The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DORA R.S.,1 Case No.: 23cv0636-AJB-SBC
12 Plaintiff,
REPORT AND
13 v. RECOMMENDATION GRANTING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
14 MARTIN O’MALLEY,2 Acting
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
Commissioner of Social Security,
15 REMANDING TO THE
Defendant. COMMISSIONER
16
17 [ECF No. 13]
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19 This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge
20 Anthony J. Battaglia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(c) of the
21 United States District Court for the Southern District of California.
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25 1 Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(e)(6)(b), “[o]pinions by the Court in [Social Security
cases under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)] will refer to any non-government parties by using only
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their first name and last initial.”
27 2 Martin J. O'Malley was appointed Commissioner for the Social Security Administration
on December 20, 2023 and is automatically substituted as the defendant under Federal
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1 Dora R.S. (“Plaintiff”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking
2 judicial review of the final administrative decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
3 Administration (“Commissioner”) regarding the denial of her application for disability
4 benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (See ECF No. 8.) The Administrative
5 Law Judge (“ALJ”) found that the Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the
6 Social Security Act and denied Plaintiff’s benefits from February 11, 2020, through the
7 date of the decision, January 27, 2022. (ECF No. 7 at 22-30 [Administrative Record
8 “AR”].)
9 Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on
10 July 11, 2023. (ECF No. 13-1.) On August 15, 2023, Defendant filed a responsive brief.
11 (ECF No. 15.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court RECOMMENDS that judgment
12 be entered REVERSING the decision of the ALJ and REMANDING this matter for
13 further administrative proceedings consistent with the findings presented herein.
14 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
15 On January 21, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability
16 and disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning February 11, 2020. (AR at
17 22.) Plaintiff’s application was denied on March 24, 2021, and again on reconsideration on
18 May 20, 2021. (Id.) On May 27, 2021, Plaintiff submitted a written request for a de novo
19 hearing by an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), which was granted on June 2, 2021. (Id.
20 at 121.) On December 9, 2021, ALJ Mary Parnow presided over the hearing. (Id. at 35.)
21 Plaintiff appeared via telephone, represented by her attorney, Armando Di Filippo. (Id. at
22 35-54.) Plaintiff with the assistance of a Spanish language interpreter, and a vocational
23 expert, Sandra Trost, testified at the hearing. (Id.)
24 On January 27, 2022, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision denying Plaintiff’s
25 request for disability benefits. (AR at 30.) On March 25, 2022, Plaintiff submitted a written
26 request for review to the Appeals Council. (Id. at 218-220.) On February 1, 2023, the
27 Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Id. at 1-3.) Having exhausted all
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1 administrative remedies, Plaintiff brought this timely civil action, seeking judicial review
2 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (See ECF No. 8.)
3 II. SUMMARY OF THE ALJ’S FINDINGS
4 In rendering her decision, the ALJ followed the Commissioner’s five-step sequential
5 evaluation process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
6 not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 11, 2020, the alleged onset date.
7 (AR at 24.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
8 (1) status post Valley Fever; (2) obesity; (3) opioid use disorder; (4) paranoid
9 schizophrenia; (5) depression; (6) anxiety; and (7) bipolar disorder. (Id.) The ALJ also
10 found non-severe impairments, including mild hearing loss, migraine, diverticulosis,
11 fibromyalgia, positive QuantiFERON TB Gold test, cysts in the breasts, facial erythema
12 and pruritis. (Id.)
13 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
14 of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments listed in the
15 relevant section of the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments3. (AR at 25.) When a
16 claimant’s impairments, or combination of impairments, do not meet the criteria of a listed
17 impairment, as was the case here, the ALJ next determines the claimant’s residual
18 functional capacity (“RFC”), i.e., the ability to do physical and mental activities despite the
19 claimant’s impairments. (See id. at 25-26.) Step four then considers whether the claimant
20 is not disabled because she has the RFC to do past relevant work, and step five looks at the
21 claimant’s ability to do any other work considering her RFC, age, education, and work
22 experience. (Id. at 24.)
