The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6
7 KEVIN B WILLIAMS, Case No. 25-cv-09527-HSG
8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART MOTIONS TO
9 v. DISMISS
10 TRANSWORLD SYSTEMS INC., et al., Re: Dkt. Nos. 15, 31
11 Defendants.
12
13 Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. The Court
14 finds these appropriate for disposition without oral argument and the motions are deemed
15 submitted. See Civil L.R. 7-1(b). For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS IN
16 PART and DENIES IN PART the motions.
17 I. BACKGROUND
18 On December 16, 2025, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint against Defendants
19 Transworld Systems, Inc. d/b/a Transworld Collections (“Transworld”) and the Regents of the
20 University of California d/b/a UCSF Medical Center and UCSF Health (“UCSF”) for “unlawful
21 medical billing, refusal to validate disputed charges, coercive debt-collection practices, and denial
22 of medically necessary care.” Dkt. No. 10 (“SAC”) at 1.
23 Plaintiff alleges that he visited UCSF for two ophthalmology visits in April 2025 and May
24 2025, and he was told that no payment was due and he was fully covered by Medicare Advantage.
25 Id. at 3–4. In June 2025, he learned that he had been billed more than $26,000 for the visits, with
26 an out-of-pocket responsibility of nearly $2,000. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that he disputed the
27 charges in writing, but UCSF referred his account to Transworld for debt collection without
1 personal information, including tax returns, proof of citizenship, marital status documentation, and
2 records of medical expenses incurred outside UCSF.” Id. UCSF then “refused to provide Plaintiff
3 with further ophthalmologic care unless he paid the disputed charges or submitted the personal
4 documentation demanded by [Transworld].” Id. at 6.
5 Plaintiff claims he “faces ongoing denial of medical care, imminent reputational harm from
6 potential credit reporting, coercive pressure to surrender statutory rights, and deterioration of his
7 medical condition.” Id. Plaintiff brings claims against both Defendants for violation of the
8 Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“Rosenthal Act”), violation of the Fair Credit
9 Reporting Act (“FCRA”), financial elder abuse, and violation of California’s Unfair Competition
10 Law (“UCL”). Id. at 6–8. Plaintiff additionally brings a claim against Defendant Transworld for
11 violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”). Id. at 6. Finally, Plaintiff brings
12 claims against Defendant UCSF for violation of the No Surprises Act, violation of the Hospital
13 Price Transparency Rule, violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), violation of
14 due process, and medical malpractice. Id. at 7–9.1
15 The Court previously denied Plaintiff’s two applications for a temporary restraining order.
16 See Dkt. Nos. 9, 16. Defendants now move to dismiss. Dkt. No. 15 (UCSF); Dkt. No. 31
17 (Transworld).
18 II. LEGAL STANDARD
19 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain
20 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2). A
21 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be
22 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the
23 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”
24 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule
25 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
26
1 Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim is somewhat distinct from his other claims. Plaintiff
27
alleges that he suffered a severe adverse reaction after an injection during one of the visits to
1 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible
2 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
3 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
4 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the complaint as
5 true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v.
6 St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless, courts do not
7 “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or
8 unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008)
9 (quotation omitted).
10 Additionally, “[p]leadings must be construed so as to do justice.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8(e).
11 “[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than
12 formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quotation
13 omitted). Nevertheless, “pro se litigants are bound by the rules of procedure.” Ghazali v. Moran,
14 46 F.3d 52, 54 (9th Cir. 1995). Even a “liberal interpretation of a . . . complaint may not supply
15 essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
16 Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).
17 Even if the court concludes that a 12(b)(6) motion should be granted, the “court should
18 grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that
19 the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Lopez v. Smith, 203
20 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotation omitted).
21 III. UCSF’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT NO. 15)
22 UCSF moves to dismiss eight of the nine claims against it for failure to state a claim and
23 lack of standing. Dkt No. 15 (“Mot”) at 2. It does not seek to dismiss Plaintiff’s medical
24 malpractice claim. 2
25
26
2 As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff observes that “Defendants repeatedly disregarded Court-
27
ordered response deadlines in the TRO/PI track.” Dkt. No. 18 at 2. It’s true that Defendants did
1 a. Violation of the Rosenthal Act (Claim Two)
2 Plaintiff claims that “UCSF violated the Rosenthal Act by referring a disputed, unvalidated
3 debt to collections.” SAC at 6. The purpose of the Rosenthal Act is to “prohibit debt collectors
4 from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the collection of consumer debts and
5 small business debts and to require debtors to act fairly in entering into and honoring those debts.”
