Gonzalez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

ERIC L. GONZALEZ, Case No. 24-cv-06675-RFL (PR)

Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

SEAN TUMACDER,

Dkt. No. 17

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Eric Gonzalez alleges in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action that Defendant Tumacder

violated his Free Exercise, RLUIPA, and due process rights by denying his request for family

visits and his request to have his security status lowered. Defendant Tumacder moves for

summary judgment. Gonzalez has filed an opposition and Defendant has filed a reply.

Defendant’s summary judgment motion is GRANTED. The denial of Gonzalez’s request

for family visits was consonant with clear prison regulations, which are reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests of security. Therefore, Gonzalez’s Free Exercise claim cannot

succeed. The denial also did not substantially burden his religious exercise, and therefore there

was no RLUIPA violation. Also, because Defendant had no authority to lower his security

status, there was no due process violation. Defendant is also entitled to qualified immunity.

BACKGROUND

Gonzalez is a California state prisoner serving a sentence of 31 years to life with the

possibility of parole pursuant to a conviction for attempted kidnapping (Cal. Penal Code §§

664/207). (MSJ, Nicassio Decl., Dkt. No. 17-13 ¶ 13.) He previously served a sentence

pursuant to four rape convictions (Cal. Penal Code § 261). (Id. ¶ 11.) Gonzalez is classified in

prison as a sex offender, with an “R” custody-suffix, “VIO” administrative determinant and a

placement score of 19. (Id., Vazirani Decl., Ex. E, G.)

On January 9, 2024, Gonzalez appeared at a hearing before the Post-Board Unit

Classification Committee at CTF-Soledad, after he had appeared before the Board of Parole

Hearings. (Compl., Dkt. No. 2 at 3.) Defendant Tumacder, who was then a Correctional Captain

at CTF, presided over the hearing. (Id.) At such hearings, correctional staff review prisoners’

case factors “to ensure they were properly endorsed to institutions and housed.” (MSJ,

Tumacder Decl. ¶ 2.) Also at such hearings, parole denial is documented and prisoners are

informed that they were denied parole. (Id. ¶ 3.)

Gonzalez asked at the hearing to be allowed to participate in the CDCR’s family visiting

program. (Compl., Dkt. No. 2 at 3.) Defendant told Plaintiff that he was ineligible for the

program because of his sex-offender status. (MSJ, Tumacder Decl. ¶ 4.) State regulations

prohibit family visits for prisoners who are convicted of any sex offense. 15 Cal. Code of Regs.

§ 3177(b)(1).

Gonzalez also asked that his custody restrictions be lowered. Defendant denied the

request because his sex-offender status barred him from having his placement score lowered

below 19. (MSJ, Tumacder Decl. ¶ 6.) Furthermore, state regulations decree that such a request

can only be considered at an annual classification review, and therefore Defendant had no

authority to consider such a request at a Post-Board United Classification Hearing. 15 Cal. Code

of Regs. § 3375.2(b)(28)(J). Gonzalez testified at his deposition that he understood the state

regulations and CDCR policies. (MSJ, Plaintiff Depo., Dkt. No. 17-3 at 20, 22-23, 26.)1

Gonzalez states that he is a Christian and that privately praying with his family members

is a practice of his religion. He contends that Defendant’s denial of his request to participate in

the family visiting program violated his free exercise rights under the First Amendment and his

1 All citations to page numbers in filings on the docket refer to ECF pagination.

statutory rights under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42

U.S.C. 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-2(b). He also claims that Defendant violated his right to due process

by refusing to lower his custody restrictions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits demonstrate

that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the movant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts are those which may affect

the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute

as to a material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a

verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of identifying those

portions of the pleadings, discovery and affidavits which demonstrate the absence of a genuine

issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving

party will have the burden of proof on an issue at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no

reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. On an issue for which the

opposing party by contrast will have the burden of proof at trial, as is the case here, the moving

party need only point out “that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case.” Id. at 325.

Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the

pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, set forth specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Court is concerned only with disputes over

material facts and “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. It is not the task of the court to scour the record in search of a

genuine issue of triable fact. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). The

nonmoving party has the burden of identifying, with reasonable particularity, the evidence that

precludes summary judgment. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make this showing, “the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

DISCUSSION

Gonzalez claims that Defendant’s actions violated (1) his right to the free exercise of

religion under the First Amendment; (2) his statutory rights under RLUIPA; and (3) his due

process rights.

I. Free Exercise of Religion

Prisoners retain the protections afforded by the First Amendment, “including its directive

that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion.” O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.

