Opinion

Carlson

Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
Filed: May 13, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT SEATTLE

SCOTT CARLSON, BRIAN CASE NO. 2:25-cv-00514

8 ROBILLARD, ALISON HALLIFAX,

MATTHEW PETERSON, JOSH FREI, ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’

9 and TYLER PARNELL, RENEWED MOTION TO DISMISS

10 Plaintiffs,

11 v.

12 MAYOR ANGELA BIRNEY, in her

individual and official capacity, FIRE

13 CHIEF ADRIAN SHEPPARD, in his

individual and official capacity, and

14 CATHRYN LAIRD in her individual

and official capacity,

Defendants.

1. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court on a Renewed Motion to Dismiss filed by

Defendants Mayor Angela Birney, Fire Chief Adrian Sheppard, and Human

Resources Director Cathryn Laird’s (collectively, “Defendants”). Dkt. No. 22.

Plaintiffs are six former City of Redmond firefighters who were terminated after

refusing to comply with the City’s COVID-19 vaccination mandate for healthcare

1 workers. They bring claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants in both their

2 official and individual capacities, alleging violations of their First Amendment

3 rights to free exercise of religion and free speech and their Fourteenth Amendment

4 right to equal protection. Having reviewed the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”),

5 the briefs, and the record, the Court GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES the case

6 with prejudice.

7 2. BACKGROUND

8 The Court is familiar with the underlying facts. A related Title VII action

9 brought by these same Plaintiffs against the City of Redmond, Carlson v. City of

10 Redmond, No. 2:22-cv-01739-JNW, resulted in summary judgment for the City on

11 all claims. Dkt. No. 157 in that case (“December 5 Order”). There is substantial

12 overlap between that case (i.e., the “Title VII case”) and this one, but the Court does

13 not rely on the Title VII case in resolving the merits of this motion. To situate the

14 analysis that follows, the Court briefly recounts the facts as alleged by Plaintiffs: in

15 August 2021, Governor Inslee issued Proclamation 21-14 requiring healthcare

16 workers, including firefighters, to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 18,

17 2021. Redmond implemented the Proclamation through Mayor Birney’s September

18 30, 2021, Executive Order. Plaintiffs requested and initially received religious

19 exemptions, which were revoked by the Executive Order. The City and the

20 firefighters’ union negotiated Letters of Agreement identifying accommodation

21 positions, but those positions were filled while Plaintiffs were on FMLA and PFML

22 leave. Plaintiffs were terminated between April and May 2022.

1 3. LEGAL STANDARD

2 The Court will grant a motion to dismiss only if the complaint fails to allege

3 “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

4 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the

5 plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

6 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

7 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted). The plausibility standard is less than

8 probability, “but it asks for more than a sheer possibility” that a defendant did

9 something wrong. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citations omitted).

10 “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's

11 liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

12 ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). In other words, a

13 plaintiff must plead “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

14 me accusation.” Id.

15 When considering a motion to dismiss, courts must accept factual allegations

16 pleaded in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to

17 the plaintiff. Lund v. Cowan, 5 F.4th 964, 968 (9th Cir. 2021). But courts “do not

18 assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of

19 factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus,

20 “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat

21 a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

1 4. DISCUSSION

2 4.1 Plaintiffs’ Monell claims are dismissed.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the

City of Redmond. Plaintiffs do not identify the City as a defendant, but their

official-capacity suit against Mayor Angela Birney, Fire Chief Adrian Sheppard, and

HR Director Cathryn Laird is functionally a claim against the City of Redmond. See

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an

agent.”). Known as Monell claims, municipal liability attaches under § 1983 when a

plaintiff shows that “(1) [they were] deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the

municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounted to a deliberate indifference to

[plaintiff's] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving force behind the

constitutional violation.” Lockett v. City of L.A., 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiffs contend that the City, acting through Defendants, adopted and

carried out an unconstitutional policy or custom targeting firefighters who sought

religious exemptions from COVID-19 vaccination. On August 9, 2021, Governor Jay

Inslee issued Proclamation 21-14 requiring healthcare workers, including

firefighters, to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by October 18, 2021. Dkt. No. 14 ¶¶

