The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 REBECA BRINKLY WARD, Case No.: 26-CV-675 TWR (DDL)
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER (1) SCREENING
13 v. COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), AND
14 C & J LEGACY RESIDENTIAL, LLC;
(2) REQUIRING PLAINTIFF TO
ADAM PERON; and PAD PROPERTIES
15 FILE A RESPONSE TO THIS
GROUP, L.P., d/b/a WEST STAR
ORDER
16 PROPERTIES,
17 Defendants.
18
19 On February 3, 2026, pro se Plaintiff Rebeca Brinkly Ward filed a Complaint against
20 C & J Legacy Residential, LLC, Adain Peron, and PAD Properties Group, L.P. (d/b/a West
21 Star Properties) alleging several claims relating to her tenancy (ECF No. 1) and a Motion
22 to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF No. 2.) On March 3, 2026, the Court granted
23 Plaintiff’s request to proceed IFP. (See ECF No. 7.) The Court must screen all IFP
24 complaints before service on defendants to ensure that they are not frivolous or malicious,
25 that they state a claim on which relief may be granted, and that they do not seek monetary
26 relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
2 I. Legal Standard
3 The Court must screen all IFP complaints before service on defendants to ensure that
4 they are not frivolous or malicious, that they state a claim on which relief may be granted,
5 and that they do not seek monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C.
6 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (holding
7 that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”). “The
8 standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief
9 can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
10 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th
11 Cir. 2012). To survive screening, all complaints must include a “short and plain statement
12 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A
13 complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
14 that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
15 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when
16 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
17 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
18 II. Background
19 Plaintiff, a Black woman with a disability, has resided at 440 Chambers Street, Unit
20 9, El Cajon, California (the “rental unit”) since December 2019. (See ECF No. 1
21 (“Compl.”) at 2.) Plaintiff alleges her tenancy is managed by General Manager Adain
22 Perone of West Star Properties. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges she experienced discrimination,
23 harassment, and retaliation by Perone throughout her tenancy, including:
24 • Wrongfully denying the addition of Plaintiff’s brother to her lease while
25 he temporarily resided with Plaintiff—thus preventing Plaintiff from
26 utilizing a housing voucher her brother received from a veteran’s
27 assistance program and depriving her of “critical financial assistance”—
28
1 despite previously adding non-Black co-tenants to Plaintiff’s lease upon
2 request without issue (id. at 2–3);
3 • Offering Plaintiff a “filthy unsuitable upstairs unit” when she requested
4 transfer to a larger, two-bedroom unit to accommodate her family, despite
5 offering a “suitable, code-compliant two-bedroom unit” in the same
6 complex to a non-Black tenant to accommodate his family (id. at 3);
7 • Never offering Plaintiff a downstairs unit at anytime during her tenancy,
8 despite her disability (id.);
9 • Harassing Plaintiff and her family over “mundane activities” including
10 chopping and stacking wood, despite permitting such activities for other
11 tenants (id.);
12 • Creating inaccurate payment histories on Plaintiff’s ledger regarding her
13 tender of rent (id. at 3–4);
14 • Refusing to accept certain forms of rent payment from Plaintiff, despite
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accepting such forms of payment from non-Black tenants without issue (id.
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at 5–6);
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• Wrongfully initiating unlawful detainer actions against Plaintiff while
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refusing to accept her rent payments (id. at 5–8);
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• Improperly serving notice of unlawful detainer and/or eviction on Plaintiff
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(id. at 8–9);
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• Wrongfully designating the rental unit as “vacant” while Plaintiff was
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actively residing there (id. 9–10);
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• Interfering with the maintenance team’s efforts to make repairs requested
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by Plaintiff and deliberately delaying repairs, rendering the rental unit
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uninhabitable (id. 9–10);
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• Refusing to address ongoing noise and nuisance issues caused by upstairs
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neighbors, despite Plaintiff’s complaints (id. at 10);
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1 • Granting permission to other tenants to use Plaintiff’s assigned parking
2 spot without her consent, despite knowing Plaintiff was pregnant, disabled,
3 and “needing her parking spot at all times due to limited mobility” (id. at
4 10–11);
5 • Refusing to address Plaintiff’s safety concerns regarding the lighting at the
6 front entrance of the rental unit (id. at 11–12);
7 • Wrongfully denying Plaintiff service animal accommodations, despite her
8 disability (id. at 12);
9 • Failing to exercise reasonable care in maintaining the rental property and
10 deliberately ignoring Plaintiff’s repair requests, including “replacing
11 window blinds, six-nonfunctional electrical outlets, light entrance, sliding
12 patio door, and caulking in the bathtub and toilet to prevent water
13 leak/intrusion” (id. at 12–13); and
14 • Wrongfully continuing to bill Plaintiff as if two people were occupying the
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rental unit after Plaintiff’s co-tenant permanently vacated and Plaintiff
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notified Perone of the change in occupancy (id. at 14).
