The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10 San Francisco Division
11 KENG JURAI, Case No. 25-cv-07093-LB
12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS AND DENYING MOTION TO
13 v. DECLARE THE PLAINTIFF A
VEXATIOUS LITIGANT
14 GOOGLE LLC, et al.,
Re: ECF Nos. 48, 53, 58
15 Defendants.
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17 INTRODUCTION
18 The court granted Google LLC’s prior motion to dismiss because the plaintiff failed to
19 plausibly plead § 1981 discrimination claim (containing only conclusory allegations about
20 discriminatory intent his qualifications for non-driver positions) and his remaining claims were
21 dismissed with prejudice as barred by res judicata (stemming from a previously settled case: No.
22 3:24-cv-07984-LB).1 The court gave the plaintiff leave to supplement the complaint with
23 additional facts supporting his § 1981 claim, and he did so.2 Google moves to dismiss because the
24 supplemental allegations are conclusory and the plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded discriminatory
25 intent or his qualifications. Google also moves to name the plaintiff a vexatious litigant for his
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1 Order – ECF No. 42. Citations refer to material in the Electronic Case File (ECF); pinpoint citations
are to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents.
1 frivolous filings against it and moves for a protective order preventing similar filings until the
2 court decides the motion to dismiss.
3 The court grants the motion to dismiss for the reasons advanced by Google and dismisses the
4 § 1981 claim with prejudice. The court denies the motion to deem the plaintiff a vexatious litigant
5 because a warning that additional, similar filings may warrant a finding of vexatiousness is a more
6 narrowly tailored response. The motion for a protective order is moot.
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8 STATEMENT
9 The plaintiff holds multiple degrees: a master’s degree in business administration and
10 bachelor’s degrees in technical management and project management.3 He has over eight years of
11 experience “in portfolios or program management or project management.”4 He was a “Senior
12 Operations & Program Management Leader and Project Manager with 8+ years of progressive
13 experience in logistics, construction, transportation, vendor management, workplace services,
14 facilities operations, and mission-critical infrastructure (data centers, manufacturing, industrial
15 environments).”5
16 The plaintiff applied for multiple positions with Google after May 2025, including positions
17 for data-center security manager and program manager of environmental health, safety, and data
18 center operations in August 2025; YouTube partner-operations manager and technical-program
19 manager in October 2025; strategy and operations lead, business-program manager, program
20 manager II, central headcount and operations position, senior data-center services manager, and
21 support and logistics section manager in November 2025; and regional strategy operations
22 manager in December 2025.6
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3 Id. at 2–3 (¶¶ 2–4).
4 Id. at 3 (¶ 5).
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5 Id. at 4 (¶ 6).
1 The plaintiff alleges that he was rejected from each of these positions and that Google
2 “illegally discriminated” against him by hiring H-1B holders instead.7 The plaintiff alleges that for
3 several of these positions, he was rejected “but-for his being a U.S. citizen.”8 Google’s
4 applications stated that it “will be prioritizing applicants who have valid working rights in
5 Thailand and do not require Google’s sponsorship for a visa” and asked, “Do you currently need,
6 or will you someday require, Google to sponsor work authorization for you to work in the country
7 of employment?”9
8 STANDARD OF REVIEW
9 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
10 entitled to relief to give the defendant fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.
11 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). It may fail by lacking a
12 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts under one. Woods v. U.S. Bank N.A., 831 F.3d 1159,
13 1162 (9th Cir. 2016). The court accepts factual allegations as true and construes them in the light
14 most favorable to plaintiffs. Interpipe Contracting, Inc. v. Becerra, 898 F.3d 879, 886–87 (9th Cir.
15 2018). But allegations must state a plausible claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Threadbare recital
16 of the elements of a claim, supported by mere conclusory statements, does not suffice. Ashcroft v.
17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
18 ANALYSIS
19 The issues are whether the plaintiff has plausibly pleaded discriminatory intent by Google
20 (supporting his § 1981 discrimination claim) and whether the plaintiff should be deemed a
21 vexatious litigant. The answer to both questions is no.
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23 1. Motion to Dismiss
24 The plaintiff has not plausibly pleaded discriminatory intent by Google.
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7 Id.
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8 Id. at 5 (¶ 9), 8–9 (¶¶ 18–19), 12–13 (¶ 28–29).
1 To state a § 1981 discrimination claim against a private defendant, a plaintiff must allege that
2 (1) he is a member of a racial group, (2) some contractual right with the defendant was impaired,
3 (3) the defendant intentionally discriminated against him based on race, and (4) his race was a but-
4 for cause of the contractual impairment. Ray v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1279
5 (C.D. Cal. 2024) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327,
6 341 (2020)). For both race discrimination and retaliation claims, “a plaintiff must prove that the
7 defendant acted against him with discriminatory intent.” Stones v. L.A. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 796 F.2d
8 270, 272 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391
9 (1982) (Ҥ 1981, like the Equal Protection Clause, can be violated only by purposeful
10 discrimination.”)).
