sought, in part, an award of all reasonable attorneys’
18 fees and costs incurred since June 6, 2025, as a result of Defendants’ noncompliance with
19 the Motion to Compel Order, including all attorney’s fees and costs incurred preparing the
20 Ex Parte Motion. (ECF No. 217 at 10.) On January 29, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s
21 Request for Attorney’s Fees. (ECF No. 236.) Within the Order, Plaintiff was instructed to
22 “file supporting declarations and documentation sufficient to support its request for
23 attorney’s fees and costs within ten (10) days” of the date of the Order. (Id. at 33.) On
24 February 6, 2026, Plaintiff filed the Declaration. (ECF No. 238.) Plaintiff seeks
25 $12,595.00 for attorney’s fees “as a result of 22.9 hours of legal work directly tied to the
26 drafting of the Ex Parte Application for OSC and Supplemental briefings.” (Id. at 4.)
27 Defendants were given an opportunity to object to Plaintiff’s fee request (ECF No. 236 at
28 34–35) but have not filed an opposition.
1
2 II. LEGAL STANDARD
3 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(C) permits a party to recover “reasonable
4 expenses, including attorney’s fees, caused by the failure” of the opposing party to comply
5 with a court order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). District courts have
6 “wide discretion” in determining what fees and expenses to award so long as the court
7 applies the appropriate standards. See Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838–39 (2011).
8 Under Rule 37(b)(2)(C), the moving party may recover “only the portion of his fees
9 that he would not have paid but for the misconduct” at issue. Silence v. McNamara, No.
10 2:22-cv-02052-MAA, 2024 WL 6847417, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2024) (quoting
11 Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 581 U.S. 101, 109 (2017)). The expenses and
12 fees awarded by the court must be reasonable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Reasonableness
13 is customarily initially evaluated by the lodestar method. Morales v. City of San Rafael,
14 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir. 1996); Silence, 2024 WL 6847417, at *16–21 (applying the
15 lodestar method to an award of expenses and fees under Rule 37(b)(2)(C)).
16 III. DISCUSSION
17 Defendants failed to file an opposition to Plaintiff’s fee request. Roush v. Berosini,
18 66 F. Appx 725, 726 (9th Cir. 2003) (the party subjected to the fee should be provided with
19 “an opportunity to review the itemized billing statements and a renewed opportunity to
20 object to the requested fees . . .”). Notwithstanding Defendants’ non-opposition, “courts
21 are required to evaluate the reasonableness of counsel’s fees, regardless of a challenge by
22 opposing counsel.” Kries v. City of San Diego, No. 17-cv-1464-GPC-BGS, 2021 WL
23 120830, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2021) (citation omitted).
24 Plaintiff seeks $12,595.00 in attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 238 at 4.) Plaintiff contends
25 that amount is a result of 22.9 hours of legal work at a standard billing rate of $550.00 per
26 hour, directly related to drafting the Ex Parte Motion. (Id.) Included within the Declaration
27 is a ledger of the attorney’s fees incurred as a result of the work performed. (Id. at 3–4.)
28
1 Plaintiff, as “the fee applicant[,] bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an
2 award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates.” Hensley v.
3 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983). Affidavits of counsel satisfy this burden provided
4 the affidavit is “sufficiently detailed to enable the court to consider all the factors necessary
5 in setting the fees.” Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir. 1993) (internal
6 quotation and citation omitted). A sufficiently detailed affidavit should “disclose[] the
7 nature of the services rendered in connection with unavailing efforts to obtain discovery,
8 the amount of attorney time so consumed, and the rates at which this time was billed to the
9 client.” Id. When a fee request is “poorly documented,” the district court may “reduce the
10 fee” or request “more detailed information,” but may not “deny[] the fee application in its
11 entirety.” Fischer v. SJB-P.D. Inc., 214 F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 2000).
12 In assessing reasonableness, the Court begins with the lodestar analysis. See Fed.
13 R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C); Morales, 96 F.3d at 363; Silence, 2024 WL 6847417, at *16–21.
14 “The ‘lodestar’ is calculated by multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party
15 reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate.” Morales, 96 F.3d at
16 363. After making the lodestar computation, the Court may adjust the lodestar figure based
17 on a number of “reasonableness” factors, including “the quality of representation, the
18 benefit obtained for the class, the complexity and novelty of the issues presented, and the
19 risk of nonpayment.”1 In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th
20 Cir. 2011) (citations omitted).
21
22
23 1 The complete list of factors includes: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty
and difficulty of the questions involved; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service
24
properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the
25 case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations
imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results
26
obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the
27 “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with
the client; and (12) awards in similar cases. Carter v. Caleb Brett LLC, 757 F.3d 866, 869
28
1 A. Reasonable Hourly Rates
2 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff's counsel provided no case citations
3 reflecting what reasonable rates are for attorneys in this community with similar skills and
4 experiences to Plaintiff’s counsel. (See generally ECF No. 238.) As the Court has little
5 evidence aside from the Declaration to support the fee request,2 the Court may “rely on its
6 own familiarity with the legal market” to determine the reasonable rates of counsel. Ingram
7 v. Oroudjian, 647 F.3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). Specifically, the Court must look to the
8 “rate prevailing in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of comparable
9 skill, experience, and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 979
10 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation and citation omitted).