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Plaintiff further claims that on July 31, 2024, Defendants filed an unlawful detainer
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action (Case No. 24UD003733C) against her claiming non-payment of rent, (id. at 8), but
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then voluntarily dismissed the action on December 5, 2024 (see id. at 14). Then, on June
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12, 2025, Defendants filed a new unlawful detainer action (Case No. 25UD030836C)
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against her. (See id.) Although unclear, it seems Plaintiff still has possession of the rental
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unit. (See, e.g., id. at 14 (“In settlement discussions related to the unlawful detainer actions,
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Defendant Adain Perone’s primary and consistent demand has been for Plaintiff to vacate
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the apartment. Defendant Perone has framed financial settlement offers around this
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condition of vacancy.”).) The status of the second unlawful detainer action is also unclear.
26
(See generally id.)
27
/ / /
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1 On February 3, 2026, Plaintiff filed a complaint against C & J Legacy Residential,
2 LLC, Adain Peron, and PAD Properties Group, L.P (d/b/a West Star Properties) (the
3 “Defendants”) alleging several causes of action.1 (See generally id.)
4 III. Discussion
5 A. Violations of the Fair Housing Act
6 The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) makes it “unlawful to discriminate against any
7 person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental, or in the provision of services
8 or facilities in connection therewith,” because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status,
9 national origin, or handicap. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b), (f)(2). Discrimination “in the provision
10 of services or facilities” includes failing or delaying maintenance or repairs of a rental
11 dwelling, or limiting the use or privileges, services, or facilities associated with a rental
12 dwelling on account of race, color, religion sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin.
13 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(a)(1), (4); see The Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of
14 Modesto, 583 F.3d 690, 711 (9th Cir. 2009). “[T]he FHA not only requires that individuals
15 be given the opportunity to secure housing in a non-discriminatory manner, but also
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18 1 The caption of Plaintiff’s Complaint lists thirteen causes of action: Violation of the Fair Housing
Act; Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; Retaliatory Eviction; Acting in Bad Faith; Violation
19 of Right to Quiet Enjoyment; Negligence; Retaliation, Harassment, and Intimidation; Invasion of Privacy;
Emotional Distress and Mental Anguish; Unauthorized Fees or Charges; Failure to Address Noise or
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Nuisance; Breach of Warranty of Habitability; Misleading and Unfair Business Practices; Breach of
21 Fiduciary Duty; and Falsification of Business Records. (See generally Compl.) The body of her
Complaint, however, discusses only the following causes of action: Violation of the Fair Housing Act;
22 Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act; Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation; Unfair
Competition; Wrongful Eviction; Retaliatory Eviction; Breach of Warranty of Habitability; and
23 Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. (See generally id.)
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The Court cannot accept legal conclusions set forth in the Complaint if Plaintiff has not supported
25 her contentions with facts. See Hoagland v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *3
(E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The Court therefore DISMISSES WITHOUT
26 PREJUDICE the following causes of action for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B): Acting in Bad Faith; Negligence; Retaliation, Harassment, and Intimidation; Invasion of
27 Privacy (Intrusion into Seclusion); Emotional Distress and Mental Anguish; Unauthorized Fees or
Charges; Failure to Address Noise or Nuisance; Misleading and Deceptive Unfair Business Practices;
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1 ‘guarantees their right to equal treatment once they have become residents of that
2 housing.’” Jimenez v. David Y Tsai, No. 5:16-CV-04434-EJD, 2017 WL 2423186, at *5
3 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2017) (quoting Hous. Rts. Ctr. v. Sterling, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1192
4 (C.D. Cal. 2004)); see Patton v. Hanassab, No. 14-CV-1489-AJB (WVG), 2016 WL
5 4507022, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2016).
