The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 ESTATE OF GUSTAVO SILVA, JR., by Case No.: 3:25-cv-1295-JES-MMP
and through successors in interest,
12
MARIA LUCILA, GUSTAVO SILVA ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO
13 SR., YESIKA SILVA, and GUSTAVO DISMISS
SILVA JR.; MARIA LUCILA,
14
individually; GUSTAVO SILVA, SR.,
[ECF Nos. 14, 15]
15 individually; YESIKA SILVA,
individually; GUSTAVO SILVA, JR.,
16
individually,
17
Plaintiffs,
18
v.
19
COUNTY OF IMPERIAL, a public
20 entity; IMPERIAL COUNTY SHERIFFS
OFFICE; SHERIFF FRED
21
MIRAMONTES, in his individual and
22 official capacities; CORRECTIONAL
CAPTAIN JUAN CHAVARIN,
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individually; CORRECTIONAL
24 LIEUTENANT ROBERT WILSON,
individually; NAPHCARE INC., an
25
Alabama Corporation; DOES 1-10,
26 individually, jointly and severally,
27 Defendants.
28 //
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 This case originates from the tragic death of Gustavo Silva Jr. while in custody at
3 the Imperial County Sheriff’s Office Regional Adult Detention Facility. Gustavo Silva Jr.
4 was arrested and placed in custody on January 21, 2024. He died by suicide the very next
5 day, January 22, 2024. Gustavo Silva Jr.’s parents and surviving children bring this case
6 against the County of Imperial, Imperial County Sheriff’s Office, NaphCare and several
7 individual Defendants. The Plaintiffs argue that Gustavo Silva Jr. was suffering from
8 mental health issues and suicidal ideation that the Defendants should have been aware of
9 and monitored to prevent his suicide. The Court acknowledges the pain the Plaintiffs are
10 suffering from the loss of their loved one. However, the complaint fails to state a cause of
11 action against any of the Defendants as it contains nothing but conclusory language to
12 describe the signs that gave notice to Defendants that Gustavo Silva Jr. was suffering from
13 suicidal ideation prior to his death, and the statute of limitations has passed preventing the
14 estate from bringing any claims for medical malpractice. For those reasons, the Court
15 GRANTS the motions to dismiss each cause of action.
16 II. BACKGROUND
17 A. Procedural Background
18 Plaintiffs Maria Lucila, Gustavo Silva, Sr., Yeshika Silva, and Gustavo Silva, Jr.,
19 individually and on behalf of the Estate of Gustavo Silva, Jr., as successors in interest,
20 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this suit against Defendants NaphCare (“NaphCare”), and
21 Defendants County of Imperial, Imperial County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Fred
22 Miramontes, (“Sheriff Miramontes”) Correctional Captain Juan Chavarin (“Capt.
23 Chavarin”), Correctional Lieutenant Robert Wilson (“Lt. Wilson,” collectively “County
24 Defendants”), and Does 1-10 (collectively, including NaphCare, County Defendants, and
25 Does 1-10, “Defendants”) arising from the death of Gustavo Silva, Jr., (“Decedent”) by
26 suicide in custody. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). NaphCare and County Defendants each filed
27 motions to dismiss this action, which were fully briefed by the parties. See ECF Nos. 14,
28
1 15, 16, 19, 24, 25. The Court considers the motions together here for consistency across
2 common issues.
3 B. Factual Background
4 On January 21, 2024, Decedent was arrested and placed in custody at the Imperial
5 County Sheriff’s Office Regional Adult Detention Facility (“RADF”) located in El Centro,
6 California. Compl. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs allege that Decedent completed a preliminary medical
7 and psychological screening and was placed in the general population of the jail. Id. ¶¶ 33-
8 34. Plaintiffs allege that Decedent was showing clear signs of mental health issues and
9 acute suicidality. Id. ¶¶ 34-35. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants had the opportunity to
10 observe these symptoms and acted with indifference towards Decedent’s dire need for
11 medical intervention. Id. ¶¶ 35-36. On January 22, 2024, Decedent died by suicide in
12 custody at RADF through self-asphyxiation. Id. ¶¶ 37, 57; see also ECF No. 14-1 at 6.
13 The current suit is brought by Decedent’s mother, Maria Lucila; his father, Gustavo
14 Silva, Sr.; his daughter, Yesika Silva; and his son, Gustavo Silva, Jr., on behalf of
15 themselves and Decedent’s estate. Compl. ¶¶ 12-16. They bring this suit against County
16 Defendants, who they allege were responsible for operations at RADF; NaphCare, a
17 corporation they allege was the exclusive provider of medical and mental health care at
18 RADF at the time of Decedent’s death; and ten unnamed Doe Defendants, representing
19 individual employees of County Defendants and/or NaphCare who Plaintiffs believe are
20 responsible in whole or part for Decedent’s death. Id. ¶¶ 17-31. Plaintiffs bring eleven
21 causes of action against Defendants: (1) failure to protect from harm in violation of 42
22 U.S.C. § 1983, against Does 1-10; (2) failure to provide medical care in violation of 42
23 U.S.C. § 1983, against Does 1-10; (3) deprivation of right to familial relationship, in
24 violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Does 1-10; (4) municipal liability, in violation of 42
25 U.S.C. § 1983, against County of Imperial, Imperial County Sheriff’s Office and
26 NaphCare; (5) supervisory liability for failure to train, supervise and discipline, in violation
27 of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Sheriff Miramontes, Capt. Chavarin, Lt. Wilson and Does 8-
28 10; (6) negligence, against all Defendants and Does 1-10; (7) medical malpractice against
1 NaphCare and Does 1-10; (8) violation of California Government Code § 845.6, against
2 all Defendants and Does 1-10; (9) violation of the Bane Act, against all Defendants and
3 Does 1-10; (10) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), against Does
4 1-10; and (11) violation of the Rehabilitation Act, against Does 1-10. Id. ¶¶ 58-173.
