The opinion
HONORABLE RICHARD A. JONES
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE
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KATHERINE ANNE LAFRENIERE, CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01691-RAJ
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Plaintiff, ORDER
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v.
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MERIDIAN SCHOOL DISTRICT,
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Defendants.
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18 I. INTRODUCTION
19 THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Defendants Meridian School District
20 (the “District”), James Everett, and Kurt Harvill’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Dkt. #
21 61. Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff Katherine Anne LaFreniere’s Motion to
22 Deem Requests for Admission Admitted, Dkt. # 72, Motion to Modify the Scheduling
23 Order, Dkt. # 73, and Motion for Relief from Scheduling Order Deadlines, Dkt. # 76. The
24 Court has reviewed the motions, the submissions in support of and in opposition to the
25 motion, and the balance of the record. For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS
26 the District’s Motion for Summary Judgment and DENIES Ms. LaFreniere’s motions.
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1 II. BACKGROUND
2 A. Proclamation Requiring COVID-19 Vaccination
3 In August 2021, in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, then-Governor Inslee
4 issued Proclamation 21-14.1 (the “Proclamation”). The Proclamation prohibited “[a]ny
5 Worker from engaging in work for the operator of an Educational Setting after October 18,
6 2021 if the Worker has not been fully vaccinated against COVID-19.” Dkt. # 63-1 at 5.
7 The Proclamation also prohibited “[a]ny operator of an Educational Setting from
8 permitting a Worker to engage in work for the operator after October 18, 2021 if the
9 Worker has not been fully vaccinated against COVID-19 and provided proof thereof[.]”
10 Id. It is uncontested that Ms. LaFreniere was a “Worker” and the District an “operator of
11 an Educational Setting” as defined in the Proclamation.1
12 The Proclamation provided for exemptions from the vaccination requirement for
13 individuals “unable to do so because of a disability or if the requirement to do so conflicts
14 with their sincerely held religious beliefs, practice, or observance.” Id. at 6. The
15 Proclamation required covered entities to provide certain disability-related reasonable
16 accommodations and sincerely held religious belief accommodations unless doing so
17 “would cause undue hardship.” Id. Prior to providing a disability-related reasonable
18 accommodation, covered entities were required, to the extent permitted by law, to “obtain
19 from the individual requesting the accommodation documentation from an appropriate
20 health care or rehabilitation professional stating that the individual has a disability that
21 necessitates an accommodation and the probable duration of the need for the
22 accommodation.” Id. at 6–7. Prior to providing a sincerely held religious belief
23 accommodation, covered entities were required, to the extent permitted by law, to
24 “document that the request for an accommodation has been made and include a statement
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1 Under the Proclamation, “Worker” includes “A person engaged to work as an employee, on-site
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volunteer, or on-site contractor for a State Agency, an operator of an Educational Setting, or an
27 operator of a Health Care Setting[.]” Id. at 9. “Educational Setting” includes “[a]ll public schools”
and “public school districts.” Id. at 12.
1 in the document explaining the way in which the requirements of this order conflict with
2 the sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance of the individual.” Id. at 7. The
3 Proclamation prohibited covered entities from providing accommodations that they knew
4 were “based on false, misleading or dishonest grounds or information” or “based on the
5 personal preferences of the individual and not on an inability to get vaccinated because of
6 a disability or a conflict with a sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.” Id.
7 The Proclamation also prohibited covered entities from providing accommodations
8 “[w]ithout conducting an individualized assessment and determination of each individual’s
9 need and justification for an accommodation; i.e., ‘rubberstamping’ accommodation
10 requests.” Id.
11 B. The District’s Implementation of the Proclamation
12 The two individual defendants in this case are Mr. Harvill and Mr. Everett. Mr.
13 Harvill is the Assistant Superintendent for the District. Dkt. # 63 ¶ 1. Mr. Everett is the
14 Superintendent for the District. Dkt. # 63-13.
15 In support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants submit a declaration
16 from Mr. Harvill. Dkt. # 63. In the declaration, Mr. Harvill explains that “[t]o comply
17 with the Proclamation, the District worked with legal counsel to develop medical and
18 religious accommodation request forms.” Id. ¶ 6. The form was “the first step to granting
19 an accommodation and exemption from the vaccination mandate.” Id. Mr. Havill
20 reviewed completed forms. Id. If the completed form “provided sufficient information to
21 comply with the Proclamation,” then Mr. Harvill met with the individual “to identify
22 appropriate safety measures” to follow. If, on the other hand, the completed form “did not
23 contain sufficient information to comply with the Proclamation,” Mr. Harvill would
24 “communicate with the individual, either in person, by phone, or by email, to discuss and
25 obtain the missing information.” Id. ¶ 7.
