Sabirov

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TAKHIR RUSTAMOVICH SABIROV, Case No. 26-cv-03213

Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

v.

Re: Dkt. No. 1

CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, ET AL.,

Respondents.

Petitioner Takhir Rustamovich Sabirov filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 requesting immediate release. (Dkt. No. 1 (“Petition”).) Petitioner’s fourth

claim is that his detention violates Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) and 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

(Id.) As Petitioner has been detained for longer than presumptively reasonable and he provided

an unrebutted good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of his removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future, his detention is unlawful. Since Petitioner prevails on this claim,

his remaining claims are not addressed. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner was born in the Soviet Union. (Petition ¶ 17.) After its dissolution, he became

a citizen of Uzbekistan. (Id.) He first entered the United States in 1997 on a student visa. (Id.)

In 2000, Petitioner returned to Uzbekistan and spoke negatively about its unstable political and

economic situation. (Id. ¶ 19.) He was accused of criticizing the government of Uzbekistan and

charged with criminal mischief. (Id.) After being released, he quickly returned to the United

States in August 2000 and has remained here ever since. (Id.) He attempted to renew his Uzbek

passport in 2004, but his application was denied and authorities indicated he was no longer

considered a citizen. (Id. ¶ 21.) Accordingly, Petitioner believes he is stateless. (Id. ¶ 1.)

Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal issued in August 2009. (Id. ¶ 23.) The

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed his appeal of that order in July 2010. (Id.

¶ 24.) He was detained pending removal starting on May 15, 2011. (Id. ¶ 25.) But Uzbekistan

did not issue a travel document. (Id.) So Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

challenging his prolonged detention. (Id. ¶ 29.) He was released from detention on

approximately January 24, 2012, and placed on an Order of Supervision. (Id. ¶ 30.)

Respondents obtained an Uzbekistani “Travel Document of Stateless Person” for

Petitioner valid from May 11, 2026, to August 11, 2026. (Id. ¶¶ 47, 50.) On May 12,

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) directed him to appear on May 14. (Id. ¶ 42.)

When Petitioner appeared, ICE detained him. (Id. ¶¶ 45–46.) He has remained in custody since

May 14. (Id.)

On May 21, Petitioner filed an emergency motion to reopen and request for stay with the

BIA, citing “the new fact of his proven statelessness and ability to be removed, and other

extraordinary circumstances.” (Id. ¶ 49.) On June 3, Respondents stated, “Petitioner has filed a

motion to reopen and a motion for stay with the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). As a

result of the stay, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has stopped all removal

efforts.” (Dkt. No. 9.) In supplemental briefing, Respondents indicated:

DHS Counsel informed Counsel for Respondents that Petitioner had

filed a Motion to Reopen (Motion) with the Board of Immigration

Appeals (BIA). DHS Counsel informed Counsel for Respondent’s

that this Motion included an automatic stay of removal. However,

contrary to the initial assessment, DHS Counsel confirmed that this

Motion with the BIA does not come with an automatic stay (auto-

stay). Therefore, the Petitioner does not have an active stay granted

by the BIA. The Motion remains pending.

(Dkt. No. 15.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United

States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004). “[T]he traditional function of the writ is

to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court

may grant a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates that they are in custody in

violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). It applies to non-citizens

detained within the United States. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687. Since Petitioner is in custody and

since he is seeking release from custody, he has standing to pursue this Petition.

III. ANALYSIS

When a non-citizen is ordered removed, the government is generally required to detain

them for ninety days pending efforts to secure their removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A).

This ninety-day period is referred to as the “removal period.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(A). After the

removal period ends, § 1231’s plain language neither requires nor explicitly places a limit on any

further detention. Id. § 1231(a)(6) (individuals “may be detained beyond the removal period”)

(emphasis added). However, the Supreme Court has found that § 1231 “limits a[] [non-citizen]’s

post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about [their] removal

from the United States” and “does not permit indefinite detention.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689.