5 III. LEGAL STANDARD
6 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6) for
7 failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of a plaintiff’s claim. Navarro v. Block,
8 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When considering the motion, the court must accept as
9 true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
10 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The court need not accept as true legal conclusions cast as factual
11 allegations. Id.; Aschroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[t]hreadbare recitals of the
12 elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are insufficient).
13 A complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,
14 550 U.S. at 570. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must include non-conclusory
15 factual content. Id. at 555; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The facts and the reasonable inferences
16 drawn from those facts must show a plausible—not just a possible—claim for relief.
17 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d
18 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The focus is on the complaint, as opposed to any new facts alleged
19 in, for example, the opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss. See Schneider v.
20 California Dep’t of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998), reverse and
21 remanded on other grounds as stated in 345 F.3d 716 (9th Cir. 2003). “Determining
22 whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] … a context-specific task that
23 requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal,
24 556 U.S. at 679. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or “unadorned, the defendant-
25 unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.;
26 see also Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.
27 //
28 //
1 IV. DISCUSSION
2 County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against them on the basis that
3 (1) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under Monell against the County because they fail to
4 causally relate any policy or practice to the alleged constitutional violations; (2) Plaintiffs’
5 state law claims fail to state a statutory basis against County Defendants; and (3) Plaintiffs
6 fail to allege supervisory liability against Sheriff Miramontes, Capt. Chavarin and Lt.
7 Wilson; and (4) Plaintiffs do not properly allege specific facts properly identifying Doe
8 Defendants. ECF No. 14-1 (“County Mot.”) at 6. NaphCare argues that Plaintiffs’ claims
9 against it should be dismissed on the basis that (1) Plaintiffs fail to state sufficient factual
10 information in regards to all claims, and (2) Plaintiffs’ state law causes of action are barred
11 by the statute of limitations. ECF No. 15-1 (“NaphCare Mot.”) at 5. The Court evaluates
12 these arguments below as to each claim.
13 A. Claims Arising Under 42 USC § 1983
14 Plaintiffs bring claims arising under 42 USC § 1983 against Doe defendants, named
15 individual Defendants, and entity Defendants. “Traditionally, the requirements for relief
16 under [§] 1983 have been articulated as: (1) a violation of rights protected by the
17 Constitution or created by federal statute, (2) proximately caused (3) by conduct of a
18 ‘person’ (4) acting under color of state law.” Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th
19 Cir. 1991). The Court analyzes the arguments of the parties regarding the sufficiency of
20 each claim below.
21 1. Doe Defendants
22 Plaintiffs’ first, second, third, and fifth claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
23 individual defendants, including Does 1-10 employed by the County and NaphCare.
24 County Defendants argue that the Doe allegations are insufficient because the Does are not
25 adequately identified by the allegations. ECF No. 14-1 at 19.
26 For all individual defendants, Plaintiffs must show that “each defendant personally
27 played a role in violating the Constitution.” Hines v. Youseff, 914 F.3d 1218, 1228 (9th Cir.
28 2019). Indeed, “[a]n official is liable under § 1983 only if culpable action, or inaction, is
1 directly attributed to them.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). When the names of individual
2 defendants are unknown, “the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery
3 to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the
4 identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.” Gillespie v.
5 Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). To survive a motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs must
6 allege the action or inaction taken by the Doe Defendants that gave rise to the cause of
7 action. Lomeli v. Cnty. of San Diego, 637 F. Supp. 3d 1046, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 2022).
8 a. Failure to Protect from Harm
9 Plaintiffs’ first claim is a survival action brought by the Estate against Doe
10 Defendants 1-10 for Failure to Protect from Harm. Compl. ¶¶ 58-76. In Castro v. Cnty. of
11 Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit held:
12
[T]he elements of a pretrial detainee's Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-
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protect claim against an individual officer are:
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(1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions
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under which the plaintiff was confined;
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(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
17
harm;
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(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that
19
risk, even though a reasonable officer in the circumstances would have
20 appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the
defendant's conduct obvious; and
21
22 (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.
23
With respect to the third element, the defendant's conduct must be objectively
24 unreasonable, a test that will necessarily turn on the facts and circumstances
of each particular case.