6 Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.1(b). To state a claim, Plaintiff must allege that “(1) the plaintiff is a
7 ‘debtor,’ (2) the debt at issue is a ‘consumer debt,’ (3) the defendant is a ‘debt collector,’ and
8 (4) . . . the defendant violated one of the liability provisions of the [Rosenthal Act].” Long v.
9 Nationwide Legal File & Serve, Inc., No. 12-CV-03578-LHK, 2013 WL 5219053, at *17 (N.D.
10 Cal. Sept. 17, 2013).
11 UCSF argues that Plaintiff did not adequately allege that it is a debt collector or that it
12 violated a provision of the Rosenthal Act. See Mot. at 15–16. A “debt collector” is defined as
13 “any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of that person or others,
14 engages in debt collection.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1788.2(c). California state courts have interpreted
15 this to be broader than the FDCPA’s definition of a “debt collector” and to mean “a person who
16 regularly engages in the act or practice of collecting money, property or their equivalent that is due
17 or owing by a natural person as a result of a transaction between that person and another person, in
18 which the natural person acquired property, services, or money on credit, primarily for personal,
19 family, or household purposes.” Davidson v. Seterus, Inc., 21 Cal. App. 5th 283, 295–96 (2018).
20 The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts from which the Court can
21 conclude that UCSF was a “debt collector.” Plaintiff alleges that UCSF billed him $26,000 for
22 two outpatient visits. SAC at 5. When Plaintiff disputed the bill, UCSF “did not validate the
23 charges” and “referred the disputed account to Defendant Transworld.” Id. UCSF then allegedly
24 refused subsequent treatment “unless [Plaintiff] paid the disputed charges or submitted the
25 personal documentation demanded by” Transworld. Id. at 6. None of these facts plausibly
26 suggest that UCSF “regularly engages in the act or practice of collecting money.” Davidson, 21
27 Cal. App. 5th at 295. If anything, Plaintiff’s allegations suggest that “debt-collection agency”
1 patients dispute the underlying bill.
2 Plaintiff argues that he “plausibly alleges that UCSF/The Regents participated in or caused
3 unlawful collection activity on a disputed consumer debt (including by forwarding disputed debt
4 to a third-party collector and enabling continued collection without validation).” Dkt. No. 18
5 (“Opp.”) at 10–11. But this does not suggest that UCSF regularly collects debts.3 Accordingly,
6 the Court DISMISSES this claim as to UCSF.4
7 b. Violation of the FCRA (Claim Three)
8 Plaintiff brings claims against UCSF for violations of 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681e(b) and 1681s-2,
9 alleging that it “threatened to furnish, and [has] the present ability to furnish, inaccurate and
10 disputed information to consumer reporting agencies, despite knowledge that the debt is
11 invalidated and disputed.” SAC at 7.
12 UCSF first argues that “Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to show that [UCSF] is a
13 consumer reporting agency.” Mot. at 17. Only consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”) are liable
14 under § 1681e(b). O’Connor v. Cap. One, N.A., No. CV 14-00177-KAW, 2014 WL 2215965, at
15 *7 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2014); 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (noting that “a consumer reporting agency . . .
16 shall follow reasonable procedures”); see also Guimond v. Trans Union Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d
17 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring a plaintiff to allege that a CRA prepared a report containing
18 inaccurate information). The FCRA defines a CRA as “any person which, for monetary fees,
19 dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of
20 assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the
21 purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). Plaintiff does not
22
23
3 In addition, the Court is skeptical that the act of referring a debt to a debt collector itself means
that an entity is engaging in the act or practice of collecting money—if it did, the definition of
24
“debt collector” would be broadened to include almost every entity that has to deal with unpaid
bills. Because Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that UCSF regularly collects debts, the Court
25
does not reach this issue. If Plaintiff chooses to amend this claim, he should more fully explain
why the Rosenthal Act extends to an entity like UCSF.
