Opinion

Brashear

Court
District Court, S.D. California
Filed
May 19, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 FAITH LYNN BRASHEAR, Case No.: 26-cv-1726-RSH-DEB

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER ON EX PARTE MOTION

13 v. FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING

ORDER AND PRELIMINARY

14 CALIFORNIA UNEMPLOYMENT

INJUNCTION

INSURANCE APPEALS BOARD, et al.,

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Defendants. [ECF No. 11]

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19 Before the Court is an ex parte motion for temporary restraining order and

20 preliminary injunction filed by plaintiff Faith Lynn Brashear. ECF No. 11. Pursuant to

21 Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds the motion presented appropriate for

22 resolution without oral argument. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s

23 motion.

24 I. BACKGROUND

25 The instant action arises from alleged failures by Defendants to provide Plaintiff

26 with disability-related accommodations.

27 On March 18, 2026, plaintiff Faith Lynn Brashear, proceeding pro se, initiated this

28 action against the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (“CUIAB”), the

1 Employment Development Department (“EDD”), the California Division of Workers’

2 Compensation (“DWC”), Nancy Faulkner, in her official capacity as the Chair of the

3 CUIAB, Nancy Farias, in her official capacity as the Director of the EDD, George

4 Parisotto, in his official capacity as the Administrative Director of the DWC, and

5 Apartment Management Consultants LLC. ECF No. 1.

6 Plaintiff alleges that, while employed by Apartment Management Consultants, she

7 experienced a workplace incident that led her to develop severe anxiety whenever she is

8 required to participate in telephone-based communication. Id. ¶¶ 35–38. According to

9 Plaintiff, Apartment Management Consultants failed to engage with her written request

10 for accomodation. Id. ¶¶ 39–42. Plaintiff alleges that she later pursued “administrative

11 proceedings” involving “workers’ compensation adjudication,” “unemployment

12 insurance appeals,” and “federal employment discrimination processes.” Id. ¶ 54.

13 Although she purportedly provided documented notice of her disability and requested

14 accommodations in those proceedings, Plaintiff alleges the responsible entities failed to

15 rule on her requests to ensure that she could participate. Id. ¶¶ 57–62.

16 Plaintiff’s Complaint asserts claims for: violations of the Americans with

17 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), Title II, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, et seq. (Claims 1 and 2);

18 violation of due process under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claim 3); a claim over the interpretation

19 of 26 U.S.C. § 131 during “unemployment appeals proceedings” (Claim 4); and ADA

20 retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (Claim 5). Id. ¶¶ 127–164.

21 On April 9, 2026, the Court dismissed the action without prejudice in light of

22 Plaintiff’s failure either to pay the $405 civil filing and administrative fee required by 28

23 U.S.C. § 1914(a) or to move to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

24 1915(a). ECF No. 6 at 2. Plaintiff subsequently paid the filing fee on April 28, 2026. ECF

25 No. 8. On May 11, 2026, Plaintiff filed the instant ex parte motion for a temporary

26 restraining order and preliminary injunction. ECF No. 11 at 2.

27 ///

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1 II. LEGAL STANDARD

2 Preliminary injunctive relief “is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of

3 right.” Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary

4 injunction must establish: (1) that she “is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) that she “is

5 likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; and (3) “that the

6 balance of equities tips in [her] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Id.

7 at 20. The standard governing the issuance of a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) is

8 substantially identical to the standard governing the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

9 See Harris v. Santos, No. 25-CV-284 JLS (DDL), 2025 WL 1594465, at *1 (S.D. Cal.

10 May 9, 2025).

11 “When a plaintiff has not provided notice of their TRO application to the

12 defendant, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b)(1) imposes additional requirements.”

13 Willard Marine, Inc. v. Shanghai Breeze Tech. Co., Ltd., No. 25-CV-2907 JLS (BLM),

14 2025 WL 3063320, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025). Under Federal Rule of Civil

15 Procedure 65(b)(1):

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The court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or

17 oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if:

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(A) specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly

19 show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage

will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard

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in opposition; and

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(B) the movant’s attorney certifies in writing any efforts made

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to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.

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Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1). “The stringent restrictions imposed by . . . Rule 65, on the

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availability of ex parte temporary restraining orders reflect the fact that our entire

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jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice

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and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute.” Granny Goose

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Foods v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 438–39 (1974).

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1 III. ANALYSIS

2 Before reaching the merits of Plaintiff’s request, the Court must first determine

3 whether Plaintiff has satisfied the notice requirements governing injunctive relief.

