The opinion
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8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ERIN LYNN PETERSON, No. 2:25-cv-3638-DMC-P
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER
14 VILLANUEVA, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s first amended complaint, ECF No. 7.
19 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief
20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C.
21 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was
22 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel.
23 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or
24 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can
25 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28
26 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).
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1 Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a
2 “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.
3 Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See
4 McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)).
5 These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim
6 and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996).
7 Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific
8 defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this
9 standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening required by law
10 when the allegations are vague and conclusory.
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12 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS
13 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Villanueva, a correctional officer
14 at California State Prison – Sacramento (CSP-Sac); Uolla, a correctional officer at CSP-Sac; (3)
15 Lopez, a correctional officer at CSP-Sac; and (4) Parham, a supervisor officer at CSP-Sac. See
16 ECF No. 7, pgs. 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
17 rights, specifically prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, excessive force, and
18 “failure to provide safe human [sic] and secure Living conditions.” Id. at 6.
19 According to Plaintiff, between May 31, 2025, and June 4, 2025, Defendant
20 Villanueva directed several African American inmates to attack Plaintiff while Plaintiff was at a
21 prison telephone booth attempting to call his family. See id. at pgs. 16-17. Plaintiff claims that the
22 assault occurred because Plaintiff refused to comply with Defendant Villanueva’s order for
23 Plaintiff to return to his cell for “close custody count.” See id. at 16. Plaintiff states that he was
24 not subject to close custody count and wanted to take a shower. See id. Defendant Villanueva
25 allegedly replied, “no take your ass back to your cell.” Id. Plaintiff, after seeing that Defendant
26 Villanueva had allowed two Hispanic inmates to use the showers, allegedly accused Defendant
27 Villanueva of racism before turning around and returning to his cell. See id. On the way back to
28 his cell, Plaintiff claims that he “saw c/o Villanueva speak to inmate Maloy who both pointed to”
1 Plaintiff and nodded their heads. Id. at 17.
2 Next, Plaintiff claims that he was assaulted by Inmate Jackson, the cellmate of
3 Inmate Maloy, on some unspecified later date for approximately two to four minutes before
4 correctional officers responded to the incident. See id. at 17-18. Plaintiff claims to have punched
5 Inmate Jackson in the face “Due to the lack of protection and lack of staff response.” Id. at 18.
6 While beating Plaintiff, the assailants allegedly stated that they would beat Plaintiff again if
7 Plaintiff “disrespected staff or the program again.” Id. Plaintiff was interviewed by Defendant
8 Parham following the assault. See id. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Parham did not address the
9 allegedly “unethical agreement” between Defendant Villanueva and the assailants to attack
10 Plaintiff. See id. at 19. Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Parham and other officers present at
11 the interview turned off their body cameras, smirked at each other, and stated that the assault
12 “looked pretty personal.” Id.
13 According to Plaintiff, on or about July 4, 2025, Plaintiff was punched on the left
14 side of his face by Inmate Maloy while Plaintiff was walking to get medications. See id. at 20.
15 Plaintiff allegedly ran to where Defendants Lopez and Uolla were located and told Defendants
16 Lopez and Uolla that he had been assaulted. See id. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Lopez and
17 Uolla did not respond or render assistance to Plaintiff. See id.
18 Plaintiff next alleges that, on or about July 12, 2025, during a routine food tray and
19 trash collection, Defendant Lopez took a plastic bag from Plaintiff’s tray and slammed the bag’s
20 contents in front of Plaintiff’s cell door. See id. at pgs. 21-22. Plaintiff believes that Defendant
21 Lopez’s actions were the “Result of Being Targeted and discriminated against by Folsom staff for
22 disagreement with c/o Villanueva.” Id. at 22.
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1 II. DISCUSSION
2 The Court finds that Plaintiff has asserted a cognizable Eighth Amendment
3 excessive force claim against Defendant Villanueva. The Court also finds Plaintiff’s remaining
4 claims to be defective, for the reasons described below. Specifically, Plaintiff has not alleged
5 facts to establish a causal link between Defendant Parham and a violation of Plaintiff’
6 constitutional or statutory rights. Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s medical care claim
7 against Defendants Lopez and Uolla is deficient because Plaintiff does not allege that he was
8 suffering from a serious medical condition. Finally, Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against
9 Defendant Lopez is insufficient because Plaintiff does not allege facts to satisfy each of the
10 elements of such a claim.
11 A. Causal Link to Constitutional or Statutory Violation
12 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual
13 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See
14 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A
15 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of
16 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform
17 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.”