28, 109. The City of Redmond implemented the Proclamation through Mayor

Birney’s September 30, 2021, Executive Order (“EO”). Id. ¶ 67. The Executive Order

required all Redmond firefighters meeting the definition of “Health Care Provider”

to be vaccinated by October 18, 2021, but authorized the HR Director to grant

“reasonable accommodation based on a disability or a sincerely held religious belief”

1 so long as they “do not cause an undue hardship for the City.” Dkt. No. 12-1 at 19.

2 Plaintiffs allege that despite this accommodation provision, Defendants carried out

3 a coordinated “action plan” designed to ensure that no unvaccinated firefighter

4 would actually receive one. The alleged plan included preemptively offering

5 accommodation positions to vaccinated firefighters, withholding notice of open

6 positions from Plaintiffs while they were on leave, misrepresenting to other

7 employees that unvaccinated firefighters were “not interested” in available

8 positions, and telling Plaintiffs that no positions were available when they were in

9 fact open. Dkt. No. 14 ¶¶ 134, 139, 143–52, 155–56, 158, 316. The Court addresses

10 each of Plaintiffs’ Monell theories in turn.

11 Plaintiffs’ custom theory cannot succeed because the conduct they describe

12 was not of “sufficient duration, frequency and consistency” to constitute “a

13 traditional method of carrying out policy.” Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th

14 Cir. 1996). Liability cannot rest on “isolated or sporadic incidents.” Id. Plaintiffs

15 identify only their own treatment over a months-long window during a once-in-a-

16 century pandemic. COVID-19 vaccine mandates for healthcare workers were a

17 novel response to an unprecedented public health emergency. There is no basis to

18 conclude that Redmond had any longstanding practice of denying religious

19 accommodations in this context, and Plaintiffs allege none.

20 Plaintiffs’ policy theory also fails. Although the FAC alleges that the

21 Executive Order was a “moving force” behind the constitutional deprivation, Dkt.

22 No. 14 ¶ 300, the Executive Order on its face tracks the Governor’s Proclamation

23 21-14, requiring vaccination for healthcare workers while authorizing

1 accommodations that do not impose undue hardship. Dkt. No. 12-1 at 18–19.

2 Plaintiffs do not dispute that the City was bound by state law to enforce the

3 Governor’s proclamation. Thus, because the Executive Order merely implements

4 state law, it is not an independent municipal policy that can serve as the “moving

5 force” behind the alleged constitutional deprivation. Wilkins v. Herron, No. 24-80,

6 2024 WL 5200177, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 176, 223 L.

7 Ed. 2d 57 (2025).

8 Plaintiffs’ reliance on Gillette v. Delmore, 979 F.2d 1342, 1347 (9th Cir. 1992),

9 for the proposition that a single policy decision can give rise to Monell liability does

10 not save their claim. A “policy of action” for Monell purposes is “one in which the

11 government body itself violates someone’s constitutional rights, or instructs its

12 employees to do so.” Jackson v. Barnes, 749 F.3d 755, 763 (9th Cir. 2014). The

13 Executive Order does neither. It required vaccination but expressly authorized

14 religious accommodations. Plaintiffs’ grievance is not with that policy but with how

15 Defendants Sheppard and Laird carried out the accommodation process. Whatever

16 the merits of those allegations, they describe individual conduct in implementing a

17 facially lawful policy, not an unconstitutional municipal policy actionable under

18 Monell.

19 Plaintiffs’ ratification theory also falls short. A municipality may be liable if a

20 final policymaker ratifies a subordinate’s decision and the basis for it. Christie v.

21 Iopa, 176 F.3d 1231, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 1999). But “[t]he mere failure to investigate

22 the basis of a subordinate’s discretionary decisions” is not ratification. City of St.

