Opinion

Doe

Court: District Court, E.D. California
Filed: Feb 19, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JANE DOE, No. 2:25-cv-03155 WBS AC

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

15 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

COUNTY OF SOLANO, SOLANO

16 SHERIFF’S OFFICE, JOHN B.

ROBERTSON (in his individual and

17 official capacities), THOMAS A.

FERRARA (in his individual and

18 official capacities), BRADLEY

DEWALL (in his individual and

19 official capacities), and

JACKSON HARRIS (in his

20 individual and official

capacities),

Defendants.

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This action arises out of events of alleged violent

sexual assault within the workplace context.

On or about October 4, 2021, plaintiff Jane Doe

commenced her employment as a Sheriff’s Deputy with the County of

1 Solano (“the County”) and the Solano County Sheriff’s Office

(“the Office”). (Docket No. 1 (Compl.) at 8.) Following her

initial orientation, plaintiff entered a “pre-field training

period” as a bailiff at a local courthouse. (Id.) During that

period, plaintiff was prohibited from leaving the courthouse

premises without a senior or lateral deputy escort pursuant to

the County’s and the Office’s policies. (Id.)

Senior Deputy John B. Robertson “positioned himself as

the primary person to escort” plaintiff from the courthouse “for

her breaks and meals.” (Id. at 9.) He further functioned as

plaintiff’s “supervisor and de facto supervisor through multiple

bases of authority.” (Id.)

Around November 2021, Robertson began to drastically

escalate his conduct as to plaintiff. Among other things, he

invited plaintiff to his home; insisted on paying for plaintiff’s

meals when alone with her; made a so-called “joke” that he would

“rape” plaintiff’s “gay friend”; and stated that he was “the only

one” plaintiff could trust regarding her workplace frustrations

and directed her to not speak to other deputies regarding such

frustrations. (Id. at 10.)

On approximately August 14, 2022, when plaintiff was

visiting Robertson at his home upon his insistence, Robertson

“physically assaulted and raped her” despite plaintiff repeatedly

“refus[ing] both verbally and by her attempts to create physical

distance” to have sexual intercourse with Robertson. (Id. at

11.) Over the following months, Robertson raped plaintiff “no

less than eight . . . more times, with his last, most violent

1 rape” involving “strangulation” that caused plaintiff to believe

that “she was going to die.” (Id. at 11-12.)

Plaintiff reported Robertson’s assaults to the

Vacaville Police Department on December 18, 2024. (Id. at 13.)

The following day, Robertson was placed on administrative leave.

(Id.) Plaintiff claims that her reporting of Robertson’s conduct

spurred defendants to engage in a “pattern of retaliatory

conduct” described below. (Id. at 13.)

First, plaintiff alleges that County Sheriff Thomas A.

Ferrara; County Undersheriff Bradley Dewall; Jackson Harris, a

Captain in the County’s Sheriff’s Office; the County; and the

Office (together, the “Entity Defendants”) conducted an

investigation biased heavily in favor of Robertson. (Id. at 15.)

To support this allegation, plaintiff states that the third-party

consultant the Entity Defendants hired to supplement their

investigation declined to interview plaintiff until she

“repeatedly insisted that she be interviewed”; and the Entity

Defendants permitted Robertson to contact witnesses, bullied

plaintiff or alternatively avoided her, and shared confidential

details about the investigation throughout the Office. (Id.)

Second, on or about March 4, 2025, plaintiff was

informed by defendants Dewall and Harris, with the approval of

Ferrara, that Robertson was being returned to full duty because

of the investigator’s conclusion that Robertson would not be

fired; Robertson resumed such duty on March 10, 2025. (Id. at

16.) However, the investigator separately informed plaintiff

that he never reached that conclusion because his investigation

1 was still ongoing. (Id.) Around this time, the Entity

Defendants also purported to impose a “stay away” order between

Robertson and plaintiff but nevertheless assigned plaintiff and

Robertson to “overlapping shifts on the same beat.” (Id. at 16.)

Although Robertson violated the order at least five times,

plaintiff alleges that the Entity Defendants did not take any

disciplinary action against him for having done so. (Id. at 16-

17.)