26 On August 27, 2021, Mr. Harvill sent all District staff an email regarding the
27 Proclamation and vaccination requirement. Id. ¶ 9. The email required staff to complete
1 a training module, which in turn provided staff with the exemption forms. Id. ¶ 9; Dkt. #
2 63-2. The email also attached a “Frequently Asked Questions” document (“FAQs”). In
3 relevant part, the FAQs explained that to obtain a religious exemption, employees must
4 “complete the form provided by their school district and/or actively participate in the
5 interactive accommodation process with a Human Resources representative.” Dkt. # 63-2
6 at 8. In addition, the FAQs explained that the Proclamation required “employees seeking
7 a religious exemption to explain the way in which the requirements of the order conflict
8 with their sincerely held religious belief, practice, or observance.” Id. Finally, the FAQ
9 stated that employees “who do not provide proof of vaccination or a medical or religious
10 exemption will be subject to non-disciplinary dismissal from employment for failing to
11 meet the qualifications of the job.” Id. Mr. Harvill sent follow-up emails regarding the
12 vaccination requirement and exemptions process on September 8, 2021 and September 24,
13 2021. Dkt. # 63 at ¶¶ 10–11; Dkt. # 63-3; Dkt. # 63-4.
14 C. Ms. LaFreniere’s Exemption Requests and Termination
15 Ms. LaFreniere was the Director of Transportation at the District. Dkt. # 63 ¶ 12.
16 On or around September 1, 2021, she sent to the District a 13-page document titled
17 “Affidavit/Declaration of Truth” and “Statement of Medical and/or Religious Exemption.
18 Id.; Dkt. # 63-5. The affidavit stated: “I am legally exempt from taking vaccines, wearing
19 any face covering, viral testing, temperature testing or inoculations.” Dkt. # 63-5 at 3. It
20 also stated: “My religious convictions or medial [sic] conditions are protected by the
21 Constitutional of United States of America” and several other laws. Id. The affidavit does
22 not appear to identify what religious conviction or medical condition prevented Ms.
23 LaFreniere from complying with the vaccination requirement. On September 3, 2021, Mr.
24 Harvill responded to Ms. LaFreniere by email. Dkt. # 63-6. He acknowledged receipt of
25 her affidavit, informed her it was not sufficient to qualify her for an exemption, reminded
26 her of the District’s exemption process, and directed her to the exemption forms. Id.
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1 On or around September 21, 2021, Ms. LaFreniere sent a 17-page affidavit
2 “challenging the District’s authority to require her to provide the basis for any requested
3 exemption.” Dkt. # 63 ¶ 14. On September 30, 2021, Mr. Harvill sent another email to
4 Ms. LaFreniere. In the email, he explained the “two affidavit letters we have received from
5 you did not provide us with the information we need in order to be able to exempt you from
6 the Governor’s proclamation.” Dkt. # 63-7 at 2. He again asked Ms. LaFreniere to
7 complete the District’s exemption form to seek an exemption. Id.
8 On October 1, 2021, Ms. LaFreniere submitted a religious accommodation request
9 form. Dkt. # 63-8. Instead of providing information regarding her religious belief,
10 however, Ms. LaFreniere stated in response to every question on the form: “The
11 constitution protects me from answering any questions that you have about my religion
12 therefore my answer is I am complying to your request to fill out a religious questionnaire
13 under duress.” Dkt. # 63-8 at 2. On October 5, 2021, Mr. Harvill sent an email to Ms.
14 LaFreniere stating: “For an exemption to be granted, you would need to describe what
15 your religious belief is that forms the basis for an exemption and/or how your religious
16 belief conflicts with you receiving a COVID-19 vaccination. You did not provide the
17 information requested to determine if an exemption could be granted.” Dkt. # 63-9 at 2
18 (emphasis in original).
19 On October 12, 2021, Mr. Harvill attended an informal hearing with Ms. LaFreniere
20 to discuss her request for a religious exemption. Dkt. # 63 ¶ 18. The meeting was originally
21 scheduled to take place in the District’s Professional Development room, but was moved
22 to the Bus Garage Bay to ensure social distancing because Ms. LaFreniere’s pastor and
23 elder, who accompanied her, refused to wear a mask. Id. During the hearing, Ms.