26
4 The Court does not reach UCSF’s remaining arguments. If Plaintiff chooses to amend this claim
27
against UCSF, he should more clearly identify what provision(s) of the Rosenthal Act UCSF has
1 plead any facts from which this Court can reasonably infer that UCSF is a CRA, and Plaintiff does
2 not directly respond to UCSF’s argument on this point. See generally Opp.5
3 Next, UCSF argues that Plaintiff cannot bring a claim under § 1681s-2(a) because there is
4 no private right of action. Mot. at 18. The Court agrees. See Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson,
5 LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1162 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding private right of action under § 1681s-2(b) but
6 not § 1681s-2(a)); 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(d) (noting that provisions in § 1681s-2 (a) “shall be
7 enforced exclusively” by federal and state officials).
8 Finally, UCSF argues that Plaintiff did not plead that “he disputed the charges with a
9 consumer reporting agency” or that UCSF “received notice from a consumer reporting agency
10 regarding plaintiff’s dispute” under § 1681s-2(b). Mot. at 19. “[T]o state a claim under [§ 1681s-
11 2(b)], a plaintiff must show that: (1) he found an inaccuracy in his credit report; (2) he notified a
12 credit reporting agency; (3) the credit reporting agency notified the furnisher of the information
13 about the dispute; and (4) the furnisher failed to investigate the inaccuracies or otherwise failed to
14 comply with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b)(1)(A)–(E).” Biggs v. Experian Info.
15 Sols., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 1142, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (quotation omitted); see also Gorman,
16 584 F.3d at 1154 (holding that “notice of a dispute received directly from the consumer does not
17 trigger furnishers’ duties under subsection (b)”). The Court agrees that Plaintiff did not plead
18 these two elements.6 Because the Court agrees that Plaintiff has not pleaded a cause of action for
19 §§ 1681e(b) or 1681s-2, the Court DISMISSES this claim as to Defendant UCSF.
20 c. Violation of the No Surprises Act (Claim Four)
21 Plaintiff argues that “UCSF failed to provide a Good Faith Estimate for non-emergency
22
23
5 While the Court grants leave to amend, it is unlikely that Plaintiff will be able to adequately
allege that UCSF is a CRA.
24
6 A Ninth Circuit memorandum disposition held that a plaintiff could adequately plead that a CRA
25
notified a furnisher of a dispute by (1) alleging that he notified a CRA and (2) eliminating his prior
allegations that the CRA did not notify the furnisher. Pace v. Bank of Am. Corp., 537 F. App’x
26
735, 736 (9th Cir. 2013) (non-precedential case the Court considers for its persuasive value). The
Ninth Circuit noted that the CRAs in that case had a legal obligation to notify the furnisher within
27
five days under 15. U.S.C. § 1681i. The Court does not opine here on what facts a plaintiff must
1 outpatient services, depriving Plaintiff of informed financial consent, in violation of 42 U.S.C.
2 § 300gg-111.” SAC at 7. UCSF argues that there is no express or implied private right of action
3 under the No Surprises Act. Mot. at 19–21.
4 “[P]rivate rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.” Alexander
5 v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001). “If Congress does not provide a private right of action
6 explicitly within a statute’s text, [courts] must determine whether Congress implied one.” Lil’
7 Man in the Boat, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 5 F.4th 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2021). Four
8 factors are relevant in determining whether a statute contains an implied right of action: “(1)
9 whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted; (2)
10 whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create a private
11 right of action or to deny one; (3) whether an implied private cause of action for the plaintiff is
12 consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of
13 action is one traditionally relegated to state law.” Id. (quotation omitted) (cleaned up). “[T]he
14 Supreme Court has elevated intent into a supreme factor, and [the] other three factors are used to
15 decipher congressional intent.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Nisqually Indian Tribe v.
16 Gregoire, 623 F.3d 923, 929 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]n implied right of action is only authorized
17 when there is clear evidence Congress intended such a right to be part of the statute.”).
18 The vast majority of courts considering the No Surprises Act have held that there is no
19 express or implied private right of action. See, e.g., Axis Neuromonitoring, LLC v. Aetna Inc., No.