11 For the reasons set forth in the Court’s order of August 14, 2025 (ECF No. 224 at 8-
12 10), the Court concludes the $550.00 hourly rate asserted by Mr. Blum is “in line with
13 those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably
14
15
16
17 2 The Court is disappointed that Plaintiff did not support its request with adequate
documentation of the reasonableness of the fee rate requested, despite the language in the
18
Court’s order that:
19
. . . Plaintiff SHALL FILE supporting declarations and documentation
20
sufficient to support its request for attorney’s fees and costs within ten (10)
21 days of the date of this Order. See id. at *3 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886, 895 n.11 (1984) (“To inform and assist the court in the exercise of
22
discretion, the burden is on the fee applicant to produce satisfactory
23 evidence—in addition to the attorney’s own affidavits—that the requested
rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services
24
by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience[,] and reputation.”);
25 McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation
omitted) (“The party seeking the award should provide documentary evidence
26
to the court concerning the number of hours spent, and how it determined the
27 hourly rate(s) requested.”)).
28
1 comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Chaudhry v. City of L.A., 751 F.3d 1096,
2 1110 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the
3 Court will utilize that rate in the lodestar analysis.
4 B. Reasonable Number of Hours Expended
5 The appropriate number of hours to be included in a lodestar calculation in the
6 context of Rule 37(b)(2)(C) sanctions are those that would not have accrued but for the
7 misbehaving party’s conduct. See Haeger, 581 U.S. at 109; see also Sanchez Y Martin,
8 S.A. de C.V. v. Dos Amigos, Inc., No. 17cv1943-LAB-LL, 2019 WL 3769191, at *10 (S.D.
9 Cal. Aug. 9, 2019) (including in the lodestar analysis hours accrued drafting motions and
10 engaging in legal research related to the disobedient party’s noncompliance, engaging in
11 meet and confer efforts with opposing counsel and experts, and conferencing with the
12 court). “The district court should exclude hours ‘that are excessive, redundant, or
13 otherwise unnecessary.’” McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009)
14 (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434); see also Cruz v. Nike Retail Servs., Inc., 346 F.R.D.
15 107, 117-18 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (excluding from the lodestar analysis hours accrued
16 responding to motions not directly related to the sanctioned behavior and compiling
17 exhibits that were not requested by the court). “Parties may also seek reasonable attorneys’
18 fees for work performed on the application for attorneys’ fees and costs (‘fees on fees’).”
19 True Health Chiropractic Inc. v. McKesson Corp., No. 13-cv-02219-HSG (DMR), 2015
20 WL 3453459, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2015) (citing Anderson v. Dir., OWCP, 91 F.3d
21 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996)).
22 Here, the Court finds the 22.9 hours claimed by Plaintiff to be reasonable. In this
23 case, “time that would not have accrued but for the opposing party’s misconduct.” includes
24 time spent by Plaintiff’s counsel analyzing discovery responses, undertaking meet and
25 confer efforts with opposing counsel, and updating Plaintiff on Defendants’
26
27
28
1 noncompliance. Id. at *9–10. The Declaration provides enough detail to directly link
2 each of the 22.9 hours claimed to Defendants’ noncompliance with the Court’s Motion to
3 Compel Order (ECF No. 215). Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 n. 12 (the fee applicant “is not
4 required to record in great detail how each minute of his time was expended” to show
5 relatedness of the hours claimed). “The essential goal in shifting fees (to either party) is to
6 do rough justice . . . .” Fox, 563 U.S. at 838. Recognizing every hour that Plaintiff’s
7 counsel accrued because of Defendants’ noncompliance achieves this goal.
8 C. Lodestar calculation
9 Based on the foregoing discussion, Plaintiff’s lodestar figure is $12,595.00.4 The
10 Court finds this amount to be reasonable without the need for further adjustment. See, e.g.,
11 Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, 825 F.3d 536, 546 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re
12 Bluetooth, 654 F.3d at 941–42) (a court may adjust the lodestar calculation by an
13 appropriate multiplier “reflecting a host of ‘reasonableness’ factors, ‘including the quality
14 of representation, the benefit obtained for the class, the complexity and novelty of the
15 issues presented, and the risk of nonpayment.’”).
16 ///
17 ///
18 ///
19
20
21 3 Previously, the Court limited Plaintiff’s fee recovery under Rule 37(a)(5)(A) to the
reasonable expenses incurred by Plaintiff’s counsel in filing a reply in support of his
22
Motion to Compel Discovery and attending hearings before the Court related to that
23 motion. (ECF No. 224 at 10–11.) At that time, the Court determined Plaintiff was not
entitled to recover expenses that were “not clearly tied to the drafting of Plaintiff’s Reply
24
Brief” such as “review of discovery responses and production, meet and confer efforts, and
25 client conferences.” (Id. at 12.) The Court reasoned that Plaintiff’s counsel—who became
counsel of record shortly before filing the motion—would have been required to undertake
26
these actions to get up to date to the case regardless. (Id.)
27
4 The lodestar figure of $12,595.00 is the product of the 22.9 hours expended by
28
1 |}IV. CONCLUSION
2 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff is awarded $12,595.00 in attorney’s fees.
3 Defendants must pay Plaintiff a total of $12,595.00 in fees within thirty (30) days of the
4 || date of this Order.
5 IT IS SO ORDERED.
6 Dated: June 23, 2026 -
n. Jill L. Burkhardt
8 ited States Magistrate Judge
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28