Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

HASANI JACKSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:26-cv-1339-KKM-LSG

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF

REVENUE CHILD SUPPORT

PROGRAM, and TIMOTHY

SIERRA,

Defendants.

___________________________________

ORDER

On June 11, 2026, the United States Magistrate Judge entered a Report

and Recommendation, recommending that I deny Plaintiff Hasani Jackson’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis, dismiss Jackson’s complaint without

leave to amend, and close this case. See R. & R. (Doc. 10) at 10. Jackson timely

objects. Objs. (Doc. 11). I adopt the Report and Recommendation over Jackon’s

objections for the reasons stated below.

Jackson brings only a Section 1983 claim averring that the defendants

deprived Jackson of procedural due process in various “child-support and

establishment and enforcement proceedings conducted between approximately

2022 and 2025.” See 2d Am. Compl.1 (Doc. 7) ¶¶ 10, 15–21. Jackson seeks

compensatory damages, “declaratory and equitable relief as permitted by law,”

and “costs and any further relief the Court deems just and proper.” See id. at

5 (Prayer for Relief). Defendant Florida Department of Revenue Child Support

Program (the Department) is “a governmental entity . . . responsible for child-

support establishment and enforcement proceedings within the State of

Florida.” Id. ¶ 4. Defendant Sierra is an attorney who participated in “the

child-support proceedings complained of.” Id. ¶ 5.

After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and

recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate

judge’s Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party files a

timely and specific objection to a finding of fact by a magistrate judge, the

district court must conduct a de novo review with respect to that factual issue.

Stokes v. Singletary, 952 F.2d 1567, 1576 (11th Cir. 1992). The district court

reviews legal conclusions de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See

Cooper-Houston v. S. Ry. Co., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam);

Ashworth v. Glades Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 379 F. Supp. 3d 1244, 1246

(M.D. Fla. 2019).

1 Although Jackson labels the operative complaint “Amended Complaint,” it is the

second amended complaint. See Compl. (Doc. 1); Am. Compl. (Doc. 6); 2d Am. Compl.

2

The Report and Recommendation is summarized thus: the Magistrate

Judge concludes that the complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1983

against either defendant. R. & R. at 4. The claim fails against Sierra because

he is not a state actor and does not fall into any of “the rare circumstances

where a private individual may qualify as a state actor.” Id. at 5. The claim

against the Department is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and there are

no allegations that would allow for the Ex parte Young exception to apply. Id.

at 6–7. Further, Florida has not waived Eleventh Amendment immunity for

civil rights actions against state agencies under Section 1983 and Congress has

not abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity for Section 1983 claims. Id. at

7. Even if the complaint avoided the foregoing issues, abstention would be

warranted because the action concerns domestic relations. Id. at 8–9. Lastly,

leave to amend should be denied because Jackson has amended his complaint

twice already and there is no plausible Section 1983 claim under any

construction of the facts and, even if there were, abstention would be

warranted. Id. at 9–10.

Jackson raises five objections—none of which identify any case law or

other authority in support. Instead of calling into question the Magistrate

Judge’s conclusions, the objections reinforce that this action is due to be

3

dismissed. None of Jackson’s objections respond to the Magistrate Judge’s

conclusions regarding the unavailability of a Section 1983 claim against Sierra.

I begin with Jackson’s fourth objection—that his claim is sufficiently

distinct “from the underlying domestic-relations proceedings” such that

abstention is unwarranted. Objs. at 9. “The federal judiciary has traditionally

abstained from deciding cases concerning domestic relations. As a result,

federal courts generally dismiss cases involving divorce and alimony, child

custody, visitation[] rights, establishment of paternity, child support, and

enforcement of separation or divorce decrees still subject to state court

modification.” Ingram v. Hayes, 866 F.2d 368, 369 (11th Cir. 1988) (per

curiam).

Somewhat belying Jackson’s other objections, which claim that

prospective injunctive relief through Ex parte Young is available to him as a

remedy, Jackson states that he “does not seek modification of child-support

obligations, recalculation of arrears, [or] review of state-court judgments.” See

Objs. at 4–9. He avers that he merely challenges unconstitutional conduct that

happened to occur in the “child-support context.” See id. at 9–10.