20 3:25-CV-01048 (SVN), 2026 WL 795260, at *5–*8 (D. Conn. Mar. 20, 2026) (collecting cases
21 and finding no express or implied private right of action); E. Coast Advanced Plastic Surgery,
22 LLC v. Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., No. 25 CIV. 1686 (PAE), 2025 WL 2371537, at *17
23 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2025) (noting that “all but one court to consider the question have held that
24 there is no private right of action under the [No Surprises Act] to enforce [independent dispute
25 resolution] awards”); Guardian Flight, L.L.C. v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 140 F.4th 271, 277 (5th
26 Cir. 2025), cert. denied, No. 25-441, 2026 WL 79855 (Jan. 12, 2026) (same). Courts have
27 observed that the act has “extensive dispute resolution process[es] between insurers and medical
1 provide any private right of action,” even where the plaintiff was “arguably a member of the class
2 the statue is intended to benefit and the cause of action is not particularly one traditionally
3 relegated to state law.” Los Robles Emergency Physicians Med. Grp. v. Stanford-Franz, No. 2:23-
4 CV-9487-DSF-MARX, 2024 WL 2106951, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2024); FHMC LLC v. Blue
5 Cross & Blue Shield of Arizona Inc., No. CV-23-00876-PHX-GMS, 2024 WL 1461989, at *3 (D.
6 Ariz. Apr. 4, 2024) (noting that “[a]n implied right of action is incongruous with such a detailed
7 statutory scheme, in which judicial review is limited to specific instances”).
8 However, the above cases arose in a slightly different posture, where plaintiffs sought to
9 enforce independent dispute resolution awards relating to payments “required to be made by the
10 plan or coverage pursuant to subsection (a)(1) or (b)(1).” See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-111(c)(1). The
11 dispute resolution process there provides a remedy for (1) group health plan or health insurance
12 issuers and (2) providers or facilities to dispute how much the former owes the latter for
13 emergency services and non-emergency services from out-of-network providers under the No
14 Surprises Act. See id.; id. § (c)(2)(A) (requiring the Secretary to establish a resolution process to
15 determine “the amount of payment under the plan or coverage for such item or service furnished
16 by such provider or facility”). These are “binding” determinations that “shall not be subject to
17 judicial review” except in limited cases. Id. § (c)(5)(E)(i).
18 In contrast, Plaintiff appears to be narrowly challenging UCSF’s alleged failure to provide
19 a good faith estimate of costs, not its failure to comply with subsections (a) and (b). It’s unclear
20 which exact provision Plaintiff is bringing his claim under. Plaintiff alleges that UCSF has
21 violated § 300gg-111, but the only provision directly dealing with good faith estimates is § 300gg-
22 111(f), which imposes requirements on group health plans and insurance issuers to provide good
23 faith estimates of costs. Plaintiff may have intended to argue that UCSF violated its obligations as
24 a provider to give notice of the “good faith estimated amount that such provider or facility may
25 charge the participant, beneficiary, or enrollee for such items and services” under 42 U.S.C.
26 § 300gg-132(d)(2)(B) of the No Surprises Act. Or Plaintiff may have intended to argue that UCSF
27 violated its similar notice obligations under 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-136. In any event, none of these
1 Nevertheless, the Court agrees that the No Surprises Act does not provide Plaintiff with a
2 private right of action here. Plaintiff does not dispute that there is no express private right of
3 action under the act. Nor does Plaintiff identify anything in the text or structure of the No
4 Surprises Act that suggests an implied private right of action. In fact, Congress explicitly assigned
5 enforcement authority for violations of the providers’ obligations to the states and the Secretary.
6 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-134(b)(1) (“If a provider or facility is found by the Secretary to be in violation
7 of a requirement . . . the Secretary may apply a civil monetary penalty . . . .”); id. § (a) (describing
8 state enforcement); cf. id. § 300gg-22 (granting explicit enforcement authority for 42 U.S.C.
9 § 300gg-111 to the Secretary with limited judicial and administrative review). Congress further
10 directed rulemaking to establish “a process to receive consumer complaints of violations,” id.
