Heard

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARQUIS EZEKIEL HEARD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:25-cv-580-SPC-KRH

M. PIERRE-LOUIS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Mackender Pierre-Louis’s Motion to

Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 20). Plaintiff Marquis Ezekiel

Heard, pro se, files a response in opposition. (Doc. 22). In his Complaint (Doc.

1), Heard has also named a second, fictitiously identified defendant, “John

Doe.” He has not been served, but the arguments raised by Pierre-Louis also

might apply to the claims against Doe. The Court has a duty under 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to dismiss any portion of the complaint that fails to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the Court has sua

sponte reviewed the claims against Doe in light of the arguments raised in the

motion. For the reasons that follow, Pierre-Louis’s motion to dismiss will be

granted in part and denied in part, and the claims against Doe will also be

dismissed in part.

Background

Heard is a prisoner of the Florida Department of Corrections. He is now

confined at the Dade Correctional Institution in Florida City, Florida. (See

Doc. 21). His claims arose on May 26, 2023, when he was held at the Charlotte

Correctional Facility in Punta Gorda, Florida. He sues two corrections officers,

Pierre-Louis and Doe (collectively “Defendants”), alleging they used excessive

force on him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Court recounts the

factual background as pled in the Complaint1, which the Court must take as

true to decide whether it states a plausible claim. See Chandler v. Sec’y Fla.

Dep’t of Transp., 695 F.3d 1194, 1198-99 (11th Cir. 2012).

On the day in question, Defendant Doe pulled Heard out of his cell “for

Mental Health Group Call-out.” (Doc. 1 at 14, ¶ 1). After placing Heard in full

body restraints, Doe “got mad at [Heard] because he did not want to refuse

Group Call-out” and “slammed [him] face first” to the ground. (Id. at 14, ¶ 3).

Doe got on top of Heard “put knees into [his] lower and upper body and head”

(id. at 12, ¶ 4) and “kneed and kicked” Heard’s legs. (Id. at 12, ¶ 3). Defendant

Pierre-Louis then arrived. (Doc. 1 at 13, ¶ 8). With Heard still on the ground

in restraints and engaged with Doe, Pierre-Louis “jumped on top of [Heard]”

1 On August 6, 2025, the Court granted a motion by Heard’s for leave to file an amended

complaint. (See Docs. 11, 12). However, he did not attach a proposed amendment to his

motion for leave, nor has he filed an amended complaint since. Therefore, the original

complaint, Doc. 1, remains the operative pleading.

and put his knees into “the back of [Heard’s] neck, stopping [him] from

breathing.” (Doc. 1 at 13, ¶¶ 9, 10). Pierre-Louis also kneed, kicked, and hit

Heard in the legs, hands, and wrists. (Doc. 1 at 13, ¶¶ 11–13). Heard insists

he was “not being disorderly” at any time during the incident. (Id. at 12, ¶ 3;

id. at 15, ¶ 6).

Heard was taken to the prison medical area where a nurse gave him

ibuprofen. (Doc. 1 at 16, ¶¶ 13, 14). As a result of the altercation, Heard had

swelling and bruises on his hands, wrists, legs, and neck lasting from between

three and seven days. (See id. at 12–14, ¶¶ 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13). He also endured

“pain and suffering” and “emotional distress.” (Id. at 16, ¶ 12).

Heard sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in both their individual

and official capacities. He demands compensatory and punitive damages, as

well as declaratory relief. Defendant Pierre-Louis moves to dismiss under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 20; see also Docs. 28, 29). Heard has filed a

memorandum in opposition. (Doc. 22).

Legal Standard

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must limit

its consideration to (1) the face of the complaint, (2) documents attached to the

complaint or otherwise central to the plaintiff’s claim and whose authenticity

is not contested, and (3) materials subject to judicial notice. See United States

ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana, Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 811 (11th Cir. 2015). The court

must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and

view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The preferential standard of review, however, does not

let all pleadings adorned with facts survive to the next stage of litigation. The

Supreme Court has been clear on this point—a district court should dismiss a

claim when a party does not plead facts that make the claim facially plausible.

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially

plausible when a court can draw a reasonable inference, based on facts pled,

that the opposing party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. This plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557

(internal quotation marks omitted)). And a plaintiff must allege more than

labels and conclusions amounting to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A federal district court is required to review a civil complaint filed in

forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint that is frivolous, malicious,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2);

see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The mandatory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1915

applies to all proceedings in forma pauperis. A complaint may be dismissed as

frivolous under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or

fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a

matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit or the

claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327. The phrase

“fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” in § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

has the same meaning as the nearly identical phrase in Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir.