6 There are three theories under which a plaintiff can establish a FHA discrimination
7 claim: (1) disparate treatment, (2) disparate impact, and (3) failure to make reasonable
8 accommodations. Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 305–07 (9th Cir. 1997);
9 Smith v. Cityfront Terrace Homeowners Ass’n, No. 15-CV-00427-BAS(WVG), 2016 WL
10 1450709, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2016).
11 1. Disparate Treatment
12 The elements of a disparate treatment claim are: “(1) [the] plaintiff’s rights are
13 protected under the FHA; and (2) as a result of defendant’s discriminatory conduct, [the]
14 plaintiff has suffered a distinct and palpable injury.” Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043, 1051
15 (9th. Cir.1999); see Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305. As for the second element, “[p]roof of
16 discriminatory motive is crucial.” Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305 (internal quotations and
17 citations omitted).
18 Plaintiff contends she is a member of the following protected classes: (a) race (she
19 is Black), (b) familial status (she was pregnant at the time of the alleged violations), and
20 (c) disability2 (she has a severe breathing disability). (See Compl. at 15.) The Court
21 addresses Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to each class in turn.
22 a. Race
23 Plaintiff satisfies the first element because race unquestionably qualifies as a
24 protected class under the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Regarding the second element,
25 Plaintiff contends “Defendants’ stated reason for eviction (non-payment) was a pretext.
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2 The Court construes Plaintiff’s disability (i.e., “handicap”) discrimination allegation as a claim
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1 Their true motive was discrimination and retaliation based on Plaintiff’s protected
2 characteristics.” (Compl. at 15.) To begin, eviction constitutes an adverse action under
3 the FHA. Patton, 2016 WL 4507022 at *6 (citing Harris v. Itzhaki, 183 F.3d 1043 (9th
4 Cir. 1999); Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., 351 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2003)). Attempted
5 eviction is also recognized as an adverse action. See, e.g., Pardo-Pena v. Kaas Props.
6 LLC, No. 2:23-CV-06197-SPG (MRWX), 2024 WL 3298284, at *7–9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9,
7 2024); Tabi v. Lazovsky, No. CV 17-7189 DMG(JC), 2018 WL 7457933 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
8 7, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 17-7189 DMG(JC), 2019 WL
9 934978, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2019); Na"im v. Sophie's Arms Fine Residences, No.
10 13CV2515 JAH BLM, 2015 WL 401257, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2015); Hous. Rts. Ctr. v.
11 Sterling, 404 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1192–93 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Accordingly, Plaintiff satisfies
12 the “district and palpable injury” requirement of the second element. See id. The
13 remaining question is thus whether Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Defendants’
14 “discriminatory conduct” (i.e., the protected classes were in part a motivating factor for the
15 adverse treatment). See Jimenez, 2017 WL 2423186, at *5.
16 With respect to race, Plaintiff alleges:
17 Defendants engaged in a pattern of conduct demonstrating racial animus and
disparate treatment, including but not limited to: (a) sabotaging the housing
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voucher for Plaintiff’s Black, veteran brother while cooperating with non-
19 Black tenants; . . . [and] (c) refusing Plaintiff a suitable ground-floor unit while
readily offering one to a non-Black family[.]
20
21 (Compl. at 15.) The foregoing allegations constitute sufficient facts to suggest Plaintiff
22 may have been subjected to less favorable “terms, conditions, or privileges” with respect
23 to the rental unit or the eviction proceedings brought against her than other tenants based
24 on her race; thus, she satisfies the “discriminatory conduct” requirement of the second
25 element. See Patton, 2016 WL 4507022, at *6; Hous. Rts. Ctr. v. Sterling, 404 F. Supp.
26 2d 1179, 1192 (C.D. Cal. 2004). Accordingly, the Court FINDS Plaintiff’s claim of
27 disparate treatment with respect to her race passes screening under 28 U.S.C.
28 § 1915(e)(2)(B).
