The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 MARIA FELIPE SUCHITE, an individual Case No.: 24cv3-LL-SBC
on behalf of herself and others,
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ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
Plaintiffs,
13 COMPEL ARBITRATION AND
v. STRIKING CLASS CLAIMS AND
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STAYING THE ACTION PENDING
ABM AVIATION, INC., a Georgia
15 PLAINTIFF SUCHITE’S
corporation, et al.
ARBITRATION
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Defendants.
17 [ECF No. 8]
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Plaintiff Maria Felipe Suchite (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Defendant
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ABM Aviation, Inc. and ABM Industries Incorporated (“Defendants”) asserting ten causes
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of action arising from her employment with Defendants. ECF No. 1 at 33-66 (hereinafter
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“Complaint”). Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims
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pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. ECF No. 8. Defendants also move to strike class
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allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss or stay the action. Id. Plaintiff filed an
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Opposition to Defendants’ Motion (“Oppo.”), and Defendants filed a Reply. ECF Nos. 11,
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13. The Court finds this matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral
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1 argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1. Upon review of the parties’ submissions and
2 the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration. The
3 Court also GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Class Allegations in the Complaint
4 and STAYS the action pending the completion of Plaintiff’s individual arbitration.
5 I. BACKGROUND
6 In or around August 2023, Plaintiff began working as a cleaner in the Southwest
7 Airline terminal at the San Diego International Airport for Defendants. Complaint ¶ 21;
8 see also ECF No. 8-1 ¶ 5 (hereinafter “Tamada Decl.”). Plaintiff alleges that she worked
9 there until she was “involuntarily terminated” by Defendants on October 6, 2023.
10 Complaint ¶ 21. As part of her employment with Defendants, Plaintiff entered into a written
11 “Mutual Arbitration Agreement” (hereinafter “Agreement”). Tamada Decl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff’s
12 Job Offer Letter, which includes the Agreement, was signed by Plaintiff on July 26, 2023.
13 ECF No. 8-1 at 7-21 (“Exhibit 1 to the Tamada Decl.”). The Agreement provides in
14 relevant part:
15 [T]he Company and I agree as follows . . . . Final and binding arbitration
before a single, neutral arbitrator, instead of a judge and jury in court, shall be
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the exclusive remedy for any ‘Covered Claim’ . . . . ‘Covered Claims’ include,
17 but are not limited to. . . any provision of federal or state labor code or a Wage
Order, for unpaid fees, expenses, wages, or overtime, for unpaid
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compensation or penalties for missed meal or rest breaks, for wrongful
19 termination, for unfair competition. . . or any federal, state, or local laws to
the full extent permitted by applicable federal law after the application of
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Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’) preemption principles . . . . As to any
21 Covered Claim, each party waives to the maximum extent permitted by
federal law, the right to bring, maintain, or participate in any class, collective,
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or representative proceeding….Further, Covered Claims must be brought in
23 the individual capacity of the party asserting the claim, and cannot be
maintained on a class, collective, or representative basis, to the full extent
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permitted by applicable federal law after the application of federal preemption
25 principles.”
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1 Tamada Decl., Exhibit 1 at 8-9. Since 2014, Defendants have required all newly-hired
2 employees, including Plaintiff, to execute the Agreement. Tamada Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff
3 accessed the Agreement via a web portal maintained by a third-party Oracle Corporation
4 and her electronic signature is on the Agreement Tamada Decl. ¶¶ 6-14. Defendants state
5 that they “do[] not limit the amount of time that employees have to review or ask questions
6 about their job offer and Agreement.” Id. ¶ 15.
7 According to Plaintiff, she did not understand that she was signing an Arbitration
8 Agreement, because she only understands Spanish. Oppo. at 7, 11. Plaintiff argues that
9 “[s]omeone else [her bookkeeper], not the Plaintiff logged in and completed the onboarding
10 paperwork for the Plaintiff because Plaintiff does not read English.” Id. at 10. In sum,
11 Plaintiff argues that “the Agreement is unenforceable under California law because it is
12 procedurally and substantively unconscionable.” Id. at 9.
