Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Sees 2:26-cv-00541-MCS RAO Rg April 29,2026

Title Kaplan v. Bessent

Present: The Honorable Mark C. Scarsi, United States District Judge

Stephen Montes Kerr —__——NotReported

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter

Attorney(s) Present for Plaintiff(s): Attorney(s) Present for Defendant(s):

None Present None Present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Charles Kaplan, a self-represented litigant, brings this action for

trespass and case against federal and state tax authorities. (See generally FAC, ECF

No. 28.) The sole remaining defendants are Scott Bessent, Commissioner of the

Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), and Mr. Larochelle, an IRS agent. (See Order 4,

ECF No. 52 (dismissing claims against other defendants).) Both were named as

parties in the original complaint, which was filed over 90 days ago. (Compl. § 7-8,

ECF No. 1.) The Court noted in a prior order “that service of officers or employees

of the United States is governed by particular service rules, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(1), and

that a defendant generally must be served within 90 days after the complaint is filed,

id. R. 4(m).” (Order 4.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) provides that, if service of the summons

and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 90 days of filing the complaint,

courts have authority to dismiss an action without prejudice after giving notice to

the plaintiff. See Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 975 (9th Cir. 2013) (requiring

notice before dismissal). If a plaintiff shows good cause for the failure to serve the

complaint within that period, the Court must extend the time for accomplishing

service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

Page 1 of 2 CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL Initials of Deputy Clerk SMO

Here, Plaintiff’s proofs of service demonstrate ineffective service. Plaintiff’s

server purportedly attempted to serve Messrs. Bessent and Larochelle by substituted

service, but the server only mailed the summons, complaint, and other case-initiating

documents to the United States Attorney for the Central District of California and

the Attorney General in Washington, D.C., with either a return receipt requested or

an acknowledgment of receipt form. (Bessent Proof of Service 1–3, ECF No. 17;

Larochelle Proof of Service 1–3, ECF No. 20.) The proofs of service use POS-010

forms designed to prove service compliant with California law. (See id.) In federal

court, service of an officer or employee of the United States cannot be completed

through substituted service under California law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2) (governing

service of officers or employees of the United States sued in an official capacity);1

cf. id. R. 4(e) (authorizing service of individuals “following state law” “[u]nless

federal law provides otherwise”). The proofs of service do not indicate the server

mailed the summons and complaint to either the United States Attorney or the

Attorney General by registered or certified mail, as Rule 4(i)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)

require. (See Bessent Proof of Service 1–2; Larochelle Proof of Service 1–2.) Nor

do they demonstrate the server also sent a copy of the summons and complaint to

Messrs. Bessent and Larochelle, as Rule 4(i)(2) requires. (See id.)

Good cause to extend the deadline to complete service is apparently lacking,

as the Court warned Plaintiff before the deadline of the special rules pertaining to

service of officers or employees of the United States. (Order 4.) Assuming the server

did not mail the summons and complaint to the United States Attorney or the

Attorney General by registered or certified mail, the Court is not obliged to extend

the service period. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(4)(A).

The Court orders Plaintiff to show cause why the claims against the remaining

defendants should not be dismissed for failure to timely complete service. Plaintiff

shall file a written response within 14 days of entry of this Order. Failure to file a

timely and satisfactory response will result in dismissal without further warning.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

1 The Court infers that Plaintiff intended to sue all individual defendants in their

official capacities, as Plaintiff identified Messrs. Bessent and Larochelle in his

pleading by their positions at the IRS, (FAC ¶¶ 9–10 (identifying Messrs. Bessent

and Larochelle by their positions at the IRS)), and conceded at the hearing on the

California Franchise Tax Board’s motion to dismiss that he sued a state employee in

her official capacity.