Doller

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

EDWARD M. DOLLER,

INDIVIDUALLY AND ON BEHALF

OF ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY

SITUATED;

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:24-cv-513-KCD-KRH

v.

HERTZ GLOBAL HOLDINGS,

INC., STEPHEN M. SCHERR,

ALEXANDRA BROOKS,

Defendants,

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Edward M. Doller, individually and on behalf of a proposed

class of investors, sues Hertz Global Holdings, Inc. and two of its former

executives. (See Doc. 50.)1 He claims that Hertz violated federal securities

laws by publicly touting robust consumer demand for its electric vehicle fleet

while internal tracking systems showed a far bleaker reality. Doller is now

moving to certify the proposed class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

(Doc. 108.) His motion is unopposed because the parties have since resolved

the remaining claims. (Doc. 109.) So the only task before the Court is to

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

ensure that the proposed class meets the requirements of Rule 23. For the

reasons below, Doller’s motion is GRANTED.

I. Legal Standard

Rule 23 draws the boundary lines for a class action. Doe v. Ladapo, No.

4:23CV114-RH-MAF, 2023 WL 8271764, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2023). A

lawsuit cannot proceed on behalf of a class as a matter of course. Rather, a

plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proposed

class “satisfies all the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)

and at least one of the requirements of Rule 23(b).” Grames v. Sarasota Cnty.,

No. 8:20-CV-739-CEH-CPT, 2021 WL 778897, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2021);

see also Navelski v. Int’l Paper Co., 244 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1303 (N.D. Fla.

2017).

To meet Rule 23(a), a plaintiff must “prove that there are in fact

sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, typicality of

claims or defenses, and adequacy of representation[.]” Grames, 2021 WL

778897, at *3.

There are multiple ways to satisfy Rule 23(b). When a plaintiff seeks

declaratory or injunctive relief, they must show that the defendant acted “on

grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or

corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a

whole.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). When “money damages are the predominant

relief sought,” a plaintiff must show that “the questions of law or fact

common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only

individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available

methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 23(b)(3); see also Adelstein ex rel. Adelstein v. Unicare Life & Health Ins.

Co., No. 6:99-CV-1544-ORL-28C, 2000 WL 35808378, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec.

27, 2000).

“In addition to the Rule 23 requirements, at least one named plaintiff

seeking class certification must have standing.” Navelski, 244 F. Supp. 3d at

1304. “The plaintiffs must also demonstrate that the proposed class is

adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” Id.

II. Discussion

“Although not explicit in Rule 23(a) or (b), courts have universally

recognized that the first essential ingredient to class treatment is the

ascertainability of the class.” Grimes v. Rave Motion Pictures Birmingham,

L.L.C., 264 F.R.D. 659, 663 (N.D. Ala. 2010). This threshold issue requires a

showing that “the class definition contains objective criteria that allows for

class members to be identified in an administratively feasible way.” Karhu v.

Vital Pharms., Inc., 621 F. App’x 945, 946 (11th Cir. 2015). In plain English,

identifying class members must be a manageable process that keeps the

litigation from bogging down in endless, individualized inquiries.

That bar is easily cleared here. The proposed class boundaries are

defined in strictly objective terms: it covers anyone who purchased or

acquired Hertz common stock during a specific, closed window between

January 6, 2023, and April 24, 2024. (Doc. 108 at 3.) Because Hertz stock

traded publicly on a national exchange, we are not left to guess about who

those buyers are. Their identities and transactions are well-documented in

standard corporate investor records, transfer agent logs, and brokerage data.

Because Doller has shown that pulling these names is a straightforward

administrative exercise rather than a fact-finding scavenger hunt, the

ascertainability requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., In re Urb. Outfitters, Inc.,

Sec. Litig., No. CV 13-5978, 2016 WL 1043014, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 29, 2016).