25
26 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations omitted). This objective deliberate
27 indifference standard also applies to cases involving pretrial detainees’ suicide or suicide
28 attempts in custody. See, e.g., Moriarty v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 17cv1154-LAB (AGS),
1 2019 WL 4643602 at *6 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 24, 2019); Horton by Horton v. City of Santa
2 Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 600 (9th Cir. 2019).
3 Here, Plaintiffs have two core theories of how Defendants failed to protect Decedent
4 from harm. The first is that Defendants failed to identify Decedent’s mental health issues
5 due to inadequate screening procedures, which led to him not receiving care necessary to
6 reduce the risk of his suicide. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 22, 48, 59-60. The second is that Defendants
7 did not perform safety and welfare checks of individuals in custody and falsified logs
8 regarding those safety checks, leading to Decedent’s death. Id. ¶¶ 59, 64, 71. Plaintiffs
9 allege that these actions were undertaken by employees of the County and NaphCare, and
10 that three Doe Defendants in supervisory roles knew of and ratified this conduct. Id. ¶¶ 24-
11 27. Assuming these allegations, taken as true, are sufficient to show (1) an intentional
12 decision to conduct inadequate mental health screening and/or not perform safety checks;
13 (2) which created a substantial risk of serious harm of violence in custody; and (3) failure
14 to take reasonable measures such as adequate screening and/or safety checks, making the
15 possible consequence of detainee self-harm obvious, Plaintiff still does not allege non-
16 conclusory facts sufficient to show causation. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071; Compl. ¶ 72.
17 The Court examines below the facts alleged in the complaint that could go to causation,
18 and finds that Plaintiffs have not alleged a sufficient factual basis under federal pleadings
19 standards.
20 To show that Defendants’ inadequate mental health screening and subsequent lack
21 of risk abatement caused Decedent’s death, Plaintiffs would have to allege non-conclusory
22 facts showing that Defendants were or should have been on notice of Decedent’s condition.
23 Plaintiffs argue that they have done so, both by Plaintiffs alleging that Decedent exhibited
24 “obvious signs” of “mental health issues,” but do not make any allegations regarding what
25 those signs were, or how Defendants should have known from those signs that Decedent
26 was at risk of suicide. Compl. ¶ 34. Similarly, Plaintiffs allege that Decedent showed “clear
27 signs” of “acute suicidality.” Id. ¶ 35. This language is conclusory. The complaint’s use of
28 adjectives like “obvious” and “clear,” and statements that he was exhibiting noticeable
1 signs, are legal conclusions without supporting factual allegations regarding the actual
2 behavior at issue. Thus, under federal pleading standards, the Court cannot find that
3 Plaintiff has pled that Defendants should have been on notice of Decedent’s mental health
4 issues without some specific factual allegations from which notice may be inferred. See
5 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
6 To show that a lack of safety checks caused Decedent’s death, Plaintiffs would have
7 to allege non-conclusory facts that link the lack of safety checks to the death itself. The
8 complaint contains very few facts about Decedent’s death considering it is the single event
9 which gives rise to this suit. On the eighteenth page of the complaint, in alleging punitive
10 damages, Plaintiffs state for the first time that Decedent died by self-induced asphyxiation.
11 Compl. ¶ 57. On the sixteenth page, Plaintiffs allege that Decedent was placed in a cell
12 which was “not suitable for an inmate who exhibited clear signs of suicidal ideations
13 because the jail cell contained suicide hazards and was unreasonably dangerous for housing
14 inmates with identified mental health concerns.” Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants
15 failed to perform welfare and safety checks, implying that such checks would have
16 prevented Decedent’s death. Id. ¶ 36. The Court can infer from the allegations made that
17 Decedent used an object in the jail cell to asphyxiate himself. However, without more
18 factual allegations regarding how Defendants could have prevented Plaintiffs death, the
19 Court cannot find that Plaintiff has alleged the causation element of a failure to protect
20 claim.
21 In conclusion, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts which, taken as true, show the
22 causation element of a failure to protect claim. The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’
23 motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ first cause of action, with leave for Plaintiffs to amend the
24 complaint in accordance with the Court’s reasoning above.
25 b. Failure to Provide Medical Care
26 Plaintiffs’ second claim is a survival action brought by the Estate against Doe
27 Defendants for Failure to Provide Medical Care. Compl. ¶¶ 77-84.
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1 “Individuals in state custody have a constitutional right to medical treatment,”
2 which, for pre-trial detainees, “arise[s] under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
3 Clause.” Sandoval v. Cnty. of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 667 (9th Cir. 2021). To state a
4 claim,
5 [P]retrial detainees alleging that jail officials failed to provide constitutionally
adequate medical care must show:
6
7 (1) The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions
under which the plaintiff was confined [including a decision with respect to
8
medical treatment];
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(2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious
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harm;
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(3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that
12
risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have
13 appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the consequences of the
defendant's conduct obvious; and
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15 (4) By not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.
16
To satisfy the third element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's
17 actions were “objectively unreasonable,” which requires a showing of “more
than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless
18
disregard.
