The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 WESTERN DIVISION
11
12 VANYA S. P., No. 2:25-cv-04674-BFM
13 Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM OPINION
14 v. A ND ORDER
15 FRANK J. BISIGNANO,
Commissioner of Social Security,
16
Defendant.
17
18 This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the
19 Administrative Law Judge denying Plaintiff’s applications for Social Security
20 benefits. For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s request for remand (ECF
21 11) is granted and the decision of the Commissioner is reversed.
22 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
23 On February 21, 2019, Plaintiff Vanya S. P.1 applied for Disability
24 Insurance Benefits, alleging disability with an onset date of February 19, 2016.
25 (Administrative Record (“AR”) 193-94, 224.) Plaintiff’s application was denied
26
27
28
1 In the interest of privacy, this Memorandum Opinion and Order uses only
1 at the initial level of review and on reconsideration, so she requested a hearing
2 before an Administrative Law Judge. (AR 54-85, 99-100.)
3 On May 26, 2021, an ALJ held a hearing and heard from Plaintiff and a
4 vocational expert. (AR 35-53.) After considering the evidence, the ALJ issued an
5 unfavorable decision, finding Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity
6 (“RFC”)2 for a range of sedentary work, which would permit her to perform jobs
7 existing in significant numbers in the national economy. (AR 16-28.)
8 After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request to review the ALJ’s
9 decision (AR 926-32), Plaintiff’ appealed the denial of benefits to this Court. See
10 Vanya [S. P.] v. Kijakazi, No. 2:22-cv-07492-DSF-JEM. (AR 933-36, 939-40.) The
11 parties stipulated to remand the case for further administrative proceedings.
12 (AR 941-50.) The Appeals Council then vacated the final decision and remanded
13 the case to an ALJ to give Plaintiff an opportunity for a hearing, to evaluate the
14 medical source opinions and prior administrative medical findings (particularly
15 those concerning Plaintiff’s handing and fingering limitations), and to issue a
16 new decision. (AR 953-54.)
17 On December 13, 2023, the same ALJ held a second hearing and took
18 testimony from Plaintiff and a vocational expert. (AR 888-903.) After
19 considering the updated evidence, the ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision,
20 again finding Plaintiff was not disabled from the February 2016 alleged onset
21 date through the December 2022, date last insured. (AR 861-76.) The ALJ found
22 at step two of the disability analysis3 that Plaintiff suffered from the following
23 severe impairments: left shoulder degenerative joint disease, cervical
24
25
2 A RFC is what a claimant can still do despite existing exertional and
26 nonexertional limitations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1).
27
3 A five-step evaluation process governs whether a claimant is disabled. 20
28 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)-(g)(1). Only the steps relevant to the issues raised are
discussed herein.
1 degenerative disc disease, bilateral carpal and cubital tunnel syndromes,
2 bilateral knee degenerative joint disease, and right foot plantar fasciitis. (AR
3 864-65.) The ALJ found that through the date last insured, Plaintiff retained a
4 RFC for light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), limited to: (1) frequent
5 postural activities; (2) occasional climbing of ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; (3)
6 occasional bilateral overhead reaching; (4) left side above-the-shoulder lifting,
7 pushing, and pulling of ten pounds; and (5) frequent handling and fingering.
8 (AR 865-75 (discounting Plaintiff’s allegations of greater limits).) At step four,
9 the ALJ found Plaintiff would be able to perform her past relevant work as a
10 stock supervisor as generally performed. (AR 875-76 (adopting vocational expert
11 testimony at AR 900-01).)4
12 The Appeals Council declined review in Plaintiff’s case, making the ALJ’s
13 March 13, 2024, decision the final decision of the agency. (AR 851-54, 1023-34.)
14 Dissatisfied with the agency’s resolution of her claim, Plaintiff filed a Complaint
15 in this Court. For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision
16 should be reversed and this matter remanded for further administrative
17 proceedings.
18 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
19 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision
20 to deny benefits to determine if: (1) the Commissioner’s findings are supported
21 by substantial evidence; and (2) the Commissioner used correct legal standards.
22 See Carmickle v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008);
23 Brewes v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 682 F.3d 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2012).
24 “Substantial evidence. . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ It means—and means
25 only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
26
27
4 Plaintiff’s past relevant work as a stock supervisor as generally performed
28 per the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (“DOT”) required frequent handling
and fingering. See Stock Supervisor, DOT 222.137-034, 1991 WL 672071.
