Daniels

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2

3

4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6

7 JEREMY DANIELS, Case No. 21-cv-03794-RMI

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION

9 v. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

10 STEVEN APONTE, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 35

Defendants.

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13 Now pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. 35),

14 seeking summary judgment in favor of Defendants Aponte and Cristancho (as to Plaintiff’s

15 unlawful arrest and excessive force claims) on the merits, pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.

16 477 (1994), and on qualified immunity grounds. Plaintiff did not file an opposition, or otherwise

17 communicate with the Court, despite being provided a reminder and an extension. The Court still

18 looks to the merits of the Motion and for the reasons stated below, the Motion is granted.

19 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

20 BACKGROUND

21 Plaintiff, a former arrestee and prisoner, sued San Jose Police Officers Aponte and

22 Cristancho pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for unlawful arrest and excessive force. Plaintiff alleges

23 that he was riding his bicycle on the street when the Defendants pulled alongside him in a patrol

24 car and told him to stop. (dkt. 14 at 5-6). Plaintiff did not stop, because he did nothing wrong, and

25 kept riding. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff states that Aponte struck Plaintiff with his patrol car causing an

26 accident and injuries. (Id. at 6-7). Cristancho then knocked Plaintiff down and got on top of

27 Plaintiff pressing his knees into Plaintiff further injuring him. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff was later

1 Undisputed Facts

2 The salient facts are undisputed. Defendants have submitted video evidence in support of

3 the motion and Plaintiff has not filed an opposition to address the facts, evidence, or arguments.

4 On November 6, 2019, Defendants were on a foot patrol at a homeless encampment in San Jose.

5 Defs. Mot. (dkt. 35), Aponte Decl. ¶ 2, Cristancho Decl. ¶ 2. Cristancho observed Plaintiff fail to

6 stop at a stop sign while riding his bicycle in violation of the vehicle code. Cristancho Decl. ¶ 2.

7 Defendants got into their marked patrol car to pursue Plaintiff to cite him for violation of the

8 vehicle code. Id. ¶ 3. Aponte was driving while Cristancho sat in the passenger seat. Id.

9 Defendants regained visual contact with Plaintiff and observed him fail to fully stop at

10 another stop sign. Id. ¶ 4. Aponte drove behind Plaintiff and activated the patrol car’s lights and

11 sirens. Aponte Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff continued riding and did not stop. Id. Defendants then activated

12 their body worn cameras. Aponte Decl. ¶ 3; Cristancho Decl. ¶ 3. The patrol car pulled next to

13 Plaintiff as he rode his bicycle and Cristancho repeatedly instructed him to pull over and stop, but

14 Plaintiff ignored those commands and continued riding. Cristancho Decl. ¶ 4. As they were closer

15 to Plaintiff, Cristancho recognized him from a mugshot he had seen earlier that day. Id. ¶ 5. As

16 part of his normal routine, Cristancho conducted a records check of known fugitives so that he

17 could familiarize himself with individuals he might encounter with outstanding warrants. Id.

18 Cristancho knew that Plaintiff had a no-bail warrant for his arrest for a parole violation and that he

19 was a gang member and had a prior firearm related arrest. Id.

20 While still riding his bicycle, Plaintiff asked if he was under arrest and Cristancho replied

21 that he was about to be under arrest. Id. ¶ 6; Ex. A, Cristancho Body Worn Camera 0:05-0:22.

22 Plaintiff continued riding his bicycle. Id. Cristancho then exited the patrol car and pursued

23 Plaintiff on foot. Id. Plaintiff increased speed on his bicycle and Defendants believed he was

24 fleeing and trying to evade them. Aponte Decl. ¶ 5; Cristancho Decl. ¶ 6. Plaintiff then rode onto

25 the sidewalk fleeing from Defendants. Id.