1 b. Familial Status
2 Like race, familial status unquestionably qualifies as a protected class under the
3 FHA.3 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Thus, Plaintiff satisfies the first element. Regarding the
4 second, Plaintiff contends “Defendants targeted [her] for adverse actions after learning of
5 her pregnancy and marriage, including initiating eviction proceedings, which constitutes
6 discrimination based on familial status.” (Compl. at 15.) These conclusory allegations are
7 insufficient to show Plaintiff’s familial status was in part a motivating factor for her adverse
8 treatment. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (holding “courts are not bound to accept as true
9 a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”). Thus, the Court DISMISSES
10 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim with respect to familial
11 status.
12 2. Disparate Impact
13 In contrast to disparate treatment, “[t]o establish a prima facie disparate impact case,
14 a plaintiff must establish at least that the defendant’s actions had a discriminatory effect.”
15 Gamble, 104 F.3d at 306 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The elements of a
16 disparate impact claim are:
17 (1) the existence of a policy, not a one-time decision, that is outwardly neutral;
(2) a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected class, of
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which the plaintiff is a member; and (3) robust causality that shows, beyond
19 mere evidence of a statistical disparity, that the challenged policy, and not
some other factor or policy, caused the disproportionate effect.
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21 Sw. Fair Hous. Council, Inc., 17 F.4th at 960; see Gamble, 104 F.3d at 305.
22 Plaintiff does not allege the existence of any policy whatsoever; rather, she alleges
23 specific instances of discrimination, harassment, and retaliation by Defendants. (See
24 generally Compl.) Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
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3 According to the U.S. Department of Urban Development, the agency tasked with implementing
27 the FHA, pregnant women qualify as members of the “familial status” protected class. See Fair Housing,
28
U.S. DEPT. OF URB. DEV., available at https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/fheo_booklet_eng.pdf.
1 Plaintiff’s FHA discrimination claim to the extent it alleges disparate impact. See Jimenez,
2 2017 WL 2423186, at *7 (dismissing a disparate impact claim under the FHA when
3 plaintiffs “did not identify a facially discriminatory policy”).
4 3. Failure to Make Reasonable Accommodations
5 Regarding disability, Plaintiff alleges Defendants “failed to make reasonable
6 accommodations,” such as “refusing to timely repair electrical outlets required for her
7 medical equipment, denying a request for a security accommodation (doorbell camera),
8 and taking away her assigned parking space.” (Compl. at 15.) To make out a prima facie
9 case for refusal to make a reasonable accommodation under the FHA, Plaintiff must plead
10 (1) she suffers from a “handicap” as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h), (2) Defendants knew
11 of her handicap or should have reasonably been expected to know of it, (3) the
12 accommodation “may be necessary” to afford Plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and
13 enjoy the dwelling, and (4) Defendants refused to make the accommodation. DuBois v.
14 Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006), cert.
15 denied, 549 U.S. 1216 (2007); United States v. Cal. Mobile Home Park Mgmt. Co., 107
16 F.3d 1374, 1380 (9th Cir. 1997).
17 The FHA defines handicap as “(1) a physical or mental impairment which
18 substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities, (2) a record of having
19 such an impairment, or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C.
20 § 3602(h). Plaintiff contends she has “a severe breathing disability” and as well as limited
21 mobility. (See generally Compl.) In support of this, Plaintiff attaches to her Complaint an
22 Application for Disabled Person Placard of Plates with the Department of Motor Vehicles.
23 (See ECF No. 1-2 at 107.) In the Application, a nurse practitioner indicates Plaintiff has
24 “[a] diagnosed disease or disorder which substantially impairs or interferes with mobility”
25 and “[a] significant limitation in the use of lower extremities” due to “gait instability
26 secondary to chronic knee pain and bilateral osteoarthritis of knees.” (See id.) The Court
27 finds the nurse practitioner’s remarks on behalf of Plaintiff may be sufficient to support
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1 that Plaintiff suffers from a handicap as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h), at least with respect
2 to her mobility.
3 Plaintiff fails, however, to establish Defendants knew or should have reasonably
4 been expected to know of her handicap. In support of her assertion that Defendants knew
5 of her disability, Plaintiff attaches a copy of an email exchange between herself and Perone.