1 support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (citations
2 omitted); Gutierrez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 740 F.3d 519, 522-23 (9th Cir. 2014).
3 To determine whether substantial evidence supports a finding, the reviewing
4 court “must review the administrative record as a whole, weighing both the
5 evidence that supports and the evidence that detracts from the Commissioner’s
6 conclusion.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). “If the
7 evidence can reasonably support either affirming or reversing,” the court “may
8 not substitute its judgment” for that of the Commissioner. Id. at 720-21.
9 III. DISCUSSION
10 Plaintiff raises three issues with respect to the ALJ’s decision: (1) that the
11 ALJ’s RFC limitation to frequent (versus occasional) handling and fingering is
12 not supported by substantial evidence; (2) that the ALJ failed to articulate
13 legally sufficient reasons for rejecting Plaintiff’s testimony; and (3) that
14 substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s step four finding because
15 Plaintiff’s past relevant work did not match Dictionary of Occupational Titles
16 job the vocational expert relied on. (ECF 11 at 14-24; ECF 18 at 2-9.) Having
17 reviewed the entire record, the Court agrees that the ALJ provided insufficient
18 reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony, and remands on that
19 basis. It therefore declines to address the remaining two issues.
20 A. The ALJ’s Reasoning for Discounting Plaintiff’s Subjective
21 Complaints is Inadequate
22 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reasoning for discounting Plaintiff’s
23 subjective complaints suggesting greater RFC limitations than the ALJ adopted
24 was inadequate. (ECF 11 at 18-22; ECF 18 at 6-7.) The Court agrees.
25 1. Legal Framework
26 Where a claimant testifies about subjective medical symptoms, an ALJ
27 must evaluate such testimony in two steps. First, the ALJ must determine
28 whether the claimant has presented objective medical evidence of an underlying
1 impairment that could “reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other
2 symptoms alleged.” Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th Cir. 2007)
3 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
4 Second, if the claimant meets that first standard and there is no evidence
5 of malingering, the ALJ can reject the claimant’s testimony only by offering
6 “specific, clear and convincing reasons for doing so.” Id. (citation and internal
7 quotation marks omitted). An ALJ “is not required to believe every allegation of
8 disabling pain, or else disability benefits would be available for the asking, a
9 result plainly contrary to the Social Security Act.” Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th
10 489, 499 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). At the
11 same time, when an ALJ rejects a claimant’s testimony, he must “specify which
12 testimony she finds not credible, and then provide clear and convincing reasons,
13 supported by evidence in the record,” to support that determination. Brown-
14 Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 488-89 (9th Cir. 2015). General or implicit
15 findings of credibility will not suffice; the ALJ must show his work. Smartt, 53
16 F.4th at 499; see also Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090,
17 1102 (9th Cir. 2014).
18 The sufficiency of the explanation should be judged in light of its
19 purpose—ensuring that this Court’s review is “meaningful.” Brown-Hunter, 806
20 F.3d at 489. That is, the explanation must be “‘sufficiently specific to allow a
21 reviewing court to conclude the adjudicator rejected the claimant’s testimony on
22 permissible grounds and did not arbitrarily discredit a claimant’s testimony[.]’”
23 Id. at 493 (citation omitted).
24 Judged by that standard, the ALJ’s reasons and explanation for
25 discounting Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were inadequate.
26 2. Plaintiff’s Testimony
27 In a March 2019 Function Report form, Plaintiff complained primarily of
28 upper extremity pain, numbness, and stiffness, causing difficulty lifting,
1 reaching, using her hands; she also alleged walking, sitting and standing
2 limitations. (AR 249-56.) She estimated she could walk a few blocks before
3 needing to rest for a few minutes, could stand/walk/sit/climb stairs for 30
4 minutes or less, “some days more,” and could lift/reach/use her hands for “very
5 short times if at all.” (AR 254.)
6 At the May 2021 hearing, Plaintiff testified that she had constant pain
7 limiting her daily activities. (AR 40-42, 44-45.) She had neck pain that radiated
8 to her shoulder and down her right arm. Plaintiff was seeing a physical
9 therapist, doing acupuncture, and taking Gabapentin and Meloxicam for
10 inflammation. (AR 45.) She had tingling, numbing, and weakness in her hands
11 and arms, and sharp elbow pain limiting how long she could bend her elbow.