11 § 300 gg-134(b)(3), and required the Secretary to establish a process through which “an uninsured
12 individual” who received “a good-faith estimate of the expected charges” could “seek a
13 determination from a selected dispute resolution entity for the charges to be paid by such
14 individual,” id. § 300gg-137(a). This patient-provider dispute resolution process was
15 implemented in 45 C.F.R. § 149.620, which permits uninsured patients to initiate dispute
16 resolution when the total billed charges are at least $400 more than the provider’s good faith
17 estimate. Id. § 149.620(a), (b).7
18 The detailed resolution mechanisms that Congress integrated throughout the No Surprises
19 Act—particularly those dealing with patient-provider disputes regarding good faith estimates—are
20 inconsistent with an intention to provide an implied private right of action, as are the provisions
21 otherwise granting enforcement authority to states and the Secretary. Moreover, there is nothing
22 in the text or structure of the statute that presents clear evidence of an implied right of action.
23 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiff’s No Surprises Act claim.8
24
25
7 Because Plaintiff is insured under Medicare, he may not be eligible for this dispute resolution
process. But that fact does not mean Congress intended to grant him an implied right of action—it
26
just reflects a choice by Congress as to enforcement priorities. Congress could have drafted this
act in a number of ways, and the language of the statute clearly reflects deliberate choices about
27
how to approach comprehensive dispute mechanisms, without including private rights of action.
1 d. Violation of the Hospital Price Transparency Rule (Claim Five)
2 UCSF also argues that there is no private right of action for Plaintiff to bring a claim under
3 the Hospital Price Transparency Rule. Mot. at 23. The rule “implements section 2718(e) of the
4 Public Health Service (PHS) Act, which requires each hospital operating within the United States,
5 for each year, to establish, update, and make public a list of the hospital’s standard charges for
6 items and services provided by the hospital” and “implements section 2718(b)(3) of the PHS Act,
7 to the extent that section authorizes [the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”)] to
8 promulgate regulations for enforcing section 2718(e).” 45 C.F.R. § 180.10. Congress intended
9 section 2718 to bring down the cost of health care coverage, in part by “requiring disclosure of
10 negotiated rates [to] help more patients select hospitals with more affordable rates.” See Am.
11 Hosp. Ass’n v. Azar, 983 F.3d 528, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
12 While Plaintiff may be a part of the class that section 2718 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
13 18) was intended to benefit, the plain language of the statute and the implementing regulations
14 suggests that Congress did not intend to create a private right of action. All the provisions grant
15 explicit enforcement authority to CMS. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 180.70(a)(1) (“CMS evaluates
16 whether a hospital has complied with the requirements under §§ 180.40, 180.50, and 180.60.”); id.
17 § 180.70(b) (“If CMC concludes that the hospital is noncompliant . . . CMS may take any of the
18 following actions . . . .”); id. § 180.90(a) (“CMS may impose a civil monetary penalty on a
19 hospital identified as noncompliant according to § 180.70 . . . .”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-
20 18(b)(3) (“The Secretary shall promulgate regulations for enforcing the provisions of this section
21 and may provide for appropriate penalties.”). Plaintiff does not directly dispute that there is no
22 private right of action, instead arguing that the Court should allow leave to amend so Plaintiff can
23 frame this as a predicate violation for the UCL. Opp. at 12–13. Because the Court agrees that
24 there is no implied or explicit private right of action, the Court DISMISSES this claim.
25 e. Financial Elder Abuse (Claim Six)
26 UCSF argues that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for financial elder abuse because he “does
27 not allege that he has paid the charges which he disputed with UCSF” or that UCSF has otherwise
1 defendant “[t]akes, secretes, appropriates, obtains, or retains real or personal property of an elder
2 or dependent adult for a wrongful use or with intent to defraud, or both,” or assists in doing so.
3 Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 15610.30(a). “[A] person or entity takes, secretes, appropriates, obtains,
4 or retains real or personal property when an elder or dependent adult is deprived of any property
5 right, including by means of an agreement, donative transfer, or testamentary bequest, regardless
6 of whether the property is held directly or by a representative of an elder or dependent adult.” Id.
7 § 15610.30(c). The Court agrees that Plaintiff has not alleged that he was deprived of any
8 property right—Plaintiff has disputed the charges, but it’s not clear that he’s paid anything or
9 otherwise lost or suffered an impairment to any property right. In his opposition, Plaintiff admits
10 that UCSF only “attempted” to obtain money or property. Opp. at 13. The Court DISMISSES
11 this claim as to Defendant UCSF.