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26 3 If the claimant’s impairment or combination of impairments is of a severity to meet or
27 medically equal the criteria of a listing and meets the duration requirement (20 CFR §§
404.1509 and 416.909), the claimant is deemed disabled. If it does not, the analysis
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1 The ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff can perform past relevant work as a
2 cleaner, which the vocational expert classified as light work under the Dictionary of
3 Occupational Titles, and that the job does not require work-related activities beyond
4 Plaintiff’s RFC. (AR at 28.) The ALJ also determined that under 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1569
5 and 404.1569(a), Plaintiff could perform other jobs in the national economy considering
6 her age, education, work experience, and RFC. (Id.) The ALJ accepted the testimony of the
7 vocational expert, who said Plaintiff could perform the requirements of Silver Wrapper
8 (D.O.T. 318.687-018), Day Worker (D.O.T. 301.687-014), and Hospital Cleaner (D.O.T.
9 323.687-010). (Id. at 29.)
10 In reaching her decision, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff as retaining the RFC to perform
11 a range of medium work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(c), with the following
12 limitations:
13 [Plaintiff can] frequently climb ramps/stairs; occasionally climb ladders,
ropes and scaffolds; frequently balance, stoop, kneel and crouch; occasionally
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crawl; avoid concentrated exposure to noise; avoid concentrated exposure to
15 pulmonary irritants (gases, odors, dusts, chemicals, etc.); no more than
moderate noise exposure; avoid concentrated exposure to unprotected heights
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and dangerous moving machinery; precluded from performing complex and
17 detailed tasks; and capable of understanding, remembering and carrying out
simple routine tasks in a routine work environment with occasional interaction
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with the general public. Occasionally is defined as occurring from very little
19 up to one-third of the time, or approximately 2 hours in an 8-hour workday.
Frequently is defined as occurring from one-third to two thirds of the time or
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approximately 6 hours in an 8-hour workday.
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(AR at 26.)
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The ALJ stated that the RFC assessment was based on “all symptoms and the extent
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to which these symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective
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medical evidence and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 CFR 404.1529 and
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SSR 16-3p.” (AR at 26.) The ALJ also considered the medical opinions and prior
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administrative medical findings in accordance with 20 CFR 404.1520c. (Id.) Based on the
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testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ concluded that “considering the [Plaintiff’s]
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1 age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the [Plaintiff] is capable
2 of making a successful adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the
3 national economy.” (Id. at 29.) The ALJ, therefore, found that Plaintiff was “not disabled”
4 as defined by the Social Security Act, from the alleged onset date of February 11, 2020,
5 through the date of the decision, January 27, 2022. (Id. at 29-30.)
6 III. ISSUE IN DISPUTE
7 The sole issue in dispute is whether the ALJ erred when evaluating Plaintiff’s
8 subjective statements regarding her physical limitations4. (See ECF Nos. 13, 15.)
9 IV. LEGAL STANDARD
10 Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act allows unsuccessful applicants to seek
11 judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The scope of
12 judicial review is limited, and the denial of benefits will not be disturbed if it is supported
13 by substantial evidence in the record and contains no legal error. Id.; see also Woods v.
14 Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022) (Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), “an ALJ
15 cannot reject an examining or treating doctor’s opinion as unsupported or inconsistent
16 without providing an explanation supported by substantial evidence.”)
17 “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a
18 preponderance. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
19 adequate to support a conclusion.” Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017)
20 (quoting Desrosiers v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988));
21 see also Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
22 An ALJ’s decision is reversed only if it “was not supported by substantial evidence
23 in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard.” (Id.) “To determine
24 whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination, [the Court] must assess the
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27 4 Although the ALJ’s decision also addresses Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the Court
only considers her physical impairments because Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ’s
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1 entire record, weighing the evidence both supporting and detracting from the agency’s
2 conclusion.” Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021) (citing Mayes v.