13 II. LEGAL STANDARD
14 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) governs motions to compel arbitration. 9
15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. In deciding whether to compel arbitration, the court must consider two
16 “gateway issues”: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties,
17 and if so (2) whether the agreement encompasses the dispute. See Brennan v. Opus Bank,
18 796 F.3d 1125, 1130 (9th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “In determining whether a valid
19 arbitration agreement exists, federal courts apply ordinary state-law principles that govern
20 the formation of contracts.” Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir.
21 2014) (citation and quotations omitted). If the court is “satisfied that the making of the
22 agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall
23 make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms
24 of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. There is an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral
25 dispute resolution.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614,
26 631 (1985). As such, “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be
27 resolved in favor of arbitration.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp.,
1 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); see also Tomkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 840 F.3d 1016, 1022 (9th
2 Cir. 2016).
3 III. DISCUSSION
4 A. Evidentiary Objections
5 The Court first addresses Defendants’ Objection to evidence submitted in support of
6 Plaintiff’s Opposition, including the Declarations of Maria Felipe Suchite and Laurie
7 Davila-Felix. See ECF No. 14. Defendants object to the Declaration of Maria Felipe
8 Suchite in its entirety, and move to strike it on the basis that it “is inadmissible because it
9 is an improperly authenticated translation of testimony given in a foreign language and
10 therefore lacks foundation.” Id. at 2. Written translations must be properly authenticated.
11 See Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). As such “[w]itness testimony translated from a foreign language
12 must be properly authenticated and any interpretation must be shown to be an accurate
13 translation done by a competent translator.” Jack v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 854 F.
14 Supp. 654, 659 (N.D. Cal. April 25, 1994) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 604 & 901). Although
15 Plaintiff’s Declaration has a “translation authentication” submitted by Laurie Davila, the
16 authentication does not indicate that she is a qualified translator or certified interpreter. See
17 Jack, 854 F. Supp. at 659. Also, there is no indication that the English version of the
18 Declaration is a true and correct translation as it appears to have been done via
19 “teleconference.” See generally Sunrider Corp. v. Bountiful Biotech Corp., 2010 WL
20 4590766 at *16 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2010); see also Consejo de Desarrollo Economico de
21 Mexicali, AC v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1226 (D. Nev. July 3, 2006) (vacated
22 and remanded on other grounds) (sustaining objection to declarations that appeared to have
23 been written originally in Spanish and later translated into English, absent any indication
24 that the English versions of the declarations were true and correct translations).
25 Accordingly, the Court SUSTAINS Defendants’ Objection to Plaintiff’s Declaration.
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1 Defendants also object to the Declaration of Laurie Davila in its entirety on the
2 grounds that it is irrelevant. ECF No. 14 at 7. The Court ultimately did not rely on Ms.
3 Davila’s Declaration. As such, this objection is MOOT.
4 Plaintiff objects to a portion of the Declaration submitted by Lorraine Bettencourt in
5 support of Defendants’ Motion to Compel on the grounds that it lacks foundation and is
6 prejudicial hearsay. ECF No. 11-3. The Court ultimately did not rely on Ms. Bettencourt’s
7 Declaration. As such, this objection is MOOT.
8 Finally, the Court notes that Plaintiff requests that the Court hold an evidentiary
9 hearing “to the extent the Court deems necessary.” Oppo. at 18. The Court declines to hold
10 an evidentiary hearing as it does not find it necessary in this case.
11 B. Defendants’ Motion to Compel
12 Defendants argue that Plaintiff must arbitrate her claims because she signed a valid
13 arbitration agreement as part of her employment contract. Plaintiff opposes on the grounds
14 that the Agreement is unenforceable because it is procedurally and substantively
15 unconscionable. The Court addresses the parties’ agreements in turn.