12 (AR 43, 48.) When her neck and shoulder tightened, her arm would feel heavy,
13 which would affect her hips, knees, and foot. (AR 45.) She also had a bone spur
14 in her foot. (AR 47.) Plaintiff claimed she could not type or write for more than
15 10 minutes without getting swelling, aching, and pain in her hands. (AR 43-44,
16 48.) She could not lift more than 15 pounds, and she could not carry things in
17 her hands all the time as she did in her prior job. (AR 44-45.) Due to stiffness
18 and pain, she could walk up to 30 minutes at a time, stand up to two hours at a
19 time, and sit up to an hour and a half at a time while frequently shifting her
20 weight and position. (AR 47.) She did not think she could sit, stand and walk for
21 six or more hours in an eight-hour workday. (AR 47.) She said some days she
22 has to lie down for 45 minutes to an hour due to fatigue, or longer if she has not
23 been sleeping. (AR 46.)
24 At the December 2023 hearing, Plaintiff testified that since the prior
25 hearing she had worsening left foot pain and stiffness from plantar fasciitis
26 which limited her to standing no more than five minutes before needing to
27 relieve the pressure on her foot, and to minimal walking (i.e., a “very short
28 distance,” such that in walking from her front door to her driveway she would
1 have to stop at least once to relieve the pressure on her foot). (AR 893-94.) She
2 still had numbness in her fingers, and her doctors were determining whether
3 her neck was the source of the issues. (AR 895.) She had been getting neck
4 injections to help alleviate her pain and stiffness, and she had issues with
5 getting insurance approval for radiofrequency treatments to try to alleviate her
6 neck pain. (AR 897.) Plaintiff testified that both consultative examinations
7 lasted less than five minutes and that the examining doctors had not touched
8 her or examined her feet. (AR 898.) Plaintiff was not asked to estimate her upper
9 extremity or sitting abilities and limitations at the most recent hearing. (AR
10 894-98.)
11 Plaintiff reported she started working again in August 2023, as a remote
12 dispatcher for an exterminating company, doing scheduling, new customer
13 entry, and email billing. (AR 1090.) At the hearing, she explained that her new
14 work was not “formal”—she was working for a friend answering calls and doing
15 other tasks once a month. (AR 893.)5
16 3. The ALJ’s Decision
17 In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s
18 testimony and found that her statements concerning the intensity, persistence
19 and limiting effects of those symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the
20 medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in
21 this decision.” (AR 865-67.) The ALJ acknowledged that the record reflected
22 “documentation of the claimant’s reported pain symptoms related to the left
23 shoulder, neck, bilateral hands/wrists, and the bilateral lower extremities, with
24
25 5 The disability period at issue is from the February 19, 2016, through
December 31, 2022. (AR 876.) For Plaintiff to be entitled to a disability
26 insurance benefits, she had to show she became disabled on or before December
31, 2022. (AR 862.) Plaintiff admits that with treatment her condition
27
eventually improved such that she could return to some work in August 2023.
28 (See ECF 11 at 17; ECF 18 at 6-7.) This concession does not foreclose the
possibility that Plaintiff is entitled to a closed period of disability benefits.
1 diagnoses, objective medical findings, and treatment related to degenerative
2 joint disease of the left shoulder, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine,
3 bilateral carpal and cubital tunnel syndromes, degenerative joint disease of the
4 bilateral knees, and right foot plantar fasciitis.” (AR 867-69 (citing AR 323-24,
5 440-41, 464, 467, 633-34, 660-61, 772 (objective evidence of Plaintiff’s left
6 shoulder issues and treatment including arthroscopic surgeries); AR 452, 633-
7 34, 660-61 (objective evidence of Plaintiff’s carpal and cubital tunnel syndrome
8 and related surgeries); AR 629-34 (objective evidence of mild bilateral adhesive
9 capsulitis in both shoulders, right knee torn medial meniscus, and right plantar
10 fasciitis); AR 467, 772, 792 (objective evidence of Plaintiff’s multilevel
11 degenerative disc disease, including moderate central canal stenosis at C6-C7);
12 AR 650-66 (Dr. Jon Greenfield’s evaluation noting pain complaints and reduced
13 cervical and left shoulder range of motion and reduced grip strength).)
14 Nevertheless, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s claims about the severity of
15 her functional limitations was “not indicated by the medical record.” (AR 867.)