6 (See ECF No. 1-2 at 184–98.) The only reference to the parking space in this exchange is
7 Plaintiff’s mentioning of “that guy you [Perone] gave my parking spot away to that lives
8 on top of my unit.” (Id. at 197.) This is insufficient to establish that Defendants knew or
9 should have reasonably been expected to know she suffers from limited mobility. Thus,
10 the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claim to the extent it alleges
11 Defendants failed to make reasonable accommodations regarding her disability (i.e.,
12 “handicap”). See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (explaining that, absent factual support, “an
13 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” does not constitute a
14 plausible claim for relief).
15 4. Interference with FHA Rights4
16 Plaintiff contends “Defendants’ campaign of fabricating ledger entries, refusing
17 tendered rent, and filing eviction actions was initiated and escalated in direct response to
18 Plaintiff’s exercise of her FHA rights (requesting accommodations, opposing
19 discrimination), in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 3617.” (Compl. at 15.) Section 3617 provides
20 that it is “unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
21 exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account
22 of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any
23 right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.” 42 U.S.C.
24 § 3617. The Ninth Circuit interprets Section 3617 broadly, “reach[ing] all practices which
25
26
27 4 Plaintiff titles her claim as “retaliation,” but cites 42 U.S.C. § 3617 as the relevant law. (See
Compl. at 15.) This statute concerns interference with a plaintiff’s FHA rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617.
28
1 have the effect of interfering with the exercise of rights under the federal fair housing laws.”
2 See Ohio House, LLC v. City of Costa Mesa, 135 F.4th 645, 670 (9th Cir. 2025) (internal
3 quotations and citations omitted). To bring a claim for interference with FHA rights, a
4 plaintiff must establish that “(1) [she] was engaged in protected activity; (2) [she] suffered
5 an adverse action; and (3) there was a causal link between the two.” Id. (internal quotations
6 and citations omitted).
7 a. “Requesting Accommodations”
8 It is unclear whether Plaintiff’s “requesting accommodations” from Defendants
9 constitutes a protected activity for purposes of Section 3617 because Plaintiff has not
10 established that Defendants knew or should have reasonably been expected to know of her
11 alleged disability. (See supra Section III.A.3.) Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES
12 WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s claim for interference with FHA rights as it relates
13 to her disability (i.e., “handicap”).
14 b. “Opposing Discrimination”
15 Based on the facts alleged, the Court cannot decipher what Plaintiff intends by
16 “opposing discrimination.” (See generally Compl.) While Plaintiff alleges several facts
17 suggesting she was subject to discrimination by Defendants, she does not clearly allege the
18 ways in which she attempted to oppose Defendants’ discriminatory practices. (See
19 generally id.) Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s
20 claim for interference with FHA rights as it relates to race and/or familial status.
21 B. Violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act
22 To state a claim for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), a
23 plaintiff must allege: “(1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendant
24 is a private entity that owns, leases, or operates a place of public accommodation; and (3)
25 the plaintiff was denied public accommodations by the defendant because of her
26 disability.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations
27 omitted). Although residential apartment complexes do not generally fall within the scope
28 of a “public accommodation” as defined by the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)–(L),
1 areas within a residential complex can qualify as places of public accommodation if they
2 are available for use by the public. See Green v. Mercy Hous., Inc., No. C 18-04888 WHA,
3 2018 WL 6704185, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2018) (citing Trostenetsky v. Keys Condo.
4 Owners Ass’n, No. 17-cv-04167, 2018 WL 2234599, at *2 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2018)).
5 Plaintiff alleges that the rental office, common area, and parking facilities of the
6 residential complex. where her rental unit resides, are places of public accommodation
7 under the ADA. (Compl. at 16.) However, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that these areas
8 are available for use by the public. (See generally id.) The Court cannot conclude—based
9 on Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions—that these areas fall within the scope of a “public
10 accommodation” such that they are subject to the ADA. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
11 (holding “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
12 allegation”). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s
13 claim for ADA violations.
14 C. Fraud/Intentional Misrepresentation
15 Under California law, “[t]he elements of intentional misrepresentation, or actual
16 fraud, are: (1) misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (2)
17 knowledge of falsity (scienter); (3) intent to defraud (i.e., to induce reliance); (4) justifiable
18 reliance; and (5) resulting damage.” Anderson v. Deloitte & Touche, 56 Cal. App. 4th
19 1468, 1474 (1997) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see Cal. Civ. Code § 1710.