19
Id. at 669 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
20
Here, Plaintiffs allege that Doe Defendants did not provide appropriate emergency
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medical care and mental health care to Decedent, leading to his death. Compl. ¶ 79.
22
Plaintiffs allege that this failure arose from supervisory failures to train, supervise, and
23
promulgate appropriate policies. Id. However, Plaintiffs do not allege in this section any
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specific actions that Defendants took, did not take, or should have taken in Decedent’s
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medical care. See id. generally. Without any factual allegations regarding the medical care
26
that was or was not provided, the Court cannot infer that Defendants can be held liable for
27
failure to provide medical care. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. If Plaintiffs mean that
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1 Defendants inadequately screened Decedent for mental health issues and then failed to
2 implement mental health care as a result, they have not alleged facts to show notice of
3 mental health issues as explained above. The Court thus GRANTS the motion to dismiss
4 Plaintiffs’ claim for failure to provide medical care, with leave to amend should Plaintiffs
5 be able to allege a factual basis for their claim under federal pleading standards.
6 c. Deprivation of the Right to Familial Relationship
7 Plaintiffs’ third claim is brought by Decedent’s family members against Doe
8 Defendants for Deprivation of the Right to Familial Relationship with the Decedent.
9 Compl. ¶¶ 85-97.
10 “[P]arents have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in the companionship and
11 society of their children.” Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 554 (9th Cir. 2010). “Official
12 conduct that ‘shocks the conscience’ in depriving parents of that interest is cognizable as a
13 violation of [substantive] due process.” Id. (internal citations omitted). The standard for
14 conscience-shocking official action to state a familial association claim depends on the
15 temporality of the officer’s actions. See Porter v. Osborn, 546 F.3d 1131, 1137 (9th Cir.
16 2008). When officers make snap judgments in fast-paced situations, the officer’s conduct
17 shocks the conscience if he or she acts with a purpose to harm that was unrelated to
18 legitimate law enforcement objectives. Id. at 1139. Contrastingly, when officers fail to care
19 or correct obvious mistakes over an extended timeframe with opportunities to do so, their
20 conduct may shock the conscience under a standard of deliberate indifference. Id.
21 Deliberate indifference may be the proper standard in less prolonged situations when, for
22 example, officers ignoring a distressed detainee and then unresponsive behavior prior to
23 death. Quinto-Collins v. City of Antioch, 718 F. Supp. 3d 1033, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2024).
24 Here, as Decedent has died, his parents have been deprived of their constitutionally
25 protected interest in his companionship. See Wilkinson, 610 F.3d at 554. Plaintiffs state
26 that Doe Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Decedent’s protection, safety, and
27 serious medical and mental health needs. Compl. ¶ 86. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference
28 their other factual allegations, including that Defendants did not conduct welfare checks,
1 falsified logs, did not train their employees on mental health care, and were on notice of
2 the dangers of these failures from previous deaths in custody. Id. ¶¶ 42, 44, 47, 50, 59, 64,
3 71, 85. Plaintiffs argue that those failures caused their harm (id. ¶ 86) but, as explained
4 above, do not allege a factual link between Defendants’ behaviors and Decedent’s death
5 necessary to link the two under federal pleading standards. Thus, for the reasons set forth
6 above, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ deprivation of familial association claim is
7 GRANTED with leave to amend.
8 d. Failure to Supervise
9 Plaintiff’s fifth claim is brought by the Estate against Doe Defendants 8-10 on a
10 theory of Supervisory Liability for Failure to Properly Train, Supervise, and Discipline.
11 Compl. ¶¶ 106-114.
12 A supervisory official may be liable under section 1983 for the unconstitutional
13 conduct of his subordinates “if there exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the
14 constitutional deprivation, or (2) a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor's
15 wrongful conduct and the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646
16 (9th Cir.1989). “A supervisor will rarely be directly and personally involved in the same
17 way as are the individual officers who are on the scene inflicting constitutional injury.”
18 Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 645 (9th Cir. 1991).
19 Here, Plaintiffs do not allege any personal involvement by any of the individual Doe
20 Defendants. Thus, the individual Doe Defendants are only liable if Plaintiffs allege a
21 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the
22 constitutional violation. See Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. Plaintiffs allege that the supervisory
23 Doe Defendants failed to properly train and supervise their employees with deliberate
24 indifference to the constitutional rights of those in their care, leading to unconstitutional
25 acts. Compl. ¶¶ 108-109. The Court infers that the Plaintiffs mean the unconstitutional acts
26 analyzed above regarding inadequate identification of mental health issues and inadequate
27 or falsified safety checks. As explained above, Plaintiffs have not alleged facts which show
28 causation for those claims. Without facts to show that the underlying actions caused
1 Decedent’s death, the Court cannot evaluate whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled a
2 causal connection as required for a separately pled supervisory liability cause of action.
3 See Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. Thus, the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ standalone supervisory
4 liability cause of action against the Doe Defendants is GRANTED with leave to amend.
5 2. Named Individual Defendants
6 Plaintiffs also allege their fifth claim for supervisory liability causing constitutional
7 violations against Defendants Sheriff Miramontes, Capt. Chavarin, and Lt. Wilson. Compl.