16 1. Whether a Valid Arbitration Agreement Exists
17 Defendants bear the burden of establishing that a valid arbitration agreement exists
18 between them and plaintiff by a preponderance of the evidence. See Knutson v. Sirius XM
19 Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014). In deciding whether parties have agreed to
20 arbitrate, courts “should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of
21 contracts.” First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); see
22 also Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1175. “It is undisputed that under California law, mutual assent
23 is a required element of contract formation.” Knutson, 771 F.3d at 565. “‘Mutual assent
24 may be manifested by written or spoken words, or by conduct,’ and acceptance of contract
25 terms may be implied through action or inaction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “Thus,
26 ‘an offeree, knowing that an offer has been made to him but not knowing all of its terms,
27 may be held to have accepted, by his conduct, whatever terms the offer
1 contains.’” Id. (quoting Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d
2 987, 991 (1972)). “Courts must determine whether the outward manifestations of consent
3 would lead a reasonable person to believe the offeree has assented to the
4 agreement.” Id. However, “[a]n offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of his
5 consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he was unaware,
6 contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.” Id. at
7 566 (quoting Windsor Mills, 25 Cal. App. 3d at 993).
8 In their pending Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff is required to arbitrate her
9 claims pursuant to the Agreement that she signed. Defendants include the Agreement as an
10 exhibit to the Declaration of Paige Tamada, a senior director of human resources
11 compliance and policies, for Defendant ABM Industries Incorporated. Tamada Decl.,
12 Exhibits 1, 2. In her Declaration, Ms. Tamada states that Defendants provided the Mutual
13 Arbitration Agreement to Ms. Suchite, and that Plaintiff accessed and reviewed the
14 Agreement through a third-party web portal maintained by Oracle Corporation. Tamada
15 Decl. ¶¶ 5-14. Ms. Tamada states that Plaintiff electronically signed the Agreement through
16 Defendants’ hiring portal on July 26, 2023. Id.; see also Tamada Decl., Exhibits 1, 2. Ms.
17 Tamada also explains that for Plaintiff to have viewed and signed the Agreement, she was
18 required to log in using a one-time password and scroll to the bottom of the Agreement
19 which clearly stated in bold that all covered matters “be submitted to arbitration rather than
20 to a judge and jury in court,” and that “by my signature or electronic signature, I knowingly
21 and voluntarily agree to this mutual arbitration agreement.” Id. at Exhibit 1. Indeed, a
22 review of the Agreement reveals that it bears Plaintiff's name, her electronic signature, and
23 the date July 26, 2023. Tamada Decl., Exhibits 1 and 2.
24 In her Opposition to the pending Motion, Plaintiff challenges the validity of the
25 Agreement, stating that “[n]o one explained to Plaintiff what she was signing” and that
26 “Plaintiff learned for the first time that there is an arbitration agreement after [her counsel]
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1 obtained her personnel file.” ECF No. 11 at 7. Plaintiff argues that in reviewing her
2 onboarding paperwork:
3 Plaintiff Suchite visited the website address ABM provided and saw it was
only in English. To help with her with the application, Plaintiff met with her
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multilingual bookkeeper, who delegated the job to her assistant, who logged
5 into the website ABM provided and completed Plaintiff’s onboarding
paperwork. . . . Given these facts, Plaintiff very respectfully requests the Court
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to find that Defendants fail[ed] to meet [their] burden to show the existence
7 of an agreement to arbitrate because there was no mutual assent, as required
to prove a contract.
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9 Id. at 11 (internal citations omitted).
10 However, an “employer [is not] required to explain the details of the contract to
11 Plaintiff or to force him to read it.” Pinto v. Squaw Valley Resort, LLC, No. 17-cv-02281-
12 MCE-CKD, 2018 WL 5630702, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2018). Plaintiff admits that she
13 authorized her multilingual bookkeeper to help her with her paperwork, and the fact that
14 Plaintiff failed to do her due diligence in reviewing the Agreement is not sufficient to
15 challenge the existence of an agreement. See generally Trevino v. Acosta, Inc., No. 17-cv-
16 06529-NC, 2018 WL 3537885, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 23, 2018) (“[T]he Court cannot
17 invalidate the terms of the signed arbitration agreement merely because Trevino did not
18 understand the agreement or chose not to read it.”).