3 Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court “may not reweigh the evidence
4 or substitute [its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” (Id.) “The ALJ is responsible for
5 determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and for resolving
6 ambiguities.” Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995).
7 Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s
8 decision must be upheld. Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). This
9 includes deferring to the ALJ’s credibility determinations and resolutions of evidentiary
10 conflicts. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 509 (9th Cir. 2001). Even if the reviewing court
11 finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions, the court must set aside the
12 decision if the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards in weighing the evidence and
13 reaching his or her decision. See Batson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1193
14 (9th Cir. 2004).
15 V. DISCUSSION
16 A. Whether the ALJ Failed to Properly Evaluate Plaintiff’s Subjective
Statements
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18 An ALJ assesses a claimant’s subjective statements regarding his or her symptoms
19 and limitations in two parts. §§ 404.1529(a), 416.929(a). First, an ALJ must determine
20 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying
21 impairment that “could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms
22 alleged.” (Id.). Second, if the first test is met and there is no evidence of malingering, “the
23 ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by
24 offering specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Ragudo v. Saul, 411 F. Supp.
25 3d 1125, 1133-34 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (citing Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1281). “This is not an easy
26 requirement to meet: ‘The clear and convincing standard is the most demanding required
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in Social Security cases.’” Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting
28 Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 278 F.3d 920, 924 (9th Cir. 2002)).
1 The ALJ “determine[s] credibility, resolve[s] conflicts in the testimony, and
2 resolve[s] ambiguities in the record.” Treichler v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d
3 1090, 1098 (9th Cir. 2014). “General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must identify
4 what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.”
5 Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Reddick v. Chater,
6 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998)); Burrell v. Colvin, 775 F. 3d 1133, 1139 (9th Cir. 2014)
7 (finding error where the ALJ “never connected the medical record” to the claimant’s
8 testimony and did not make “a specific finding linking a lack of medical records to [the
9 claimant’s testimony about the intensity of her . . . symptoms”).
10 In assessing a claimant’s statements about his or her symptoms, the ALJ may
11 consider, inter alia, (1) the claimant’s reputation for truthfulness; (2) inconsistencies in the
12 claimant’s testimony or between her testimony and her conduct; (3) the claimant’s daily
13 living activities; (4) the claimant’s work record; and (5) testimony from physicians or third
14 parties concerning the nature, severity, and effect of the claimant’s condition. Thomas v.
15 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154,
16 1163 (9th Cir. 2014) (listing factors) (citation omitted).
17 While “an ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely on a
18 lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain . . . it is a factor
19 that the ALJ can consider in his credibility analysis.” Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 680
20 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n ALJ may not reject a claimant’s subjective complaints based solely
21 on a lack of medical evidence to fully corroborate the alleged severity of pain.”); Light v.
22 Social Security Administration, 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[A] finding that the
23 claimant lacks credibility cannot be premised wholly on a lack of medical support for the
24 severity of his pain”); Social Security Ruling (SSR) 16-3p (S.S.A. Oct. 25, 2017) (SSA
25 adjudicators should “not disregard an individual’s statements about the intensity,
26 persistence, and limiting effects of symptoms solely because the objective medical
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1 evidence does not substantiate the degree of impairment-related symptoms alleged by the
2 individual”).5
3 1. Plaintiff’s Subjective Statements
4 At the December 9, 2021, administrative hearing, the ALJ asked Plaintiff about her
5 impairments. (AR at 37-54.) Plaintiff explained that she cleaned houses for fifteen years,
6 but she stopped working because she would run out of strength afterwards and then would
7 have to rest for two to three days. (Id. at 42.) Plaintiff testified to suffering from
8 gastrointestinal issues and stated that she was undergoing “studies” because the pain had
9 lasted two months. (Id. at 44.) Plaintiff also testified to suffering from fibromyalgia,
10 depression, anxiety, migraines, which she stated causes limitations in her daily life. (Id. at
11 45.)