23 Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988). Ratification requires that the

1 policymaker have actual knowledge of the unconstitutional act and make “a

2 deliberate choice to endorse” it. Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 743 F.3d

3 1211, 1231 (9th Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs rely on statements Defendant Laird allegedly

4 made to Plaintiff Peterson about Mayor Birney’s “intentions”—that the Mayor

5 wanted “consequences for the unvaccinated” and to show they were “being treated

6 differently.” Dkt. No. 14 ¶¶ 91, 97. The FAC frames these as Birney’s intentions as

7 relayed by Laird; it is unclear whether Laird was quoting the Mayor directly or

8 characterizing her wishes. At this stage, the Court reads the allegations in the light

9 most favorable to Plaintiffs and assumes Birney made these statements. Even so,

10 the statements were made before the Executive Order was issued, and before the

11 specific conduct Plaintiffs challenge—the “action plan,” the filling of accommodation

12 positions with vaccinated employees, and the pretextual terminations. Pre-conduct

13 statements of intent may support an inference that a policymaker instigated a

14 course of action, but they do not establish that the policymaker had actual

15 knowledge of, and deliberately endorsed, the particular unconstitutional acts that

16 followed. These allegations describe instigation, not ratification. See Coal. on

17 Homelessness v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 758 F. Supp. 3d 1102, 1139–40 (N.D.

18 Cal. 2024).

19 To the extent the FAC’s allegation that Defendant Laird “lacked both

20 training and experience in dealing with religious accommodations,” Dkt. No. 14 ¶

21 45, can be read to assert a failure-to-train theory, it falls well short of Monell’s

22 requirements. Deliberate indifference to a known need to train ordinarily requires a

23 “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” Connick v.

1 Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). A single allegation about one official’s

2 qualifications does not meet that standard. Plaintiffs did not attempt to develop this

3 theory in their opposition, confirming its abandonment. See Bennett v. Chicago Title

4 Ins. Co., No. C13-1354RSL, 2013 WL 6795167, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17, 2013).

5 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiffs’ Monell claims. Because Plaintiffs

6 have already amended their complaint once with the benefit of extensive discovery

7 from the parallel Title VII case, and because the deficiencies identified above are

8 structural rather than factual, further amendment would be futile. Ascon Props.,

9 Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 (9th Cir. 1989). The Monell claims are

10 dismissed with prejudice.

4.2 The Court does not dismiss on issue preclusion grounds.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims are barred by the doctrine of issue

preclusion based on the December 5 Order. Issue preclusion bars relitigating where

“(1) [issues] necessarily decided at the previous proceeding is identical to the one

which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final

judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted

was a party or in privity with a party at the first proceeding.” Garity v. APWU Nat’l

Lab. Org., 828 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2016).

Plaintiffs have refashioned their claims from the Title VII case into the §

1983 claims here. Although the factual predicates between the cases overlap

substantially, the claims are not identical for purposes of issue preclusion. The Title

VII claims were analyzed under a statutory framework, while the § 1983 claims

1 invoke the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, which is analyzed under a

2 distinct constitutional framework. Because the first element of issue preclusion is

3 not satisfied, the Court does not apply the doctrine here. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v.

4 Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746–47 (9th Cir. 2006) (all three elements of issue

5 preclusion must be satisfied for the doctrine to apply).

4.3 Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’

individual capacity Section 1983 claims.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ individual capacity claims should be

dismissed on qualified immunity grounds. “The doctrine of qualified immunity

protects government officials from liability for civil damages ‘unless a plaintiff

pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right,

and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged

conduct.” Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014) (citation modified). Courts may

address these prongs in either order. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).

For purposes of qualified immunity analysis, the Court assumes without deciding

that Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a constitutional violation against the individual

defendants. But they fail at the second prong—whether a right was clearly

established.