1997). Accordingly, review under the former provision applies the same

standards as a motion to dismiss under the latter. Id.

Heard files his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a § 1983

claim, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant deprived him of a right

secured under the Constitution or federal law, and (2) the deprivation occurred

under color of state law. Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir.

2011) (citing Arrington v. Cobb Cty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998)). In

addition, a plaintiff must allege and establish an affirmative causal connection

between the defendant’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Marsh v.

Butler Cty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001).

Heard is representing himself. Courts hold the pleadings of pro se

litigants to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.

Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). But courts

do not have a duty to “re-write” a pro se litigant’s complaint to find a claim.

See Washington v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 256 F. App’x 326, 327 (11th

Cir. 2007).

Discussion

The Eighth Amendment forbids, among other things, “cruel and usual

punishments.” That provision applies to the States under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,

666–67 (1962). Under the Eighth Amendment, prison guards may apply

reasonable force “in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline” but

not “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Sears v. Roberts, 922 F.3d

1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7

(1992)).

A. Heck v. Humphrey

Pierre-Louis first argues Heard’s claim against him is barred by Heck v.

Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck held that a plaintiff may not recover

damages under § 1983 if a judgment in his favor would “necessarily imply the

invalidity” of a conviction or sentence, unless that conviction or sentence has

been invalidated. 512 U.S. at 487. The Supreme Court extended the rule to

lawsuits that would imply the invalidity of prison disciplinary proceedings

affecting the fact or duration of the plaintiff’s underlying criminal sentence.

See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646–48 (1997). However, Heck does not

bar a § 1983 claim that would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary

proceeding that does not affect the plaintiff’s sentence. Muhammad v. Close,

540 U.S. 749, 754–55 (2004).

The Eleventh Circuit has further explained:

“Heck bars a § 1983 claim only when it is a ‘logical necessity’ that

judgment for the plaintiff in that suit would contradict the existing

punishment.” Dixon [v. Hodges, 887 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir.

2018)] (quoting Dyer v. Lee, 488 F.3d 876, 879 (11th Cir. 2007))).

Factual allegations bar claims under Heck in only narrow

circumstances: “where the allegation in the § 1983 claim is a

specific one that both necessarily implies the earlier decision is

invalid and is necessary to the success of the § 1983 suit itself.”

Hall, 67 F.4th at 1292 (quoting Dixon, 887 F.3d at 1239). “When a

plaintiff alleges a fact that, if true, would conflict with the earlier

punishment, but that fact is not necessary to the success of his §

1983 suit, the Heck bar does not apply.” Id.

Hall v. Merola, 67 F.4th 1282, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2023).

Heard emphasizes he was “not being disorderly” at any time. However,

Pierre-Louis maintains Heard received a disciplinary report (DR) arising from

the incident, resulting in prison authorities finding him guilty of “disobeying a

verbal order” in violation of prison rules. (Doc. 20 at 4). In support, Pierre-

Louis submits associated DR records from the prison. (Doc. 29-1). In them

“Officer W. Romero, who appears to be the Doe defendant, reports he was

placing Heard “in a rip-restraint2 for mental health group” when Heard

2 This appears to be an intended reference to a “RIPP” restraint, a brand name of restraint

equipment used by law enforcement and corrections personnel. See https://www.

rippinternational.com (last visited July 1, 2026); see also, e.g., Gonzalez v. City of Phoenix,

163 F.4th 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 2026); Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573, 576 (7th Cir.

2012).

“attempted to pull away from [him].” (Doc. 29-1 at 5 (footnote added)). Romero

alleged he gave Heard “a direct verbal order to cease his actions,” but Heard

refused, “result[ing] in a reactionary physical use of force.” (Id.) For his part,

Heard denied pulling away as Romero put him in restraints. (Id. at 8).

However, Heard admitted he refused an order by Romero to go back into his

cell because he “wanted to go to group.” (Id.; see also id. at 9, 11). A prison

investigator reviewed a surveillance recording of the incident, which is not in

the record. (Id. at 11). He reported seeing Romero place restraints on Heard,

a struggle ensuing in front of the cell, and Romero taking Heard to the ground.

(Id. at 11). However, the investigator could not hear what was being said.

