Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 VICTOR JOEL VALDEZ RODRIGUEZ, Case No. 1:24-cv-01194-HBK

12 Plaintiff, ORDER REMANDING CASE TO

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY1

13 v.

(Docs. 14, 16)

14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

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Defendant.

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18 Victor Joel Valdez Rodriguez (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the

19 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying his application for

20 supplemental security income under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). The matter is currently

21 before the undersigned on the parties’ briefs, which were submitted without oral argument.

22 (Docs. 14, 16). For the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court remands the matter to the

23 Commissioner of Social Security for further administrative proceedings.

24 I. JURISDICTION

25 Plaintiff protectively filed for supplemental security income on January 15, 2021, alleging

26 a disability onset date of August 16, 2019. (AR 330-36). Benefits were denied initially (AR 134-

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1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge, in accordance with 28 U.S.C.

28 §636(c)(1). (Doc. 9).

1 44, 170-74) and upon reconsideration (AR 145-63, 178-83). Plaintiff appeared for a telephonic

2 hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) on April 12, 2023. (AR 86-104). Plaintiff

3 testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel. (Id.). The ALJ denied benefits (AR 21-

4 39) and the Appeals Council denied review (AR 6-13). The matter is before the Court under 42

5 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).

6 II. BACKGROUND

7 The facts of the case are set forth in the administrative hearing and transcripts, the ALJ’s

8 decision, and the briefs of Plaintiff and Commissioner. Only the most pertinent facts are

9 summarized here.

10 Plaintiff was 22 years old at the time of the hearing. (See AR 347). He graduated from

11 high school in special education classes and attempted a few college classes but “did not get very

12 far in either of them.” (AR 93, 357). He lives with his mother, stepfather, younger sister, and her

13 boyfriend. (AR 93). He has work history as a general laborer. (AR 93-94, 101). Plaintiff

14 testified that he was told his job ended because he was laid off, but he was “not sure if that was

15 completely the case.” (AR 94-95). He reported he needs reminders for daily tasks and hygiene

16 from his parents, can make simple meals but not cook on the stove, could not grocery shop on his

17 own, has difficulty being in a large group, and has difficulty with loud noises. (AR 96-99).

18 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

19 A district court’s review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is

20 governed by 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of review under § 405(g) is limited; the

21 Commissioner’s decision will be disturbed “only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or

22 is based on legal error.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012). “Substantial

23 evidence” means “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

24 conclusion.” Id. at 1159 (quotation and citation omitted). Stated differently, substantial evidence

25 equates to “more than a mere scintilla[,] but less than a preponderance.” Id. (quotation and

26 citation omitted). In determining whether the standard has been satisfied, a reviewing court must

27 consider the entire record as a whole rather than searching for supporting evidence in isolation.

28 Id.

1 In reviewing a denial of benefits, a district court may not substitute its judgment for that of

2 the Commissioner. “The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion when the evidence is susceptible

3 to more than one rational interpretation.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir.

4 2008). Further, a district court will not reverse an ALJ’s decision on account of an error that is

5 harmless. Id. An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate

6 nondisability determination.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). The party appealing the ALJ’s

7 decision generally bears the burden of establishing that it was harmed. Shinseki v. Sanders, 556

8 U.S. 396, 409-10 (2009).

9 IV. SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION PROCESS

10 A claimant must satisfy two conditions to be considered “disabled” within the meaning of

11 the Social Security Act. First, the claimant must be “unable to engage in any substantial gainful

12 activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be

13 expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period

14 of not less than twelve months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Second, the claimant’s impairment

15 must be “of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work[,] but cannot,

16 considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial

17 gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

18 The Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis to determine whether a

19 claimant satisfies the above criteria. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step one, the

20 Commissioner considers the claimant’s work activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i). If the

21 claimant is engaged in “substantial gainful activity,” the Commissioner must find that the

22 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).

23 If the claimant is not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the analysis proceeds to step

24 two. At this step, the Commissioner considers the severity of the claimant’s impairment. 20

25 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant suffers from “any impairment or combination of

26 impairments which significantly limits [his or her] physical or mental ability to do basic work

27 activities,” the analysis proceeds to step three. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). If the claimant’s

28 impairment does not satisfy this severity threshold, however, the Commissioner must find that the

1 claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c).

