The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ANGELO ALEXANDRO CODALLO- Case No.: 3:26-cv-2559-JES-AHG
CAMBERO,
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ORDER:
Petitioner,
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v. (1) DENYING PETITION; and
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PAM BONDI, Attorney General;
15 (2) DENYING MOTION FOR
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary of
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
16 DHS; TODD LYONS, Director of ICE;
ORDER
CHRISTOPHER LAROSE, Warden of
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Otay Mesa Detention Center,
18 [ECF No. 1]
Respondents.
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Before the Court is Petitioner Angelo Alexandro Codallo-Cambero’s (“Petitioner”):
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(1) Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“Petition”); and (2)
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Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). ECF Nos. 1 (“Pet.”), 2. Pursuant to
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the Court’s Order to Show Cause (ECF No. 4), Respondents filed a return to the petition.
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ECF No. 7 (“Return”). The Court conditionally appointed Federal Defenders to represent
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Petitioner and Federal Defenders filed a traverse. ECF Nos. 4, 10. After due consideration
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and for the reasons below, the Court DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE the petition. The
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Court also DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for a TRO.
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1 I. BACKGROUND
2 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela, who was admitted into the United
3 States on a nonimmigrant visa on or about June 13, 2015, for a temporary period not to
4 exceed six months, but remained beyond the six-month period. See ECF No. 7-1 (Notice
5 to Appear, “NTA”) at 2; see also ECF No. 7-2 (“I-213”). On March 6, 2025, Petitioner was
6 arrested by ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations in Kissimmee, Florida while at a
7 Florida probation office. See I-213 at 3. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
8 determined that Petitioner is deportable/removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), as an
9 individual who was admitted to the United States and has remained for a time longer than
10 permitted by law. See NTA at 2. As a result, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear and
11 placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. Return at 2. On April 22, 2025,
12 Petitioner had a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
13 1226(a). See generally ECF No. 7-3. The IJ denied Petitioner’s request for bond as “[t]he
14 Court [wa]s not satisfied that the respondent is not a danger.” See id.
15 On March 20, 2026, Petitioner had a merits hearing for his previously filed
16 applications for asylum, withholding of removal and protections under the convention
17 against torture. Return at 2, ECF No. 7-4 at 2. The IJ denied all applications for relief and
18 ordered Petitioner removed to Venezuela, or Mexico in the alternative. Id at 2-5. Petitioner
19 had until April 20, 2026, to file an appeal regarding his removal order before the Board of
20 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Id. at 5. On April 13, 2026, Petitioner attempted to file an
21 appeal before the BIA, but the appeal was rejected because he failed to include the
22 appropriate filing fee or a request for a fee waiver. Return at 2; see generally ECF No. 7-
23 5. Petitioner did not timely file an appeal before the BIA. Return at 2; see generally ECF
24 No. 7-6. Since Petitioner never appealed the IJs removal order, his removal order became
25 final on April 21, 2026. ECF No. 7-4 at 5.
26 II. LEGAL STANDARD
27 A writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual detained within the United
28 States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2).
1 “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that
2 custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal
3 custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A court may grant a writ of
4 habeas corpus to a petitioner who demonstrates to be in custody in violation of the
5 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Traditionally, “the writ of habeas
6 corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in
7 that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301
8 (2001). Accordingly, challenges to immigration-related detention are within the purview
9 of a district court’s habeas jurisdiction. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see
10 also Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003).
11 III. DISCUSSION
12 Respondents argue that with a final order of removal, Petitioner is now detained
13 under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 and his detention is not yet prolonged. Return at 3. The Court agrees.
14 Petitioner was initially admitted into the United States on a nonimmigrant visa and
15 overstayed the six-month duration of that visa. He was detained on March 6, 2025, and was
16 initially detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). However, once an immigration court enters a
17 final order of removal, § 1231 governs the detention. Under this provision, the government
18 “shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days.” 8 U.S.C. §
19 1231(a)(1)(A)-(a)(2)(A). The government shall detain the alien in custody during the initial
20 90-day removal period by statute. Id. In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that when the
21 government is unable to remove an alien within 90 days, the alien may seek review of the
22 reasonableness of their continued detention under the due process clause through petition
23 for writ of habeas corpus. 533 U.S. at 687. The Court instructed courts to analyze whether
24 continued detention beyond the 90-day period “exceeds a period reasonably necessary to
25 secure removal,” based on “the [removal detention] statute’s basic purpose, namely,
26 assuring the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Id. at 699. The Court has held
27 that it is presumptively reasonable for the government to detain an alien for a period of 6
28 months while it works to effectuate his removal after issuing a final order of removal
1 against him. /d. at 701. Beyond that period, “if removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the
2 ||court should hold continued detention unreasonable and no longer authorized by statute”
3 grant the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Jd. at 699-700.
4 In his petition, Petitioner states that he “has an ongoing case on the ‘BIA’ Board of
5 Immigration Appeals were Petitioned will highly succeed on.” Pet. at 2. However, in the
6 || Return, Respondents highlight that Petitioner’s request for appeal was rejected by the BIA
7 || and he does not have an appeal currently pending before the BIA. See generally ECF Nos.
8 7-6. Since Petitioner did not file a valid appeal, his removal order became final on
9 || April 21, 2026. ECF No. 7-3. Thus, detention is now governed by § 1231 by statute. Under
10 |/the § 1231 framework as outlined above, Petitioner’s removal period clock started on April
11 2026, when his removal became final. Thus, to date, his detention period under § 1231
12 just over one month, which is still within the presumptively reasonable period articulated
13 |}in Zadvydas.
14 Accordingly, at this time, the Court must DENY Petitioner’s petition. The denial,
15 ||however, is WITHOUT PREJUDICE to Petitioner refiling should his post-removal
16 || detention extend past the 6-month period of presumptive reasonableness.
17 IV. CONCLUSION
18 For the reasons discussed above, the Court DENIES the Petition without prejudice.
19 || In light of this ruling, the Court DENIES AS MOOT Petitioner’s Motion for TRO. The
20 || Clerk is directed to close the case.
21 IT IS SO ORDERED.
22 || Dated: June 1, 2026
24 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr.
5 United States District Judge
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