(Doc. 29-1 at 11). Prison authorities ultimately found Heard guilty of

disobeying Romero’s order to stop “pulling way.” (Id. at 1). The decision

further recognized the surveillance recording “did not provide evidence to

support” Plaintiff’s claim he had not “pulled away from” Romero. (Id. at 1).

Pierre-Louis contends Plaintiff’s disobedience, as established by the DR

records, justified the force applied. Pierre-Louis argues the § 1983 damages

claim is barred by Heck and Balisok because Heard “seeks to invalidate the

findings of his disciplinary convictions.” (Doc. 20 at 4). This argument would

also apply to the claim against Doe.

Heard does not challenge the authenticity of the DR records. Nor does

he contest Pierre-Louis’s invitation for the Court to consider them. The Court

therefore takes judicial notice of the DR records as documents created by a

government agency. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; Robinson v. Larson, 2016 WL

2620477, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 4, 2016). In doing so, the Court might

consider the records to examine the disciplinary charge, what matters were

litigated, and the disposition by prison authorities, but not for the truth of the

matters asserted in the records. See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553

(11th Cir. 1994). Nevertheless, Heard insists the DR does not bar his claim

under Heck. The Court agrees.

First, Heck does not apply “categorically to all suits challenging prison

disciplinary proceedings.” Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 754. Even if a § 1983 claim

would imply the invalidity of a prison disciplinary sanction, Heck cannot

preclude the claim unless the prison discipline “affect[s] the duration of time

to be served” on the underlying criminal conviction, as “by bearing on the

award or revocation of good time credits,” id., known in Florida as “gain time.”

See Fla. Stat. § 944.275. The DR records show that Heard received 30 days of

disciplinary confinement for the infraction. (Doc. 29-1 at 1). However, neither

Pierre-Louis nor Heard alleges or acknowledges Heard lost gain time. Nor is

such a loss clear from the DR decision. Therefore, Pierre-Louis fails to

demonstrate Heck applies. But even if the DR did affect the duration of

Heard’s sentence, the Court would still conclude Heck does not apply, as

explained below.

Even if the DR findings establish that Heard refused Romero’s order and

“pulled away” from him, those circumstances would not necessarily preclude a

finding that one or both Defendants used unconstitutionally excessive force.

That is, Heard might not have immediately yielded to Romero’s order to stop

resisting, and the Defendants might have maliciously applied excessive force

beyond that required to secure compliance and restore discipline. See Hall, 67

F.3d at 1292 (prison disciplinary action for tampering with sprinkler system

did not bar excessive force claim under Heck; defendant guards could be found

to have used more force than constitutionally permissible in stopping the

plaintiff from tampering with the system even if his claim that he did not

tamper was false); Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1268–70 (11th Cir.

2020) (inmate’s guilty plea to resisting or obstructing corrections officer

without violence did not bar excessive force claim against officer under Heck);

Dixon, 887 F.3d at 1239–40 (although disciplinary action established the

prisoner lunged at defendant guard, it was “logically possible both that [the

prisoner] lunged at [the guard] and that [the guard] used excessive force

against him”). Heck does not bar Heard’s § 1983 claims.

B. Failure to Allege Unconstitutionally Excessive Force

To succeed on an excessive force claim under the Eighth Amendment, a

plaintiff must make both an objective showing and a subjective showing. See

Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1265—66. The objective showing is met when the

official’s actions were “harmful enough...or sufficiently serious ...to violate the

Constitution.” Id. (citations omitted). Force violates the Eighth Amendment

if it “offends contemporary standards of decency, regardless of whether

significant injury is evident.” Id.

To establish the subjective element, a plaintiff must allege facts showing

that the official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. “[T]o have a

valid claim...the excessive force must have been sadistically and maliciously

applied for the very purpose of causing harm,” as opposed to “a good faith effort

to maintain or restore discipline.” Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1265 (citation

omitted). Factors relevant to this inquiry include: (1) the extent of the

prisoner’s injury; (2) the need for the application of force; (3) the relationship

between the need and the amount of force used; (4) the threat that was

reasonably perceived by the responsible officials; and (5) any efforts made to

temper the severity of a forceful response. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.

But “[t]he infliction of pain in the course of a prison security

measure...does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because

it may appear in retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for

security purposes was unreasonable, and hence unnecessary in the strict

sense.” Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation

omitted). And prison officials’ actions should be viewed in light of the broad

deference afforded them in preserving order and security. Hudson, 503 U.S.

at 6.