“A right is clearly established when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”

Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577

U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). The plaintiff need not cite “a case directly on point, but existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”

1 Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (2015). “This inquiry ‘must be undertaken in light of the

2 specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.’” Rivas-Villegas, 595

3 U.S. at 5–6 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).

4 Plaintiffs have identified no precedent, existing at the time of Defendants’

5 conduct in 2021 and 2022, holding that a municipal official violates the Free

6 Exercise Clause by implementing a COVID-19 vaccine mandate for healthcare-

7 providing firefighters—even one that denies particular accommodation requests or

8 is implemented imperfectly. The cases Plaintiffs cite—Roman Catholic Diocese of

9 Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 592 U.S. 14 (2020); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia,

10 Pennsylvania, 593 U.S. 522 (2021); Tandon v. Newsom, 593 U.S. 61 (2021); Village

11 of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)—stand for the broad general

12 propositions that government may not target religious exercise for disfavored

13 treatment and must treat similarly situated groups alike. But the Supreme Court

14 has “repeatedly told courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define

15 clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100,

16 104 (2018) (citation modified). None of these cases involves a COVID-19 vaccination

17 policy for healthcare workers, and none addresses the specific question whether

18 denying a firefighter’s request to work unvaccinated during a pandemic violates

19 clearly established constitutional rights.

20 The weight of authority confirms that this constitutional question was not

21 “beyond debate” in 2021 and 2022. In Curtis v. Inslee, 709 F. Supp. 3d 1257 (W.D.

22 Wash. 2023), aff’d, 154 F.4th 678 (9th Cir. 2025), the Honorable Robert J. Bryan

23 granted qualified immunity to Governor Inslee on all federal claims arising from the

1 same Proclamation 21-14, finding that the plaintiffs pointed to “no existing

2 precedent that ‘placed the statutory or constitutional questions beyond debate.’” 709

3 F. Supp. 3d at 1270. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on alternative grounds without

4 disturbing this analysis. More broadly, the Ninth Circuit has consistently upheld

5 COVID-19 vaccine mandates for healthcare workers as constitutionally permissible

6 and has cautioned courts against second-guessing pandemic decision-making with

7 hindsight. See Health Freedom Def. Fund, Inc. v. Carvalho, 148 F.4th 1020, 1031

8 (9th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (COVID-19 vaccine mandate survives rational basis

9 review); Curtis v. Inslee, 154 F.4th 678, 692 (9th Cir. 2025) (same, arising from

10 Proclamation 21-14); Petersen v. Snohomish Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211,

11 1222 (9th Cir. 2025) (courts “cannot judge [employers] with the clarity of hindsight

12 or the benefit of post-pandemic debates over what measured responses frontline

13 employers should have taken”). Against this backdrop, reasonable officials could

14 have concluded that implementing the Governor’s vaccine mandate for healthcare-

15 providing firefighters—including by determining that masking and testing were

16 insufficient alternatives to vaccination—was constitutionally permissible.

17 Defendants are thus entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs’ individual

18 capacity § 1983 claims. Because the absence of clearly established law at the time of

19 the challenged conduct cannot be cured by amendment, dismissal is with prejudice.

4.4 Motion to strike.

Plaintiffs move to strike the Declaration of John Barry, Dkt. No. 22-1. Dkt.

No. 29 at 8, which contains a copy of the declaration Dr. Thomas Rea submitted in

1 the Title VII case. But “a defendant may seek to incorporate a document into the

2 complaint if the plaintiff refers extensively to the document or the document forms

3 the basis of the plaintiff's claim.” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988,

4 1002 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation modified). Because the FAC refers extensively to Dr.

5 Rea and his letter, which Plaintiffs argue forms part of the basis of their Monell

6 claim, these materials are incorporated by reference. Dkt. No. 29 at 13; Dkt. No. 14

7 ¶¶ 60, 73, 98, 209, 253–254, 316.

8 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to strike; the Court,

9 however, does not rely on the declaration to resolve factual disputes but considers it

10 only to provide context for Plaintiffs’ allegations.

5. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 22, is GRANTED and

Plaintiffs’ case is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

Dated this 13th day of May, 2026.

16 a

Jamal N. Whitehead

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.