19 Accordingly, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of establishing
20 that a valid, written agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties.
21 2. Whether The Agreement Encompasses the Dispute
22 The Court must now determine whether the Agreement encompasses the dispute at
23 issue. The Agreement states that “ABM Industries Incorporated and its subsidiary
24 companies (collectively, the ‘Company’) and I desire to resolve fairly and quickly, all
25 disputes between us . . . . including but not limited to those arising from and/or relating in
26 any way to any aspect of my hiring, my employment, my compensation, and/or the end of
27 my employment, with the Company.” Tamada Decl., Exhibit 1 at 8. Thus, the Agreement
1 is between Plaintiff and Defendants. All of Plaintiff’s claims asserted in this action relate
2 to her employment with Defendants and are thus encompassed by the Agreement.
3 Because there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between the parties and the claims
4 raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint fall within the scope of the parties’ Agreement, the
5 Court must compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims, unless the Agreement is unenforceable.
6 3. Whether the Agreement is Enforceable
7 Next, the Court will analyze whether the Agreement is valid and enforceable under
8 9 U.S.C. § 2. Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is procedurally and substantively
9 unconscionable. Oppo. at 9-18.
10 i. Procedural Unconscionability
11 “Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into whether the contract is one
12 of adhesion.” Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 113
13 (2000). “The term contract of adhesion signifies a standardized contract, which, imposed
14 and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party
15 only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.” Id. “The procedural element of
16 unconscionability focuses on ‘oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining
17 power.’” Poublon v. C.H. Robinson Co., 846 F.3d 1251, 1260 (9th Cir.
18 2017) (quoting Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal.
19 4th 223, 246 (2012)); see also Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 733 F.3d 916, 922 (9th
20 Cir. 2013) (“Procedural unconscionability concerns the manner in which the contract was
21 negotiated and the respective circumstances of the parties at that time, focusing on the level
22 of oppression and surprise involved in the agreement.”). “Oppression addresses the weaker
23 party’s absence of choice and unequal bargaining power that results in ‘no real
24 negotiation,’” while “[s]urprise involves the extent to which the contract clearly discloses
25 its terms as well as the reasonable expectations of the weaker party.” Chavarria, 733 F.3d
26 at 922 (citations omitted).
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1 Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is unenforceable because it is an unconscionable
2 adhesion contract. The Court finds that the Agreement is a contract of adhesion. There was
3 a significant imbalance in bargaining power between Plaintiff and Defendants as
4 Defendants are a large company with locations throughout the nation. The Agreement was
5 required as part of Plaintiff’s employment with Defendants, did not contain an opt-out
6 provision, and Plaintiff signed it in connection with her offer letter. Thus, based on the
7 standardized, take-it-or-leave it nature of the agreement, the Court finds that the Agreement
8 is a contract of adhesion. The Court therefore finds that Plaintiff has established some
9 degree of procedural unconscionability.
10 In assessing the degree of procedural unconscionability, the Court finds it minimal
11 in light of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the contract. Several courts have
12 found that “mandatory arbitration agreements offered as a precondition to employment are
13 enforceable provided there is no indication that applicants signed the agreement under
14 duress, were lied to, or otherwise manipulated into signing the agreement.” See,
15 e.g., Snipes v. Dollar Tree Distribution, Inc., No. 15-CV-00878-MCE-DB, 2019 WL
16 5830052, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2019) (citing Baltazar v. Forever 21, Inc., 62 Cal. 4th
17 1237, 1245 (2016)); Hermosillo v. Davey Tree Surgery Co., No. 18-CV-00393-LHK, 2018
18 WL 3417505 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2018). “The adhesive nature of a contract, without more,
19 would give rise to a low degree of procedural unconscionability at most.” Poublon, 846
20 F.3d at 1261-62 (citing Baltazar, 62 Cal. 4th at 1245).
21 Plaintiff claims that Defendants provided the Agreement only in English knowing
22 she had limited English capability, but this adds “only a minimal degree of procedural
23 unconscionability” when there is an opportunity to seek help. See Chico v. Hilton
24 Worldwide, Inc., No. CV 14-5750-JFW SSX, 2014 WL 5088240 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 7,
25 2014) (compelling arbitration where the company provided only an English-language
26 arbitration agreement to a Spanish-speaking employee). Plaintiff had an unlimited amount
27 of time to review or ask questions about her job offer and Agreement. Tamada Decl. ¶ 15.