Pierre-Louis argues, “Giving proper weight to the findings of Plaintiff’s

disciplinary proceedings [that he] disobeyed an order on May 26, 2023,”

Plaintiff “has failed to articulate how or why Pierre-Louis’s alleged response …

[was] done for any reason but to restore order….” (Doc. 20 at 9). Pierre-Louis

also highlights a lack of alleged malicious intent and any significant and

lasting injuries. (Id. (citation omitted)).

Pierre-Louis does not explain why the Court should accept the DR

findings as true outside the Heck analysis. As explained above, the Court must

accept Heard’s allegations as true when evaluating the sufficiency of his

complaint. According to Heard, he was not being disorderly during the

incident. He claims Doe got mad at him because he did not want to refuse

Group Call-out. Having already put Heard in full body restraints, Doe

slammed him to the ground face-first. Then Doe and Pierre-Louis got on top

of Heard and kneed, kicked, and hit him. Defendants’ joint assault caused

bruises and swelling on Heard’s neck, legs, hands, and wrists lasting between

three and seven days. Heard’s allegations plausibly support that Doe started

the altercation for no penologically valid reason and that both Defendants

applied significant, gratuitous force to Heard as he lay on the ground in full

body restraints, causing observable physical injuries.

Admittedly, the Complaint does not show Heard’s injuries were very

serious. However, that does not itself defeat Plaintiff’s claims. See Wilkins v.

Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37–40 (2010). The Complaint’s allegations, assumed true

and construed in the light favorable to Heard, raise reasonable inferences

meeting the objective and subjective components of an Eighth Amendment

claim against each Defendant. See, e.g., Williams v. Radford, 64 F.4th 1185,

1197–98 (11th Cir. 2023) (allegations that guard repeatedly struck a

handcuffed, restrained, and unarmed prisoner several times because he raised

his voice was sufficient to state a claim); Sconiers, 946 F.3d at 1267–68

(prisoner’s testimony that guard slammed him to the ground and pepper

sprayed him for failing to comply with guard’s orders to repeatedly stand and

sit were sufficient to support an excessive force claim).

C. Physical Injury under the PLRA

Pierre-Louis argues Heard’s allegations do not show an injury

compensable under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). (Doc. 20 at 10).

He relies upon 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), which provides in relevant part: “No

federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison, or

other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in

custody without a prior showing of physical injury[.]” Pierre-Louis contends

Plaintiff cannot recover compensatory and punitive damages because his

allegations show only trivial harms and not “physical injury” within the

meaning of § 1997e(e). (Doc. 20 at 10).

“[T]o satisfy § 1997e(e) the physical injury must be more than de

minimis, but need not be significant.” Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1286

(11th Cir. 1999), reh’g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 197 F.3d 1059

(11th Cir. 1999), opinion reinstated in relevant part, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th

Cir. 2000) en banc)); see also Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1307 (11th Cir.

2015). Heard alleges physical injuries marked by swelling and bruising lasting

between three and seven days and for which he received no medical treatment

beyond an over-the-counter pain reliever. The Court agrees with Pierre-Louis

that such injuries are de minimis for purposes of § 1997e(e). See Pierre v.

Padgett, 808 F. App’x 838, 843–44 (11th Cir. 2020). Accordingly, Heard’s

claims against both Defendants will be dismissed to the extent they seek

compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury. However, even without

a qualifying physical injury, Plaintiff’s claims are not subject to dismissal

under § 1997e(e) insofar as they might support an award of nominal damages,

Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1307–08, or punitive damages. Hoever v. Marks, 993 F.3d

1353, 1355–56 (11th Cir. 2021) (en banc).

D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Pierre-Louis argues Heard’s official capacity claims should be dismissed

based on Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The Eleventh

Amendment states, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be

construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or

Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. Absent an abrogation

of immunity by Congress or a waiver of immunity by the state being sued, the

Eleventh Amendment is an absolute bar to suit by an individual against a state

or its agencies in federal court. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662

(1974).

“When the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the

state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to invoke

its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal

defendants.” Id. at 663. “Thus, the rule has evolved that a suit by private

parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in

the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.” Id. In other words,

the bar protects state officials sued in their official capacities but not their

individual capacities. Melton v. Abston, 841 F.3d 1207, 1234-35 (11th Cir.

2016).