20 Additionally, in the Ninth Circuit, claims for intentional misrepresentation must meet
21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirements. See Vess v. Ciba–
22 Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hayduk v. Lanna, 775
23 F.2d 441, 443 (1st Cir. 1985) (“[W]hile a federal court will examine state law to determine
24 whether the elements of fraud have been pled sufficiently to state a cause of action, the
25 Rule 9(b) requirement that the circumstances of the fraud must be stated with particularity
26 is a federally imposed rule.”)). Specifically, Rule 9(b) requires “[a]verments of fraud [to]
27 be accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.”
28 Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cooper v.
1 Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 627 (9th Cir. 1997)). The purpose of this heightened standard is “to
2 give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the fraud
3 charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done
4 anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985).
5 Plaintiff alleges Defendants knowingly made false statements of material fact by
6 creating and maintaining fraudulent rental ledgers that misrepresented “the April 2024 rent
7 payment as four separate money orders totaling $1,600.00, when Plaintiff had tendered a
8 single negotiable instrument for a different amount” and the date that payment was
9 received. (Compl. at 17.) Plaintiff contends Defendants intended “to deceive Plaintiff . . .
10 by creating a fabricated paper trail to falsely show a payment irregularity and justify
11 unlawful detainer actions.” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants intended to induce
12 Plaintiff’s reliance “by confusing her account status.” (Id.) Moreover, Plaintiff asserts she
13 suffered actual damages, such as being “forced to expend resources to defend against
14 eviction lawsuits prejudicated on this fraud.” (Id.)
15 Considering the foregoing, the Court FINDS Plaintiff’s fraud/intentional
16 misrepresentation claim passes screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
17 D. Unfair Competition
18 To state an Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) claim in California, “a plaintiff must
19 show either an (1) ‘unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business act or practice,’ or (2) ‘unfair,
20 deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising.’” Lippett v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 340
21 F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200). California’s
22 UCL “‘borrows’ violations of other laws and treats these violations, when committed
23 pursuant to business activity, as unlawful practices independently actionable under section
24 17200 et seq. and subject to the distinct remedies provided thereunder.” Farmers Ins. Exch.
25 v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 377, 383 (1992). Accordingly, “if a ‘business practice’
26 violates any law—literally—it also violates § 17200 and may be redressed under that
27 section.” Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
28 (internal citations and quotations omitted). “A plaintiff who has spent or lost money due
1 to an unfair business practice may bring an action under the UCL to enjoin the practice, or
2 to secure restitution of benefits which have been acquired as the result of the unfair
3 competition.” Martinez v. Optimus Props., LLC, No. 2:16-CV-08598-SVW-MRW, 2017
4 WL 1040743, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2017) (citing Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17203–
5 04).
6 Because Plaintiff seeks injunctive and declaratory relief, (see Compl. at 34), and
7 considering she pleaded sufficient facts to allege the predicate violation, (see supra Section
8 III.C.), the Court FINDS Plaintiff’s UCL claim passes screening under 28 U.S.C.
9 § 1915(e)(2)(B).
10 E. Wrongful Eviction
11 To state a claim for wrongful eviction under California law, a plaintiff must have
12 suffered “damages for injuries to his person and goods caused by the forcible entry of one
13 who is, or claims to be, the lawful owner or possessor.” Spinks v. Equity Residential
14 Briarwood Apartments, 171 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 90 Cal. Rptr. 3d 453 (2009) (internal
15 quotations and citations omitted). Problematically, Plaintiff does not allege actual
16 dispossession of the rental unit. (See generally Compl.) Instead, Plaintiff merely alleges
17 that Defendants initiated and pursued unlawful detainer actions against her, causing her to
18 suffer “the imminent loss of her home.” (See id. at 19 (emphasis added).) Because
19 Plaintiff’s alleged injury is only speculative, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT
20 PREJUDICE her claim for wrongful eviction. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568
21 U.S. 398, 401 (2013) (explaining a “theory of future injury is too speculative to satisfy the
22 well-established requirement that threatened injury must be ‘certainly impending’”).