8 ¶¶ 106-114. Like the Supervisory Liability claim against the Doe Defendants, this claim
9 does not contain nonconclusory allegations showing causation. The Court thus GRANTS
10 the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ supervisory liability claim against Defendants Sheriff
11 Miramontes, Capt. Chavarin, and Lt. Wilson.
12 Plaintiff also names these individual defendants in other civil rights causes of action
13 only pled against Doe Defendants. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 64, 71. However, as those claims
14 are not pled against the individual named defendants, the Court declines to analyze them
15 as such here.
16 3. Entity Defendants
17 Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action is against both County Defendants and NaphCare
18 for entity liability for pattern or practice of employee conduct under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as
19 interpreted in Monell. Both groups of defendants argue that Plaintiffs failed to adequately
20 plead their liability. ECF Nos. 14-1 at 8-12; 15-1 at 7-10. Because Plaintiff’s allegations of
21 policy and causation are the same against both entity Defendants, and Defendants make
22 essentially identical arguments for dismissal, the Court considers the arguments together
23 here.
24 In Monell, the Supreme Court held that local governments can be held liable under
25 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for injuries caused by their officers’ unconstitutional actions when those
26 injuries result from official policy or custom attributable to the government. Monell v.
27 Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A plaintiff may state a Monell claim by
28 alleging “(1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which he was deprived;
1 (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate indifference
2 to the plaintiff's constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force behind the
3 constitutional violation.” Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996).
4 At the pleading stage, a plaintiff’s Monell claim must contain “sufficient allegations of
5 underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
6 effectively” which, taken as true, “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” AE ex rel.
7 Hernandez v. Cnty. of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 637 (9th Cir. 2012). The Court examines each
8 prong of Monell liability in turn below.
9 a. Deprivation of a Constitutional Right
10 Here, Plaintiffs allege, and Defendants do not contest, that Decedent had
11 constitutional rights protected by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from
12 deliberate indifference to serious medical and mental health needs. Compl. ¶ 136.
13 Defendants also do not appear to contest that Plaintiff was deprived of that interest, but
14 rather that they are not responsible for such deprivation. ECF Nos. 14 at 10-14; 15 at 10.
15 Thus, Plaintiffs have adequately pled the first element of a Monell claim.
16 b. Municipal Policy
17
The Ninth Circuit has defined a policy as “a deliberate choice to follow a course of
18
action … made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for
19
establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Long v. Cnty. of
20
Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation omitted). A plaintiff
21
may allege a policy exists either through the entity’s affirmative activity or through
22
inactivity such as a “failure to implement procedural safeguards to prevent constitutional
23
violations” that amounts to “deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right.”
24
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
25
omitted). Plaintiffs may also proceed on a theory of an unofficial policy which, “although
26
not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is ‘so permanent and well settled
27
as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.” Brown v. City of Fort
28
1 Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1481 (11th Cir. 1991) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik,
2 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)).
3 Here, Plaintiffs allege both a set of official policies Defendants were required and
4 failed to adhere to (such as staffing the jail’s medical and mental health units, designing
5 and implementing a suicide prevention program, creating and implementing policies
6 related to the provision of mental health care, and providing oversight of mental health
7 units) and a set of unofficial policies or customs employed by Defendants in practice
8 (including denying detainees access to care, encouraging the falsification of safety check
9 logs, and failing to implement training and care regarding suicide prevention). Compl. ¶¶
10 99-100.
11 Both County Defendants and NaphCare take issue with the specific policies which
12 Plaintiff alleges they were required to have in place: NaphCare calls them a “random list
13 of policies,” (ECF No. 15-1 at 8) and County Defendants emphasize that “[t]o state the
14 obvious, the County is not a medical or nursing school.” ECF No. 14-1 at 11. But the
15 alleged policies are as straightforward and common sense, like “operational oversight for
16 the medical and mental health units” and “continuous training to detention staff regarding
17 the screening of inmates, identification of mentally ill inmates, risk recognition, and suicide
18 prevention.” Compl. ¶ 46. The complaint alleges that neither NaphCare nor the County
19 adequately trained RADF employees on basic mental health screening and identification
20 of suicidal behaviors. Id. ¶¶ 46, 100. Considering California’s requirement that jails
21 provide competent mental health screening by trained employees at intake, the Court does
22 not find the alleged policies “random” or believe that an allegation that such policies exists
23 holds the County to the standard of a medical school. See 15 C.C.R. § 1207 (requiring a
24 screening at intake which “shall include… mental health problems” “in accordance with
25 written procedures” and “performed by licensed health personnel or trained facility staff.”).
26 The Court also does not take lightly that Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to
27 implement safety checks and encouraged their employees to falsify related records. Compl.
28
1 ¶ 100. Thus, Plaintiffs have adequately pled policies attributable to a municipality as
2 required by Monell.