12 f. Violation of the UCL (Claim Seven)
13 UCSF argues that Plaintiff has not alleged “facts to show that he suffered an injury in fact,
14 either through loss of money or other property, as a result of the alleged unfair competition by”
15 UCSF. Mot. at 25. Under the UCL, Plaintiff only has statutory standing if he alleges “an injury in
16 fact and has lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code
17 § 17204. Plaintiff argues that he has identified unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent conduct. Opp. at
18 14. But he does not identify what money or property he has lost because of UCSF’s allegedly
19 unlawful conduct. Cf. Lombard Flats LLC v. Fay Servicing LLC, No. 22-CV-05686-LB, 2023
20 WL 6541866, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2023) (“It is difficult to say that an allegedly misleading
21 debt-collection letter, standing alone, caused loss of money or property . . . .”); Jensen v. Quality
22 Loan Serv. Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1199 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (rejecting argument that possible
23 future non-judicial foreclosure could establish UCL standing). As a result, the Court DISMISSES
24 this claim as to Defendant UCSF.9
25
9 Plaintiff potentially could satisfy this requirement in an amended pleading. See, e.g., Lombard
26
Flats, 2023 WL 6541866, at *5 (noting that there would be standing “if, for example, the plaintiffs
alleged damage to their credit history because of [defendant’s] debt-collection practices”); Janti v.
27
Encore Cap. Grp., Inc., No. 09CV1969 JLS (CAB), 2010 WL 3058260, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 3,
1 g. Violation of the ADA (Claim Eight)
2 Plaintiff alleges that he “is a seventy-two-year-old permanently disabled Medicare
3 Advantage beneficiary” and that “UCSF discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of disability
4 by denying medically necessary care unless Plaintiff paid disputed charges or submitted intrusive
5 personal documentation.” SAC at 2, 8. UCSF argues that Plaintiff has not pleaded that it “knew
6 of [p]laintiff’s disability or that . . . [it] discriminated against him because of his disability.” Mot.
7 at 26.
8 Title II of the ADA states that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
9 such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
10 programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42
11 U.S.C. § 12132. “To state a claim of disability discrimination under Title II, the plaintiff must
12 allege four elements: (1) the plaintiff is an individual with a disability; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise
13 qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or
14 activities; (3) the plaintiff was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the
15 public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the
16 public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the
17 plaintiff’s disability.” Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
18 The Court agrees that Plaintiff does not provide any factual basis from which the Court can
19 plausibly infer that UCSF discriminated against him on the basis of his disability. Plaintiff does
20 not directly respond to UCSF’s argument on this point. Instead, he claims that “he was denied
21 continued ophthalmologic care because he disputed the debt and refused to provide invasive
22 financial/citizenship/marital documentation to a collector.” Opp. at 14. If anything, this suggests
23 that Plaintiff was denied care for a reason other than his disability. Accordingly, the Court
24 DISMISSES this claim.
25 h. Violation of Due Process (Claim Nine)
26 Plaintiff claims that “UCSF deprived Plaintiff of property and liberty interests without due
27 process by imposing unlawful charges, refusing validation, denying care, and leveraging state
1 stated a protected property interest. Mot. at 27. A plaintiff bringing a procedural due process
2 claim must allege “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest, and
3 (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections.” Kildare v. Saenz, 325 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir.
4 2003). “To constitute a protected property interest, an individual must have ‘more than an abstract
5 need or desire’ or ‘unilateral expectation’ for a benefit, but rather a ‘legitimate claim of
6 entitlement’ based on, inter alia, ‘existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
7 source such as state law,’ a ‘statute defining eligibility,’ a contract ‘creat[ing] and defin[ing]’
8 certain terms, or some other ‘clearly implied promise.’” Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083,
9 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–78
10 (1972)).10
11 Plaintiff has not adequately alleged facts establishing that he has a constitutionally
12 protected liberty or property interest in specific future medical care at UCSF or that UCSF’s
13 efforts to impose allegedly unlawful charges somehow deprived him of some liberty or property
14 interest.11 Plaintiff does not respond to UCSF’s argument, instead stating that “if the Court finds
15 sovereign immunity limits damages claims against an arm of the state, Plaintiff should be granted
16 leave to amend.” Opp. at 15. But the Court does not understand UCSF to be arguing that
17 sovereign immunity bars Plaintiff’s claim. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this claim.