4 The docket does not reflect that Plaintiff served Defendants with—or otherwise

5 provided Defendants notice of—her application for a TRO and preliminary injunction.

6 See Docket. The Court therefore “declines to assume any alleged notice was offered, let

7 alone adequate.” Willard Marine, 2025 WL 3063320, at *3 (internal quotation marks

8 omitted); see Globalization Partners, Inc. v. Layton, No. 19-CV-01990-BAS-LL, 2019

9 WL 5268657, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2019) (“Because there is no proof of service or

10 other documentation reflecting that service was completed, it is unclear whether

11 Defendant received notice of this proceeding. Hence, for purposes of this Order, the

12 Court assumes Defendant was not provided notice of the instant application and construes

13 Plaintiff’s application as a request to issue the TRO without providing notice to

14 Defendant.”).

15 The “threshold question,” then, is whether Plaintiff has provided “an adequate

16 justification” for proceeding without notice to the opposing party. Willard Marine, 2025

17 WL 3063320, at *2. As recognized by the Ninth Circuit, “courts have recognized very

18 few circumstances justifying the issuance of an ex parte TRO. For example, an ex parte

19 TRO may be appropriate where notice to the adverse party is impossible either because

20 the identity of the adverse party is unknown or because a known party cannot be located

21 in time for a hearing.” Reno Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir.

22 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In cases where notice could have been given

23 to the adverse party, courts have recognized a very narrow band of cases in which ex

24 parte orders are proper because notice to the defendant would render fruitless the further

25 prosecution of the action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

26 Here, Plaintiff has not established that this case falls within the “very narrow band”

27 of cases in which an ex parte TRO is proper. In her application for a TRO, Plaintiff

28 challenges the CUIAB’s administrative rulings concerning her unemployment benefits.

1 See ECF No. 11. Specifically, Plaintiff contests the CUIAB’s determination that she is

2 liable for overpaid benefits. Id. at 3–7; see ECF No. 11-3. Plaintiff contends that

3 enforcement proceedings, including funds being taken from her bank account, are

4 ongoing. ECF No. 11 at 6. For these reasons, absent emergency relief, Plaintiff argues

5 she will face “immediate and ongoing harm,” including “[a]ctive levy and seizure of

6 funds from her bank account,” “[l]oss of essential living funds derived from wages,”

7 “[a]dditional financial penalties and banking fees,” and an “[i]nability to correct or

8 supplement the administrative record.” Id. at 9.

9 While the alleged urgency of Plaintiff’s financial harm bears on irreparable harm,

10 it is not enough, by itself, to justify the issuance of an ex parte TRO. Defendants are

11 identified in the Complaint and TRO application and Plaintiff has not submitted any

12 evidence that Defendants cannot be located in time for a hearing. Plaintiff has also not

13 explained why providing notice to Defendants “would render fruitless the further

14 prosecution of the action.” Reno Air Racing, 452 F.3d at 1131; see Willard Marine, 2025

15 WL 3063320, at *3 (“But to secure a TRO without notice, Plaintiffs’ general argument of

16 irreparable harm alone is not enough.”); see also Modular Mgmt. Grp., Inc. v. Adamo

17 Constr., Inc., No. 25-CV-01419-BAS-SBC, 2025 WL 2799678, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 30,

18 2025) (denying TRO motion where plaintiff failed to demonstrate case qualified as

19 “extraordinary circumstance” in which ex parte TRO may be granted); Corrales L. PC v.

20 Equal Access Just. Fund LP, No. 25-CV-1834 JLS (MMP), 2025 WL 2309019, at *3

21 (S.D. Cal. July 22, 2025) (denying TRO motion where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the

22 case fell “into the ‘very narrow’ category of cases where ex parte orders are proper.”).

23 For these reasons, the Court concludes Plaintiff has not satisfied the threshold

24 requirement for ex parte relief and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her request for a

25 TRO. Because Plaintiff has not shown that she provided adequate notice to Defendants,

26 the Court also DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her request for a preliminary

27 injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1)(“The court may issue a preliminary injunction

28 only on notice to the adverse party.”); Modular, 2025 WL 2799678, at *2 (“When the

1 ||moving party fails to show that it has provided adequate notice to its adversary, courts

2 || will generally deny the request for a preliminary injunction.”).

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: May 19, 2026 Jekut C / ‘

6 Hon. Robert S. Huie

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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