342, 348 (1987) (citation omitted). But a prisoner’s right to free exercise of religion “is

necessarily limited by the fact of incarceration,” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 876 (9th Cir. 1993)

(citing O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348). “A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the

government action in question substantially burdens the person’s practice of her religion.” Jones

v. Williams, 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015.) “A substantial burden . . . place[s] more than

an inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into acting

contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his

behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013)

(quoting Guru Nanak Sikh Soc’y of Yuba City v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir.

2006) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).

“To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials,” the Supreme

Court has directed that alleged infringements of prisoners’ free exercise rights be “judged under

a ‘reasonableness’ test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of

fundamental constitutional rights.” O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 349. A prison regulation that impinges

on a prisoner’s constitutional rights is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological

interests. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Turner sets forth four factors to be balanced

in determining such validity: (1) whether there is a “ ‘valid, rational connection’ between the

prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it”; (2) whether

there are “alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates”; (3)

whether “accommodation of the asserted constitutional right” will “impact . . . guards and other

inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) whether there is an

“absence of ready alternatives” versus the “existence of obvious, easy alternatives.” Id. at 89-90

(quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).

“We must accord substantial deference to the professional judgment of prison

administrators, who bear a significant responsibility for defining the legitimate goals of a

corrections system and for determining the most appropriate means to accomplish them.”

Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132 (2003). “The burden, moreover, is not on the State to

prove the validity of prison regulations but on the prisoner to disprove it.” Id.

a. First Turner Factor

Under the first Turner factor, a court must determine whether there was a “valid, rational

connection” between the prison’s regulation and the legitimate penological interest put forward

to justify it. Id. at 89. “Family visits shall not be permitted for incarcerated persons convicted of

. . . any sex offense.” 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3177(b)(1). This regulation bears a rational

relationship to a legitimate penological interest. As stated in the regulations, the purpose of

restricting family visitation is to “maintain order, the safety of persons, the security of the

institution/facility, and required prison activities and operations.” Id. § 3177(b)(1)(D). The

Supreme Court upheld a prison restriction on child visitation because it was related to

maintaining internal security, reducing the number of visitors, and protecting child visitors from

exposure to sexual or other misconduct. Overton, 539 U.S. at 133.

Gonzalez contends that the regulation is not rationally related to a legitimate purpose. He

asserts that it is contrary to the state’s rehabilitative objectives; sex offenders were previously

allowed participate in the family visiting program prior to the exclusion of all sex offenders

under section 3177(b)(1); and the regulation is applied in a discriminatory manner. Given the

undisputed facts in the record, Gonzalez has not carried his burden to show that the regulation

fails constitutional scrutiny. Virtually any regulation will be either overinclusive or

underinclusive. That is not enough to make it unconstitutional as insufficiently related to

legitimate goals of a corrections system. Nor is it sufficient for Gonzalez to point out that the

CDCR previously allowed sex offenders to participate in the program. The prison authorities

may rationally take a variety of approaches to ensure safety during family visitation.

Gonzalez contends the regulation is applied inconsistently and in a discriminatory

fashion. He states that while it applies to all persons convicted of sex offenses, it does not apply

to prisoners who have been convicted of murder or other dangerous persons (such as those in

Security Threat Group 1). (Opp., Dkt. No. 18 at 16.) The regulation does bar prisoners who

have been “convicted of a violent offense where the victim is a minor or family member.” 15

Cal. Code Regs. § 3177(b)(1). It bars various prisoners who pose grave security concerns. Id. §

3177(b)(2). Regardless, even if the regulation is underinclusive, Gonzalez has failed to produce

evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute as to whether the regulation is so underinclusive as

to be lacking a rational connection to a legitimate penological goal.

Furthermore, the regulation here is content-neutral. “We have found it important to

inquire whether prison regulations restricting inmates’ First Amendment rights operated in a

neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90. Here,

the regulation bars all family visits for any purposes whatever, and therefore operates without

regard to the content of the expression.

The first Turner factor weighs in favor of Defendant.

b. Second Turner Factor

Under the second Turner factor, a court considers whether the prisoner has “alternative

means by which he can practice his religion” or is “denied all means of religious expression.”

Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993). “The relevant inquiry under this factor is not

whether the inmate has an alternative means of engaging in the particular religious practice that

he or she claims is being affected; rather, we are to determine whether the inmates have been

denied all means of religious expression.” Id. 877.

Gonzalez testified at his deposition that he is able to practice his religion while

incarcerated, such as by respecting women, not lying, engaging in private fasting, praying, and

reading the Bible. (MSJ, Gonzalez Depo., Dkt. No. 17-3 at 8-10.) This record shows Plaintiff

has “retained the ability to participate in other significant rituals and ceremonies of [his] faith”

and therefore has means of expressing his religion. Ward, 1 F.3d at 877. Gonzalez does not

discuss the second Turner factor in his opposition, and therefore has not shown any reason it

should weigh in his favor. Accordingly, the second Turner factor weighs in favor of Defendant.

c. Third Turner Factor

Under the third Turner factor, a court considers the “impact [the] accommodation . . .

will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.”