24 LaFreniere again repeated her position that she is not required to explain her religious
25 beliefs. Id. ¶ 19; Dkt. # 63-11.
26 On October 18, 2021, Ms. LaFreniere submitted a second religious accommodation
27 form. Dkt. # 63-12. In this form, she stated her “religious beliefs are private rights” and
1 “therefore exempt from disclosure to you, the government or any infringing party.” Id. at
2 3. In response to questions regarding how her religious belief conflicts with the vaccination
3 requirement, she stated “N/A” or “non [sic] of these are applicable.” Id. at 2.
4 On October 21, 2021, in a letter signed by Mr. Everett, the District informed Ms.
5 LaFreniere of her termination based on her failure to comply with the vaccination mandate
6 or obtain an exemption. Dkt. # 63-13. According to Mr. Harvill’s declaration, the District
7 granted exemptions to 10–15% of the staff. Dkt. # 63 ¶ 6. Ms. LaFreniere “was the only
8 District employee who failed to provide the basis for her request for a religious exemption.”
9 Id.
10 III. LEGAL STANDARD
11 Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material
12 fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
13 The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue
14 of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving
15 party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no
16 reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Soremekun v. Thrifty
17 Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). On an issue where the nonmoving party
18 will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by pointing out
19 to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's
20 case. Id. If the moving party meets the initial burden, the opposing party must set forth
21 specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial in order to defeat the
22 motion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). The court must view
23 the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable
24 inferences in that party's favor. Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984. Credibility determinations
25 and the weighing of the evidence are jury functions, not those of a judge. Anderson, 477
26 U.S. at 255.
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1 IV. DISCUSSION
2 Ms. LaFreniere asserts the following claims: (1) count one: violation of First
3 Amendment right to free exercise of religion; (2) count two: violation of Title VII of the
4 Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”); (3) count three: violation of Fourteenth Amendment
5 procedural due process; (4) count 4: violation of Fourteenth Amendment equal protection;
6 (5) count five: violation of substantive due process; and (6) count six: violation of
7 Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”); (7) count seven: violation of
8 Washington State Constitution; and (8) count eight: municipal liability under Monell v.
9 Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Dkt. # 6 at 11–20. The Amended
10 Complaint does not clearly identify which claims are asserted against which defendants,
11 but construing the pro se pleading liberally, the Court will treat all claims as asserted
12 against all Defendants. In addition, the Amended Complaint’s caption indicates Mr.
13 Harvill and Mr. Everett are only sued in their official capacity, although another section of
14 the Amended Complaint states they are sued in both their “official and individual capacities
15 for actions taken under color of state law.” Id. at 1, 9. Again construing the pleading
16 liberally, the Court will analyze claims against Mr. Harvill and Mr. Everett in both their
17 official and individual capacities. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants are entitled
18 to summary judgment on all claims.
19 A. Ms. LaFreniere’s Surreply
20 As a threshold matter, after the completion of briefing on Defendants’ Motion for
21 Summary Judgment, Ms. LaFreniere filed a document titled “Plaintiff’s Opposition to
22 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment; Objection to Note for Calendar; And Motion
23 to Strike Defendants’ Reply.” Dkt. # 70. The Court construes the filing as a surreply to
24 the Motion for Summary Judgment.
25 Under the District’s Local Civil Rules, a party “may file a surreply requesting that
26 the court strike” “ material contained in or attached to a reply brief.” LCR 7(g). The
27 surreply “shall be strictly limited to addressing the request to strike.” Id. “Extraneous
1 argument or a surreply filed for any other reason will not be considered.” Id. “A surreply
2 is not an opportunity for rebuttal.” Thompson v. Seattle Pub. Sch., No. 25-cv-468, 2026
3 WL 1025392, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 25, 2026).
4 Here, Ms. LaFreniere’s surreply contains extraneous arguments not permitted under
5 Local Civil Rule 7(g) or otherwise by leave of the Court. See Dkt. # 70 at 1–12. The Court
6 will not consider those arguments in this order.