16 Rather, the record was “consistent with the [ALJ’s RFC] determination.” (AR
17 867.) The ALJ noted that (1) the medical record demonstrated “appropriate
18 specialized medical treatment involving surgical interventions” which appeared
19 to have “improved and stabilized her pain symptoms,” resulting in “objective
20 medical abnormalities of generally mild-to-moderate severity after surgical
21 interventions” and “routine treatment recommendations”; (2) the two
22 consultative examinations “demonstrated only a few clinical findings, indicative
23 of lesser severity of symptoms than as alleged”; (3) Dr. Greenfield’s orthopedic
24 evaluations “demonstrated functional capacities that were generally consistent
25 with” the state agency physicians’ opinions and the consultative examiners’
26 opinions; and (4) although Plaintiff alleged significant standing and walking
27 limitations from left foot pain, there was no evidence that an assistive device
28
1 was medically necessary. (See AR 867-71 (discussing the medical record
2 supporting each reason).)
3 4. Analysis
4 The ALJ’s reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony generally fit into
5 two categories: (1) medical evidence that, in the ALJ’s view, undermined
6 Plaintiff’s testimony; and (2) effective treatment that had controlled Plaintiff’s
7 symptoms. (AR 867-71.)
8 a. Medical Evidence
9 The ALJ pointed to several data points suggesting he viewed Plaintiff's
10 testimony as not fully consistent with the medical evidence in the record. (AR
11 867-71.) On review, these data points do not provide substantial evidence to
12 support his conclusion.
13 As an initial matter, the ALJ’s explanation on this point does not meet the
14 standard set by the Ninth Circuit. An ALJ is required to “identify the testimony
15 she or he finds not to be credible and must explain what evidence undermines
16 the testimony.” Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001)
17 (emphasis added). In this case, however, the ALJ merely summarized Plaintiff’s
18 medical records and concluded that they were consistent with the assessed RFC.
19 (AR 867-71.) Under Ninth Circuit precedent, such analysis is inadequate. See
20 Brown-Hunter, 806 F.3d at 494 (criticizing ALJ for doing nothing more than
21 stating her conclusion concerning the claimant’s credibility and then
22 summarizing the medical evidence that supported her RFC determination).
23 Indeed, the only area in which the ALJ linked specific testimony to specific
24 medical evidence was Plaintiff’s testimony about standing and walking
25 limitations caused by left foot pain. The ALJ noted that the medical record
26 “demonstrate[ed] no evidence of medically necessary use of an assistive device.”
27 (AR 867.) As a reason to reject testimony, though, this one is hardly convincing:
28
1 Plaintiff never claimed she needed an assistive device for her foot pain. Instead,
2 she claimed she needed to get off her foot entirely to relieve pressure. (AR 894.)
3 Even if the Court were to overlook the ALJ’s failure to adequately explain
4 his reasons, his implicit reasoning lacks the support of substantial evidence. An
5 ALJ is not permitted to cherry pick those records which support his conclusion
6 and ignore those records that undermine his conclusion. Holohan, 246 F.3d at
7 1207-08 (finding that an ALJ erred in selectively relying on some entries in a
8 plaintiff's records while ignoring others). While the ALJ cited several records
9 that he believed undermined Plaintiff’s allegations, the broader record does not
10 support that conclusion. (See AR 867-71.)
11 Plaintiff alleged an onset date in 2016, with a date last insured of 2022.
12 Plaintiff had several surgeries early in that period, including left shoulder
13 surgeries in April 2016 and November 2017, and left carpal and cubital tunnel
14 release surgery in July 2017, and right carpal and cubital tunnel release surgery
15 in January 2019. (AR 867-68 (citing AR 441, 452, 464-65, 467, 633-34, 660-61).)
16 The ALJ cited two records that discussed Plaintiff’s pain levels during the early
17 part of the period: (1) Dr. Greenfield’s August 2018 evaluation noting that
18 Plaintiff had moderately severe pain in her neck and upper extremities (AR 868
19 (citing AR 650-63)) and (2) Dr. Harlan Bleecker’s May 2019 evaluation noting
20 that Plaintiff had continued neck and upper extremity pain and numbness with
21 related findings of tenderness and some lost sensation (AR 868-69 (citing AR
22 629-34)). These notes hardly support the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s pain
23 and symptoms stabilized during this period.