12 Plaintiff stated that she does not leave the house except for when she drives her son
13 to and from school. (AR at 46.) Plaintiff stated it is “extremely difficult” because of the
14 very strong pain. (Id.) Plaintiff can barely get out of bed because she feels very fatigued.
15 (Id.) She is unable to do household chores. (Id.) She stated that she can barely walk, she
16 cannot cook for her son, and her arms do not function anymore. (Id. at 44.) Plaintiff stated
17 that she used to only have issues with her left arm, but now she has issues with both arms.
18 (Id. at 46-47.) As a result, she can no longer wash her body or hair, or open jars. (AR 46-
19 47.) Lastly, Plaintiff stated that she suffers from migraines at least twice a month for at
20 least three days at a time. (Id. at 47.)
21 2. The ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Subjective Statements
22 The ALJ’s decision noted the following of Plaintiff’s alleged impairments:
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5 Social Security Ruling 16-3p superseded SSR 96-7p and, in part, eliminated use of the
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term “credibility” from SSA “sub-regulatory policy” to “clarify that subjective symptom
27 evaluation is not an examination of an individual's [overall character or truthfulness] . . .
[and] more closely follow [SSA] regulatory language regarding symptom evaluation.”
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1 During the hearing, the claimant testified that her past work involved cleaning
houses and that she stopped working last year. The claimant testified that she
2
is undergoing diagnostic work up concerning her gastrointestinal issues and
3 that she has fibromyalgia, depression and migraine headaches. The claimant
testified that she experiences fatigue and migraine headaches and has had
4
difficulty getting out of bed in the past two months. The claimant testified that
5 she has difficulty grabbing and handling with her arms and that she is unable
to open a jar.
6
7 (AR at 26-27.) The ALJ found that the record established medically determinable
8 impairments that could reasonably be expected to cause Plaintiff’s alleged symptoms. (Id.
9 at 27.) “However, the [Plaintiff’s] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and
10 limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence
11 and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” (Id.)
12 In making the determination, the ALJ stated the following:
13 Several factors indicate that the claimant’s statements concerning the
intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her reported symptoms and
14 limitations are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence. The record
15 contains limited treatment notes and lacks treatment notes corresponding to
the alleged onset date. Clinical findings, as discussed, support the residual
16 functional capacity determination. The claimant has a longstanding history of
17 smoking cigarettes. (Exhibit 5F/24, 11F/35) The claimant stated that her pain
was controlled and that she was able to function. (Exhibit 6F/6) The record
18 lacks longitudinal mental health treatment notes, and the claimant did not take
19 prescribed psychiatric medication consistently. (Exhibit 11F/32) The claimant
was able to travel to Mexico. (Exhibit 3F/3).
20
(AR at 27.)
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This finding meets the threshold with respect to part one. Next, because there was
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no finding that Plaintiff was malingering, the ALJ was required to make specific findings
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stating clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective statements.
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Lingenfelter, 504 F.3d at 1036.
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i. Failure to Address Certain Alleged Limitations
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27 First, the Court considers Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly discounted
28 her subjective statements by failing to address certain limitations to her daily activities.
1 (See ECF No. 13-1 at 4.) Specifically, Plaintiff highlights portions of the administrative
2 hearing where she described difficulties with cooking, walking, driving, chores, migraines,
3 and the inability to use her left arm6. (Id.) Defendant counters that the ALJ properly
4 discounted Plaintiff’s subjective statements because they were not supported by the
5 medical record, and there were limited treatment notes. (ECF No. 15 at 2-4.) Defendant
6 also argues that the ALJ is not required to address all of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints.
7 (Id. at 5.) Although the Court agrees with Defendant, Plaintiff’s subjective statements
8 regarding difficulty with walking, having migraines for multiple days every month, and the
9 inability to use her arm(s) are highly relevant to a disability claim.