Ward, 1 F.3d at 878 (citing Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990)).

Defendant contends that allowing Gonzalez to participate in the family visiting program

would violate state regulations and “jeopardize the institutional safety the regulations intend to

maintain.” (MSJ, Dkt. No. 17-1 at 17.)

Gonzalez avers that his participation would not negatively affect guards or other

prisoners because he maintains good relationships with both staff and other prisoners, he has a

low risk for violence, he is in the “maintenance stage of change,” has not “acted in violence”

during his 28-year incarceration, has learned to manage his negative emotions and impulses, and

has “successfully completed numerous self-help programs that addressed his offending.” (Opp.,

Dkt. No. 18 at 19.) He further contends that he is housed within a secured perimeter that is

directly under a gun tower. (Id.) Also, his participation would not impact prison resources

because prisoners are required to provide all food for the family visit, no additional staff would

have to be used because only a “set number of inmates are allowed to participate in family

visits,” and “family visiting is located right under a ‘gun tower.’ ” (Id. at 20.)

Even construing the evidence in Gonzalez’s favor as to the progress he has made in

reducing his risk level, the prison has an institutional interest in allocating its resources to limit

reassessments of inmate risk levels to the standardized annual classification review. Gonzalez

has not introduced evidence to refute this interest. He points to a May 2025 Comprehensive Risk

Assessment (CRA). (Opp., Plaintiff Decl., Dkt. No. 18-1 ¶ 26; Dkt. No. 18-1 at 29-30.) But the

May 2025 CRA was written well after the January 2024 events at issue in this suit. It would not

have been available to Defendant when Gonzalez’s request was denied. While the CRA may

serve Gonzalez at an annual classification review, where such evidence can be examined by

persons with authority to change his custody status, it is not relevant to the present suit.

Also, Gonzalez’s estimation that additional staff would not be required and that safety

can be maintained is based on speculation, not on evidence such as how many family members

he would have and how many security guards would be needed. His estimation is not sufficient

to create a genuine dispute of material fact. Accordingly, the third Turner factor weighs in favor

of Defendant.

d. Fourth Turner Factor

Under the fourth and final Turner factor, whether the regulation is an “exaggerated

response” to the prison’s concerns, the prisoner must show there are “obvious, easy alternatives”

to the regulation that “fully accommodates the prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid

penological interests.” Turner, 482 U.S. at 90-91.

Gonzalez contends that there is an obvious easy alternative to the regulation. “All prison

officials would have to do is simply apply [T]itle 15 § 3177(b)(2) categorial list to sex offenders,

as to does to all other inmates applying to [sic] family visiting.” (Opp. Dkt. No. 18 at 21.)

“Thus, any security concerns about Gonzalez’s participation in family visiting could easily be

addressed in his annual classification hearing to determine whether he qualifies under [T]itle 15

§ 3177(b)(2)’s security categories.” (Id.)

Gonzalez, however, has failed to submit evidence necessary to show such an alternative

would impose only a de minimis cost to valid penological interests, including the safety of

visitors, other prisoners, and staff. He has thus not raised a genuine issue of material fact. Also,

the proposed alternative would necessitate altering the regulations themselves to provide prison

officials with the necessary authority, which Defendant cannot do on his own. Accordingly, the

fourth Turner factor weighs in favor of Defendant.

Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he has failed to

demonstrate the existence of a “genuine issue for trial” as to his Free Exercise claim. Anderson,

477 U.S. at 249. The four Turner factors weigh in favor of Defendant. Accordingly, Defendant

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and his motion for summary judgment as to this claim

is GRANTED.

II. RLUIPA

“To state a claim under RLUIPA, a prisoner must show that: (1) he takes part in a

‘religious exercise,’ and (2) the State’s actions have substantially burdened that exercise.”

Walker v. Beard, 789 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878,

888-89 (9th Cir. 2008)). “If the prisoner satisfies those elements, then the State must prove its

actions were the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest.” Id.

(citing Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995 (9th Cir. 2005)).

“[A] substantial burden on religious exercise must impose a significantly great restriction

or onus upon such exercise.” San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024,

1034 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining whether

there is a substantial burden, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Factors to

consider include whether the government’s reasons for denying the request were arbitrary, and

whether the plaintiff has “ready alternatives or whether those alternatives would require

substantial uncertainty delay, or expense.” Spirit of Aloha Temple v. Cnty. of Maui, 132 F.4th

1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2025). “[W]hether [the plaintiff’s] religious exercise was ‘substantially

burdened’ is a legal determination, and it [is] error for the district court to submit that issue to the

jury.” Id. at 1154-56. Here, Gonzalez has not carried his burden to make the required showing.