Congress has not abrogated Florida’s immunity, and Florida has not

waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Carr v. City of Florence, 916

F.2d 1521, 1525 (11th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff cannot sue Defendants for money

damages in their official capacities.

In addition to money damages, Heard demands declaratory relief. A

limited exception to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity exists where a

plaintiff alleges that state officials are engaged in an ongoing violation of

federal law and seeks prospective equitable relief, including declaratory relief.

See Summit Med. Assoc, P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11th Cir. 1999)

(addressing the exception set out in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).

This exception does not apply to Heard’s claims. “[A] plaintiff may not

use the [Ex parte Young] doctrine to adjudicate the legality of past conduct.”

Summit Med. Assoc., 180 F.3d at 1337. When analyzing whether the Ex parte

Young exception is applicable, a court “need only conduct a straightforward

inquiry into whether [the] complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law

and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Verizon Md., Inc. v.

Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002). Because Heard’s

complaint only involves past events, the Ex parte Young exception to Eleventh

Amendment sovereign immunity does not apply to his official capacity claims

for declaratory relief.

The Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign

immunity on Heard’s official capacity claims. Even though amendment of

these claims would be futile, their dismissal is without prejudice because

“[s]overeign immunity is jurisdictional in nature” and “[d]ismissals for a lack

of jurisdiction are not judgments on the merits and are to be entered without

prejudice.” Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999, 1007 (11th Cir. 2024) (citations

omitted).

E. Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects government officials from individual

liability unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional

rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Snorton v. Owens,

808 F. App’x 814, 820 (11th Cir. 2020). An official invoking qualified immunity

must first show he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.

Id. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show: (1) the official violated a

federal statutory or constitutional right; and (2) the unlawfulness of the

official's conduct was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

Id. at 820-21. Defendants were plainly acting within the scope of their

discretionary authority when they used force on Heard.

“A federal right is ‘clearly established’ when ‘at the time of the officer's

conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would

understand that what he was doing is unlawful.’” Anderson v. Vazquez, 813 F.

App’x 358, 360 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018)).

“In other words, existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the

officer’s conduct beyond debate.” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63 (internal quotation

marks omitted). To show that a legal principle is clearly established, a plaintiff

must produce precedent “clear enough that every reasonable official would

interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id.

As explained above, Heard adequately alleges that Pierre-Louis and Doe

violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. So the

question is whether the unlawfulness of Defendants’ actions were clearly

established at the time. It was. When the incident occurred, it was clearly

established that “the unjustified use of excessive force by a prison guard

against an inmate” who is restrained and “pose[s] no continuing threat”

violates the Eighth Amendment. Davis v. Locke, 936 F.2d 1208, 1213 (11th

Cir. 1991); see also Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008)

(the use of gratuitous force against a “handcuffed, non-resisting” prisoner

violates the Eighth Amendment). Heard alleges that both Defendants kneed,

kicked, and hit him even though he was lying on the ground in full body

restraints, was “not being disorderly,” and therefore posed no threat of harm.

Accepting these allegations as true, neither defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity.

F. Mootness

Since the incident, Plaintiff has been transferred to a different prison.

(See Doc. 21). The general rule in the Eleventh Circuit “is that a transfer or

release of a prisoner from prison will moot that prisoner’s claims for injunctive

and declaratory relief.” Lewis v. Sheriff, Fulton Cnty. Georgia, 166 F.4th 107,

115–16 (11th Cir. 2026) (citation omitted). Because mootness implicates

subject-matter jurisdiction, federal courts have an obligation to consider the

issue sua sponte. See United States v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 778 F.3d 1223,

1226 (11th Cir. 2015). Any claims for declaratory or injunctive relief against

Defendants in either capacity are moot. See Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169,

1173–74 (11th Cir. 1985).

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

(1) Defendant Mackender Pierre-Louis’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss

(Doc. 20) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

(2) All claims against Pierre-Louis and John Doe in their official

capacities are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

(3) The claims against Pierre-Louis and John Doe in their individual

capacities are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE to the extent they

seek compensatory damages for mental or emotional injury.

(4) Plaintiff’s claims declaratory or injunctive relief are DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE as MOOT.

(5) Pierre-Louis’s motion is otherwise DENIED, and he shall file an

answer to the complaint within 14 days of this Opinion and Order.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 1, 2026.

tt WOhLataat he

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-3

Copies: All Parties of Record

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