11 To show discriminatory intent, the plaintiff points to (1) allegations that “but-for” his race and
12 citizenship, Google rejected his applications, (2) Google’s asking about an applicant’s need for
13 sponsorship on job applications, and (3) allegations made for the first time in his opposition that
14 Google has engaged in fraud by falsely certifying and submitting a labor condition application.
15 None of his arguments are persuasive.
16 The allegations that Google “illegally discriminated” against the plaintiff by hiring H-1B
17 holders instead of him and that Google rejected him “but-for his being a U.S. citizen” are
18 conclusory.10 The statement and question about sponsorship on Google’s applications do not show
19 discriminatory intent.11 The Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair
20 Employment Practices issued a technical assistance letter advising employers that it “recommends
21 that employers wishing to inquire about sponsorship limit their question to that topic, without
22 asking specifically about immigration status.”12 The plaintiff does not dispute that the language
23 cited in Google’s applications conforms with this advice.13
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10 Id. at 5–13.
26 11 Id. at 5–9 (¶¶ 9, 13, 18–19), 12–13 (¶¶ 28–29).
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12 Office of Special Counsel, Department of Justice, Technical Assistance Letter (Sep. 6, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/09/11/171.pdf.
1 The plaintiff asserts for the first time in his opposition that Google “fraudulently certified LCA
2 and H-1B visa process by intentionally falsifying the statement to USDOL and USCIS.”14 Because
3 this allegation is not in the pleadings, the court does not consider it. Schneider v. Cal. Dept. of
4 Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6)
5 dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a
6 memorandum in opposition to a defendant's motion to dismiss”).
7 The court dismisses the plaintiff’s § 1981 discrimination claim with prejudice because even
8 after amendment, his allegations about Google’s discriminatory intent are not plausibly pleaded.
9 With no remaining claims, Google’s motion for a protective order is terminated as moot.
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11 2. Vexatious
12 Google contends that the plaintiff should be declared a vexatious litigant because he has (1)
13 sued Google twice after settling two other related law suits, (2) propounded discovery after
14 agreeing to defer it until after a settlement conference, and (3) made frivolous filings for a
15 temporary restraining order and a motion for default against Google.15 On this record, the court
16 does not recommend such a finding.
17 Flagrant abuse of the judicial process cannot be tolerated because it enables one person to
18 preempt the use of judicial time that properly could be used to consider the meritorious claims of
19 other litigants. See De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990). However, “pre-
20 filing orders should rarely be filed” because such orders could impose a “substantial burden on the
21 free-access guarantee” under the First Amendment, “‘which is one of the most precious of the
22 liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights.’” Ringgold-Lockhart v. County of Los Angeles, 761
23 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Such rare instances require that the courts comply
24 with certain procedural and substantive requirements as set forth in De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147–
25 48. Ringgold-Lockhart, 761 F.3d at 1062.
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14 Opp’n – ECF No. 51 at 4.
] Orders restricting a person’s access to the courts may be issued only after a litigant has had an
2 || opportunity to oppose the order and the court has made substantive findings as to the frivolous or
3 harassing nature of the litigant’s actions. See De Long, 912 F.2d at 1147-48. The order must be
4 || based on adequate justification supported in the record and narrowly tailored to address the abuse
5 || perceived. See id.; cf In re: Thomas, 508 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir. 2007) (prefiling orders
6 || precluding a litigant from proceeding with an appeal may be imposed only when (1) the appeal is
7 || patently insubstantial or clearly controlled by well settled precedent; or (2) the facts presented are
8 fanciful or in conflict with facts of which the court may take judicial notice).
9 A pre-filing “injunction cannot issue merely upon a showing of litigiousness.” Moy v. United
10 || States, 906 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1990). The plaintiffs claims must not only be numerous but
11 also be patently without merit. See id.
12 While there appears to be no objectively reasonable basis for filing cases against Google for
13 conduct occurring after the May 2025 settlements, the plaintiffs filings have not been sufficiently
14 || numerous to justify a pre-filing injunction, and a warning that additional, similar filings may
15 || warrant a finding of vexatiousness is a more narrowly tailored response.
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17 CONCLUSION
Z 18 The plaintiffs § 1981 claim for discrimination is dismissed with prejudice. The court denies
19 || Google’s motion to declare the plaintiff a vexatious litigant, but similar filings by the plaintiff in
20 || the future may warrant that response. The motion for a protective order is terminated as moot.
21 IT ISSO ORDERED.
22 Dated: May 14, 2026 LAE
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LAUREL BEELER
24 United States Magistrate Judge
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