2 At step three, the Commissioner compares the claimant’s impairment to severe

3 impairments recognized by the Commissioner to be so severe as to preclude a person from

4 engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii). If the impairment is as

5 severe or more severe than one of the enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must find the

6 claimant disabled and award benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).

7 If the severity of the claimant’s impairment does not meet or exceed the severity of the

8 enumerated impairments, the Commissioner must pause to assess the claimant’s “residual

9 functional capacity.” Residual functional capacity (RFC), defined generally as the claimant’s

10 ability to perform physical and mental work activities on a sustained basis despite his or her

11 limitations, 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1), is relevant to both the fourth and fifth steps of the analysis.

12 At step four, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the

13 claimant is capable of performing work that he or she has performed in the past (past relevant

14 work). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant

15 work, the Commissioner must find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If

16 the claimant is incapable of performing such work, the analysis proceeds to step five.

17 At step five, the Commissioner considers whether, in view of the claimant’s RFC, the

18 claimant is capable of performing other work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §

19 416.920(a)(4)(v). In making this determination, the Commissioner must also consider vocational

20 factors such as the claimant’s age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §

21 416.920(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of adjusting to other work, the Commissioner must

22 find that the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1). If the claimant is not capable of

23 adjusting to other work, analysis concludes with a finding that the claimant is disabled and is

24 therefore entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1).

25 The claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four above. Tackett v. Apfel,

26 180 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999). If the analysis proceeds to step five, the burden shifts to the

27 Commissioner to establish that (1) the claimant is capable of performing other work; and (2) such

28 work “exists in significant numbers in the national economy.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Beltran

1 v. Astrue, 700 F.3d 386, 389 (9th Cir. 2012).

2 V. ALJ’S FINDINGS

3 At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity

4 since January 15, 2021, the application date. (AR 27). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

5 has the following severe impairment: autism spectrum disorder. (AR 27). At step three, the ALJ

6 found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or

7 medically equals the severity of a listed impairment. (AR 27). The ALJ then found that Plaintiff

8 has the RFC to

9 perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the

following nonexertional limitations: he can understand and

10 remember simple tasks. He can maintain attention, concentration,

and pace for simple tasks in two hour periods. He cannot have public

11 contact. He can have occasional coworker contact. He can make

simple work related decisions. He can adapt to job routine and

12 environment consistent with simple tasks.

13 (AR 29). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (AR 33). At step

14 five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there

15 are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform,

16 including: hand packager, machine packager, and kitchen helper. (AR 34-35). On that basis, the

17 ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act,

18 since January 15, 2021, the date the application was filed. (AR 35).

19 VI. ISSUES

20 Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision denying him

21 supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. (Doc. No. 1).

22 Plaintiff raises the following issue for this Court’s review:

23 1. Whether the RFC was supported by substantial evidence in light of the ALJ’s

24 consideration of the medical opinion evidence; and

25 2. Whether the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s symptom claims.

26 (Doc. 14 at 4-9)

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1 VII. DISCUSSION

2 A. Medical Opinion

3 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, new regulations apply that change the

4 framework for how an ALJ must evaluate medical opinion evidence. Revisions to Rules

5 Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 2017 WL 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18,

6 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. The new regulations provide that the ALJ will no longer “give

7 any specific evidentiary weight…to any medical opinion(s)…” Revisions to Rules, 2017 WL

8 168819, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844, at 5867-68; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Instead, an ALJ must

9 consider and evaluate the persuasiveness of all medical opinions or prior administrative medical

10 findings from medical sources. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) and (b). The factors for evaluating the

11 persuasiveness of medical opinions and prior administrative medical findings include

12 supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant (including length of the treatment,

13 frequency of examinations, purpose of the treatment, extent of the treatment, and the existence of

14 an examination), specialization, and “other factors that tend to support or contradict a medical

15 opinion or prior administrative medical finding” (including, but not limited to, “evidence showing

16 a medical source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an understanding of our

17 disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).