Third, two months after plaintiff emailed the Entity

Defendants (to no response) documenting the retaliation she

allegedly experienced at their behest, those same defendants

served her with a “gag order” directing her to not discuss the

events giving rise to the investigation with anyone except an

Internal Affairs Sergeant, who was later removed from the

investigation due to a conflict-of-interest in favor of

Robertson. (Id. at 18-19.)

Plaintiff filed this action shortly thereafter, in

which she brings ten claims. Relevant here, she brings two

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”): one against the

Entity Defendants in their individual and official capacities for

retaliating against her for engaging in constitutionally

protected speech, and the other against the County, the Office,

and Ferrara and Dewall pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Svcs.,

436 U.S. 658 (1978).

Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss, in

which they seek to dismiss as against Harris, Dewall, and

Ferrara, and argue that plaintiff has not adequately pled her

1 First Amendment and Monell claims. (See Docket No. 18-1.)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for

dismissal when the plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

The inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the

allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor, the complaint has stated “a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare recitals of

the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id.

I. First Amendment Retaliation

To properly plead a First Amendment retaliation claim,

plaintiff must demonstrate that she “spoke on a matter of public

concern”; “spoke as a private citizen,” as opposed to a “public

employee”; and that her “protected speech was a substantial or

motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Eng v.

Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009).

a. Matter of Public Concern

“Speech involves a matter of public concern when it can

fairly be considered to relate to ‘any matter of political,

social, or other concern to the community.’” Johnson v.

Multnomah Cnty., Or., 48 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting

Connick v. Myers, 416 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). As such, “speech

that concerns ‘issues about which information is needed or

appropriate to enable the members of society’ to make informed

decisions about the operation of their government merits the

1 highest degree of [F]irst [A]mendment protection.” McKinley v.

City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)). Conversely,

“speech that deals with individual personnel disputes and

grievances and that would be of no relevance to the public’s

evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies” is

generally not of public concern. Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320

F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2003) (quotations omitted).

Plaintiff alleges that she reported Robertson’s

behavior to the Vacaville Police Department, the County, and the

Office, and that her reports addressed “law enforcement

misconduct, sexual violence by peace officers, workplace

retaliation, and sexual harassment [and] discrimination.” (See

Compl. at 13, 26.) To this end, the Ninth Circuit has held that

the “reporting . . . [of] instances of possible . . .

discrimination[] or misconduct” by public safety officers “and

following up on those complaints” is “clearly a matter of public

concern.” See Robinson v. York, 566 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir.

2009) (quotations omitted).

Indeed, whether a police department “treats complaints

of misconduct seriously or fails to follow[-]up is . . . a matter

of ‘relevance to the public’s evaluation of the performance of

governmental agencies’ and consequently independently a matter of

public concern.” Id. at 823 (quoting Coszalter, 320 F.3d at

973). Specifically, the ability to discern whether a police

force competently handles internal allegations of violent sexual

assault is undoubtedly a matter of concern to the public that may

1 report similar conduct to that same organization. Cf. id.

Accordingly, plaintiff has satisfied her burden of

demonstrating that she spoke on a matter of public concern.

b. Private Citizen or Public Employee

“The Supreme Court has observed that the inquiry into

whether employee speech is pursuant to employment duties is a

practical one.” Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932 (9th Cir.

2007). Under this “practical” inquiry, id., “[s]tatements are

made in the speaker's capacity as citizen if the speaker had no

official duty to make the questioned statements, or if the speech

was not the product of performing the tasks the employee was paid

to perform,” Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071.

“[P]articularly in a highly hierarchical employment

setting such as law enforcement, whether or not the employee

confined h[er] communications to h[er] chain of command is a

relevant, if not necessarily dispositive, factor in determining

whether [s]he spoke pursuant to his official duties.” Dahlia v.

Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2013). Correspondingly,

“[w]hen a public employee communicates with individuals or

entities outside of h[er] chain of command, it is unlikely that

[s]he is speaking pursuant to h[er] duties.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges that, at minimum, she reported

Robertson’s conduct to the Vacaville Police Department, an

external entity necessarily sitting “outside of h[er] chain of

command.” See id. Further, plaintiff’s complaints concerned

departmental “abuse,” making it “unlikely that such complaints

c[ould] reasonably be classified as being within the job duties

1 of an average public employee.” See id. at 1075.