3 c. Deliberate Indifference
4 Deliberate indifference for Monell liability is an objective standard. Castro, 833 F.3d
5 at 1076. The core inquiry in determining whether a municipality was deliberately
6 indifferent is whether it had “actual or constructive notice” that the action or inaction in
7 question was “substantially certain to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of
8 their citizens.” City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 396 (1989). Plaintiffs can
9 meet this standard by either showing that “the policy [is] so facially deficient that any
10 reasonable policy maker would recognize the need to take action,” or by showing “a pattern
11 of prior, similar violations of federally protected rights, of which the relevant policy makers
12 had actual or constructive notice.” Hyun Ju Park v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 952 F.3d
13 1136, 1142 (9th Cir. 2020). For harm in custody cases, plaintiffs may plead notice by
14 alleging specific prior incidents resulting from the policy in question prior to the incident
15 giving rise to the suit, and/or by citing to other ways the city should have known of the
16 harm that was likely to result from the policy or custom. See, e.g., Laurel v. Cnty. of
17 Alameda, No. 24-cv-04427-RFL2025, WL 2402674 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2025) (denying
18 motion to dismiss where plaintiff alleged notice based on eleven highly publicized specific
19 deaths and a federal investigation showing inadequate healthcare in a jail); Heath v. Miani-
20 Dade Cnty., 736 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (S.D. Fla. 2024) (denying a motion to dismiss where the
21 complaint identified three suicides in custody, a report on inadequacies, and prior
22 agreements by the municipality to screen for mental health risks). To show notice for
23 unofficial policy allegations, Plaintiffs must show that “custom or practice, while not
24 adopted as an official formal policy, may be so pervasive as to be the functional equivalent
25 of a formal policy.” Grech v. Clayton County, Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 n. 6 (11th Cir.
26 2003). A “single incident would not be so pervasive as to be a custom or practice.” Id.
27 Here, Plaintiffs make few allegations of notice to show deliberate indifference that
28 are not legal conclusions. See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 5 (Defendants “had repeated notices” of
1 unlawful conduct); 47 (Defendants “had been on notice for years”); 61 (Defendants “were
2 on notice” of risk of harm). Plaintiffs allege that other deaths in custody show notice, but
3 list one death which occurred before Decedent’s death, which thus could not have put
4 Defendants on notice of the inadequacy of their practices as to Decedent, and another which
5 they do not even allege was a suicide or related to mental health issues. See id. ¶ 42. Further,
6 Plaintiffs conclusory argue that their failure to train claims have such an obvious result that
7 specific instances are unnecessary. ECF No. 24 at 13. Plaintiffs then allege for the first
8 time that had “staff received appropriate suicide-prevention training, Mr. Silva could have
9 been transferred to a hospital or, at minimum, placed on suicide watch in a safety cell under
10 24-hour supervision.” Id. However, this claim does not appear in the complaint and the
11 Court declines to analyze a theory not articulated in the complaint based on factual
12 allegations not present in the complaint. Plaintiffs have thus not met their burden at the
13 pleading stage to show deliberate indifference.
14 d. Causation
15 Plaintiffs allege that these knowing failures to provide adequate care and prevent
16 harm resulted in the death of Decedent. Compl. ¶ 51. As explained above, Plaintiffs have
17 not alleged non-conclusory facts linking individual Defendants’ alleged failures to
18 Decedent’s death. Similarly, here, Plaintiffs’ arguments make the legal conclusion of
19 causation or imply the likelihood of the alleged policies causing the harm, but do not allege
20 non-conclusory factual allegations linking the alleged policies to the harm in practice. See,
21 e.g., id. ¶ 104 (the only paragraph of the Monell claim going to causation in the complaint,
22 alleging that “the aforementioned customs […] were a moving force and/or proximate
23 cause of the deprivations of Gustavo Silva, Jr.’s clearly established and well-settled
24 constitutional rights.”); ECF No. 24 at 13 (arguing that if proper policies were in place,
25 “Mr. Silva could have been transferred to a hospital.” (emphasis added)). These legal
26 conclusions or likelihood arguments are insufficient to allege causation under Monell. See
27 Mann v. Helmig, 289 Fed. App'x 845, 850 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[P]roof merely that such a
28 policy or custom was ‘likely’ to cause a particular violation is not sufficient; there must be
1 proven at least an ‘affirmative link’ between policy or custom and violation; in tort
2 principle terms, the causal connection must be ‘proximate,’ not merely ‘but-for’ causation-
3 in-fact.”) (internal citation omitted). Plaintiffs have thus not met their burden to allege
4 causation.
5 In conclusion, the motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Monell claims are GRANTED with
6 leave to amend.
7 B. Negligence
8 Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of action is common law negligence against all Defendants.
9 Compl. ¶¶ 115-122. “In order to establish negligence under California law, a plaintiff must
10 establish four required elements: (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages.”
11 Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1203 (9th Cir. 2003). As explained above, Plaintiffs
12 have not adequately pled causation for Decedent’s death. The Court also briefly examines
13 below the vicarious liability and timeliness issues briefed by the parties.
14 Whether the County can be vicariously liable for its employees’ negligence turns on
15 whether the immunity provision of California Government Code § 845.6 applies. That
16 code, in relevant part, makes public entities and their employees immune from suit for the
17 failure to furnish medical care for a prisoner, unless the employee knows or has reason to
18 know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and fails to summon such care.