26 Aponte, who was still driving the patrol car with lights and sirens activated, lost sight of

27 Plaintiff when he rode on the sidewalk due to parked vehicles. Aponte Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. A, Aponte

1 bicycle to flee on foot, so he pulled into a driveway on the sidewalk to set a perimeter to either

2 block Plaintiff’s escape or join the foot pursuit. Id. Aponte did not see Plaintiff as he turned his

3 vehicle because he was looking in the direction he was driving. Id. As the patrol car stopped in the

4 driveway, Plaintiff, who was still riding the bicycle, collided with the passenger side door and fell

5 off the bicycle. Cristancho Decl. ¶ 6; Cristancho Body Worn Camera Slow Motion 0:31-0:48.1

6 Plaintiff immediately jumped up off the ground and continued to flee to the end of the

7 driveway, where there was a dead end due to closed garage. Cristancho Decl. ¶¶ 6-7; Cristancho

8 Body Worn Camera 0:23-0:32. Plaintiff then reached into his waistband and pulled out a black

9 object and threw it over the fence. Cristancho Body Worn Camera 0:30-0:32. Aponte observed

10 that it was a firearm and yelled, “he’s got a gun” to warn Cristancho. Aponte Decl. ¶¶ 7-8; Aponte

11 Body Worn Camera 0:52-0:57.

12 Defendants repeatedly ordered Plaintiff to get on the ground, but he did not comply.

13 Aponte Decl. ¶ 9; Cristancho Body Worn Camera 0:26-0:32. Cristancho grabbed Plaintiff’s right

14 wrist with one hand and grabbed his upper body with the other hand, and after Plaintiff refused to

15 comply and get on the ground, Cristancho tripped Plaintiff to get him on the ground so he could be

16 taken into custody. Cristancho Decl. ¶ 8; Cristancho Body Worn Camera 0:32-0:55. Cristancho

17 placed his knee on Plaintiff’s lower buttock area for approximately 12 second, so Plaintiff could

18 be handcuffed. Id. Aponte placed his knee on Plaintiff’s left shoulder area for approximately 10

19 seconds while placing handcuffs on him. Aponte Decl. ¶ 9; Cristancho Body Worn Camera 0:40-

20 0:50. Plaintiff continued to argue with Defendants and showed no signs of distress. Cristancho

21 Decl. ¶ 8; Cristancho Body Worn Camera 0:50-1:10. Plaintiff had a small abrasion on his eyebrow

22 and complained of knee pain. Cristancho Decl. ¶ 8.

23 Defendants recovered a 9mm semi-automatic handgun with a live round in the chamber, an

24 empty 17-round magazine, and several rounds of 9mm ammunition. Aponte Decl. ¶ 9-10. A

25 records check confirmed that Plaintiff was on parole for being a felon in possession of a firearm

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1 Defendants included a portion of Cristancho’s Body Worn Camera footage that is in slow motion

1 and had a no-bail warrant for his arrest for a parole violation. Cristancho Decl. ¶ 10. Plaintiff

2 eventually pled guilty to a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), being a felon in possession of a firearm

3 and served two years a result. Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice, Exs. A, B.2

4 LEGAL STANDARD

5 Summary judgment on a claim or defense is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is

6 no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

7 law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To prevail, a party moving for summary judgment must show the

8 absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to an essential element of the nonmoving

9 party’s claim, or to a defense on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at

10 trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this

11 showing, the burden then shifts to the party opposing summary judgment to identify “specific facts

12 showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The party opposing summary judgment must then

13 present affirmative evidence from which a jury could return a verdict in that party’s favor.

14 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).

15 On summary judgment, a court will draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the

16 nonmovant. Id. at 255. In deciding summary judgment motions, “[c]redibility determinations, the

17 weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury

18 functions, not those of a judge.” Id. However, conclusory or speculative testimony or allegations

19 do not raise genuine issues of fact and are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See e.g.,

20 Thornhill Publ’g Co., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 (9th Cir. 1979).

21 A claim of unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourth

22 Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures if the complaint alleges that

23 the arrest was without probable cause or other justification. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-

24 558 (1967); Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d 1010, 1014 n.1. (9th Cir. 2015) (absence of

25 probable cause is essential element of a § 1983 false arrest claim). Further, a claim of unlawful

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2 The Court takes judicial notice of the Court records provided by Defendants (dkt. 36). See Reyn’s

1 detention or imprisonment is cognizable under § 1983 for violation of the Fourteenth

2 Amendment’s guarantee of due process if the arrest was without probable cause or other

3 justification and the defendant knew or should have known that plaintiff was entitled to release.

4 See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-145 (1979); Lee v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,

5 684-85 (9th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff stated due process claim where police arrested plaintiff’s son

6 without probable cause, detained him without verifying that he was the subject of warrant, despite

7 his obvious mental incapacity, and detained him for one day before an extradition hearing, which

8 led to his incarceration in another state for two years).