10 While “[c]ontradiction with the medical record is a sufficient basis for rejecting the
11 claimant’s subjective testimony,” an ALJ must still “identify what testimony is not credible
12 and what evidence undermines the claimant’s complaints.” Carmickle v. Commissioner,
13 Social Sec. Admin, 533 F.3d 1155, 1161 (9th Cir. 2008); Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722. Here,
14 the ALJ’s decision noted Plaintiff’s subjective statements concerning gastrointestinal
15 issues, fibromyalgia, depression, migraine headaches, fatigue, difficulty getting out of bed,
16 and grabbing and handling objects with her arms. (AR at 26-27.) The ALJ then outlined
17 Plaintiff’s medical history, including septic shock, opioid use disorder, obesity, valley
18 fever, and various mental impairments such as depression and anxiety. (Id. at 27.) The ALJ
19 found that the record contained “limited treatment notes” that correspond to Plaintiff’s
20 severe impairments, which include valley fever, obesity, opioid use disorder,
21 schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, and bipolar disorder7. (See id. at 24, 27.) Then, when
22 concluding that Plaintiff’s subjective statements were “not entirely consistent” with the
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26 6 Although Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and function report states that she is
27 unable to use her left arm, Plaintiff stated during the administrative hearing that the
problem has worsened, and she is now unable to use both of her arms. (See AR at 46-47.)
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1 record, the ALJ generally noted a lack of treatment notes corresponding to the alleged onset
2 date. (Id. at 27.)
3 However, when discounting Plaintiff’s subjective statements, the ALJ failed to
4 identify which of Plaintiff’s subjective statements were “not entirely consistent” with the
5 record. (See AR at 22-30); see Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1278 (9th Cir. 2020)
6 (holding that even though the ALJ provided “a relatively detailed overview of claimant’s
7 medical history, providing a summary of medical evidence ... is not the same as providing
8 clear and convincing reasons for finding the claimant's symptom testimony not credible”).
9 Instead, the ALJ merely provided a general summary of Plaintiff’s subjective statements,
10 medical history, and broadly stated that there is a lack of treatment notes when discounting
11 Plaintiff’s subjective statements. (See AR at 26-27.) At a certain point, the ALJ noted that
12 Plaintiff “complained of bilateral arm pain, but [the] record lacks corresponding diagnostic
13 work up or follow up treatment notes.” (AR at 25.) While this could have been a clear and
14 convincing reason to discount Plaintiff’s subjective statements regarding arm pain, it is
15 important to note that Plaintiff alleges an inability to use her arm(s), which is a significantly
16 more serious claim. (See AR at 46-47, 275.) Ultimately, the ALJ was silent as to which of
17 Plaintiff’s subjective statements were “not entirely consistent” with the record. Therefore,
18 the Court finds the ALJ did not provide clear and convincing reasons to discount Plaintiff’s
19 subjective statements.
20 Furthermore, the ALJ’s failure to specifically identify which parts of the Plaintiff’s
21 testimony or statements were not credible, and then connect those statements to the record
22 of alleged inconsistency prevents the Court from conducting a meaningful judicial review.
23 See Reddick, 157 F.3d at 722 (“General findings are insufficient; rather, the ALJ must
24 identify what testimony is not credible and what evidence undermines the claimant’s
25 complaints.”); Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1284 ([a]n ALJ “must state specifically which symptom
26 testimony is not credible and what facts in the record lead to that conclusion.”); Rios v.
27 Saul, No. 19CV704-LL, 2020 WL 71080, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2020). “Because the ALJ
28 did not provide enough reasoning in order for us to meaningfully determine whether the
1 ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence,” the Court finds the error is not
2 harmless. See Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1266, 1278.