18 Supportability and consistency are the most important factors, and therefore the ALJ is

19 required to explain how both factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2).

20 Supportability and consistency are explained in the regulations:

21 (1) Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and

supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or

22 her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more

persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s)

23 will be.

24 (2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical

25 sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the

medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.

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20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2). The ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how the other

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factors were considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2). However, when two or more medical

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1 opinions or prior administrative findings “about the same issue are both equally well-supported ...

2 and consistent with the record ... but are not exactly the same,” the ALJ is required to explain how

3 “the other most persuasive factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)” were considered. 20

4 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(3).

5 The Ninth Circuit has additionally held that the new regulatory framework displaces the

6 longstanding case law requiring an ALJ to provide “specific and legitimate” or “clear and

7 convincing” reasons for rejecting a treating or examining doctor’s opinion. Woods v. Kijakazi, 32

8 F.4th 785 (9th Cir. 2022). Nonetheless, in rejecting an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as

9 unsupported or inconsistent, an ALJ must still provide an explanation supported by substantial

10 evidence. Id. at 792. This means that the ALJ “must ‘articulate ... how persuasive’ [he or she]

11 finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each doctor or other source ... and ‘explain how [he or

12 she] considered the supportability and consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Id. (citing

13 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), 404.1520(b)(2)).

14 In August 2021, state agency medical consultant Myles Friedland, Ph.D. opined that

15 Plaintiff does not have understanding and memory limitations; and has no significant limitation in

16 his ability to carry out very short and simple instructions, work in coordination with or in

17 proximity to others without being distracted by them, make simple work-related decisions, and

18 ask simple questions or request assistance. (AR 155-57). However, Dr. Friedland also found

19 moderate limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and

20 concentration for extended periods, perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular

21 attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances, sustain an ordinary routine without

22 special supervision, complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from

23 psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consist pace without an unreasonable

24 number and length of rest periods, interact appropriately with the general public, accept

25 instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors, get along with coworkers or

26 peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes, maintain socially appropriate

27 behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness, respond appropriately to

28 changes in the work setting, be aware of normal hazards and take appropriate precautions, and

1 travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation. (AR 155-58). As relevant here, Dr.

2 Friedland provided additional narrative explanation of the assessed mental residual functional

3 capacity as follows: “Claimant can sustain concentration and pace for simple one and two-step

4 mental tasks only over time due to psychological based symptoms.” (AR 158). The ALJ found

5 Dr. Friedland’s opinion persuasive as it was consistent with the objective record and Plaintiff’s

6 reports, and it was supported with a review and narrative of the evidence available to him at that

7 time. (AR 32-33).

8 Plaintiff argues that despite finding Dr. Friedland’s opinion persuasive, the ALJ’s failure

9 to incorporate the opined limitation that Plaintiff “can sustain concentration and pace for simple

10 one and two-step mental tasks only over time,” or otherwise “provide any rationale to support the

11 decision not to include [the] limitation,” constituted reversible error. (Doc. 14 at 5-6). The Court

12 agrees. A claimant’s RFC is “the most [the claimant] can still do despite [his or her] limitations.”

13 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a); 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). The RFC assessment is an administrative

14 finding based on all relevant evidence in the record, not just medical evidence. Bayliss v.

15 Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). In determining the RFC, the ALJ must consider

16 all limitations, severe and non-severe, that are credible and supported by substantial evidence in

17 the record. (Id.) (RFC determination will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence).

18 However, an ALJ’s RFC findings need only be consistent with relevant assessed limitations and

19 not identical to them. Turner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 613 F.3d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010).