Even still, abstention is warranted. There is a split as to whether the

domestic relations abstention should apply in cases invoking federal question

jurisdiction. Ingram, 866 F.2d at 370–72. Although the Eleventh Circuit has

4

not answered this question, it noted that, ordinarily, courts apply the exception

in such cases only “when the federal court would necessarily become enmeshed

in the domestic factual disputes.” Id. at 372. The crux of Jackson’s claim is that

the Department improperly weighed or rejected his evidence “[d]uring child-

support establishment and enforcement proceedings[,]” thus violating his due

process rights by determining and enforcing Jackson’s child support

obligations in an arbitrary manner. See, e.g., 2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 19–20.

Assuming that a procedural due process claim could be founded on such

allegations, to resolve Jackson’s claim would require me to become embroiled

in the child support proceeding and its accompanying factual disputes

regarding Jackson’s medical condition, ability to work, and the financial needs

of any children that are the subject of the proceeding. Cf. Ingram, 866 F.2d at

372 (“Because Ingram’s claim merely requires the district court to consider the

constitutionality of the Alabama court’s [notice] procedures, resolution of this

issue does not require the court to delve into the parties’ domestic affairs.”).

The domestic-relations case is ongoing, see R. & R. at 9, and it is plausible

that Jackson will be subject to more enforcement proceedings. See 2d Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 12–13 (describing Jackson’s “unemployment and ongoing medical

deterioration,” and his workers’ compensation payments as “temporary

resources,” calling into question Jackson’s ability to pay child support). Thus,

5

any order declaring unconstitutional the Department’s past conduct, such as

its conclusions regarding evidentiary disputes over the impact of Jackson’s

“ongoing medical complications” on his ability to work, would undoubtedly

interfere with future enforcement proceedings. See id. ¶¶ 7, 10–13, 19.

Further, Jackson’s representations that this lawsuit, even without a

request for injunctive relief, could provide prospective relief and that the

Department continues to rely on the purportedly unconstitutional

“determinations” for “continuing administration of child-support obligations,”

suggest that Jackson might seek to use a ruling in his favor in this action to

alter his child support obligations in the separate state action. See Objs. at 5–

6. I overrule Jackson’s fourth objection.

Jackson’s first three objections all resist the conclusion that Ex parte

Young is not applicable. In sum, he contends that there is an ongoing violation

of federal law, that prospective relief is available to remedy this, and that Ex

parte Young applies. Objs. at 4–8. These representations contradict his

complaint, which does not request an injunction, does not name a state officer

as a defendant, and claims to seek no “appellate review of domestic-relations

rulings or modification of state family-court orders.” See 2d Am. Compl. at 1,

4–5 (Introduction, Conclusion, Prayer for Relief).

6

If his arguments accurately characterized the nature of his action, it

would only reinforce the necessity of applying domestic relations abstention.

Any prospective injunctive relief that determines which “evidentiary

treatment,” “governmental decision-making,” or “enforcement actions” do not

violate Jackson’s due process rights would necessarily interfere with the

ongoing state court domestic relations proceedings. See id. at 4 (Conclusion);

R. & R. at 9 (noting that Jackson’s “state domestic-relations action is ongoing”).

I overrule these objections.

Jackson’s fifth objection is that the Report and Recommendation

erroneously concludes that amendment is futile. Objs. at 10–12. Jackson does

not specifically identify how he could amend to cure the issues. Rather, he

argues that because the first four objections are correct, amendment would not

be futile. See id. at 10 (“The determination that amendment would serve no

purpose depends substantially upon several underlying conclusions that

Plaintiff has specifically challenged through these objections.”). Further, he

states that the Report and Recommendation’s “concerns do not necessarily

establish incurable defects. Rather, they concern matters capable of

clarification through more precise pleading.” Id. at 11. Beyond bald

statements, such as that a third “amended complaint could more precisely

identify the governmental practices challenged, the actors responsible for those

7

practices, the conduct attributed to each, and the relationship between the

constitutional injuries alleged and the relief sought,” Jackson does not explain

what “more precise pleading” he could provide. Id. I overrule this objection.

After reviewing the record and Jackson’s arguments, I overrule

Jackson’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions. I adopt the

Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation in full.

Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:

1. Jackson’s Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report &

Recommendation (Doc. 11) are OVERRULED.

2. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (Doc. 10) is

ADOPTED and made a part of this Order for all purposes.

3. Jackson’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 2) is DENIED.

4. Jackson’s Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 7) is DISMISSED

without leave to amend.

5. This action is DISMISSED without prejudice.

6. The Clerk is directed to ENTER JUDGMENT, which shall read:

“This case is dismissed without prejudice.”

8

7. The Clerk is further directed to TERMINATE any pending motions,

hearings, and deadlines, and to CLOSE this case.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on June 29, 2026.

Fl imball Mizelle

United States District Judge