Opinion

Powers

Court
District Court, S.D. California
Filed
Jun 8, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CHRISTIN POWERS, Case No.: 26-cv-03050-DMS-JAC

Plaintiff,

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v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS;

APPLE,

DISMISSING COMPLAINT SUA

14 Defendant.

SPONTE; DENYING OMNIBUS

15 MOTION

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[ECF Nos. 1–3]

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Plaintiff Christin Powers, proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint against Defendant

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Apple on May 15, 2026. (Compl., ECF No 1.) Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to

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proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), (IFP Mot., ECF No. 2), and an omnibus motion,

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wherein she makes miscellaneous requests (“Omnibus Motion”), (Omnibus Mot., ECF No.

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3). For the following reasons, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to proceed IFP, dismisses

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the Complaint sua sponte, and denies all requests in the Omnibus Motion.

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I. MOTION TO PROCEED IFP

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In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and Civil Local Rule 3.2, any action sought to

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be filed IFP “must be accompanied by an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets

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which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 3.2. Plaintiff

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1 receives $2,040 a month in alimony payments. (IFP Mot. 1.) She reportedly is unemployed

2 and does not receive income from another source. (Id. at 1–2.) She has less than $4.00 in

3 her checking accounts and is $150,000 in debt. (Id. at 3–4.) In light of Plaintiff’s financial

4 standing, the Court finds Plaintiff is eligible to proceed IFP pursuant to § 1915(a).

5 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion.

6 II. SUA SPONTE SCREENING OF COMPLAINT

7 A. Legal Standard

8 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), an IFP complaint must be screened by the Court. 28

9 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must sua sponte dismiss an IFP complaint that is frivolous

10 or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

11 immune from such relief. Id.; see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)

12 (per curiam) (noting that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to

13 prisoners”).

14 The standard for determining whether an IFP complaint fails to state a claim under

15 § 1915(e)(2) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure

16 to state a claim. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6)

17 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim

18 to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

19 Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a

20 cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. While the

21 Court has an obligation to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

22 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010), it may not “supply essential elements of [claims] that were not

23 initially pled,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir.

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25 In addition, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim

26 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to

27 state a claim for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 if the factual assertions in

28 it, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable

1 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

2 “[T]he pleading standard . . . does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands

3 more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting

4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A complaint that is too verbose,

5 long, confusing, redundant, irrelevant, or conclusory may be dismissed for failure to

6 comply with Rule 8.” Alexis v. Contreras, No. 25-CV-1625, 2025 WL 1811819, at *2

7 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2025) (citing Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058–

8 59 (9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases upholding dismissals for those reasons)).

9 B. Discussion

10 Plaintiff asserts that her “Apple card” and Goldman Sachs have provided

11 inconsistent banking opportunities over several years. (Compl. 2.) She claims the most

12 recent grievance occurred a week prior to filing suit. (Id.) It appears Plaintiff’s card was

13 shut down. (Id.) When she attempted to contact a “human banker,” she was prompted to

14 input her phone number during the call; however, upon entering her phone number, the call

15 would drop. (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff wishes to “own and control all of Apple,” as well

16 as JPMorgan Chase. (Id. at 2–3.)

17 Plaintiff fails to satisfy the Rule 8 pleading standard. The Complaint does not allege

18 any cause of action and fails to plausibly allege facts to support the elements of any claim.

19 See Rashidiasl v. MEP, No. 23-CV-0325-GPC-DEB, 2023 WL 3728685, at *2 (S.D. Cal.

20 May 30, 2023). Plaintiff states she “defer[s] to Judge to assign proper legal clauses [and]

21 law” for this alleged harm. (Compl. 3.) However, the Court cannot tell Plaintiff what

22 causes of action to bring. Cf. Ivey, 673 F.2d at 268 (holding a court cannot “supply essential

23 elements of [claims] that were not initially pled”). Further, the allegations pled are unclear

24 and confusing. It is difficult to understand what harm Plaintiff suffered and how that harm

25 allegedly occurred. As pleaded, Plaintiff’s Complaint does not afford Defendant a fair

26 opportunity to defend itself. Therefore, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint with

27 leave to amend.

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I TIT. OMNIBUS MOTION

2 Plaintiff requests the Court (1) transfer this case to “Chief Justice”; (2) make a ruling

3 or before May 22, 2026; (3) schedule a settlement conference attended by a

4 ||representative for each company; and (4) if needed, contact “the bank or the board” about

5 settlement” on or before May 20, 2026. (Omnibus Mot. 1.) First, because the

6 ||Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, there is no operative complaint on which to base

7 || Plaintiff's requests. See Abera v. San Diego Pacificvu LLC, No. 3:25-CV-01437-RBM-

8 || DEB, 2025 WL 1645593, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 10, 2025). Second, these requests are vague

9 || and lack any legal basis for the Court to take such actions. The Court DENIES the requests

10 |/in the Omnibus Motion.

11 IV. CONCLUSION

12 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's motion to proceed IFP,

13 || DISMISSES the Complaint, and DENIES the Omnibus Motion. Plaintiff may file an

14 || Amended Complaint to cure the defects described above no later than twenty one (21)

15 || days from the date this Order is entered.

16 IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 || Dated: June 8, 2026

Ig Jrrn Yn « LA

Hon. Dana M. Sabraw

19 United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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