24 The ALJ cited other records from this period, and they do not support his
25 conclusion either. (See, e.g., AR 483 (February 2017 note indicating continued
26 radiating pain down Plaintiff’s arm as well as examination findings showing
27 weakness and tenderness); AR 574-76 (September-October 2017 notes
28 indicating Plaintiff complained of left shoulder pain and had tenderness,
1 weakness, mild impingement, and paresthesias on examination); AR 467-68
2 (March 2018 examination findings showing limited range of motion,
3 paresthesias to ulnar digits, left elbow tenderness); AR 784-85 (November 2019
4 report noting Plaintiff complained of loose shoulders, persistent pain and
5 popping, and moderate bicep pain, left elbow pain, right wrist pain, and some
6 finger numbness, with examination showing paresthesias to ulnar digits and
7 left elbow tenderness); AR 1349-50 (September 2020 left and right shoulder x-
8 rays showed chronic deformity change to the clavicle from prior trauma, with
9 chronic AC separation and soft tissue calcification in the left shoulder, and
10 minimal nonerosive arthritis of the AC joint in the right shoulder).)
11 The record does reflect some more positive notes later in the alleged
12 disability period. For example, the ALJ pointed to Dr. Erik Dworsky’s January
13 2021 note reporting pain, numbness, and tingling, but also mild relief with ice,
14 a TENS unit, Meloxicam, and Gabapentin. (AR 869 (citing AR 790-92).) The ALJ
15 reasoned that, from January 2021 through July 2021, the medical record
16 demonstrated “generally stable symptoms” and “routine treatment
17 recommendations” for physical therapy, an over-the-counter knee sleeve, home
18 exercise, icing, and more consistent use of Gabapentin. (AR 869.) But even then,
19 Dr. Dworsky’s treatment notes as a whole tell a different story: he noted that
20 Plaintiff had “gradually worsening symptoms in her neck and bilateral knees”
21 despite treatment, and recommended that Plaintiff start with conservative
22 treatment to address these new issues. (AR 792.) In July 2021, Plaintiff reported
23 a sudden flare-up in pain that left her largely bed-bound, and Dr. Dworsky
24 referred Plaintiff to pain management for possible epidural steroid injections.
25 (AR 1135-37.) By September 2022, Dr. Dworsky admitted that conservative
26 treatment for Plaintiff’s knee and back pain had failed. (AR 1151-54.)
27 Some more positive records followed later in 2021. (E.g. AR 870 (citing AR
28 1098-1100) (treatment notes from Dr. Minkoff showing intact sensation, full
1 motor strength, and pain reduction from a cervical facet joint injection); AR 870
2 (citing AR 1107, 1189, 1192) (Dr. Minkoff’s and Dr. Dworsky’s office treatment
3 notes from May, July and August 2023—after the date last insured—when
4 Plaintiff’s neck and hand symptoms had concededly improved).) At most, such
5 evidence suggests that some of Plaintiff’s impairments may have improved
6 before Plaintiff’s date last insured, or that she had cycles of improvement and
7 deterioration during the six-year period the ALJ considered. They cannot
8 support a finding that Plaintiff’s subjective testimony can be rejected across the
9 board.
10 Defendant casts this as Plaintiff asking the Court to reweigh the evidence
11 and ignoring the standard of review. (ECF 17 at 11, 16.) Not so: the Court is
12 required to ensure that the ALJ does not support his conclusion with cherry-
13 picked evidence. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1207-08. Because he did so here, the ALJ
14 erred.
15 b. Effective Treatment
16 The ALJ also reasoned that Plaintiff’s symptoms had stabilized through
17 conservative treatment. (AR 867-71.) Evidence suggesting a claimant’s
18 symptoms are managed or improve with treatment can be a clear and convincing
19 reason for rejecting disabling symptomatology. See Lapuzz v. Berryhill, 740 F.
20 App’x 596, 597 (9th Cir. 2018) (“effectiveness of medication is a clear and
21 convincing reason to discredit claimant testimony”) (citing Tommasetti v.
22 Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2008)); Wellington v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d
23 867, 876 (9th Cir. 2017) (“evidence of medical treatment successfully relieving
24 symptoms can undermine a claim of disability”); Warre v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
25 Admin., 439 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Impairments that can be
26 controlled effectively with medication are not disabling for the purpose of
27 determining eligibility for SSI benefits.”); Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021
28 WL 4078015, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2021) (that claimant’s pain was reported
1 to be well-managed and improved with medication is a clear and convincing
2 reason to reject pain testimony).