9 An allegation of the use of excessive force by a law enforcement officer in effectuating an

10 arrest states a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d

11 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1986), overruled on other grounds by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386

12 (1989); see also Byrd v. Phoenix Police Dep’t, 885 F.3d 639, 641-42 (9th Cir. 2018) (pro se

13 allegations that police officers “beat the crap out of” plaintiff and caused him severe injury enough

14 to support a legally cognizable claim under § 1983). Excessive force claims which arise in the

15 context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen are analyzed under the Fourth

16 Amendment reasonableness standard. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95.

17 DISCUSSION

18 Unlawful Arrest

19 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff,

20 and they have met their burden in demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

21 fact and the they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to

22 refute Defendants’ arguments or evidence.

23 The existence of probable cause for an arrest is a complete defense to a § 1983 claim

24 alleging false arrest. See Fortson v. Los Angles City Atty’s Office, 852 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir.

25 2017). Here, Defendants were justified in stopping Plaintiff due to his failure to obey traffic laws

26 by failing to stop at multiple stop signs and because there was an outstanding warrant for his

27 arrest. A police officer may conduct an investigatory stop when the officer has reasonable

1 1100 (9th Cir. 2006). A traffic infraction alone is sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. Id.

2 Moreover, when an officer has probable cause to believe a criminal offense has been committed in

3 his presence—including a minor offense punishable only by a fine, such as a traffic violation—the

4 officer may lawfully detain and arrest the suspect without violating the Fourth Amendment.

5 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001).

6 While Plaintiff did not file an opposition, to the extent he could argue that he did stop at

7 the stop signs and did not violate any traffic laws, Defendnats still had probable cause to arrest

8 him based on the warrant. An outstanding arrest warrant independently supplies probable cause as

9 a matter of law. See Case v. Kitsap Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 249 F.3d 921, 924, 927-28 (9th Cir.

10 2001).

11 Excessive Force

12 With respect to the excessive force claim, Defendants have also met their burden in

13 demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the they are entitled to

14 judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to refute Defendants’ arguments or

15 the evidence.

16 Plaintiff first contends that Defendants used excessive force when he was fleeing on foot.

17 The undisputed video evidence demonstrates that there was no excessive force. Plaintiff refused

18 repeated commands to get on the ground and removed a gun from his waistband to throw it away.

19 It is undisputed that after Defendants took Plaintiff to the ground and Cristancho placed his knee

20 on Plaintiff’s lower buttock area for approximately 12 second, so Plaintiff could be handcuffed,

21 while Aponte placed his knee on Plaintiff’s left shoulder area for approximately 10 seconds.

22 The Supreme Court held in Graham that, “[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later

23 seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge’s chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 396

24 (internal citation omitted); see also Jackson v. City of Bremerton, 268 F.3d 646, 650, 653 (9th Cir.

25 2001) (finding no constitutional violation where an officer pushed the plaintiff to the ground to

26 handcuff her and fractured plaintiff's finger in the process); see also Kidwell-Bertagnolli v. County

27 of Sonoma, 2024 WL 1589468, at *6-8 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2024) (granting summary judgment

1 trier of fact could find an 18-second hold was more than minimal force). The de minimis amount

2 of force used by Defendants to handcuff Plaintiff who was fleeing, refused commands to get on

3 the ground, and removed a gun, does not present a Fourth Amendment claim. Defendants are

4 entitled to summary judgment.

5 Aponte is also entitled to summary judgment regarding his driving of the patrol car. It is

6 undisputed that Aponte did not strike Plaintiff with the car; he drove the car into a driveway and

7 then Plaintiff rode his bicycle into the car and fell because there was not enough time to stop or

8 turn. Aponte submitted a declaration stating that he lost sight of Plaintiff when he rode on the

9 sidewalk due to parked vehicles and he thought that Plaintiff may have dismounted from the

10 bicycle to flee on foot. Aponte pulled into a driveway on the sidewalk to set a perimeter to either

11 block Plaintiff’s escape or join the foot pursuit and did not see Plaintiff as he turned his vehicle

12 because he was looking in the direction he was driving. Plaintiff did not submit any opposition

13 contesting this evidence; therefore, it is undisputed that Plaintiff crashing into the car was an

14 accident.