Gonzalez has not shown that the denial of the request was arbitrary. The undisputed evidence is

that prison regulation applies to all persons who have been convicted of sex offenses, and that

this rule has a reasonable relationship to important safety concerns that are difficult for prison

officials to otherwise address. Also, Gonzalez has not shown that he lacks ready alternatives,

such as praying privately with other Christians at prison and praying with his family over the

telephone. Nor has he shown that those alternatives would be inadequate for his religious needs

or that they would impose substantial uncertainty, delay, or expense on him. Under the totality

of circumstances, the Court concludes as a matter of law that Gonzalez has not shown a

substantial burden on his religious exercise.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED on the RLUIPA claim.

III. Due Process

Gonzalez’s claim that Defendant violated his due process rights by denying his request to

lower his custody restrictions cannot succeed on the undisputed record. As an initial matter,

Defendant lacked the authority under state law to grant such a request, which can only be

considered at an annual classification review, not at a Post-Board United Classification Hearing.

15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3375.2(b)(28)(J) (“An incarcerated person who has a VIO administrative

determinant . . . shall be eligible for consideration of removal of an existing VIO during the

annual classification review.”) Gonzalez has not presented any evidence that the annual

classification review process is inaccessible to him or otherwise fails to satisfy his due process

rights. As such, Defendant cannot be held liable for a due process violation when he lacked the

authority to grant Gonzalez’s request and there were other mechanisms available to handle such

requests.

Also, Gonzalez’s convictions for sex crimes render him ineligible to be housed in a lower

level of security, such as at a Level I facility. 15 Cal. Code Regs. § 3375.2(a)(2). His

convictions require that he have a placement score of no lower than 19, a fact Gonzalez

acknowledged at his deposition. (MSJ, Plaintiff Depo., Dkt. No. 17-3 at 23-25.)

Gonzalez also claims that Defendant violated his due process rights by refusing to allow

him to present evidence to contest the evidence used by Defendant to maintain his security level.

(Compl., Dkt. No. 2 at 3-4.) Again, no due process violation occurred. If Defendant had no

authority to grant his request, it makes no sense to require Defendant to allow Gonzalez to

present evidence in support of his request.

Plaintiff also claims that Defendant’s refusal to review his documents constitutes an

atypical and significant hardship “because there is a likelihood Gonzalez will serve additional

time in prison for not meeting the Board’s lower custody level recommendation.” (Opp., Dkt.

No. 18 at 27.) It also exposed him to a likelihood of being attacked by other prisoners, such as

happened when a prior cellmate attacked him after seeing his sex offender determinant on

documents. (Id. at 28.) These claims appear only in the opposition, and not in the complaint and

therefore are not cognizable here. Even if they were properly before the Court, it remains true

that Defendant had no authority to consider such evidence or grant a request to lower Gonzalez’s

custody status.

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on this claim is GRANTED.

IV. Qualified Immunity

Defendant contends that he is entitled to qualified immunity. (MSJ, Dkt. No. 17-1 at 22.)

The defense of qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil

damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,

818 (1982). To determine whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must

decide whether the facts alleged show that the official’s conduct violated a constitutional or

statutory right; and, if so, whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was

unlawful in the situation he confronted. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001); see

also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (overruling Saucier’s requirement that qualified

immunity analysis proceed in a particular sequence). “[I]f no constitutional [or statutory] right

would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further

inquiries concerning qualified immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

Regarding the first prong, the threshold question must be: Taken in the light most

favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct

violated a constitutional or statutory right? Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201; see Martin v. City of

Oceanside, 360 F.3d 1078, 1082 (9th Cir. 2004) (in performing the initial inquiry, court is

obligated to accept plaintiff's facts as alleged, but not necessarily his application of law to the

facts; the issue 1s not whether a claim is stated for a violation of plaintiffs constitutional or

statutory rights, but rather whether the defendants actually violated a constitutional right)

(emphasis in original). “If no constitutional [or statutory] right would have been violated were

the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified

immunity.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.

Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. The facts do not show that Defendant

violated a constitutional or statutory right, for the reasons stated above as to the free exercise,

RLUIPA, and due process claims. Also, even if Defendant violated a right, it would not be clear

to a reasonable officer that his actions were unlawful: the regulations clearly forbade the request,

and Defendant had no authority to override the regulations.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. (Dkt. No. 17.) The Clerk

shall terminate Dkt. No. 27, enter judgment in favor of Defendant, and close the file.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 21, 2026 AE

United States District Judge