1 In other words, Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to ask questions or request a
2 translation, but she did not do so. See Chico, 2014 WL 5088240, at *15 (finding that “if
3 [the company] did not give [employee] an opportunity to ask questions, consult with an
4 attorney, take the arbitration agreements home, or obtain a Spanish translation of the
5 [arbitration agreement], it would support [employee’s] claim of procedural
6 unconscionability”). By having time to seek assistance or inquire further about the
7 arbitration agreement, Plaintiff faced a lessened degree of oppression and surprise.
8 The Court concludes that the arbitration agreement is an adhesion contract with
9 minimal procedural unconscionability. Thus, enforceability turns on whether the
10 arbitration agreement has a high degree of substantive unconscionability.
11 ii. Substantive Unconscionability
12 Having found that the Agreement is only minimally procedurally unconscionable,
13 the Court must find that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable to a much greater
14 degree to conclude that it, as a whole, is unconscionable. Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at 114.
15 Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is substantively unconscionable because: (1) it
16 disallows Berman proceedings1; (2) it unlawfully bars claims via the Private Attorney
17 General Act (“PAGA”); (3) it unlawfully requires the parties to bear their own attorneys’
18 fees and costs; and (4) the unconscionable provisions may not be severed. Oppo. at 12-18.
19 The Court will address each argument in turn.
20 Plaintiff’s claim that the Agreement does not allow for Berman proceedings is
21 unfounded. Upon the Court’s own review of the Agreement, it explicitly states:
22 Nothing in this Agreement precludes me from filing a charge or from
participating in an administrative investigation of a charge before an
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26 1 A Berman hearing is conducted by a deputy commissioner, and the procedure is “designed
to provide a speedy, informal, and affordable method of resolving wage claims.” Cal. Code
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1 appropriate government commission, body, or agency, be it federal, state or
local. Similarly, this agreement does not preclude the parties from conciliating
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any charge pending before an appropriate government commission, body or
3 agency.
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Agreement, p. 4, ¶ E. Thus, based on the plain reading of the Agreement, there is
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nothing that prohibits Plaintiff from having chosen to file an administrative claim with the
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Labor Commissioner to seek a Berman-hearing. Additionally, Plaintiff’s reliance on OTO,
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L.L.C. v. Kho is misplaced. 8 Cal. 5th 111 (2019). The plaintiff in OTO was given an
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arbitration agreement without an opportunity to read it. Id. at 118. Ms. Suchite was
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undeniably given an opportunity to read and understand the Agreement at issue in her case,
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but she chose not to. Additionally, unlike the OTO case, here, Plaintiff has failed to allege
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any facts indicating that she signed the Agreement under a “coercive setting.” Id. at 137.
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument on substantive unconscionability on this ground fails.
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Regarding the PAGA claims, Plaintiff argues that the Agreement is substantively
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unconscionable because it prohibits the prosecution of a representative PAGA action in
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violation of California’ rule prohibiting wholesale waivers of PAGA claims. Oppo. at 15
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(internal citations omitted). Notably, Plaintiff does not even bring a PAGA claim in her
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Complaint. Accordingly, the Court need not address Plaintiff’s argument that the
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Agreement is substantively unconscionable on this basis. Plaintiff argues more generally
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that the Agreement is unconscionable because it “mandates that all claims in arbitration to
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be pursued ‘in the individual capacity of the party asserting the claim.’” Oppo. at 15 (citing
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Tamada Decl., Exhibit 1 ¶ B). Plaintiff’s argument on this ground also fails because the
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Court is bound to “enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms – including
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terms providing for individualized proceedings.” Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497,
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502 (2018); see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011)
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(“Requiring the availability of classwide arbitrations . . . creates a scheme inconsistent with
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the [Federal Arbitration Act].”); Carter v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 718 F. App’x 502, 504 (9th
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1 Cir. 2017) (explaining that Concepion “foreclos[es] any argument” that “an arbitration
2 agreement is unconscionable solely because it contains a class action waiver”).