19 Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6. As explained above, Plaintiff has not yet pled non-conclusory
20 facts showing that Defendants were on notice of Decedent’s mental health condition or
21 Decedent’s plan to commit suicide prior to doing so. Thus, this code also bars suit at this
22 time. The negligence claim against the city is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
23 NaphCare raises a timeliness defense to this claim based upon California’s one year
24 statute of limitations for professional negligence of a healthcare provider in a wrongful
25 death action. See ECF No. 15-1 at 11-12; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.5. That code sets a
26 statute of limitations of the sooner of two options: (1) three years after the date of the injury
27 or (2) one year after the plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, the injury. Cal. Civ.
28 Proc. Code § 340.5. By California law, the general rule is that injury accrues in a wrongful
1 death action on the day that a person died. Larcher v. Wanless, 18 Cal. 3d 646, 659 (1976).
2 However, a later date of accrual may be appropriate when a plaintiff shows that he
3 reasonably did not know of the negligent cause of his injury until a later date. Gutierrez v.
4 Mofid, 39 Cal. 3d 892, 896 (1985).
5 Here, Decedent died on January 22, 2024, and this action was filed on May 21, 2025.
6 See Compl. The complaint, upon which the Court must rely in deciding this motion,
7 contains no facts showing that a later date of accrual would be appropriate. See generally,
8 Compl. In their opposition to NaphCare’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs attach a declaration
9 of counsel that their counsel was not aware that NaphCare was the proper defendant in this
10 action until November 19, 2024. ECF No. 16 at 11. However, that contradicts counsel’s
11 earlier statement that, “On July 15, 2024, Plaintiffs’ counsel requested a copy of the
12 decedent’s medical and mental health records after learning NaphCare was the entity
13 responsible for providing medical and mental health services at the Imperial County
14 Sheriff’s Office, Regional Adult Detention Facility.” ECF 16-11, Declaration of Denisse
15 O. Gastelum (“Gastellum Decl.”) at 2 (emphasis added). Regardless, the Court must rely
16 on facts pled in the complaint itself to determine whether a motion to dismiss is proper.
17 See Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Even if it could properly consider the declaration as
18 an allegation in the complaint, the Court does not believe that counsel’s late identification
19 of the proper defendant constitutes Plaintiffs reasonably not knowing of the negligent cause
20 of their injury. See Gutierrez, 39 Cal. 3d at 896. Plaintiffs do not identify any other reason
21 the late discovery rule should apply in their briefing. Thus, Plaintiffs’ negligence claim
22 against NaphCare is DISMISSED without leave to amend.
23 C. Medical Malpractice
24 Plaintiff also brings a medical malpractice claim against NaphCare. As to NaphCare,
25 the same statute of limitations applies to medical malpractice claims for wrongful death as
26 for negligence. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.5. Per the analysis above, Plaintiffs’ medical
27 malpractice claim against NaphCare is DISMISSED without leave to amend.
28 D. Survival and Wrongful Death
1 Plaintiff’s eighth cause of action is a wrongful death action under California law
2 against all Defendants and Does 1-10. Compl. ¶¶ 129-133. In their opposition to Defendant
3 NaphCare’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs conceded that NaphCare is not liable for this
4 claim. ECF No. 16 at 13; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.5. Thus, Plaintiff’s survival and
5 wrongful death claim against NaphCare is DISMISSED without leave to amend.
6 As to County Defendants, California’s wrongful death statute creates liability for a
7 public employee “if the employee knows or has reason to know that the prisoner is in need
8 of immediate medical care, and he fails to take reasonable action to summon such medical
9 care.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6. As explained above, Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged
10 facts to show that Defendants were on notice of Decedent’s need for medical care as
11 required by the plain language of the statute. See id. Therefore, Plaintiff’s survival and
12 wrongful death claim against County Defendants is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
13 E. Bane Act
14 Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action is brought under California Civil Code § 52.1, the
15 Bane Act, against all Defendants and Does 1-10. Compl. ¶¶ 134-143.
16 The Bane Act “provides a cause of action for violations of a plaintiff's state or federal
17 civil rights committed by threats, intimidation, or coercion.” Chaudhry v. City of Los
18 Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation omitted). The Ninth
19 Circuit has explained that “the Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, intimidation or
20 coercion’ element of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional
21 violation alleged.” Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018).
22 However, analyzing California legal precedent and the Bane Act’s purpose of preventing
23 hate-based state action, the Circuit court did find that Plaintiffs must show that the
24 Defendant had the specific intent to commit the constitutional violation. Id. Reckless
25 disregard for a person’s constitutional rights may serve as evidence of a defendant’s
26 specific intent under the Act. Id. at 1045.
27 Here, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not met the standard to show deliberate
28 indifference to Decedent’s medical needs, let alone allege the specific intent to violate
1 constitutional rights necessary for a Bane Act claim. ECF Nos. 14-1 at 17-18, 15-1 at 13.