7 The surreply also contains a request to strike Defendnats’ reply brief. Ms.
8 LaFreniere asks the Court to strike the reply because (1) Defendants filed the reply brief
9 one day before the noting date; (2) the reply raises new arguments; and (3) “counsel’s
10 credential demand . . . remains unresolved.” Id. at 13. Under the Local Civil Rules, reply
11 briefs must be “filed and received by the opposing party no later than 21 days after the
12 filing date of the motion.” LCR 7(d)(3) (emphasis added). Filing the reply brief early does
13 not run afoul of Rule 7(d)(3) and provides no basis to strike the filing. Next, the Court
14 does not find that Defendants’ reply brief raises new arguments and Ms. La Freniere fails
15 to identify any purported new arguments. Finally, the Court again rejects Ms. LaFreniere’s
16 arguments regarding counsel’s legal credentials. See Dkt. # 57 at 3 (order directing Ms.
17 LaFreniere “to refrain from filing any further motions relating to counsel’s legal
18 credentials.”). In sum, the request to strike is denied.
19 B. Section 1983 Claims Against the District and Against the Individual
20 Defendants in Their Official Capacity (Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, 8)
21 Defendants argue Ms. LaFreniere’s § 1983 claims based on Monell liability fail
22 because “the District was enforcing the Governor’s Proclamation, not an internal policy
23 created and adopted by the District.” Dkt. # 61 at 10. Ms. LaFreniere argues Monell
24 liability applies because the “District’s policy choices—designating an untrained evaluator,
25 adopting a form that interrogated employees about the specifics of their faith, and providing
26 no criteria for evaluating sincerity—are attributable to the District, not to the Governor.”
27 Dkt. # 65 at 10. The Court agrees with Defendants.
1 “A litigant complaining of a violation of a constitutional right must utilize 42 U.S.C.
2 § 1983.” Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704, 705 (9th Cir. 1992).
3 “Municipalities and other local governing bodies such as school districts may be held liable
4 under § 1983 where a plaintiff shows that ‘execution of a government’s policy or
5 custom . . . inflict[ed] the injury.” Damiano v. Grants Pass Sch. Dist. No. 7, 140 F.4th
6 1117, 1154 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 694). “A municipality may
7 be held liable ‘only for its own violations of federal law.’” Wilkins v. Herron, No. 24-80,
8 2024 WL 5200177, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 23, 2024) (quoting Los Angeles County v.
9 Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 36 (2010)). In addition, the “municipal policy or custom must
10 constitute a ‘deliberate choice to follow a course of action . . . made from among various
11 alternatives.” Id. (quoting Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th
12 Cir. 2021)).
13 In Wilkins, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Monell claims against a
14 school district under similar circumstances. There, a former public school teacher alleged
15 the school district “violated his constitutional rights by enforcing Oregon’s regulatory
16 vaccine and mask mandates for public school employees.” Id., at *2. It was undisputed,
17 however, that “state laws required school employees to be vaccinated and to wear masks”
18 and “those laws were binding on the School District.” Id. Based on this undisputed fact,
19 the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff failed to plead Monell liability because his alleged
20 injuries were not “traceable to any policy or custom of the School District, as opposed to
21 state law.” Id.
22 Here, like in Wilkins, Ms. LaFreniere’s injuries are not traceable to any policy or
23 custom of the District. Rather, her termination was a direct result of the Proclamation,
24 which was binding on the District. Her arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. First,
25 the Court observes that Ms. LaFreniere did not submit any exhibits or other evidence to
26 support her assertions that the District designated an “untrained evaluator,” adopted a form
27 that “interrogated employees about the specifics of their faith,” and provided “no criteria
1 for evaluating sincerity.” See Dkt. # 65 at 10.2 “A trial court can only consider admissible
2 evidence in ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285
3 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). Thus, the Court disregards Ms. LaFreniere’s unsupported
4 assertions.
5 Second, and more importantly, these assertions do not undermine the District’s
6 position. The Proclamation prohibited the District from employing anyone who was not
7 vaccinated against COVID-19 unless approved for an exemption. Dkt. # 63-1 at 5–6. The
8 Proclamation further required the District to conduct an “individualized assessment and
9 determination” of exemption requests, and for religious exemptions, to document “the way
10 in which the requirements of this order conflict with the sincerely held religious belief,
11 practice, or observance of the individual.” Id. at 7. The Proclamation explicitly prohibited
12 “rubberstamping” accommodation requests. Id. Ms. LaFreniere’s repeated refusal to
13 explain her sincerely held religious belief and how that belief conflicted with the
14 vaccination requirement left the District with no choice but to terminate her employment.
