The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
7
LINDA COOK, CASE NO. 2:25-cv-02013-JHC
8
ORDER
9
Plaintiff,
10
v.
11
BEN HOSSIENZADEH ET AL.,
12
Defendants.
13
14
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Hossienzadeh, Correa, and King
15
County’s Motion to Dismiss. Dkt. # 35. The Court has considered the materials filed in support
16
of and in opposition to the motion, the rest of the file, and the governing law. Being fully
17
advised, for the reasons below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion.
18
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
19
Procedure 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a complaint must contain sufficient
20
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
21
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
22
(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
23
24
1 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
2 Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
3 “When evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court must accept all material
4 allegations in the complaint as true, and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-
5 moving party.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir.
6 2013). In a pro se action, the court must also “construe the pleadings liberally and [ ] afford the
7 [pro se plaintiff] the benefit of any doubt.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)
8 (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). But pro se or not,
9 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
10 statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also In
11 re VeriFone Sec. Litig., 11 F.3d 865, 868 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Conclusory allegations of law and
12 unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
13 claim.”). And a court can (and should) dismiss a complaint if it lacks a “cognizable legal theory”
14 or “sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d
15 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
16 Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint asserts claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. §
17 1983. See generally Dkt. # 33. To state a claim under § 1983, however, a plaintiff must first
18 establish that there was a deprivation of a federal right, i.e., “that a right secured by the
19 Constitution or laws of the United States was violated” and that this right was “unambiguously
20 conferred” by federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)
21 (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002).
22 But Plaintiff’s asserted right—a right to be free from local zoning regulations and impairment of
23 the use and enjoyment of one’s land by local regulatory authorities—is not an unambiguously
24
1
conferred right under the Constitution or any federal statute.1 Nor does the Complaint allege any
2 facts that could be construed liberally to support an alternate theory of deprivation for Plaintiff’s
3 § 1983 claims to survive. See generally Dkt. # 33.
4 Likewise, without a clear violation of federal law, Plaintiff cannot overcome Defendants’
5 immunity arguments. See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (“The doctrine
6 of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as
7 their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
8 reasonable person would have known.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Cannon
9 v. Polk Cnty./Polk Cnty. Sheriff, 68 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1291 (D. Or. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
10 Cannon v. Polk Cnty., 702 F. App’x 527 (9th Cir. 2017) (explaining that a prosecutor is entitled
11 to absolute immunity, even if they violate a person’s constitutional rights, so long as they are
12 performing “the traditional functions of an advocate”) (citation and internal quotation marks
13 omitted). Nor can Plaintiff plausibly plead the elements of a Monell claim for municipal
14 liability. See, e.g., Ass’n for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 648 F.3d 986,
15 992–93 (9th Cir. 2011) (“To bring a § 1983 claim against a local government entity, a plaintiff
16 must plead that a municipality’s policy or custom caused a violation of the plaintiff’s
17 constitutional rights.”).
18
19
1 See, e.g., Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U.S. 452, 468 (1896) (rejecting the argument that property
20 conveyed through federal land patents are entitled to be exempted from state and local regulations);
Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[P]roperty received through
21 federal land patents is subject to state and local regulations.”); Bowers v. Whitman, 671 F.3d 905, 915
(9th Cir. 2012) (“It is well established that there is no federal Constitutional right to be free from changes
22 in the land use laws.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Poppell v. City of San Diego, 149
F.3d 951, 969 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the plaintiff “simply has no right to be free of the zoning
codes duly established by the City of San Diego”); CraneVeyor Corp. v. City of Rancho Cucamonga,
23
2023 WL 3017949, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2023) (unpublished) (“[A] property owner cannot reasonably
expect that property [ ] be free of government regulation such as zoning.”) (citation and internal quotation
24 marks omitted).
l The Complaint thus fails to state a cognizable legal theory to support a claim for relief
2 || that is plausible on its face. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
3 (Dkt. # 35) and DISMISSES Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 33). Additionally, because
4 the Court finds that the deficiencies identified in this Order are uncurable, it concludes that
5 amendment would be futile. It thus DENIES Plaintiff leave to amend and DISMISSES
6 || Plaintiffs § 1983 claims with prejudice.”
7 Dated this 28th day of May, 2026.
9 John H. Chun
United States District Judge
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22 .
? See, e.g., Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991) (“A district court does not err
3 in denying leave to amend where the amendment would be futile or where the amended complaint would
be subject to dismissal.”’) (internal citations omitted); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d
1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that dismissal with prejudice and without leave to amend is
24 appropriate if the complaint cannot be saved by amendment).