2 Plaintiffs refute this by pointing to sections of the complaint that say, for example,
3 “Defendants, each acting in concert/conspiracy, as described above, while decedent
4 Gustavo Silva, Jr was in custody, and by threat, intimidation, and/or coercion, interfered
5 with, attempted to interfere with, and violated Gustavo Silva, Jr.’s rights.” ECF No. 24 at
6 20. Plaintiffs go on to point to allegations that Defendants “depriv[ed] Decedent of
7 necessary care,” “subject[ed] Decedent to ongoing violations of his rights to prompt care,”
8 “deliberately contract[ed] for and caus[ed] the provision of inadequate and incompetent
9 medical health care,” “requir[ed] medical and mental health staff to work outside their
10 scope of treatment,” and “institut[ed] and maintain[ed] the unconstitutional customs,
11 policies, and practices described herein.” Id. at 20-21 These allegations are troubling, but,
12 as explained above regarding deliberate indifference, contain few non-conclusory facts to
13 show notice or intent. Without something more than a recitation of legal conclusions
14 regarding Defendant’s knowledge of their actions, the Court cannot find that Plaintiffs have
15 alleged that Defendants had the specific intent to violate Decedent’s constitutional rights.
16 See Reese, 888 F.3d at 1043. The Court thus GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss
17 the Bane Act claim with leave to amend.
18 F. Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act
19 Plaintiffs’ tenth and eleventh causes of action arise under 42 U.S.C. § 12132, the
20 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), the Rehabilitation Act
21 (“Rehab Act”), respectively, against Does 1-10. Compl. ¶¶ 144-173. “The standards used
22 to determine whether an act of discrimination violated the Rehablitation Act are the same
23 standards applied under the Americans with Disabilities Act.” Coons v. Sec'y of U.S. Dep't
24 of Treasury, 383 F.3d 879, 884 (9th Cir. 2004).
25 Title II of the ADA, which applies to state and local governments, provides that “no
26 qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
27 participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
28 entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
1 County Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not properly pled the identities of Doe
2 Defendants. ECF No. 14-1 at 18-19. In evaluating the sufficiency of Doe Defendant
3 allegations, courts look to whether the allegations are sufficiently specific to give notice
4 and to state a claim once Doe Defendants are identified. See Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d
5 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980); Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999).
6 While Plaintiffs need not plead Doe allegations against government officers with perfect
7 specificity as to the acts of each officer, they must allege actions or inactions of the Does
8 which tie the Does to the claims. See, e.g., Estate of Osuna v. Cnty. of Stanislaus, 392 F.
9 Supp. 3d 1162, 1169 (E.D. Cal. 2019) (finding Doe allegations against officers “who
10 encountered the decedent on the day he was killed” sufficient); Urquijo v. State, No. 5:22-
11 cv-02133-AH (DTBx), 2025 WL 2005446, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2025) (finding Doe
12 allegations against officers who were at the scene and fired their service weapons
13 sufficient).
14 Here, the complaints identifies Does 1-10 as law enforcement and medical personnel
15 who were employed by the County and NaphCare. Compl. ¶ 24. However, in making ADA
16 claims, Plaintiffs do not distinguish the particular actions or inactions which constitute
17 discrimination, nor do they explain what disability Doe Defendants discriminated against.
18 Id. ¶¶ 144-173. In their opposition to the County’s motion to dismiss Doe Defendants,
19 Plaintiffs list all of their theories of the case again, and confusingly add the following claim,
20 which also occurs once in the complaint itself: “failing to enact policies to address the
21 constitutional rights of protesters despite the obvious need for such a policy.” ECF No. 24
22 at 22; Compl. ¶ 27. First, as explained above, Plaintiffs’ other theories of the case lack
23 alleged facts showing that Decedent’s mental health issues were known to Defendants.
24 Second, regarding the language quoted above, the Court is confused by the inclusion of
25 this allegation because Plaintiffs have not alleged that Decedent was a protester. Because
26 Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts tying Doe Defendants to ADA or Rehab Act claims,
27 Defendants do not have adequate notice to defend against those claims. See Gillespie, 629
28
1 ||F.2d at 642. Thus, Plaintiff's ADA claims and Rehab Act claims are DISMISSED with
2 || leave to amend.
3 Vv. CONCLUSION
4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss,
5 || ECF Nos. 14, 15. The Court grants Plaintiffs leave to amend their first, second, third,
6 || fourth, fifth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh causes of action as to all defendants, and their sixth
7 eighth causes of action as to County Defendants but not NaphCare. Plaintiffs may file
8 ||their Amended Complaint, if any, no later than June 17, 2026. The Court cautions
9 || Plaintiffs that failure to cure the deficiencies present in this complaint in an amended
10 |}complaint may bar their opportunity for future leave to amend. See Zucco Partners, LLC
11 ||v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“A district court...may in its
12 discretion deny leave to amend...due to repeated failure to cure deficiencies by
13 |}amendments previously allowed.’’) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
14 IT IS SO ORDERED.
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16 Dated: May 26, 2026 Smet
17 Honorable James E. Sunmons Jr.
18 United States District Judge
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