15 Under the plain terms of the Proclamation, the District could not grant her exemption
16 request because it had no information to conduct an “individualized assessment and
17 determination” of her request. Without an approved exemption, it could not continue her
18 employment. The District had no discretion in the matter. Ms. LaFreniere complains that
19 the District designated an “untrained evaluator” and used improper exemption forms and
20 criteria, but no amount of training or improved process could remedy the fundamental issue
21 that the District did not have the most basic information to evaluate her exemption request.
22 Thus, § 1983 claims against the District are dismissed.
23 Official capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action
24 against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991)
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2 Indeed, her assertion that the District’s forms “interrogated employees about the specifics of their
26
faith” is flatly contradicted by the existing record. See Dkt. # 63-8 (request form); Dkt. # 63 ¶ 19
27 (“This was not a rigorous review of anyone’s religious tenets but merely ensuring that the person
provided a basis for their request that complied with the requirements of the Proclamation.”).
1 (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)). Accordingly, § 1983 claims
2 against Mr. Harvill and Mr. Everett in their official capacity are dismissed for the same
3 reasons.
4 C. Section 1983 Claims Against the Individual Defendants in Their
5 Individual Capacity (Counts 1, 3, 4, 5)
6 Next, Ms. LaFreniere asserts § 1983 claims against Mr. Harvill and Mr. Everett in
7 their individual capacity for violation of (1) the free exercise clause; (2) procedural due
8 process; (3) equal protection; and (4) substantive due process. Defendants argue Mr.
9 Harvill and Mr. Everett are entitled to qualified immunity. The Court agrees.3
10 “Qualified immunity is ‘an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of
11 litigation,’ which, in certain circumstances, shields government officials from civil liability
12 for actions taken in the course of their duties.” Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812 (9th
13 Cir. 2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). To overcome qualified
14 immunity, the plaintiff must show the defendant “(1) ‘violated a federal statutory or
15 constitutional right’ and (2) ‘the unlawfulness of their conduct was clearly established at
16 the time.’” Moore v. Garnand, 83 F.4th 743, 750 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ballentine v.
17 Tucker, 28 F.4th 54, 61 (9th Cir. 2022)). These elements may be analyzed “in any order.”
18 Id. To show that a right is clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the
19 statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741
20 (2011). Additionally, the right must have been established “at the time of the alleged
21 violation.” Moran v. State, 147 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1998). The clearly established
22 right should not be defined “at a high level of generality.” Moore, 83 F.4th at 750 (quoting
23 Ballentine, 28 F.4th at 64).
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25
26
27 3 Because the Court resolves these claims based on qualified immunity, it will not reach
Defendants’ argument regarding personal participation. See Dkt. # 61 at 8–9.
1 i. No Clearly Established Right
2 Ms. Freniere fails to meet her burden of identifying a clearly established right. See
3 LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1157 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Once the defense of qualified
4 immunity is raised by the defendant, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the rights
5 allegedly violated were ‘clearly established.’”). She argues that “the right to free exercise
6 of religion and to be free from religious discrimination in employment has been clearly
7 established for decades.” Dkt. # 65 at 8. This, however, is exactly the “high level of
8 generality” that must be avoided when identifying the clearly established right. Moore, 83
9 F.4th at 750. She identifies no clearly established law that is sufficiently related to the
10 alleged constitutional violations at issue in this case. This failure alone “is fatal to [her]
11 federal claims.” Bennett v. King County, No. 24-2065, 2026 WL 41131, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
12 Jan. 7, 2026).
13 Indeed, courts have “routinely held that officials are entitled to qualified immunity
14 in similar challenges to public health orders because they were facing an ‘unprecedented
15 global pandemic,’ for which there was little if any clearly established precedent.”
16 Strandquist v. State Dep’t of Soc. and Health Servs., No. 23-cv-5071, 2024 WL 4645146,
17 at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 31, 2024) (collecting cases), reconsideration denied, 2024 WL
18 4979859 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 4, 2024). In similar COVID-19 vaccine mandate contexts,
19 courts have found officials are entitled to qualified immunity, based on failure to identify
20 clearly established law, for every constitutional claim at issue in this case. See, e.g.,
21 Bennett, 2026 WL 41131, at *3 (finding defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for
22 free exercise, procedural due process, and equal protection claim); Colombo v. State Dep’t
23 of Nat’l Res., No. 24-cv-5887, 2025 WL 1434903, at *3–4 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2025)
24 (same); Wilkins, 2024 WL 5200177, at *3 (“At the time the Administrators enforced the
25 vaccine and mask mandates, there was no clearly established [substantive] due process
26 right to refuse a vaccine or to wear a mask during a pandemic”).