To reach this determination, the Supreme Court found that § 1231 was ambiguous, and

read in a reasonable time limit after analyzing the statute’s legislative history and finding no

evidence “clearly demonstrat[ing] a congressional intent to authorize indefinite, perhaps

permanent, detention.” Id. at 699. “[I]nterpreting the statute to avoid a serious constitutional

threat,” the Supreme Court “conclude[d] that, once removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,

continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id. It further held that a six-month

period of post-removal detention constitutes a “presumptively reasonable period of detention.”

Id. at 701. After this six-month period passes, the petitioner has the burden to “provide[] good

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable

future.” Id. If a petitioner satisfies their initial burden, the burden then shifts to the government

to rebut that showing. Id.

As an initial matter, Petitioner has been detained for longer than presumptively

reasonable. Courts routinely aggregate periods of detention for purposes of Zadvydas. Phan v.

Warden of Otay Mesa Det. Facility, 813 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1184–85 (S.D. Cal. 2025).

Respondents do not contest aggregation in this case. When aggregating Petitioner’s two

stretches of detention, he has been in custody for over nine months. (See Petition ¶¶ 25, 30, 45–

46.) That is longer than the presumptively reasonable six months. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

701.

Petitioner has provided good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of his

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Respondents stated that because of Petitioner’s

motion to reopen and motion to stay, ICE “has stopped all removal efforts.” (Dkt. No. 9.)

Petitioner indicates that “the estimated timeline for resolution of a motion to reopen before the

BIA is between three to 18 months.” (Dkt. No. 16 at 3.)1 Even assuming Petitioner’s motion

will be resolved in three months, the fastest estimate, Petitioner’s travel document would already

be expired since it is only valid for another two months. (See Petition ¶ 47.) And given

Petitioner’s apparent statelessness and Respondents’ prior difficulties obtaining a travel

document for Petitioner, there is good reason to believe obtaining another travel document will

be difficult and involve a lengthy process. (See Petition ¶¶ 21, 25; Castro-Napoles v. Noem, No.

26-CV-03212-RFL, 2026 WL 1720963, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 15, 2026).)

Respondents have not rebutted Petitioner’s showing. While an active travel document

would ordinarily be sufficient, Respondents have stated they “stopped all removal efforts.” (Dkt.

No. 9.) And though Respondents now believe “Petitioner does not have an active stay granted

by the BIA,” they notably do not say that ICE resumed removal efforts. (See Dkt. No. 15.) Nor

are they “[]able to provide a time frame as to how long the BIA will take to adjudicate the

pending Motion.” (Id.) They also do not provide any information about how long it might take

to obtain a new travel document under the circumstances. Due to this lack of evidence,

Respondents have failed to rebut the showing made by Petitioner. See Castro-Napoles, 2026

WL 1720963, at *3. Accordingly, the Petition is granted because Petitioner’s detention is no

1 All citations to page numbers in filings on the docket refer to ECF pagination.

longer authorized by § 1231(a)(6).

IV. REMEDY

When a district court grants a writ of habeas corpus it may “dispose of the matter as law

and justice require.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), 2243. Release from detention is the “typical

remedy” for “unlawful executive detention.” Munafv. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). The

typical remedy is appropriate here to address the statutory violation identified above.

Furthermore, to ensure that Petitioner’s release pursuant to this Order is not “rendered

meaningless,” it is necessary to enjoin the government from simply re-detaining Petitioner in the

same manner. See Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, 811 F. Supp. 3d 274, 320-21 & nn.19-20

(E.D.N.Y. 2025) (collecting cases); Martinez v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 349, 373 (S.D.N.Y.

2019). As a result, the relief ordered below falls within the core of habeas.

Petitioner has also requested an award of attorney’s fees. (Petition at 27.) The Court will

consider an application requesting reasonable attorney’s fees that is filed within 30 days of the

entry of judgment. Accordingly, Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees is DENIED without

prejudice.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is GRANTED. Respondents shall immediately

release Petitioner, within 24 hours of the filing of this Order at the latest, under the same terms

and conditions of his most recent Order of Supervision. Respondents are ENJOINED from re-

detaining Petitioner under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) unless and until (1) there is a material change in

circumstances justifying his detention; and (2) Respondents have followed all applicable

statutory and regulatory procedures.

The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 16, 2026 at 1:13 p.m. FA

RITA F. LIN

United States District Judge