Hixson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

SEAB HIXSON, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:26-cv-740-MMH-SJH

EVERYBODY IN MEDICAL,

Defendants.

_________________________________

ORDER

Plaintiff Seab Hixson, Jr., an inmate of the Florida Department of

Corrections, initiated this case by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Complaint; Doc. 1) in the Fort Myers Division. A judge of the

Fort Myers Division transferred the case to this Court because Hixson

complains about the conditions of his confinement at Florida State Prison. See

Order (Doc. 2). Hixson asserts he needs stomach surgery because officers “keep

put[t]ing [things] in [his] food,” but his requests for surgery have been denied.

See Complaint at 3. He also asserts officers are putting HIV in his food, but

the medical department will not order bloodwork. Id. Finally, Hixson claims

he has lost about fifty-five pounds in three months because he has not been

given a 3,000-calorie diet. Id. at 6. Hixson does not name any individual

medical providers as Defendants, but instead seeks to sue “everybody in

medical.” Id. at 1, 2. As relief, he asks that the Court help him get the surgery

he needs and “millions of dollars.” Id. at 6.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires the Court to dismiss

this case at any time if the Court determines that the action is frivolous,

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks

monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.1 See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. “A claim is frivolous if it is without arguable

merit either in law or fact.” Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)

(citing Battle v. Cent. State Hosp., 898 F.2d 126, 129 (11th Cir. 1990)). A

complaint filed in forma pauperis which fails to state a claim under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automatically frivolous. Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) dismissals should

only be ordered when the legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” id. at 327,

or when the claims rely on factual allegations which are “clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). “Frivolous claims include claims

‘describing fantastic or delusional scenarios, claims with which federal district

judges are all too familiar.’” Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328). Additionally, a claim may be dismissed as frivolous when it appears

that a plaintiff has little or no chance of success. Id. As to whether a complaint

1 Hixson requests to proceed as a pauper. See Motion (Doc. 17).

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“fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” the language of the

PLRA mirrors the language of Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

and therefore courts apply the same standard in both contexts.2 Mitchell v.

Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Alba v. Montford, 517

F.3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).

Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need only

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. (8)(a)(2). In addition, all reasonable inferences

should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,

705 (11th Cir. 2010). Nonetheless, the plaintiff still must meet some minimal

pleading requirements. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250,

1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary[,]”

the complaint should “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is

and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93

(2007) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Further, the plaintiff

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

2 “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 570 (2007)).

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pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

While not required to include detailed factual allegations, a complaint must

allege “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Id.

A “plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal

quotations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (original alteration

omitted)). Indeed, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the

allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal

conclusions[,]”which simply “are not entitled to [an] assumption of truth.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 680. In the absence of well-pled facts suggesting a

federal constitutional deprivation or violation of a federal right, a plaintiff

cannot sustain a cause of action against the defendant.

In assessing the Complaint, the Court must read Hixson’s pro se

allegations in a liberal fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). And,

while “[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings

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drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed,” Tannenbaum

v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998), “this leniency does not

give the court a license to serve as de facto counsel for a party or to rewrite an

otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air

Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168–69 (11th Cir. 2014).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)

the defendant deprived him of a right secured under the United States

Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred under color of

state law. Salvato v. Miley, 790 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 2015); Bingham v.

Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Richardson v.

Johnson, 598 F.3d 734, 737 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). A plaintiff must

allege “an affirmative causal connection between the official’s acts or omissions

and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d

397, 401 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted); Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294,

1306 n.10 (11th Cir. 2007).

The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must

provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that

inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must

‘take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’” Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517,

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526–27 (1984)). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a prisoner must

satisfy both an objective and subjective inquiry regarding a prison official’s

conduct. Swain v. Junior, 961 F.3d 1276, 1285 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834).