15 A Fourth Amendment seizure requires an officer’s intentional acquisition of physical

16 control. Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (“ . . . the detention or taking itself

17 must be willful. This is implicit in the word “seizure,” which can hardly be applied to an

18 unknowing act.”) Accidental or unintended contact does not constitute a seizure. See id.; County of

19 Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998) (no Fourth Amendment seizure where harm

20 results from unintentional conduct). Aponte has met his burden in demonstrating that there is no

21 genuine dispute as to any material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

22 because he did not intentionally use force against Plaintiff. Even assuming Aponte’s actions were

23 intentional and there was a Fourth Amendment seizure, he would be entitled to qualified immunity

24 as discussed below.

25 Qualified Immunity

26 The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for

27 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

1 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The rule of “qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or

2 those who knowingly violate the law.’” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001) (quoting Malley

3 v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)). Defendants can have a reasonable, but mistaken, belief about

4 the facts or about what the law requires in any given situation. Id. at 205. A court considering a

5 claim of qualified immunity must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an

6 actual constitutional right and whether such right was clearly established such that it would be

7 clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. See

8 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (overruling the sequence of the two-part test that

9 required determining a deprivation first and then deciding whether such right was clearly

10 established, as required by Saucier). The Court may exercise its discretion in deciding which

11 prong to address first, in light of the particular circumstances of each case. Pearson, 555 U.S. at

12 236.

13 A right is clearly established if it was “sufficiently clear [at the time of the conduct at

14 issue] that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that

15 right.” Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822, 825 (2015). The Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned

16 that courts should not define clearly established law at a high level of generality. See White v.

17 Pauly, 58 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam); see, e.g., Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104-08

18 (2018) (per curiam) (officer entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a woman who was armed

19 with a large knife, was ignoring officers’ orders to drop the weapon, and was within striking

20 distance of her housemate; prior cases on excessive force did not clearly establish that it was

21 unlawful to use force under these circumstances, where officer may not have been in apparent

22 danger but believed woman was a threat to her housemate).

23 The Court has not found a constitutional violation, and even if there was a violation,

24 Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity. For the unlawful arrest claim, police officers

25 are entitled to qualified immunity if “it is reasonably arguable that there was probable cause for

26 arrest.’” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 1207 n.4 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Rosenbaum v.

27 Washoe County, 663 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2009)). In the instant case it is undisputed that

] 2012) (reversing denial of qualified immunity when there was “no question” that officers had

2 || probable cause to believe that plaintiff had committed the actus reus of theft, even though

3 || reasonable people could draw different conclusions based on plaintiff's behavior).

4 Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity for the force used against Plaintiff when

5 || he was fleeing on foot. It would not be clear to reasonable officer that the de minimis use of force

6 || in this situation would be a constitutional violation. As discussed above, Plaintiff fled on a bicycle

7 || and then on foot, refused commands to get on the ground, and removed a gun from his waistband.

8 Aponte is also entitled to qualified immunity for driving his car into the driveway which

9 || led to Plaintiff crashing his bicycle. In a similar situation in Seidner v. de Vries, 39 F.4th 591 (9th

10 || Cir. 2022), the Ninth Circuit held that a police car pulling in front of a bicyclist resulting in the

11 bicyclist striking the police car, would require a jury to determine the reasonableness of the

12 || amount of force used. /d. at 601. However, the Circuit also held that the police officer was entitled

13 || to qualified immunity because the law that existed in 2020, when the incident occurred, did not

14 || clearly establish that his actions would violate the Fourth Amendment. /d. at 603.

3 15 Seidner was decided in 2022, and the underlying incident in this case, occurred in 2019.

a 16 || Seidner is controlling and for the same reasons that qualified immunity applied in Seidner, Aponte

17 || is entitled to qualified immunity in this case.

18 CONCLUSION

19 Accordingly, for the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

20 || (dkt. 35) is GRANTED. A separate judgment shall issue and the Clerk shall close this case.°

21 IT IS SO ORDERED.

22 || Dated: May 27, 2026

23

ROBERT M. ILLMAN

25 United States Magistrate Judge

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28 ; Because the Court found no constitutional violation and that Defendants are entitled to qualified

immunity, the Heck argument will not be addressed.