20 Defendant briefly argues, without citation to legal authority, that the ALJ “rationally”

21 interpreted Dr. Friedland’s assessment to mean “Plaintiff could do simple tasks and could do one

22 or two-step tasks; not that Plaintiff was limited to solely one or two-step tasks” and “[r]eferencing

23 the lesser-included ability to do ‘one and two-step” tasks did not affect Plaintiff’s ability to do

24 ‘simple’ tasks.” (Doc. 16 at 4). Defendant is correct that an ALJ’s RFC is an administrative

25 finding based on all the relevant evidence in the record and need only be consistent with the

26 relevant assessed limitations and not identical to them. See Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 613,

27 F.3d 1217, 1222-23 (9th Cir. 2010); Stubbs, 539 F.3d 1173-74 (finding harmless error when the

28 ALJ’s hypothetical properly incorporated limitations consistent with those identified in medical

1 testimony). However, regardless of whether the assessed RFC properly limited Plaintiff to

2 “simple tasks” based on the overall evidence of record, the issue remains as to whether the ALJ

3 properly considered Dr. Friedland’s opinion that Plaintiff limited to sustaining concentration and

4 pace for “simple one to two-step tasks only over time.” (AR 158); see Brown-Hunter v. Colvin,

5 806 F.3d at 495 (a court “cannot substitute [the court’s] conclusions for the ALJ’s, or speculate as

6 to the grounds for the ALJ's conclusions. Although the ALJ’s analysis need not be extensive, the

7 ALJ must provide some reasoning in order for [the court] to meaningfully determine whether the

8 ALJ’s conclusions were supported by substantial evidence.”); see SSR 96-8p (“If the RFC

9 assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the

10 opinion was not adopted.”).

11 Here, as correctly noted by Plaintiff, the ALJ “failed to acknowledge the existence of

12 these opined limitations when addressing the opinion.” (Doc. 14 at 5-6; AR 32-33 (ALJ outlining

13 Dr. Friedland’s assessment exactly as follows: “claimant had no limitations in understanding,

14 remembering, and applying information but has moderate limitations in all other areas of mental

15 functioning including moderate limitations in the ability to interact appropriately with co-workers

16 and the general public.”). Thus, the ALJ failed to either provide reasons, supported by substantial

17 evidence, to reject the limitation to simple one or two step tasks, or to properly incorporate the

18 limitations into the assessed RFC. See Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 880, 886 (9th Cir.

19 2006) (“an ALJ is not free to disregard properly supported limitations”); Byrd v. Colvin, 2017 WL

20 980559, at *8 (D. Or. Mar. 14, 2017) (“Here, the ALJ gave great weight to [the] opinion, but the

21 RFC failed to take into account all of the limitations identified by [the doctor], and the ALJ failed

22 to explain why she did not include the limitations in the RFC. As a result, the ALJ erred in

23 formulating the RFC.”). This constitutes error.

24 Further, the reviewing court cannot consider an error harmless unless it “can confidently

25 conclude that no reasonable ALJ, when fully crediting the [evidence], could have reached a

26 different disability determination.” Stout v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1056

27 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, in response to the hypothetical propounded by the ALJ at the hearing, the

28 vocational expert testified that an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and

1 the RFC outlined above, including the limitation to maintaining attention, concentration, and pace

2 for simple tasks in two-hour periods, can perform the requirements of hand packer, machine

3 packager, and kitchen helper. (AR 34-35, 102). However, as noted by Plaintiff, these

4 occupations all require a DOT reasoning level of 2. See DOT 920.587-018, available at 1991

5 WL 687916 (hand packager occupation requires reasoning level of 2); DOT 920.685-078,

6 available at 1991 WL 687942 (machine packager occupation requires reasoning level of 2); DOT

7 318.687-010, available at 1991 WL 672755 (kitchen helper occupation requires reasoning level

8 of 2). It is well-settled in the Ninth Circuit that an individual restricted to one to two-step tasks

9 cannot perform occupations requiring a Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) reasoning of

10 2. See Rounds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 807 F.3d 996, 1003 (9th Cir. 2015) (“There was an

11 apparent conflict between Rounds’ RFC, which limits her to performing one- and two-step tasks,

12 and the demands of Level Two reasoning, which requires a person to ‘[a]pply commonsense

13 understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions.’”); Carlton D. v.

14 Bisignano, 2026 WL 296657, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2026) (“had the ALJ incorporated Dr.

15 Friedland’s opined restriction limiting Plaintiff to simple one and two-step tasks, a properly

16 formulated RFC might contain mental limitations inconsistent with representative occupations

17 identified by the vocational expert” “both of which require level two reasoning.”); Stephanie S. v.