3 Here, Plaintiff admits that her symptoms improved to the point she could
4 resume some work in August 2023—after extensive treatment including three
5 left shoulder surgeries, bilateral carpal and cubital tunnel release surgeries,
6 physical therapy, acupuncture, casting Plaintiff’s wrist, and eventually pain
7 management including epidural and trigger point injections. See ECF 11 at 17;
8 ECF 18 at 6-7. But as discussed above, it is far from clear when Plaintiff’s
9 symptoms improved. Around the February 2016 alleged disability onset date,
10 Plaintiff had tried and failed multiple courses of cortisone injections and
11 physical therapy. She had continued tenderness in her shoulder and cubital
12 tunnel, limited range of motion, 4/5 motor strength in her supraspinatus
13 muscles, positive impingement tests and Tinel’s signs over the cubital tunnel,
14 and decreased sensation in the left ulnar nerve. (AR 412-15.) Throughout the
15 record, there is evidence of insufficiently controlled symptoms with some
16 moments of minor improvement. (See, e.g., AR 519-21 (May 2015 report
17 indicating “significant residual symptoms” after 2013 arthroscopic surgery); AR
18 574-77 (September and October 2017 reports indicating Plaintiff still had
19 tenderness, weakness, mild impingement, and paresthesias following July 2017
20 left carpal and cubital tunnel release surgery and multiple cortisone injections,
21 and was a candidate for a “possible [surgical] redo” as well as left shoulder PRP
22 injections); AR 467-68 (March 2018 examination findings showing limited range
23 of motion, paresthesias to ulnar digits, left elbow tenderness despite November
24 2017 left shoulder arthroscopic surgery and injections); AR 548-50 (January
25 2019 right carpal and cubital tunnel release surgery); AR 619-22 (March 2019
26 right shoulder injection gave 50 percent relief in left/right shoulder and back
27 pain); AR 781 (December 2019 report where Plaintiff complained that her right
28 shoulder had not improved and felt like it was shifting in the socket, her left
1 shoulder felt like it was worse, and her left elbow and wrist pain were
2 persistent).) On this record, effective control of symptoms was not an adequate
3 reason to discount Plaintiff’s symptoms testimony throughout the period.6
4 Warre, 439 F.3d at 1006.
5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds inadequate the ALJ’s reasoning
6 for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective statements.
7 IV. REMEDY
8 Remand (as opposed to an outright grant of benefits) is appropriate as the
9 circumstances of this case suggest that further administrative proceedings
10 could remedy the ALJ’s errors. See Dominguez v. Colvin, 808 F.3d 403, 407 (9th
11 Cir. 2015) (“Unless the district court concludes that further administrative
12 proceedings would serve no useful purpose, it may not remand with a direction
13 to provide benefits.”); Treichler, 775 F.3d at 1101, n.5 (remand for further
14 administrative proceedings is the proper remedy “in all but the rarest cases”);
15 Harman v. Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1180-81 (9th Cir. 2000) (remand for further
16 proceedings rather than for the immediate payment of benefits is appropriate
17 where there are “sufficient unanswered questions in the record”).
18 Having found that remand is warranted, the Court declines to address
19 Plaintiff's remaining arguments, which can be addressed, as necessary, on
20 remand. See Hiler v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Because we
21
22
6 The ALJ’s appears to have correctly found that Plaintiff’s standing and
23
walking limitations were sufficiently contradicted by the conservative
24 treatment of icing, stretching, injections, and immobilization; expected duration
of less than 12 months; and inconsistency between abnormal podiatry findings
25
and generally normal podiatry records is supported by the record. (AR 871
26 (citing AR 1220-21, 1371-1400 (podiatry records); AR 1250, 1252, 1256 (Dr.
Minkoff’s notes reporting normal/stable non-antalgic gait).) But this was only
27
one part of Plaintiff’s alleged limitations, and the ALJ failed to adequately
28 address the others in discounting her symptoms testimony.
1 || remand the case to the ALJ for the reasons stated, we decline to reach
2 || [plaintiffs] alternative ground for remand.”); see also Augustine ex rel. Ramirez
3 || v. Astrue, 536 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1153 n.7 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[The] Court need not
4 || address the other claims plaintiff raises, none of which would provide plaintiff
5 || with any further relief than granted, and all of which can be addressed on
6 || remand.”).
7
8 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
9 For all the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that: (1) the decision of the
10 |} Commissioner is reversed, and this matter is remanded pursuant to sentence
11 || four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further administrative proceedings consistent with
12 || this Opinion and Order; and (2) Judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff.
Tey
14 || DATED: May 5, 2026
15 BRIANNA FULLER MIRCHEFF
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
15