18 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations
19 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See
20 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth
21 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional
22 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988).
23 Here, Plaintiff alleges that he suffered harm or injury as a result of the actions and
24 inactions of Defendant Parham. However, Defendant Parham’s actions and inactions do not
25 implicate any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend the
26 first amended complaint to identify and allege a constitutional violation by Defendant Parham.
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1 B. Medical Care
2 The treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which the
3 prisoner is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits cruel
4 and unusual punishment. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993); Farmer v. Brennan,
5 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). The Eighth Amendment “. . .embodies broad and idealistic concepts of
6 dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102
7 (1976). Conditions of confinement may, however, be harsh and restrictive. See Rhodes v.
8 Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). Nonetheless, prison officials must provide prisoners with
9 “food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” Toussaint v. McCarthy,
10 801 F.2d 1080, 1107 (9th Cir. 1986). A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when
11 two requirements are met: (1) objectively, the official’s act or omission must be so serious such
12 that it results in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2)
13 subjectively, the prison official must have acted unnecessarily and wantonly for the purpose of
14 inflicting harm. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Thus, to violate the Eighth Amendment, a prison
15 official must have a “sufficiently culpable mind.” See id.
16 Deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury, or risks of serious
17 injury or illness, gives rise to a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105;
18 see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. This applies to physical as well as dental and mental health
19 needs. See Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1253 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by
20 Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). An injury or illness is sufficiently serious if the failure to
21 treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the “. . . unnecessary and
22 wanton infliction of pain.” McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled
23 on other grounds by WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc); see
24 also Doty v. County of Lassen, 37 F.3d 540, 546 (9th Cir. 1994). Factors indicating seriousness
25 are: (1) whether a reasonable doctor would think that the condition is worthy of comment; (2)
26 whether the condition significantly impacts the prisoner’s daily activities; and (3) whether the
27 condition is chronic and accompanied by substantial pain. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122,
28 1131-32 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
1 Plaintiff alleges that he was punched and that, afterwards, Defendants Lopez and
2 Uolla did nothing. However, Plaintiff does not allege that he had a serious medical need as a
3 result of being punched. An Eighth Amendment medical claim only arises when the defendant is
4 deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend.
5 C. Retaliation
6 In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for retaliation, the plaintiff must
7 establish that he was retaliated against for exercising a constitutional right, and that the retaliatory
8 action was not related to a legitimate penological purpose, such as preserving institutional
9 security. See Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). In meeting
10 this standard, the prisoner must demonstrate a specific link between the alleged retaliation and the
11 exercise of a constitutional right. See Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 807 (9th Cir. 1995);
12 Valandingham v. Bojorquez, 866 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (9th Cir. 1989). The prisoner must also
13 show that the exercise of First Amendment rights was chilled, though not necessarily silenced, by
14 the alleged retaliatory conduct. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 2000), see also
15 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 569 (9th Cir. 2005). Thus, the prisoner plaintiff must
16 establish the following in order to state a claim for retaliation: (1) prison officials took adverse
17 action against the inmate; (2) the adverse action was taken because the inmate engaged in
18 protected conduct; (3) the adverse action chilled the inmate’s First Amendment rights; and (4) the
19 adverse action did not serve a legitimate penological purpose. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568.
20 Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lopez slammed a plastic bag in front of Plaintiff’s
21 cell door to retaliate against Plaintiff for his disagreements with Defendant Villanueva. The Court
22 finds this claim to be deficient because Plaintiff has not established elements (2) and (3) of a
23 retaliation claim. First, as currently alleged, Plaintiff has not pled that Defendant Lopez’s conduct
24 was “because of” Plaintiff’s disagreements with Defendant Villanueva, since Plaintiff does not
25 allege that Defendant Lopez knew about Plaintiff’s alleged disagreements. Second, Plaintiff has
26 not alleged a protected activity relating to his disagreements, such as the filing of a grievance
27 about which Defendant Lopez was aware. The Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend the first
28 amended complaint.
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2 III. CONCLUSION
3 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by
4 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire
5 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is
6 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See
7 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to
8 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended
9 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if
10 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make
11 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be
12 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id.
13 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the
14 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See
15 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how
16 each named defendant is involved and must set forth some affirmative link or connection between
17 each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167
18 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
19 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the
20 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at
21 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply
22 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b).
23 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981).
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1 | ///
2 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
3 1. Plaintiff's first amended complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and
4 2. Plaintiff shall file a second amended complaint within 30 days of the date
5 || of service of this order.
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7 | Dated: February 5, 2026 Svc
8 DENNIS M. COTA
9 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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