3 Plaintiff’s argument that the parties are required to bear their own attorneys’ fees
4 and costs does not make the Agreement substantively unconscionable. The Agreement
5 clearly provides that ABM agreed “that it will pay all fees and costs of AAA and the
6 arbitrator,” including “the initial filing fee associated with filing the demand.” Agreement
7 ¶ C. See Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 110-11 (“[W]hen an employer imposes mandatory
8 arbitration as a condition of employment, the arbitration agreement or arbitration process
9 cannot generally require the employee to bear any type of expense that the employee would
10 not be required to bear if he or she were free to bring the action in court.”). The Agreement
11 also allows for the arbitrator to exercise his or her discretion to award attorneys’ fees and
12 costs associated with the arbitration. Agreement ¶ C. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument
13 about attorneys’ fees and costs is unfounded.
14 Having found that there are no substantively unconscionable provisions in the
15 Agreement, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s argument about severing the
16 unconscionable provisions. In sum, Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing. The Court finds
17 that Plaintiff fails to show that the Mutual Arbitration Agreement is substantively
18 unconscionable. Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s individual claims are subject to arbitration.
19 4. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Class Claims and to Dismiss or Stay
the Action Pending the Outcome of Arbitration
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21 Defendants request that the Court strike Plaintiff’s class claims. The Court has
22 already found that Plaintiff’s individual claims are subject to arbitration. That leaves open
23 the question of how to handle Plaintiff’s class allegations and claims. As set forth above,
24 the Agreement does not permit arbitration of the class or representative claims but instead
25 includes an enforceable waiver of those claims.
26 The Agreement states in relevant part:
27 As to any Covered Claim, each party waives to the maximum extent permitted
1 by federal law, the right to bring, maintain, or participate in any class,
collective, or representative proceeding . . . Further, Covered claims must be
2
brought in the individual capacity of the party asserting the claim, and cannot
3 be maintained on a class, collective or representative basis, to the full extent
permitted by applicable federal law after the application of federal preemption
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principles.
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Agreement ¶ C. The Agreement has clear language that it does not permit arbitration of
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class, collective, or representative actions. See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 587 U.S. 176,
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139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2019) (“Neither silence nor ambiguity provides a sufficient basis
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for concluding that parties to an arbitration agreement agreed to undermine the central
9
benefits of arbitration itself.”). Additionally, California and U.S. Supreme Courts have
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recognized, class action or representative action waivers like the one above are enforceable.
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See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351; Carter v. Rent-A-Center, Inc., 718 F. App’x at 504 (9th
12
Cir. 2017). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Strike class claims
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because of the valid waiver in the Agreement.
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Thus, Plaintiff’s only remaining claims are the individual claims that are subject to
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arbitration. The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court has the discretion to stay or
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dismiss a plaintiff’s claims where all of the relevant claims are subject to arbitration. See
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Sparling v. Hoffman Const. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Martin Marietta
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Aluminum, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 586 F.2d 143, 147-48 (9th Cir. 1978)). The Court finds
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it appropriate to ORDER Plaintiff Suchite and Defendants to arbitration and STAY the
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action pending completion of those proceedings. The Parties are directed to file a joint
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status update within seven days of completing arbitration.
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IV. CONCLUSION
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In accordance with the foregoing, the Court HEREBY ORDERS:
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1. Defendants’ Motion to Compel Plaintiff Suchite to arbitration is GRANTED;
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2. Defendants’ Motion to Strike Class Allegations is GRANTED;
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3. The Court STAYS this action pending the outcome of Plaintiff Suchite’s
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1 4. The parties are ORDERED to file a joint status update within seven days of
2 || completing the arbitration proceedings.
3 || IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 || Dated: July 22, 2024 NO
5 Je J
6 Honorable Linda Lopez
United States District Judge
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