As it relates to medical care, “the Supreme Court has held that prison

officials violate the bar on cruel and unusual punishments when they display

‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners.’” Keohane v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). “[T]he deliberate-indifference standard sets

an appropriately high bar.” Swain, 961 F.3d at 1285. For decades, the Eleventh

Circuit described that “high bar” inconsistently as a “more than mere

negligence” or “more than gross negligence standard.” See Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir. 2020) (“To establish deliberate

indifference, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the prison officials (1) had

subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and

(3) acted with more than gross negligence.” (internal quotations omitted)); see

also Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 2024). However, in 2024,

the Eleventh Circuit determined that those standards conflicted with the

Supreme Court’s decision in Farmer and clarified that courts in this circuit

should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard as used in the criminal

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law. Id. at 1253. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit has instructed that to

establish liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, the

plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered a

deprivation that was, “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” [Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with “subjective

recklessness as used in the criminal law,” id. at 839, and to do so

he must show that the defendant was actually, subjectively aware

that his own conduct caused a substantial risk of serious harm to

the plaintiff—with the caveat, again, that even if the defendant

“actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or safety,” he

“cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.” Id. at 844–45.

Id. at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).3

The law is well settled that the Constitution is not implicated by the

negligent acts of corrections officials and medical personnel. Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1986); see also Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S.

344, 348 (1986) (“As we held in Daniels, the protections of the Due Process

Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are just not triggered by lack of

due care by prison officials.”). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently

emphasized that the subjective recklessness standard requires a plaintiff to

3 The Court notes that the Honorable Adalberto Jordan wrote a concurrence to

the majority’s opinion in Wade, finding that to the extent prior Eleventh Circuit

deliberate indifference cases are not inconsistent with Wade, “they should continue

to be cited as binding precedent.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1265 (Jordan, J., concurring).

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show a prison official had “more than a generalized or abstract knowledge” of

a risk. See McClinton v. Warden, Baldwin State Prison, 172 F.4th 1276, 1283

(11th Cir. 2026). “Put simply, a constitutional violation occurs only when

prison officials act ‘consciously’ such that their acts or omissions knowingly

have the effect of inflicting a punishment.” Id. at 1283, 1286 (holding that

prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because, even though some

were aware of a “risk in the abstract,” the plaintiffs’ arguments “invoke[d] a

negligence standard, premised on a violation of a duty owed to [their son],” who

was killed by a known gang member).

The Eleventh Circuit has also noted that “[n]othing in our case law would

derive a constitutional deprivation from a prison physician’s failure to

subordinate his own professional judgment to that of another doctor; to the

contrary, it is well established that ‘a simple difference in medical opinion’ does

not constitute deliberate indifference.” Bismark v. Fisher, 213 F. App’x 892,

897 (11th Cir. 2007)4 (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th

Cir. 1989)). Similarly, “the question of whether governmental actors should

4 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a

particular point. See McNamara v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th

Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished

opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they may be cited as persuasive

authority.”).

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have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment ‘is a

classic example of a matter for medical judgment’ and therefore not an

appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.”

Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S.

at 107).

Hixson’s Complaint is subject to dismissal pursuant to this Court’s

screening obligation because he fails to state a plausible claim under § 1983.

Aside from the fact that he does not identify by name any individual who

allegedly violated his constitutional rights, Hixson does not assert facts

permitting the reasonable inference that a serious medical need is being

ignored. His assertions that he needs surgery and bloodwork because officers

are contaminating his food with unidentified items and viruses “describ[e] [a]

fantastic or delusional scenario[]” that are not to be credited. See Bilal, 251

F.3d at 1349. Moreover, to the extent Hixson asserts that “medical refus[es] to

put [him] on the 3,000 [calorie] tray,” Complaint at 6, a mere disagreement

with the decisions of medical providers “is an inappropriate basis for attaching

[§] 1983 liability,” Adams, 61 F.3d at 1545.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. This case is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice.

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2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case without

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close this case.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 16th day of June,

2026.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

Jax-6

C:

Seab Hixson, Jr.

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