3 ii. Inconsistencies with Daily Activities
4 Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by finding that certain activities of daily
5 living, specifically a longstanding history of smoking cigarettes8 and the ability to travel to
6 Mexico, are inconsistent with Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. (See ECF No. 13-1 at 4-5.)
7 Defendant maintains that an ALJ can discount subjective statements when they are
8 inconsistent with a plaintiff’s daily activities, and Plaintiff’s ability to travel to Mexico is
9 just one of the many factors that the ALJ considered when discounting Plaintiff’s subjective
10 statements. (See ECF No. 15 at 4-5.) Furthermore, Defendant explains that the ALJ did not
11 err because “Plaintiff’s travel contradicted her testimony of debilitating pain that
12 essentially left her bedridden.” (Id. at 5-6.)
13 As a preliminary matter, the Court does not find Defendant’s argument persuasive.
14 Even if Defendant’s contention was taken as true and the Court assumed that the ALJ
15 discounted Plaintiff’s subjective statements because of the alleged contradiction between
16 traveling to Mexico and debilitating pain that essentially left Plaintiff bedridden, the Court
17 does not have a basis to affirm the argument because it was not articulated by the ALJ.
18 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3at 492.
19 As previously discussed, the issue before the Court is whether the ALJ properly
20 discounted Plaintiff’s subjective statements. An ALJ may properly rely on inconsistencies
21 between a claimant’s testimony and the claimant’s reported daily activities as a basis for
22 an adverse credibility determination. Light v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir.
23 1997). However, an ALJ must “elaborate on which daily activities conflicted with which
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25
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8 When considering the ALJ’s decision regarding Plaintiff’s subjective statements,
27 Defendant acknowledges that it does not rely on the ALJ’s reference to Plaintiff’s history
of smoking cigarettes as being supported by substantial evidence. (ECF No. 15 at 5.)
28
1 part of Claimant's testimony.” Burrell, 775 F.3 at 1138. Here, the ALJ failed to show how
2 Plaintiff being able to travel to Mexico was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s statements
3 concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her subjective statements.
4 While Defendant correctly argues an ALJ may properly rely on a plaintiff’s daily activities
5 when discounting subjective statements, the ALJ failed to make the connection between
6 which of Plaintiff’s activities were inconsistent with her alleged symptoms and limitations.
7 For example, it was stated that “[t]he claimant was able to travel to Mexico” without further
8 explanation. (See AR at 27.) However, the mere fact that someone has physical limitations
9 does not necessarily mean that they cannot travel. People with physical limitations can still
10 travel between states and countries, albeit sometimes requiring assistance. Therefore, the
11 simple fact that the Plaintiff was able to travel to Mexico, without further detail, does not
12 necessarily undermine her claims of physical limitations.
13 Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s general conclusion that Plaintiff was
14 able to travel to Mexico is insufficient for discounting her subjective statements. “Because
15 the ALJ did not provide enough reasoning in order for us to meaningfully determine
16 whether the ALJ's conclusions were supported by substantial evidence,” the Court finds
17 the error is not harmless. See Lambert, 980 F.3d at 1266, 1278.
18 iii. Controlled Pain and Cherry-Picking
19 Lastly, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ cherry picked
20 information from the record when only citing to one medical record to show that
21 “[Plaintiff’s] pain was controlled and . . . she was able to function9.” (ECF No. 13-1 at 5-
22 6; AR at 27, 543.) Defendant contends that the ALJ’s single citation to the record was
23 merely one example of Plaintiff’s stable symptoms “in an otherwise sparse record.” (ECF
24 No. 15 at 6.) In support of this argument, Defendant highlights doctor office visits in
25 October 2021 where Plaintiff reported that her pain was controlled on her current treatment
26
27
9 The Court notes that Plaintiff failed to cite any record to counter that her pain was not
28
1 course, and that she had no complaints. (Id.; AR at 689, 762) However, the Court notes
2 that Defendant omitted information from one of the visits, which includes “[t]he regimen
3 brings the pain to 5/10 on average.” (See AR at 689.)
4 An ALJ cherry picks when they selectively cite to the record, ignoring evidence that
5 contradicts their opinion. See D.T. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 538 F. Supp. 3d 952, 958 (N.D.
6 Cal. 2021); Hoffschneider v. Kijakazi, No. 18-15504, 2022 WL 3229989, at *1 (9th Cir.
7 Aug. 10, 2022). If the ALJ acknowledges facts adverse to their conclusion and relies on a
8 broad set of exams, they have not cherry picked. See D.T., 538 F. Supp. at 958; Wesselius
9 v. Kijakazi, No. 20-35386, 2021 WL 4948928, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2021).
10 Here, the ALJ failed to acknowledge adverse facts and did not consider a broad range
11 of examinations. As Plaintiff highlighted, the ALJ noted that “[Plaintiff] stated that her
12 pain was controlled and . . . she was able to function.” (Id.) In doing so, the ALJ cited one
13 exhibit from the medical record, a telephonic follow-up appointment on February 3, 2021,
14 regarding Plaintiff’s fibromyalgia. (See AR at 27, 543.) A close review of the record shows
15 several other instances where Plaintiff expressed that she was experiencing pain. For
16 instance, on January 6, 2021, only a month earlier, Plaintiff reported “chronic pain.” (See
17 id. at 475.) On October 28, 2020, mental status exam notes state that Plaintiff has a “history
18 of chronic pain.” (Id. at 464-466.) In August 2021, Plaintiff went to Kern Medical
19 Emergency Department with complaints of abdominal pain. (Id. at 649-653.) On October
20 7, 2021, clinic notes state that Plaintiff was receiving treatment for “generalized pain.” (Id.
21 at 731-733.) On October 13, 2021, office visit notes report “fatigue and lethargy constantly
22 throughout day” and “[p]ain in both arms.” (Id. at 881.) On October 20, 2021, Plaintiff
23 reported that she was not doing well. (Id. at 889.) Given the numerous medical records
24 indicating that Plaintiff’s pain was not controlled, and the ALJ’s reliance on one medical
25 record to suggest otherwise, the Court finds that the ALJ impermissibly cherry picked.
26 B. CONCLUSION
27 The only remaining question for the Court is whether to remand for further
28 administrative proceedings or for the payment of benefits. “The decision of whether to
1 ||remand a case for additional evidence, or simply to award benefits[,] is within the
2 || discretion of the court.” Trevizo, 871 F.3d at 682 (quoting Sprague v. Bowen, 812 F.2d
3 || 1226, 1232 (9th Cir. 1987)). “Remand for further administrative proceedings is appropriate
4 enhancement of the record would be useful.” Benecke v. Barnhart, 379 F.3d 587, 593
5 Cir. 2004). A remand for an immediate award of benefits is appropriate only in rare
6 || circumstances. Leon v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court concludes that
7 || “[t]he rare circumstances that result in a direct award of benefits are not present in this
8 || case.” Ud.)
9 Instead, the Court finds further administrative proceedings would serve a meaningful
10 purpose. On remand, the ALJ must provide specific reasons for the weight given to the
11 || Plaintiff's subjective statements. All reasons set forth by the ALJ’s decision must be clearly
12 articulated so that any subsequent reviewer can assess how the ALJ evaluated the
13 || claimant’s symptoms and the record. Stout, 454 F.3d at 1054; Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at
14
15 Based on the foregoing, the Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court
16 || VACATE the ALJ’s decision and REMAND this case for further administrative
17 || proceedings consistent with the findings presented herein.
18 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any written objection to this report must be filed
19 || with the Court and served on all parties no later than August 5, 2024. The document should
20 || be captioned “Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections shall be filed with
22 ||the Court and served on all parties no later than August 12, 2024. The parties are advised
23 || that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those
24 || objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
25 IT IS SO ORDERED.
26 || Dated: July 22, 2024
GF A.
28 ilies Sees eecistele Judge