18 Kijakazi, 2022 WL 594547, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2022) (“Following Rounds, a number of

19 district courts in the Ninth Circuit have reversed ALJ decisions imposing a ‘simple, repetitive

20 tasks’ RFC limit where the ALJs fail to address and distinguish conclusions by doctors that

21 claimants can perform one-and-two step instructions.”) (collecting cases); Wells v. Colvin, 2016

22 WL 4744668, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2016) (remanding where ALJ gave significant weight to

23 doctor’s opinion that Plaintiff could “sustain simple one-two step repetitive tasks,” but did not

24 adopt this limitation in the RFC, instead limiting Plaintiff to “simple, routine, and repetitive

25 tasks.”); Cf. Zavalin v. Colvin, 778 F.3d 842, 847 (9th Cir. 2015) (individual limited to simple,

26 repetitive tasks has been found able to perform occupations requiring a DOT reasoning level of

27 2).

28 Thus, as noted by Plaintiff, the error is harmful because, had the ALJ adopted the

1 restriction to one to two-step tasks, Plaintiff would not have been able to perform the occupations

2 listed at step five of the sequential evaluation. Further, because there was no testimony from the

3 vocational expert regarding a limitation to one to two-step tasks, the Court cannot confidently

4 conclude that the disability determination would remain the same were the ALJ to fully credit this

5 portion of Dr. Friedland’s opinion. See Hill, 698 F.3d at 1161 (when the ALJ improperly ignores

6 significant and probative evidence in the record favorable to a claimant’s position, the ALJ

7 “thereby provide[s] an incomplete . . . [disability] determination.”). Based on the foregoing, the

8 Court finds the ALJ erred by failing to properly reject the limitation to one to two-step tasks

9 opined by Dr. Friedland or incorporate it into the assessed RFC.

10 On remand, the ALJ must reconsider Dr. Friedland’s opinion along with the relevant

11 medical evidence.

12 B. Symptom Claims

13 Plaintiff additionally argues the ALJ failed to provide clear and convincing reasons for

14 discounting his symptoms. (Doc. 14 at 7-9). In light of the need to reconsider Dr. Friedland’s

15 medical opinion and the relevant medical evidence, it is unnecessary for the Court to consider this

16 challenge. On remand, the ALJ is instructed to reconsider the relevant medical opinion evidence

17 and conduct a new sequential analysis, including a reevaluation of Plaintiff’s symptom claims,

18 and a reassessment of the RFC and step five finding if necessary

19 C. Remedy

20 The Court finds that further administrative proceedings are appropriate. See Treichler v.

21 Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1103-04 (9th Cir. 2014) (remand for benefits is not

22 appropriate when further administrative proceedings would serve a useful purpose). Here, the

23 ALJ improperly considered the medical opinion evidence, which calls into question whether the

24 assessed RFC, and resulting hypothetical propounded to the vocational expert, are supported by

25 substantial evidence. “Where,” as here, “there is conflicting evidence, and not all essential

26 factual issues have been resolved, a remand for an award of benefits is inappropriate.” Treichler,

27 775 F.3d at 1101. On remand, the ALJ should reconsider the medical opinion evidence, and

28 provide legally sufficient reasons for evaluating the opinions, supported by substantial evidence.

1 | The ALJ should order additional consultative examinations and, if appropriate, take additional

2 | testimony from medical experts. The ALJ should conduct a new sequential analysis, reevaluate

3 | Plaintiff's symptom claims, reassess Plaintiff's RFC, and, if necessary, take additional testimony

4 | from a vocational expert which includes all of the limitations credited by the ALJ.

5 Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

6 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.

7 2. Defendant’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 16) is DENIED.

8 3. Pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C.§ 405(g), the Court REVERSES the

9 Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS this case back to the Commissioner of

10 Social Security for further proceedings consistent with this Order.

11 4. An application for attorney fees may be filed by separate motion within thirty (30)

12 days.

13 5. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff, terminate any pending

14 motions/deadlines, and close this case.

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16 Dated: March 6, 2026 LA. ZA. Aareh Zackt

17 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA

ig UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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