27
1 Because the Court finds Ms. Freniere fails to identify any clearly established right
2 in support of her constitutional claims, it need not go any further to find that Mr. Harvill
3 and Mr. Everett are entitled to qualified immunity on those claims. Nevertheless, for the
4 sake of completeness, the Court will briefly address each constitutional claim at issue.
5 ii. Free Exercise
6 “A person asserting a free exercise claim must show that the government action in
7 question substantially burdens the person’s practice of her religion.” Jones. v. Williams,
8 791 F.3d 1023, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015). “A substantial burden . . . place[s] more than an
9 inconvenience on religious exercise; it must have a tendency to coerce individuals into
10 acting contrary to their religious beliefs or exert substantial pressure on an adherent to
11 modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” Id. at 1031–32 (quoting Ohno v. Yasuma,
12 723 F.3d 984, 1011 (9th Cir. 2013)). Here, requiring Ms. LaFreniere to complete a
13 religious exemption form did not substantially burden her religion. The form merely asked
14 high-level questions about her religious objection so the District could conduct an
15 individualized assessment as required by the Proclamation. See Dkt. # 63-8. Nothing in
16 the record suggests the exemption form had the tendency to coerce Ms. LaFreniere to act
17 in a way contrary to her religion. See Campbell v. Bowser, No. 22-cv-3422, 2025 WL
18 2779911, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2025) (“The requirement to engage with the school’s
19 exemption process and submit a completed exemption form is at most an inconsequential
20 or de minimis burden on religious practice that would not implicate the First Amendment.”)
21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 iii. Procedural Due Process
23 “The essential requirements of due process . . . are notice and an opportunity to
24 respond.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). Under
25 Loudermill, “[p]ublic employees are entitled to ‘oral or written notice of the charges against
26 [them]’ and ‘an opportunity to present [their] side of the story’ before they are terminated.”
27 Pilz v. Inslee, No. 21-cv-5735, 2022 WL 1719172, at *7 (W.D. Wash. May 27. 2022)
1 (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546). Assuming Loudermill applies to Ms. LaFreniere’s
2 termination, its requirements were easily satisfied. The District afforded Ms. LaFreniere
3 substantial process and opportunity to respond prior to her termination. The District
4 provided repeated notice to all employees that individuals who do not vaccinate or obtain
5 an exemption will be terminated. Dkts. # 63-2, 63-3, 63-4. The District, through Mr.
6 Harvill, also personally informed Ms. LaFreniere on multiple occasions that to qualify for
7 an exemption, she must complete the District’s exemption form and explain the reason she
8 is seeking an exemption. Dkts. # 63-6, 63-7, 63-9. In total, the District considered two
9 affidavits and two exemption forms submitted by Ms. LaFreniere, but none provided basic
10 information regarding the nature of her religious objection to the vaccination requirement.
11 Dkts. # 63-5, 63-8, 63-12. The District then held a Loudermill hearing “to get a clearer
12 understanding of Ms. LaFreniere’s position.” Dkt. # 63 ¶ 18. These undisputed facts show
13 the District did not violate Ms. LaFreniere’s procedural due process rights. See Gray v.
14 State Dep’t of Trans., No. 23-3278, 2024 WL 5001484, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2024) (“Even
15 if Loudermill could be read as clearly established law with respect to the accommodation
16 process, and we are doubtful that it can, Employees received as much notice and process
17 as the law required” based on notice of the vaccination and exemption policy and
18 pretermination opportunities to respond); Bacon, 2024 WL 3041850, at *2 (employees who
19 received notice of the vaccination requirement, were offered the opportunity to participate
20 in Loudermill hearings, and received the results of those hearings “were given all the
21 process that was due.”). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what more process the District
22 could have provided to Ms. LaFreniere under the circumstances.
23 iv. Equal Protection
24 A plaintiff asserting an equal protection claim “must show that the defendants acted
25 with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a
26 protected class.” Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1030 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Barren
27 v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998)). On the undisputed record, it is
1 abundantly clear that the District terminated Ms. LaFreniere because of her refusal to
2 explain the nature of her religious objection to the vaccine mandate. See, e.g., Dkt. # 63-
3 6. The District granted “numerous” other employees’ requests for religious exemption.