18 IV. TRANSWORLD’S MOTION TO DISMISS
19 Transworld moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s FCRA, financial elder abuse, and UCL claims.
20 See Dkt. No. 31 (“Mot.”) at 3. It does not move to dismiss Plaintiff’s FDCPA or Rosenthal Act
21 claims. Id. at 3 n.1.
22 a. Violation of the FCRA (Claim Three)
23 Like UCSF, Transworld argues that (1) Plaintiff has not pleaded that it is a consumer
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10 To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a substantive due process claim, “[a] threshold requirement to
[both] a substantive [and] procedural due process claim is the plaintiff’s showing of a liberty or
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property interest protected by the Constitution.” Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix,
Ariz., 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994).
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1 reporting agency, and § 1681e(b) does not apply; (2) there is no private right of action for § 1681s-
2 2(a); and (3) Plaintiff has not pleaded that Transworld was notified by a CRA that Plaintiff
3 disputed its credit reporting under § 1681s-2(b). Mot. at 5–6. As before, the Court agrees with
4 these arguments, and there is nothing specific about the allegations against Transworld that
5 changes that conclusion.
6 Plaintiff argues that “[c]ourts routinely deny dismissal [of a § 1681s-2(b) claim] where
7 notice [from a consumer reporting agency to a furnisher] can be inferred or proven in discovery.”
8 Dkt. No. 33 (“Opp.”) at 4. But the case he cites does not support that proposition. See Nelson v.
9 Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp., 282 F.3d 1057, 1060 (9th Cir. 2002) (assessing whether a claim
10 can be brought under this section against a furnisher). Plaintiff has not alleged that any CRA was
11 ever involved in this matter, so the Court certainly cannot infer that Transworld was notified by a
12 CRA of the dispute. As a result, the Court DISMISSES this claim as to Defendant Transworld.
13 b. Financial Elder Abuse (Claim Six)
14 Transworld argues that Plaintiff did not plead that it “obtained any property from Plaintiff,
15 let alone that the taking of Plaintiff’s property was for a wrongful use.” Mot. at 7. As before, the
16 Court agrees that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged that Transworld deprived him of any
17 property right. Plaintiff argues that “California courts recognize that attempted takings and
18 coercive practices fall within the statute.” Opp. at 5. But his cited case addresses a different issue
19 regarding whether “a merely incorrect denial of policy funds” may constitute “wrongful use.”
20 Paslay v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 248 Cal. App. 4th 639, 657 (2016). The deprivation in that
21 case was clear and adequately alleged—a plaintiff had allegedly not been given funds that they
22 were entitled to by contract. See id. As a result, the Court DISMISSES this claim as to
23 Defendant Transworld.
24 c. Violation of the UCL (Claim Seven)
25 Finally, Transworld argues that “Plaintiff fails to allege he suffered any injury or lost
26 money or property as a result of any specific conduct by” Transworld. Mot. at 7. As with UCSF,
27 the Court agrees. Plaintiff claims he “alleges economic injury including costs responding to
1 Defendant’s conduct.” Opp. at 5. But Plaintiff does not identify any non-conclusory facts in his
2 complaint regarding what money or property he has lost as a result of Defendant’s alleged
3 conduct. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES this claim as to Defendant Transworld.
4 V. UCSF’S MOTION TO STRIKE
5 Plaintiff seeks “[d]eclaratory relief that the disputed charges are unlawful and
6 unenforceable” and “[i]njunctive relief prohibiting collection, reporting, or denial of care based on
7 the disputed charges.” SAC at 9. UCSF moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief
8 as “duplicative of the substantive claims and remedies already sought,” and argues that it is
9 “unclear how [P]laintiff’s request for declaratory relief will remedy [P]laintiff’s claims.” Mot. at
10 28–29. UCSF also moves to strike Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, arguing that it is
11 “vague, overbroad and not narrowly tailored.” Id. at 29. Rule 12(f) permits the Court to “strike
12 from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous
13 matter.” Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(f).