Plaintiff has thus satisfied her burden of showing that

she spoke as a private citizen.

c. Substantial or Motivating Factor Behind Adverse

Employment Action

To constitute an adverse employment action, a

government act of retaliation must be “reasonably likely to deter

employees from engaging in protected activity.” Dahlia, 735 F.3d

at 1078. “Depending on the circumstances, even minor acts of

retaliation can infringe on an employee's First Amendment

rights.” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 975.

Under this inquiry, “some, perhaps all, of the

following acts, considered individually, were adverse employment

actions for purposes of plaintiff[’s] First Amendment retaliation

suit,” id. at 976: (1) disclosing information regarding the

confidential sexual assault investigation to other employees

(Compl. at 15), (2) bullying and alternatively ignoring plaintiff

(id.), (3) returning Robertson to duty after the investigation

and assigning him to “overlapping shifts on the same beat” as

plaintiff (id. at 16), (4) refusing to enforce the “stay away”

order directing Robertson to avoid plaintiff (id. at 16-17), and

(5) conspicuously refusing to identify plaintiff (and plaintiff

alone) by her official title at a County event (id. at 18).

“When taken together, it is clear that these acts amounted to a

severe and sustained campaign of employer retaliation that was

reasonably likely to deter plaintiff[] from engaging in speech

protected under the First Amendment.” Coszalter, 320 F.3d at

1 977. Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately established that she

was subject to adverse employment actions.

Plaintiff must also demonstrate that “retaliation was a

substantial or motivating factor behind . . . defendant[s’]

adverse employment actions,” which she can do in at least “three

ways.” Id. “First,” she “can introduce evidence regarding the

proximity in time between the protected action and the allegedly

retaliatory employment decision, from which a jury logically

could infer that the plaintiff was [harmed] in retaliation for

h[er] speech.” Id. (citation modified). “Second,” she “can

introduce evidence that h[er] employer expressed opposition to

h[er] speech, either to h[er] or to others.” Id. (quotations

omitted). “Third,” she “can introduce evidence that h[er]

employer's proffered explanations for the adverse employment

action were false and pre-textual.” Id. (quotations omitted).

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged retaliation was a

substantial or motivating factor under the first approach.

Plaintiff initially complained of Robertson’s conduct in December

2024 (Compl. at 17); she alleges that defendants engaged in the

above-mentioned retaliatory conduct in February 2025 (id. at 18),

April 2025 (id. at 18-19), and June 2025 (id. at 27). The

minimal amount of time elapsed between plaintiff’s complaint and

defendants’ alleged conduct “easily . . . support[s] an inference

of retaliation.” See Coszalter, 320 F.3d at 977 (three-to-eight-

month time range raises inference of retaliation).

Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately alleged a First

1 Amendment retaliation claim.1

II. Monell Claim

Plaintiff alleges a Monell claim against the County and

the Office under failure-to-train and ratification theories.2

Because plaintiff adequately alleges a Monell claim against the

County and the Office under a failure-to-train theory, the court

need not address the viability of plaintiff’s ratification

theory. See, e.g., Thomas v. Stanislaus Cnty., No. 2:25-cv-02113

WBS CSK, 2026 WL 35695, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026).

“In limited circumstances, a local government's

decision not to train certain employees about their legal duty to

avoid violating citizens’ rights may rise to the level of an

official government policy for purposes of § 1983,” but “[a]

municipality's culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its

most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick

v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). To state a claim for

failure to train, a plaintiff must show deliberate indifference

on the part of the County in adequately training its law

20 1 It may be the case that defendants have an “adequate

justification” for engaging in their allegedly retaliatory

actions, or that they would have taken such actions “even in the

22 absence of . . . [plaintiff’s] protected conduct. Eng, 552 F.3d

at 1071-72. However, at the pleading stage, defendants have not

23 yet had an opportunity to present such justification.

24 2 Plaintiff also alleges this claim against Ferrara and

Dewall. However, “a Monell claim cannot properly be brought

against individual defendants.” Lopez v. Cnty. of San

Bernardino, No. SA 19:cv-1436 JVS ADSx, 2020 WL 2027597, at *5

(C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2020) (citing Guillory v. Cty. of Orange, 731

27 F.2d 1379, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984)). Accordingly, the court will

dismiss plaintiff’s Monell claim against Ferrara and Dewall.