4 Dkt. # 63 ¶ 21. Thus, it cannot be said that Defendants discriminated against Ms.
5 LaFreniere based on her religious beliefs or any other protected characteristic.
6 v. Substantive Due Process
7 In Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905), the Supreme
8 Court “upheld a government vaccine mandate over objections about the vaccine’s efficacy
9 and safety.” Wilkins, 2024 WL 5200177, at *3. “[S]ince the onset of the COVID-19
10 pandemic, numerous courts have rejected claims that COVID-19 vaccine mandates or
11 mask mandates violate individuals’ substantive due process rights . . . .” Id. (collecting
12 cases). At minimum, the question of whether vaccine mandates violate individuals’
13 substantive due process rights was not clearly established at the time the mandates went
14 into place. See id. (“any purported due process right to refuse a vaccine or to wear a mask
15 during the pandemic was not clearly established.”); Johnson v. Kotek, No. 22-35624, 2024
16 WL 747022, at *3 (9th Cir. Feb. 23, 2024) (“At best, the validity of these vaccine mandates
17 under the principles discussed in Jacobson, Cruzan, and related cases is debatable”), cert.
18 denied, 145 S. Ct. 378 (2024). Based on the reasoning of Wilkins and Johnson, the Court
19 finds the individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because
20 there is no clearly established right at issue.
21 In her opposition, Ms. LaFreniere argues her substantive due process claim is “not
22 limited to a ‘right to refuse vaccination.’” Dkt. # 65 at 17. Instead, she appears to argue
23 that her termination “shocks the conscience.” Id. This argument is rejected. Requiring
24 Ms. LaFreniere to complete an exemption form, as many other District employees did, does
25 not shock the conscience.
26 In sum, § 1983 claims against Mr. Harvill and Mr. Everett in their individual
27 capacity are dismissed based on qualified immunity.
1 D. Title VII Claim (Count 2)
2 Title VII “proscribes discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color,
3 religion, sex, or national origin.” Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 543
4 (2019) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1)). “As a precondition to the commencement of a
5 Title VII action in court, a complainant must first file a charge with the Equal Employment
6 Opportunity Commission [‘EEOC’].” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1), (f)(1)). It is
7 undisputed that Ms. LaFreniere did not file a charge with the EEOC prior to commencing
8 this lawsuit. See Dkt. # 65 at 13.
9 Ms. Lafreniere argues that the administrative exhaustion requirement should be
10 excused based on equitable tolling, estoppel, and waiver. Id. Equitable tolling is available
11 in “extreme cases” and “has been applied sparingly.” Scholar v. Pac. Bell, 963 F.2d 264,
12 267 (9th Cir. 1992). “[T]he Supreme Court has allowed equitable tolling when the statute
13 of limitations was not complied with because of defective pleadings, when a claimant was
14 tricked by an adversary into letting a deadline expire, and when the EEOC’s notice of the
15 statutory period was clearly inadequate.” Id. at 267–68. “Courts have been generally
16 unforgiving, however, when a late filing is due to claimant’s failure ‘to exercise due
17 diligence in preserving his legal rights.’” Id. (quoting Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 498 U.S.
18 89, 96 (1990)). The Court does not find this is the “extreme case” where equitable tolling
19 should be applied. Ms. LaFreniere’s only stated reason for failing to file an EEOC charge
20 is that she is a pro se litigant and “may have been unaware” of the requirement. Dkt. # 65
21 at 13–14. This is not a sufficient justification, particularly at this late stage in the case. Cf.
22 Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2007)
23 (“[plaintiff’s] pro se status does not afford her different treatment” under the Title VII
24 statute of limitations standards). While Ms. LaFreniere also argues administrative
25 exhaustion should be excused based on estoppel and waiver, she does not provide any
26 support for these arguments. Accordingly, the Title VII claim is dismissed.
27
1 E. WLAD Claim (Count 6)
2 “Washington’s claim filing statute requires plaintiffs to give local government
3 entities notice prior to filing suit for tortious conduct.” Reimer v. County of Snohomish,
4 No. 17-cv-384, 2018 WL 2183997, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 11, 2018); see RCW 4.96.020.
5 Again, it is undisputed that Ms. LaFreniere did not comply with this requirement. See Dkt.
6 # 65 at 17.