14 Following this order, Plaintiff’s only remaining claims are his FDCPA claim against
15 Transworld, his Rosenthal Act claim against Transworld, and his medical malpractice claim
16 against UCSF. Plaintiff’s specific requests for declaratory and injunctive relief only plausibly
17 relate to the first two claims. But declaratory and injunctive relief are unavailable for Rosenthal
18 Act and FDCPA claims. See Varnado v. Midland Funding LLC, 43 F. Supp. 3d 985, 992–93
19 (N.D. Cal. 2014); Jacobson v. Persolve, LLC, No. 14-CV-00735-LHK, 2015 WL 3523696, at *10
20 (N.D. Cal. June 4, 2015) (same). Accordingly, the Court will STRIKE these requests for relief
21 for now, with leave to amend if Plaintiff adequately pleads claims that warrant such relief. Lee v.
22 Hertz Corp., 330 F.R.D. 557 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“When striking a claim or defense, leave to amend
23 should be freely given if doing so does not cause prejudice to the opposing party.”).12
24 Next, UCSF asks the Court to strike Plaintiff’s request for statutory damages under the
25 Rosenthal Act, statutory damages under the FCRA, and treble damages under the financial elder
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12 Given this straightforward resolution, the Court does not reach UCSF’s specific arguments on
1 abuse statute. Mot. at 30–32. Because the Court has dismissed all of these claims as to Defendant
2 UCSF, the Court DENIES the motion as moot.
3 Finally, UCSF states that it is not liable for punitive damages under California Government
4 Code § 818. Mot. at 32. California Government Code § 818 states that “[n]otwithstanding any
5 other provision of law, a public entity is not liable for damages awarded under Section 3294 of the
6 Civil Code or other damages imposed primarily for the sake of example and by way of punishing
7 the defendant.” See also Cal. Gov’t Code § 811.2 (noting that Defendant UCSF is a public entity).
8 Accordingly, the Court STRIKES any remaining claim for punitive damages against UCSF as to
9 the medical malpractice claim. Cf. McCrary v. UCLA Health, No. LA CV18-10001 JAK (JPRx),
10 2020 WL 2025392, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 31, 2020) (striking punitive damages for claims that
11 arise under California law).
12 VI. CONCLUSION
13 Defendant UCSF’s motion, Dkt. No. 15, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
14 PART. Defendant Transworld’s motion, Dkt. No. 31, is GRANTED. Claims Four and Five are
15 DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND against all Defendants.13 Claims Three, Six,
16 Seven, Eight, and Nine are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND against all Defendants.
17 Claim Two is DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to Defendant UCSF only. The
18 Court STRIKES WITH LEAVE TO AMEND Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages,
19 injunctive relief, and declaratory relief against UCSF. Any amended complaint must be filed
20 within 28 days of the date of this order and may not include any new claims or defendants. This
21 order VACATES the May 7, 2026 hearing date.
22 The Court further SETS a case management conference in this case on May 5, 2026, at
23 2:00 p.m. The hearing will be held by Public Zoom Webinar. All counsel, members of the public,
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13 Because the Court has found that no private right of action exists as to Claims Four and Five,
granting leave to amend would be futile, since no factual amendment could cure this purely legal
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deficiency. Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011)
(“[A] district court may dismiss without leave where a plaintiff’s proposed amendments would fail
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to cure the pleading deficiencies and amendment would be futile.”); Dunn v. Moll, No. 22-35545,
] and media may access the webinar information at https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/hsg. All
2 || attorneys and pro se litigants appearing for the case management conference are required to join at
3 least 15 minutes before the hearing to check in with the courtroom deputy and test internet, video,
4 || and audio capabilities. The parties are DIRECTED to file, by April 28, 2026, (1) either a joint
5 case management statement or separate statements under Civil Local Rule 16-9(a); and (2) the
6 || standard ADR form, Stipulation and Proposed Order Selecting ADR Process.
7 The Court further advises Plaintiff, who is representing himself, that he can seek assistance
8 at the Legal Help Center if he desires assistance complying with this order. The Legal Help
9 || Center provides free information and limited-scope legal assistance to pro se litigants. More
10 || information about the Legal Help Center is provided at https://cand.uscourts.gov/representing-
11 yourself. Telephone appointments may be scheduled either over the phone at (415) 782-8982 or
12 || by email at FedPro@sfbar.org. The Court advises Plaintiff that in particular the Help Center may
13 || be able to help him assess whether narrowing the number of claims in order to focus the case
14 || could be beneficial.
16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
17 || Dated: 4/10/2026
18 Abepwrrd 5 Abel).
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.
19 United States District Judge
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