1 enforcement officers, and that the inadequate training actually

caused a deprivation of her constitutional rights. Merritt v.

Cnty. of Los Angeles, 875 F.2d 765, 770 (9th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff alleges that the County and the Office failed

to adequately train its officers regarding:

(1) prohibition on sexual harassment and assault of

subordinate employees; (2) appropriate boundaries

between senior deputies and probationary deputies; (3)

mandatory reporting requirements under [state law]; (4)

protection of employees who report sexual misconduct;

(5) enforcement of ‘stay away’ orders and workplace

safety measures; and (6) the prohibition on retaliation

against employees who exercise First Amendment rights

to report misconduct.

(Compl. at 29.)

She thus “plausibly allege[s]” that the County and the

Office failed to train its officers regarding workplace sexual

misconduct and that “this failure to train resulted in” the

deprivation of her First Amendment rights. See Estate of

Chivrell, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 1238.

Plaintiff further alleges that, based on the County and

the Office’s checkered history of inadequately handling multiple

similar complaints of workplace sexual misconduct (see Compl. at

30), the County’s and the Office’s failure to implement such

policies amounted to deliberate indifference to constitutional

rights. See Estate of Chivrell, 695 F. Supp. 3d at 1238. This

is sufficient to state a Monell claim under a failure-to-train

1 theory at the pleading stage.

III. Individual Defendants

Defendants argue that plaintiff’s First Amendment claim

must be dismissed against Harris, Dewall, and Ferrara in their

individual capacities because the complaint contains insufficient

allegations against them, individually. (See Docket No. 18-1 at

3-5.) Defendants are correct that “[l]iability under [S]ection

1983 arises only upon a showing of personal participation by

[each] defendant.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.

1989).

Beginning with Harris, defendants argue in their motion

to dismiss that Harris, and only Harris, is entitled to qualified

immunity. (See Docket No. 18-1 at 4.) The Ninth Circuit has

instructed that, “[o]nce the defense of qualified immunity is

raised by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of

showing that the rights allegedly violated were ‘clearly

established.’” LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir.

2000).

Plaintiff’s counsel did not address defendants’

qualified immunity argument as to Harris either in their papers

or at oral argument upon being prompted by the court. At oral

argument, the court asked plaintiff’s counsel to define for

purposes of a qualified immunity analysis the “clearly

established” right that defendants allegedly violated.

Plaintiff’s counsel was unable to do so. Assuming that the right

at issue is the right to not be in forced proximity to an

individual after complaining of that individual’s sexually

1 inappropriate behavior, plaintiff’s counsel has been unable to

provide any authority clearly establishing such right.

Accordingly, this action must be dismissed as against Harris on

qualified immunity grounds.

As for Ferrara, plaintiff alleges that he issued an

approval of Robertson’s return to full duty while the

investigation into his conduct was still pending. (Id. at 27.)

She further alleges that he, as County Sheriff, contributed to

the enactment of the “gag order” against her and ratified

subordinates’ retaliatory conduct against her. (Id. at 21.)

These individualized allegations suffice.

Lastly, regarding Dewall, plaintiff claims that he

informed her that Robertson was being returned to full duty

because the investigation into his behavior resulted in a

conclusion that he would not be terminated, notwithstanding the

investigator confirming to plaintiff that he never reached such a

conclusion because his investigation was ongoing. (Id. at 16.)

Plaintiff also alleges that he failed to introduce her by her

official title at a County event, despite introducing other

individuals by their official titles at the same event, shortly

after she reported Robertson’s conduct. (Id. at 18.) While the

court does not doubt that Dewall’s behavior upset plaintiff, it

did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Accordingly, the court will dismiss Dewall as a defendant.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion to

dismiss (Docket No. 18) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part as follows:

ee EN IEE ESE IIE III EIR) SEINE IO

This action is DISMISSED as against defendants Dewall

and Harris;

Plaintiff’s third cause of action is DISMISSED as

against defendant Ferrara; and

° Defendants’ motion to dismiss is DENIED as to all other

° claims against the remaining defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

° Dated: February 18, 2026 bette 2d. □□

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10 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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