23 F. Retaliatory Eviction
24 Plaintiff brings a claim for retaliatory eviction pursuant to California Civil Code
25 § 1942.5, (see Compl. at 19), which provides specific methods (i.e., subsections) for
26 satisfying the statute. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1942.5(a)(1)–(5). As a threshold matter,
27 Plaintiff does not identify which subsection applies to her claim. (See Compl. 19–20.)
28 Because it is improper to assume Plaintiff can prove facts she has not alleged, see
1 Associated Gen. Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters,
2 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983), the Court declines to assume which subsection Plaintiff intends
3 to apply for her Section 1942.5 claim. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges Defendants retaliated by
4 threatening and initiating unlawful detainer proceedings against her, resulting in “the
5 imminent loss of her home.” (Compl. at 20 (emphasis added).) As previously explained,
6 Plaintiff’s allegation of a speculative injury is insufficient to state a claim. (See supra
7 Section III.E.) Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE her claim
8 for retaliatory eviction.
9 G. Breach of Warranty of Habitability5
10 California law provides that a dwelling shall be deemed untenable if it substantially
11 lacks certain affirmative standard characteristics, including: “plumbing or gas facilities that
12 conformed to applicable law in effect at the time of installation, maintained in good
13 working order[,]” “electrical lighting, with wiring and electrical equipment that conformed
14 with applicable law at the time of installation, maintained in good working order[,]” and
15 “floors, stairways, and railings maintained in good repair.” See Cal. Civ. Code § 1941.1(a).
16 Plaintiff alleges Defendants breached their duty under Section 1941 because the
17 rental unit contains certain defects, including eleven non-functional electrical outlets,
18 inoperable and broken lighting at the unit entrance, and defective plumbing. (Compl. at
19 20–21.) Plaintiff further alleges she gave Defendants written and oral repair requests and
20 suffered damages, including “being forced to reside elsewhere to access basic utilities”
21 (i.e., constructive eviction). (Id. at 21.) The Court FINDS Plaintiff breach of warranty of
22 habitability claim passes screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
23 / / /
24 / / /
25
26
5 The Court notes that Plaintiff brings her Breach of Warranty of Habitability cause of action against
27 “Landlord Defendants,” without defining who comprise the “Landlord Defendants.” (See Compl. at 20–
21.) All other causes of action are brought against “All Defendants.” (See generally id.) The Court
28
1 H. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
2 The elements for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)
3 under California law are (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) extreme
4 or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff, and (3) actual and proximate causation between
5 the two. Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1001 (1993). To be
6 outrageous, the defendant’s conduct must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that
7 usually tolerated in a civilized community. Id. Moreover, the defendant must have
8 engaged in conduct intended to inflict injury or with the realization that injury will result.
9 Id.
10 Plaintiff alleges Defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct including
11 “[m]aking direct, threatening references to her pregnancy and family” and “[s]abotaging
12 her family’s housing stability (e.g., blocking her brother’s veteran voucher).” (Compl. at
13 21–22.) Plaintiff further alleges she suffered severe emotional distress as a result of
14 Defendants’ conduct, such as anxiety, depression, sleep deprivation, and stress, resulting
15 in exacerbation of her disability-related conditions. (Id. at 22.) The Court FINDS
16 Plaintiff’s IIED claim passes screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
17 CONCLUSION
18 Because the Court has dismissed some of Plaintiff’s claims without prejudice,
19 Plaintiff may elect to amend her Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may elect to proceed
20 with the claims that survived screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Accordingly,
21 Plaintiff SHALL FILE a response within forty-five (45) days of the Court’s Order electing
22 either to: (1) proceed only with the following claims against Defendants: disparate
23 treatment with respect to race in violation of the Fair Housing Act, fraud/intentional
24 misrepresentation, unfair competition, breach of warranty of habitability, and intentional
25 / / /
26 / / /
27 / / /
28 / / /
1 || infliction of emotional distress,° OR (2) file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff chooses
2 file an amended complaint, no other response to this Order is necessary.
3 IT IS SO ORDERED.
4 Dated: May 15, 2026 ——
6 Honorable Todd W. Robinson
United States District Judge
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27 If Plaintiff elects to proceed only with these claims, her remaining claims will be dismissed without
5g || Prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(¢)(2)(B).
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