7 Ms. LaFreniere argues “WLAD is not a tort statute subject to the tort claim filing
8 requirement of RCW 4.96.” Dkt. # 65 at 17. To the contrary, “Washington courts
9 recognize WLAD claims as arising from tortious conduct, and therefore RCW 4.96.020’s
10 notice requirements apply.” Wong v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, No. 16-cv-1774, 2018 WL
11 1035799, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2018).
12 Ms. LaFreniere also argues “substantial compliance or equitable estoppel may
13 excuse non-compliance,” and states Defendants had “extensive notice of Plaintiff’s claims
14 through three sworn Affidavits, the Loudermill hearing, and this litigation.” Dkt. # 65 at
15 17–18. Equitable estoppel does not apply for the reasons discussed above. Moreover, Ms.
16 LaFreniere did not substantially comply with the statute’s requirement. Substantial
17 compliance is met when parties follow a statute in a way that satisfies the “intent for which
18 the statute was adopted.” Lee v. Metro Parks Tacoma, 335 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Wash. Ct.
19 App. 2014). “The purpose of claim filing statutes is to ‘allow government entities time to
20 investigate, evaluate, and settle claims.’” Id. (quoting Medina v. Pub. Utility Dist. No. 1 of
21 Benton Cty., 53 P.3d 993, 997 (2002)). Here, while Ms. LaFreniere notified the District of
22 her objection to the vaccine exemption procedures, there is no indication she provided
23 notice of her WLAD claim before filing suit. See Reimer, 2018 WL 2183997, at *3 (finding
24 plaintiff did not comply with claim filing statute because plaintiff did not “satisfy the
25 purpose of the claim filing statute: alerting the [Defendant] to Plaintiff’s decision to sue.”).
26 Accordingly, the WLAD claim is dismissed as well.
27
1 F. Claim under the Washington Constitution (Count 7)
2 Finally, “Washington law contains no counterpart to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
3 Washington courts reject invitations to establish a cause of action for damages based upon
4 [Washington State] constitutional violations without the aid of augmentative legislation.”
5 Lubers v. Hinson, No. 23-cv-1396, 2024 WL 810552, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2024)
6 (citing Blinka v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n., 36 P.3d 1094, 1102 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)). Ms.
7 LaFreniere asserts a free exercise under the Washington Constitution. See Dkt. # 6 at 18.
8 This claim is dismissed because there is no private right of action. See Shirley v. State
9 Dep't of Fish & Wildlife, No. 23-cv-05077, 2025 WL 1360872, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 9,
10 2025) (dismissing Washington constitutional claims, including free exercise claim),
11 reconsideration granted in part on other grounds, 2025 WL 2165946 (W.D. Wash. May
12 23, 2025), appeal filed, 25-4763 (9th Cir. July 29, 2025).
13 G. Remaining Motions
14 Also pending before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for
15 Admission Admitted, Dkt. # 72, and two motions to modify the scheduling order. Dkts. #
16 73, 76.
17 Under the Court’s Order Setting Trial Date and Related Dates, Dkt. # 38, the
18 deadline to file discovery motions was February 9, 2026. Ms. LaFreniere’s Motion to
19 Deem Requests for Admission Admitted was filed more than two months after this
20 deadline, on April 13, 2026. The Court declines to consider this untimely motion and
21 denied it for that reason.
22 Next, Ms. LaFreniere asks the Court to modify the scheduling order to reopen
23 discovery, Dkt. # 73, and to “designate a rebuttal expert and to complete expert-related
24 discovery,” Dkt. # 76. “A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the
25 judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). The Court does not find good cause to modify
26 the scheduling order. The current scheduling order has been in place since June 4, 2025.
27 Ms. LaFreniere provides no reason she could not have conducted appropriate discovery
1 within the time permitted. Moreover, permitting additional discovery at this late stage—
2 after the conclusion of summary judgment briefing and two months away from trial—
3 would unduly prejudice Defendants. Accordingly, the motions to modify the scheduling
4 order are denied.
5 V. CONCLUSION
6 For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary
7 Judgment, Dkt. # 61, and DISMISSES all claims in this case. The Court DENIES
8 Plaintiff’s Motion to Deem Requests for Admission Admitted, Dkt. # 72, Motion to Modify
9 the Scheduling Order, Dkt. # 73, and Motion for Relief from Scheduling Order Deadlines,
10 Dkt. # 76.
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12 DATED this 13th day of May, 2026.
A
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The Honorable Richard A. Jones
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United States District Judge
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