Turning to Rule 23(a), the prerequisites of numerosity and

commonality come down to a straightforward look at the data. Hertz had

more than 305 million shares outstanding during the class period, with

nearly 19 million shares changing hands every week. (Doc. 108 at 7.) That

kind of volume means the class easily numbers in the thousands, rendering

individual joinder impracticable. See In re HealthSouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 213

F.R.D. 447, 457 (N.D. Ala. 2003) (“Courts generally presume that plaintiffs

establish numerosity when the claims involve securities traded nationally.”).

These thousands of investors also share a single, overriding legal question

that can be answered for everyone “in one stroke”: did Hertz publicly lie

about consumer demand for its electric vehicles? Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.

Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011). Because every investor’s right to recover

hinges on the same alleged course of deception, the core elements of falsity,

materiality, and scienter are well-suited for class-wide proof. See Cooper v.

Pac. Life Ins. Co., 229 F.R.D. 245, 257 (S.D. Ga. 2005).

The typicality and adequacy requirements are just as easily satisfied.

The proposed class representative stands in the same shoes as the absent

class members—he bought Hertz common stock during the class period,

relied on the integrity of the market price, and took a financial hit when the

truth emerged. (Doc. 108 at 8-9.) Because his legal theory is identical to that

of the class, his claims are textbook typical. Furthermore, there is zero

reported friction between the class representative and the rest of the class.

And his active participation in discovery shows he takes his stewardship

seriously. See In re Miller Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 186 F.R.D. 680, 687 (N.D.

Ga. 1999).

Turning to Rule 23(b), Doller must steer this litigation through one of

the rule’s specific procedural gateways. Because his lawsuit is fundamentally

about recovering money damages, he turns to Rule 23(b)(3). Under this

provision, “the Court considers (1) whether issues of law or fact common to

members of the class predominate over questions affecting only individual

members; and (2) whether a class action is superior to other available

methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Id. at 688.

Doller has shown predominance through his fraud-on-the-market

theory that is backed by expert testimony. See Loc. 703, I.B. of T. Grocery &

Food Emps. Welfare Fund v. Regions Fin. Corp., 762 F.3d 1248, 1253 (11th

Cir. 2014). A class action is also the superior way to run this railroad. For a

geographically scattered group of stock purchasers, trying to litigate

thousands of identical fraud claims one by one would clog the dockets, bleed

the parties’ resources, and invite inconsistent results. See Cheney v.

Cyberguard Corp., 213 F.R.D. 484, 502 (S.D. Fla. 2003). Because a single,

cohesive action resolves the entire controversy in one orderly stroke, Doller

has easily carried his burden under Rule 23(b)(3).

One last issue. Doller seeks to appoint Levi & Korsinsky, LLP as class

counsel. (Doc. 108 at 24-25.) Nothing suggests that L&K has an adverse

interest in this litigation, and the firm is qualified on paper. L&K has also

already done the heavy lifting—investigating the claims, interviewing

confidential witnesses, and successfully piloting the surviving fraud claims

past the pleading stage. Given the firm’s attested experience, the Court

grants the request.

III. Conclusion

The Court is satisfied that Doller’s proposed class satisfies the demands

of Rule 23, a conclusion made straightforward by the fact that the motion is

unopposed. Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. The Motion for Class Certification, Appointment of Class

Representative, and Appointment of Class Counsel (Doc. 108) is

GRANTED;

2. The Court certifies the following proposed class:

a. All persons and entities who purchased or otherwise acquired

common stock of Hertz Global Holdings, Inc., between January 6,

2023 and April 24, 2024, inclusive, and were injured thereby; and

b. excluded are: (a) Defendants; (b) members of the immediate

families of Defendants; (c) the subsidiaries and affiliates of

Defendants; (d) any person who is an officer, director or

controlling person of Hertz Global Holdings, Inc.; (e) any entity in

which any Defendant has a controlling interest; (f) Defendants’

directors’ and officers’ liability insurance carriers, and any

affiliates or subsidiaries thereof; and (g) the legal

representatives, heirs, successors or assigns of any such excluded

party.

3. Robert Stephens is appointed as the class representative;

4. Levi & Korsinsky, LLP is appointed as class counsel; and

5. The Court will address all remaining issues, including class notice and

approval of the settlement, in conjunction with the parties’ outstanding

motion (Doc. 120).

ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 22, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge