Opinion

Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
Filed: May 12, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

TYAJAH WILLIAMS, CASE NO. 3:24-cv-05496-DGE

Plaintiff, ORDER ON MOTION TO AMEND

12 v. JUDGMENT (DKT. NO. 59)

13 RECOVERY INNOVATIONS INC et al.,

14 Defendants.

16 I INTRODUCTION

17 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to amend judgment pursuant Federal Rule of Civil

18 Procedure 59(e) or in the alternative, for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b). (Dkt. No.

19 59.) Defendants Recovery Innovations Inc. (“RI”) and Michael Giles (collectively,

20 “Defendants”) oppose the motion. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is GRANTED

21 in part and DENIED in part.

1 II FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2 A. Procedural History of Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) Motion

3 On January 20, 2026, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and

4 entered a judgment dismissing all of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. (Dkt. Nos. 56, 57.) On

5 February 17, Plaintiff filed her motion to amend. (Dkt. No. 59.) The Court ordered Defendants

6 to respond and outlined a briefing schedule for the instant motion. (Dkt. No. 61.)

7 Plaintiff argues the Court incorrectly concluded she had failed to provide evidence RI

8 prohibited her from returning to work on October 1, 2023. (Dkt. No. 59 at 8.) She identifies

9 three errors the Court made in coming to this conclusion: (1) it conflated and combined two

10 correct citations, “leading it to ignore key evidence”; (2) it ignored key evidence that RI

11 prohibited Plaintiff from returning to work on October 1; and (3) it ignored examples of pretext

12 related to communications surrounding Plaintiff’s return-to-work and whether RI had in fact

13 instructed her not to return on October 1. (Id.) Plaintiff further argues that the exclusion of key

14 facts from the Court’s order also led it to incorrectly grant summary judgment on several other

15 claims, including those for disparate treatment discrimination, hostile work environment, failure

16 to accommodate, retaliation in violation of the Washington Law Against Discrimination

17 (“WLAD”), and unlawful discharge. (Id. at 12–15.)

18 In their response, Defendants posit that Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion is a “recast motion

19 for reconsideration” that goes further than addressing the Court’s footnote error. (Dkt. No. 62 at

20 2.) Defendants argue Plaintiff has not pointed to any “manifest errors” that would warrant

21 reconsideration under Rule 59(e) on any of her employment claims. (Id. at 4–6.) In reply,

22 Plaintiff reiterates her position that the footnote error “affected the core analysis” of several of

23 her causes of action, and further, that any disputes about the credibility of deposition testimony

1 or other facts should be construed in her favor. (Dkt. No. 64 at 2–5.) The Court held a hearing

2 on the motion on April 30, 2026. The matter is now ripe for disposition.

3 B. Summary of Relevant Facts

4 The Court refers to its order on the motion for summary judgment for a full recitation of

5 the facts underlying this lawsuit. (See Dkt. No. 56 at 1–8.)

6 1. RI’s Ten-Day Notice Policy

7 As of July 2023, RI was using a ten-day notice policy, where it would provide employees

8 who were out on leave with an intent-to-return email ten days before their scheduled return date.

9 (Dkt. No. 47-33 at 21–23, 42.) Under the policy RI would email employees ten days prior to the

10 “known date of an employee’s end date for their leave” and inform them of the required

11 documents for the employee to return, including a fitness for duty form regarding any

12 accommodations. (Id. at 42.) Lead Benefit Specialist McKenna Haig testified RI defined the

13 “known date” for the end of an employee’s leave based on the approved end date for their

14 “medical certification or ADA paperwork.” (Id. at 42–43.)

15 However, Haig testified the ten-day notice policy does not apply in situations where an

16 employee’s return date is unknown. (Id. at 95) (“We can’t -- we reach out with a ten-day notice

17 when we are aware of the exact date that somebody is expected to return. The ten day -- the ten

18 days can’t be provided if we’re not aware of that date.”). In those situations, RI would send the

19 intent-to-return email with fewer than ten days’ notice. (Id. at 23.) Critically, the ten-day policy

20 does not extend a return date; an extension on the return date would only be considered if before

21 the return date, the employee communicated with RI about needing additional time. (Id. at 94

22 (“[A]s long as [the employee] provided us enough information for us to see that it is due to

23 circumstances outside of their control . . . we are willing and able to wait and extend out their

1 leave.”); 126–127 (That ten-day policy that we have is not typically to extend a leave date. It is

2 to provide ten days before [the employee’s] end date in order to allow them to schedule whatever

3 they may possibly need to schedule.”).) Haig emphasized in deposition that an employee

4 requesting additional time to return paperwork needed to show “a consistent intent to return to

5 work” and to “communicate with us, if they are expected to return on a certain day, when we can

6 expect that documentation so that we can approve an extension.” (Id. at 95, 98.)

7 2. Timeline of Plaintiff’s Return to Work

8 RI has no record of an official return-to-work date ever identified at the time Plaintiff

9 went on leave. In her deposition, Haig clarified that on July 7, 2023, RI received “a copy of the

10 form that would be sent to Washington.” (Id. at 85.) The record indicates on July 6, 2023,

11 Plaintiff emailed a Washington Paid Family Medical Leave (“PFML”) “Medical Certification

12 Serious Health Condition” form to Melissa Greaig, a Senior HR Generalist, requesting leave

13 from June 28 through September 28. (Dkt. No. 39-6 at 2–3.) The description of the serious

14 health condition read, “High conflict w/ Supervisor . . . resulting in Adjustment disorder w/

15 Anxious mood.” (Id. at 3.) Haig confirmed RI had received this “original notice that the actual

16 [leave benefits] request had been submitted[,]” but the company never received documentation

17 from the state confirming Plaintiff’s benefits had been approved. (Dkt. No. 47-33 at 86.) This

18 meant, according to RI, that Plaintiff was on “an unapproved pending leave status[,]” because RI

19 was aware of her leave request, but had not been able to verify or approve the leave request.

20 (Id.) As discussed in more depth in the order on summary judgment (see Dkt. No. 56 at 5), there

21 are questions about why RI was never made aware Plaintiff was approved for PFML by

22 Washington, but the evidence indicates the entire time Plaintiff was on leave, RI was waiting for

23 confirmation of her leave status from the state.

1 September 26

2 Plaintiff reached out to RI on September 26, 2023, by emailing Program Supervisor

3 Wendy Milton.1 (Dkt. No. 44 at 23–24.) Plaintiff wrote, “I am reaching out today to verify my

4 employment status with [RI]. It was my understanding that my return-to-work date was Oct 1,

5 2023. Thank you in advance for your timely [] reply for the above given matter.” (Id. at 24.)

6 Milton told Plaintiff to “follow up with [the] benefits department as it has not been clearly

7 communicated a return date.” (Id. at 23.) Plaintiff asked Milton to assist with getting her in

8 touch with Benefits and clarified she was still employed but “you have not received an update of

9 my date of return.” (Id.) Milton advised Plaintiff someone from Benefits would be reaching out

10 to her. (Id.) In her deposition, Haig confirmed that as of September 26, “[n]obody at RI

11 International had her return-to-work date” because they had not received Plaintiff’s PFML

12 approval letter and therefore did not know the official dates of Plaintiff’s leave. (Dkt. No. 47-33

13 at 85, 90–91.) The evidence indicates September 26 was the first time Plaintiff’s return date was

14 identified.

15 September 27

16 Plaintiff states on September 27 she attempted to contact her program supervisor “via

17 telephone and email to confirm her employment status.” (Dkt. No. 44 at 4.) She further states

18 when she was contacted by email, her program supervisor “refused to confirm [her] employment

19 status.” (Id. at 5.) The only documented email from someone at RI to Plaintiff on September 27

20 is an email from Haig to Plaintiff’s personal email with next steps to facilitate Plaintiff’s return.2

22 1 Plaintiff sent an email to RI on September 13, 2023 that states her return is “rapidly

approaching” but does not include a return date. (See Dkt. No. 47-31 at 74.)

2 Breanne Wolfgram, RI’s corporate representative, testified that when someone was on leave, RI

“normally send[s] communication[s] to their personal email.” (Dkt. No. 47-32 at 155.)

1 (Dkt. No. 47-31 at 80–81.) The email requested (1) a return-to-work form completed by

2 Plaintiff’s attending physician and (2) a “WA FMLA Approval Letter”: “If you utilized

3 Washington State Family and Medical Leave Act (WA FMLA) during your time off, please

4 provide us with a copy of the approval letter or documentation to confirm that your leave was

5 approved.” (Id. at 81.) Haig wrote to Plaintiff, “[o]nce we receive these documents, we can

6 work together to plan your return to work in a way that accommodates any necessary

7 adjustments or accommodations, if applicable.” (Id.) Haig acknowledged in deposition that

8 someone who received this email could reasonably assume they could not return to work until

9 they completed both forms. (Dkt. No. 47-33 at 122–123.)

10 September 29

11 Plaintiff emailed RI on September 29 from her work email. (Dkt. No. 44 at 28.) She said

12 she was “mentally ready and excited to continue with [her] position as a Milieu Specialist” at RI

13 and inquired again “regarding the company’s return policy and whom to follow up with

14 regarding situations of return.” (Id.) She requested someone reach out to “confirm employment

15 status and with necessary conversations regarding me returning to work[.]” (Id.) Haig

16 responded and forwarded the email she sent Plaintiff on September 27 which requested the

17 return-to-work form and WA FMLA Approval Letter. (Id. at 27.) Plaintiff responded, asking

18 again about the “investigation that [she] was involved in” and requesting that someone provide a

19 copy of the investigation findings. (Id.) She did not acknowledge RI’s request for Plaintiff to

20 submit the return-to-work form or the PFML approval letter. (Id.) There is no evidence in the

21 record that Plaintiff sent RI a PFML approval letter.

22 At some point around September 29, Plaintiff apparently scheduled a doctor’s

23 appointment, but it is unclear when exactly, and the record suggests she did not tell RI about the

1 appointment at this point. Plaintiff states in her declaration she “promptly scheduled an

2 appointment with [her] doctor,” but there was no availability before October 1. (Dkt. No. 44 at

3 5.) Haig testified that Plaintiff did not communicate that she had taken steps to complete the

4 return-to-work form by scheduling a doctor’s appointment, nor did she request additional time to

5 complete RI’s requests. (Dkt. No. 47-33 at 128–129, 131.) Plaintiff herself confirmed in

6 deposition she did not communicate with RI between September 29 and October 5, and when

7 asked why she never reached out to RI about scheduling a doctor’s appointment, she stated, “I

8 don’t know. There was no reason why. I just didn’t.” (Dkt. No. 47-31 at 25.) Her belief was

9 that because RI told her she could not work until receiving her return-to-work form, she was not

10 scheduled to work on October 1. (Dkt. No. 44 at 5.)

11 October 5

12 Wolfgram emailed Plaintiff on October 5 to “formally address [her] failure to return to

13 work following [her] approved leave of absence[.]” (Dkt. No. 39-11 at 3.) Wolfgram noted

14 Plaintiff had failed to return to work and pointed to Plaintiff’s “extended absence without prior

15 notice or communication” as evidence of Plaintiff’s resignation. Wolfgram wrote, “[y]our

16 employment at RI International is terminated as of 10/5/2023.” (Id.) Plaintiff responded less

17 than an hour later stating she had “no knowledge of any communication regarding return from

18 leave from the HR Department that I have not responded to[.]” (Id. at 2.) She requested her

19 personnel file and complained she had received “little to no communication” from HR during her

20 leave but still did not address the return-to-work form, PFML approval letter, or other

21 requirements Haig had identified. (Id.) Plaintiff then emailed Wolfgram a second time and

22 finally confirmed her receipt of the return-to-work form and informed Wolfgram the “soonest

1 availability” her doctor could see her was October 27. (Id.) Wolfgram responded that RI was

2 “unable to continue employment based on the failure to return.” (Dkt. No. 44 at 30.)

3 3. Jennifer Goodwin

4 Plaintiff identifies a white RI employee named Jennifer Goodwin whom Plaintiff believes

5 received the benefit of RI’s ten-day notice policy when Plaintiff did not. Goodwin was a

6 registered nurse in Arizona who went on pregnancy leave in 2025 and had a known return date

7 of July 20, 2025. (Dkt. Nos. 38 at 2; 47-33 at 104–105.) Haig testified she sent Goodwin the

8 return-to-work email on July 10, ten days prior to Goodwin’s return date, in alignment with RI’s

9 policy. (Id. at 102, 105.) Haig did not hear from Goodwin until Goodwin reached out on July

10 18, two days before her scheduled return-to-work date, explaining her belief that her doctor was

11 in communication with RI. (Id. at 105.) Haig advised Goodwin that RI had not heard from

12 Goodwin’s doctor and informed her RI needed her paperwork. (Id. at 102–103.) Goodwin asked

13 for additional time and gave Haig the date of her new doctor’s appointment. (Id. at 103.) Haig

14 approved Goodwin’s request for more time. (Id.)

15 III DISCUSSION

16 A. Citation Error

17 At the hearing, the Court explained it confused Dkt. No. 47-32 at 149 with Plaintiff’s

18 citation to Dkt. No. 47-32 at 168.3 Dkt. No. 47-32 at 149 is “page 168” of the deposition

19 transcript filed at Dkt. No. 47-32. The Court inadvertently attributed deposition page 168 of the

20 as Plaintiff’s citation, and then used docket page 149 of Dkt. No. 47-32 as the Court’s citation for

21 page 168 of the deposition. Plaintiff was correct to identify this error.

3 The Court cited Dkt. No. 47-32 at 149 in footnote 8 of the order granting Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. (See Dkt. No. 56 at 15.) Plaintiff cited Dkt. No. 47-32 at 168 in her

response. (See Dkt. No. 48 at 18.)

1 Because of this error, it is appropriate for the Court to review all issues Plaintiff raises in

2 her present motion, though for the reasons identified herein, the effect of the Court’s confusion is

3 less impactful than Plaintiff seeks to characterize.

4 B. Legal Standard

5 “A motion to alter or amend a judgment is construed under Rule 59(e) if it is filed within

6 28 days of entry of judgment; otherwise, it is considered under Rule 60(b) as a motion for relief

7 from a judgment or order.” Bonilla v. California, Case No.: 3:24-cv-00681-JES-KSC, 2024 WL

8 3043531, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 18, 2024) (citing Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am.

9 Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892 898–899 (9th Cir. 2001)). Because Plaintiff’s motion was filed

10 within this 28-day window (see Dkt. Nos. 56, 57, 59), the Court will consider it as a motion

11 brought under Rule 59(e).

12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to “alter or amend a

13 judgment[.]” Because “‘specific grounds for a motion to amend or alter are not listed in the rule,

14 the district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying the motion.’” Allstate Ins.

15 Co. v. Herron, 634 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). That said, a Rule

16 59(e) motion may generally be granted on one of “four basic grounds,” though courts are not

17 limited to these situations. Herron, 634 F.3d at 1111. Here, Plaintiff lists only two bases for

18 relief: (1) to correct a manifest error of fact upon which the judgment rests and (2) to prevent

19 manifest injustice.4 (Dkt. No. 59 at 7.) Amending a judgment after its entry is an

20 “‘extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.’” Herron, 634 F.3d at 1111 (citation

21 omitted). It should not be used as an opportunity for a party to get a “‘second bite at the apple’

4 The other two grounds identified in Herron are (3) if the motion is necessary to present newly

discovered or previously unavailable evidence and (4) if the amendment is justified by an

intervening change in controlling law. 634 F.3d at 1111.

1 in order to re-argue an issue already presented to the court or to raise new arguments that could

2 have been raised in the original briefs.” Romo v. City of L.A., Case No. CV 23-10864 WDK

3 (PVC), 2024 WL 5227411, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2024) (citing Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1231,

4 1236 (9th Cir. 2001)). Notwithstanding, Rule 59(e) can serve as a “useful function” because it

5 “‘permits, if not encourages, a district court to correct its own clear errors.’” Id. (quoting

6 Kaufman v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 843, 851 (9th Cir. 2022)).

7 However, as the Court noted during the hearing, because of its confusion the Court is

8 treating Plaintiff’s motion as a motion for reconsideration and therefore applying the less

9 onerous standard of Local Civil Rule 7(h)(1), which states motions for reconsideration should be

10 granted only (1) if there is a “showing of manifest error in the prior ruling” or (2) a “showing of

11 new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to [the court’s] attention earlier

12 with reasonable diligence.” See also Marlyn Natraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH &

13 Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] motion for reconsideration should not be granted,

14 absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered

15 evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.”).

16 “Whether or not to grant reconsideration is committed to the sound discretion of the court.”

17 Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 1041, 1046 (9th

18 Cir. 2003).

19 C. Analysis

20 1. Plaintiff has established a genuine issue of material fact on her claim of

unlawful discharge in violation of public policy related to her leave.

In her motion to amend the judgment, Plaintiff argues the Court erroneously decided

many of her claims. (Dkt. No. 59 at 7–15.) The Court has reviewed Plaintiff’s motion and re-

reviewed the record in full and concludes that Plaintiff has shown a genuine issue of material fact

1 to overcome summary judgment only on her claim of unlawful discharge in violation of public

2 policy premised on her taking leave.

3 “Wrongful discharge in violation of a public policy is an intentional tort[]”; it provides a

4 “narrow exception” and courts must “‘proceed cautiously.’” Worley v. Providence Physician

5 Servs. Co., 307 P.3d 759, 763 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted). An unlawful discharge

6 claim is a “tort of last resort,” id. (citation omitted), though the Washington Supreme Court has

7 cautioned that it “is independent of any underlying contractual agreement or statute” and does

8 not require the employee to exhaust their contractual or administrative remedies before bringing

9 a claim. Rose v. Anderson Hay & Grain Co., 358 P.3d 1139, 1145–1146 (Wash. 2015) (en

10 banc). “Additionally, the [unlawful discharge] tort ‘is not designed to protect an employee’s

11 purely private interest in [their] continued employment; rather, the tort operates to vindicate

12 the public interest in prohibiting employers from acting in a manner contrary to fundamental

13 public policy.’” Paddock v. Port of Tacoma, 531 P.3d 278, 284 (Wash. Ct. App. 2023) (citation

14 omitted).

15 To establish a prima facie claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, an

16 employee must show (1) that his or her “‘discharge may have been motivated by reasons that

17 contravene a clear mandate of public policy,’ and (2) that the public-policy-linked conduct was a

18 significant factor in the decision to discharge the worker.” Mackey v. Home Depot USA, Inc.,

19 459 P.3d 371, 384 (Wash. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). There

20 are four scenarios to which Washington courts have generally limited wrongful discharge claims:

21 (1) where employees are fired for refusing to commit an illegal act; (2) where

employees are fired for performing a public duty or obligation, such as serving

22 jury duty; (3) where employees are fired for exercising a legal right or privilege,

such as filing workers’ compensation claims; and (4) where employees are fired

23 in retaliation for reporting employer misconduct, i.e., whistleblowing.

1 Martin v. Gonzaga Univ., 425 P.3d 837, 843 (Wash. 2018) (en banc) (citation omitted).

2 However, if the employee’s case “does not fit neatly within one of these scenarios,” id. (citing

3 Becker v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 359 P.3d 746, 749 (Wash. 2015) (en banc)), courts should

4 apply a four-part framework:

5 (1) The plaintiffs must prove the existence of a clear public policy (the clarity

element). (2) The plaintiffs must prove that discouraging the conduct in which

6 they engaged would jeopardize the public policy (the jeopardy element). (3) The

plaintiffs must prove that the public-policy-linked conduct caused the dismissal

7 (the causation element). (4) The defendant must not be able to offer an overriding

justification for the dismissal (the absence of justification element).

Id.

Here, Plaintiff appears to argue she was terminated for exercising her right to take leave,

which the Court assumes fits within the third scenario outlined in Martin. In her motion,

Plaintiff refers only to the FMLA in arguing her unlawful discharge claim should proceed. (See

Dkt. No. 59 at 15.) At oral argument, Plaintiff described three additional public policies: (1) that

an employee’s disability will be accommodated; (2) that an employer will not discriminate

against an employee on the basis of disability or race; and (3) that employers should not be able

to trick employees by telling them to do one thing and then terminating them for following that

directive. Though “[w]hat constitutes a clear mandate of public policy . . . can be established by

statute[,]” Mackey, 459 P.3d at 385, Plaintiff’s primary argument seems to be that she invoked

protected leave of some kind and was wrongfully terminated for doing so. The Court finds

Plaintiff has not sufficiently raised these three additional bases as “clear mandate[s] of public

policy” giving rise to additional wrongful discharge claims. Id. at 384.

1 However, the Court accepts Plaintiff’s claim that the PFML demonstrates “a clear

2 mandate of public policy.”5 (Dkt. No. 59 at 15.) As to the second element, Plaintiff argued in

3 her response to the motion for summary judgment that RI’s actions, i.e., terminating her while

4 she was attempting to comply with RI’s requirements to return from leave, would “discourage

5 employees to . . . take mental health leave[] or apply for [PFML].” (Dkt. No. 48 at 22.) In

6 support of her claim, Plaintiff points to a Teams conversation between Haig and Rochelle

7 Williams, RI’s HR Director during the relevant time, that occurred on October 2, 2023. (See

8 Dkt. Nos. 47-33 at 77; 47-34 at 2.) In the message thread, Haig identified that Plaintiff had

9 applied for PFML but Haig “believe[d] it was denied”; Williams responded, “I need you to find

10 out definitely because I don’t believe we should be allowing her to return.” (Dkt. No. 47-34 at

11 2.) Plaintiff alleges these messages evidence RI’s intention to terminate her because she had

12 sought protected leave benefits and demonstrate RI’s end-run around its return-to-work policy.

13 Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it was not unreasonable for her to seek

14 leave and/or seek paid leave benefits, and her doing so furthers the policy goal of allowing

15 employees in Washington to seek leave without fear of repercussion. See Rickman v. Premera

16 Blue Cross, 358 P.3d 1153, 1158 (Wash. 2015) (en banc) (“[T]he reasonableness of the

17 plaintiff’s conduct relates to whether the plaintiff’s conduct furthers public policy goals.”).

18 Accordingly, although Plaintiff’s unlawful discharge claim is not nearly as detailed as one might

5 Though Plaintiff uses FMLA and PFML somewhat interchangeably throughout her briefing,

the record indicates Plaintiff was not eligible for FMLA when she took her leave in 2023,

because she had not yet been employed by RI for 12 months or worked the requisite number of

hours. (Dkt. No. 47-31 at 36–37.) The Court notes the distinction is immaterial to the basic

argument that Plaintiff sought leave (whether federal or state) and that she was ultimately

discharged for attempting to exercise the right to seek leave.

1 prefer, the Court concludes it is sufficient to overcome summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion is

2 therefore GRANTED as to her unlawful discharge claim.

3 2. Plaintiff fails to show there were manifest errors in the Court’s analysis on

the remainder of her claims.

Even considering the arguments and evidence put forth in Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion,

the Court concludes Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate there is a genuine issue of material fact on

the remainder of her claims.

a. WLAD retaliation based on Plaintiff’s leave

The WLAD makes it unlawful for an employer to “discharge, expel, or otherwise

discriminate against any person because he or she has opposed any practices forbidden by this

chapter, or because he or she has filed a charge, testified, or assisted in any proceeding under this

chapter.” Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.210(1) (emphasis added); Cornwell v. Microsoft Corp., 430

P.3d 229, 234 (Wash. 2018) (en banc) (“WLAD . . . prohibits employers from retaliating against

employees who oppose discriminatory practices.” (emphasis added)); Bittner v. Symetra Nat’l

Life Ins. Co., 558 P.3d 177, 187 (Wash. Ct. App. 2024) (same).

Washington requires three elements to establish a WLAD retaliation claim: “(1) the

employee took a statutorily protected action, (2) the employee suffered an adverse employment

action, and (3) a causal link between the employee’s protected activity and the adverse

employment action.” Cornwell, 430 P.3d at 234 (citing Currier v. Northland Servs., Inc., 332

P.3d 1006, 1011 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014)). “The first element describes opposition to ‘any

practices forbidden by’ Chapter 49.60 [of the Washington Revised Code]. When a person

reasonably believes he or she is opposing discriminatory practices, [§]49.60.210(1) protects that

person whether or not the practice is actually discriminatory.” Currier, 332 P.3d at 1011

(footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, one’s opposition to discriminatory practices is key

1 to a WLAD retaliation claim under § 49.60.210(1). This conclusion is underscored by the

2 Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: a plaintiff must prove they were opposing what they

3 “reasonably believed to be discrimination on the basis” of a protected status. WASH. PATTERN

4 JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL § 330.05, 6A WASH. PRAC. (7th ed. 2022).6

5 Plaintiff fails to establish she was retaliated against for opposing discriminatory practices.

6 Plaintiff argues “HR had decided to terminate [Plaintiff] days before they would terminate a

7 white woman contemplating Intent-to-Return, days before they had ever terminated someone for

8 No Call/No Show, and for the express purpose of punishing her for taking mental health leave

9 and seeking FMLA for mental health purposes.” (Dkt. No. 59 at 14.) Nowhere in this argument

10 is an assertion that Plaintiff was opposing conduct she believed to be discriminatory. While an

11 employee does not need to show actual discrimination to establish a WLAD retaliation claim, the

12 employee must show they reasonably believed their employer violated the law and that they

13 complained about the alleged violation. See Ellis v. City of Seattle, 13 P.3d 1065, 1071 (Wash.

14 2000) (en banc). No such evidence is presented in the record.

6 At the hearing, the Court mentioned that the language of the three-part test outlined in Cornwell

did not actually align with the statutory language requiring a plaintiff show opposition to a

discriminatory practice, rather than engaging in statutorily protected action more broadly.

Counsel for Plaintiff acknowledged the law’s black letter language but advocated for a liberal

construction of the statute that would allow Plaintiff’s claim premised on her taking mental

health leave to proceed. As noted, Cornwell cites favorably to Currier but omits Currier’s

discussion of the first element, which explicitly requires that a person must reasonably believe

they are opposing discriminatory practices in order to meet the first prong of a WLAD retaliation

claim. See Currier, 332 P.3d at 1011. Reading § 49.60.210(1), Cornwell, and Currier together

harmonizes the conflict identified by the Court and solidifies that a successful WLAD retaliation

claim requires the plaintiff show they were opposing what they reasonably believe to be

discriminatory practice forbidden by Chapter 49.60 of the Washington Revised Code.

1 b. Disparate treatment discrimination based on race, with Goodwin as a

comparator

Goodwin is not a similarly situated comparator and therefore cannot provide the basis for

a disparate treatment discrimination claim. “Disparate treatment occurs when an employer treats

some people less favorably than others because of race, color, religion, sex, or other protected

status.” Alonso v. Qwest Commc’ns Co., LLC, 315 P.3d 610, 615 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013). To

make a prima facie disparate treatment claim by reference to a comparator, the plaintiff must

establish (1) they belong to a protected class; (2) they were treated less favorably in the terms of

conditions of their employment (3) than a similarly situated comparator; and (4) the plaintiff and

comparator were doing “substantially the same work.” Johnson v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs.,

907 P.2d 1223, 1231 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). If the plaintiff makes the prima facie showing, then

the rest of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework applies.7 Alonso, 315 P.3d at 616.

At the hearing, Plaintiff argued she and Goodwin were similarly situated, because they

both had intended return dates, both were in communication with RI, and both needed more time

to submit their medical documentation, but that she was treated differently from Goodwin

because Goodwin “was given up to eight days” to provide the necessary paperwork to return

from leave, whereas Plaintiff was “not even given one day[.]” (Dkt. No. 59 at 12.) Despite

Plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary, the Court concludes Plaintiff’s prima facie case is

insufficient because she cannot show that she and Goodwin were “similarly situated in all

7 Under the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff bears the initial

burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Scrivener v. Clark Coll., 334 P.3d

541, 546 (Wash. 2014) (en banc). If the plaintiff makes their prima facie case, the burden shifts

to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse action. Id. If

the defendant meets this burden, the third part of the test requires the plaintiff to produce

sufficient evidence that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Id. (citation

omitted).

1 material respects[.]” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 755 (9th Cir. 2006); accord. Johnson, 907

2 P.2d at 1232 (analyzing the “similarly situated in all respects” element as it related to the conduct

3 for which the plaintiff and his comparator were disciplined for).

4 To illustrate, Goodwin is not a proper comparator because she was subject to, and availed

5 herself of, RI’s ten-day return-to-work policy, whereas Plaintiff unequivocally did not. As Haig

6 testified, Goodwin had a known return date of July 20, 2025. (Dkt. No. 47-33 at 104–105.)

7 Because Goodwin had a known return date, Haig was able to send the ten-day notice email on

8 July 10 in accordance with RI’s policy. (Id. at 102.) Goodwin responded on July 18—before the

9 ten-day period had run—requesting more time to obtain and submit her medical documentation.

10 (Id. at 102–103.) It was only at that point RI agreed to give Goodwin more time to return her

11 paperwork. (Id. at 103.)

12 By contrast, RI never knew Plaintiff’s return date because it had never been able to verify

13 her leave approval with the state. (Dkt. No. 47-33 at 85–86.) Accordingly, RI considered

14 Plaintiff to be on “unapproved pending leave status” the entire time she was on leave. (Id. at 86.)

15 Though Plaintiff asserts she had an intended return date, she acknowledged during oral argument

16 there was never a known return date for her leave. So when Plaintiff emailed on September 26,

17 2023, hoping to verify employment and identifying her plans to return on October 1, this was the

18 first time RI was made aware of any return date. (Dkt. Nos. 44 at 24; 47-33 at 85, 90–91.) RI

19 clearly could not employ its ten-day notice policy, because Plaintiff had provided fewer than ten

20 days’ notice before her chosen return date. (See Dkt. No. 47-33 at 95) (“The ten day -- the ten

21 days can’t be provided if we’re not aware of that date.”).

22 Further, as Haig explained, the ten-day notice policy is not an automatic extension of the

23 employee’s return date; it is designed to provide an employee time to “schedule whatever they

1 may possibly need to schedule.” (Id. at 126–127.) In other words, just because RI responded to

2 Plaintiff on September 27 and 29 requesting Plaintiff’s medical form and PFML approval (Dkt.

3 Nos. 44 at 27; 47-31 at 80–81), it does not mean Plaintiff was given ten days from that date to

4 provide that documentation. And Plaintiff undisputably did not communicate with RI between

5 September 29 and October 5, only asking for more time after her self-identified return-to-work

6 date had passed. (Dkt. Nos. 39-11 at 2; 47-31 at 25.) Any claim that Plaintiff was treated

7 differently than Goodwin therefore lacks merit, because they were not similarly situated: they did

8 not “display similar conduct.” Vasquez v. City of L.A., 349 F.3d 634, 641 (9th Cir. 2003).

9 c. Disparate treatment based on disability

10 Plaintiff’s disability disparate treatment claim also fails. To prevail, Plaintiff must make

11 a prima facie case, which requires she show: “(1) she was within a statutorily protected class, (2)

12 she was discharged by the defendant, (3) she was doing satisfactory work, and (4) after her

13 discharge, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants with

14 qualifications similar to the plaintiff.” Litvack v. Univ. of Wash., 546 P.3d 1068, 1078 (Wash.

15 Ct. App. 2024). If she makes the prima facie case, it creates a rebuttable presumption of

16 discrimination. See n.7 supra (McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework).

17 Plaintiff’s claim fails on the first prong because she has not provided sufficient evidence that she

18 was disabled, or perceived to be disabled, within the meaning of the WLAD. See Wash. Rev.

19 Code § 49.60.040(7)(a). She argues, “[s]he was terminated while on disability leave after she

20 sought FMLA for disability reasons[.]” (Dkt. No. 59 at 13.) In her response to Defendants’

21 motion for summary judgment, she provided a PFML Medical Certification Serious Health

22 Condition form, signed by a medical provider, that characterizes her health condition as “High

23 conflict with supervisor . . . resulting in Adjustment disorder w/ Anxious mood.” (Dkt. No. 47-

1 31 at 62.) But this form alone, without supporting medical records or a declaration from a

2 provider or expert, is insufficient to establish that Plaintiff had a “sensory, mental, or physical

3 impairment” to fall within WLAD’s definition of disabled. Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.040(7)(a).

4 Further, when Plaintiff reached out to RI on September 29, she expressed she was

5 “mentally ready and excited to continue with [her] position[,]” without mentioning a disability or

6 impairment or any potential accommodations she might need for such a disability. (Dkt. No. 44

7 at 28.) If anything, RI did not perceive Plaintiff to be disabled because it never received

8 documentation approving her leave from the state and accordingly questioned the basis for her

9 leave. (Dkt. No. 47-33 at 85–86) (Haig explaining Plaintiff was on “unapproved pending leave

10 status” because RI never received confirmation of Plaintiff’s leave benefits from the state). At

11 the hearing, Plaintiff argued the only reason she was on leave was because of a mental health

12 disability, and that she was terminated while attempting to obtain the proper medical

13 documentation to certify this disability—so the only possible explanation for her termination was

14 because of her disability. But without sufficient evidence that indicates Plaintiff was disabled or

15 that RI perceived her to be disabled when she was returning from leave, Plaintiff cannot establish

16 a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on disability.

17 d. Hostile work environment discrimination

18 Plaintiff does not create a genuine issue of material fact on her hostile work environment

19 claim and instead relies on conclusory generalizations about her treatment upon her attempt to

20 return to work. (See Dkt. No. 59 at 13) (“The series of events surrounding [her] attempts to

21 return to work constituted a hostile work environment[.]”). “To establish a prima facie hostile

22 work environment claim under WLAD, a plaintiff must show the following four elements: ‘(1)

23 the harassment was unwelcome, (2) the harassment was because [plaintiff was a member of a

1 protected class], (3) the harassment affected the terms and conditions of employment, and (4) the

2 harassment is imputable to the employer.’” Loeffelholz v. Univ. of Wash., 285 P.3d 854, 859

3 (Wash. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted). Harassment is only actionable if it is “sufficiently

4 pervasive so as to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working

5 environment.” Alonso, 315 P.3d at 618. Courts must look at the totality of the circumstances

6 and consider “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically

7 threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes

8 with an employee’s work performance.” Brooks-Joseph v. City of Seattle, 697 F. Supp. 3d 1085,

9 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (citing Dominguez-Curry v. Nev. Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1034

10 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted)). However, the work environment must be both

11 “subjectively and objectively hostile[,]” meaning the plaintiff must show they believed the work

12 environment to be hostile and that a reasonable person would perceive the same. Dominguez-

13 Curry, 424 F.3d at 1034.

14 Here, Plaintiff makes no attempt to point to evidence that shows she was subjected to

15 harassment that was pervasive enough to create an abusive working environment, nor evidence

16 that shows she was subjected to such harassment because she is part of a protected class. She

17 merely concludes, without more, “[w]hen such actions [(i.e., terminating Plaintiff after taking

18 leave)] are taken against a Black woman but not her white colleague who is incommunicado for

19 eight days, it is motivated by race as well as disability. When it occurs to punish a person for

20 taking mental health leave, it is motivated by disability discrimination.” (Dkt. No. 59 at 13.) At

21 the hearing, she clarified that the hostile work environment was caused by RI denying

22 communication, stonewalling, and tricking Plaintiff into violating the return-to-work policy

1 while she was on disability leave. Such conclusory statements, without evidence, are insufficient

2 to establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim.

3 e. Failure to accommodate

4 Plaintiff cannot show there is a genuine issue of material fact on her failure to

5 accommodate claim. She argues the Court misunderstood her accommodation request and

6 asserts she was deprived of two accommodations: (1) information about when she needed to

7 return to work and (2) confirmation that the investigation into Giles “had established she would

8 not be shot when she returned to work.”8 (Dkt. No. 59 at 14.)

9 To allege a prima facie case for failure to reasonably accommodate a disability under

10 either the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) or WLAD, the plaintiff must show:

11 (1) the employee had a sensory, mental, or physical abnormality that substantially

limited his or her ability to perform the job; (2) the employee was qualified to

12 perform the essential functions of the job in question; (3) the employee gave the

employer notice of the abnormality and its accompanying substantial limitations;

13 and (4) upon notice, the employer failed to affirmatively adopt measures that were

available to the employer and medically necessary to accommodate the

14 abnormality.

15 Davis v. Microsoft Corp., 70 P.3d 126, 131 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (citation

16 omitted); Austin v. Boeing Co., Case No. C12–623 MJP, 2013 WL 230824 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 22,

17 2013) (“The failure to accommodate claim under WLAD follows the same analysis as the

18 ADA’s failure to accommodate claim.”). An employer’s duty to accommodate an employee’s

19 disability does not arise until the employer is aware of the disability and the employee’s

8 This accommodation request comes out of a rumor Plaintiff heard from a former employee,

who had been informed by an unnamed “E&T” staff member, that Giles had threatened to “come

after” Plaintiff with a gun following their altercation on June 28, 2023. (Dkt. No. 39-5 at 3.) In

its order on summary judgment, the Court noted this statement was hearsay and likely would be

inadmissible at trial. (See Dkt. No. 56 at 4 n.3.)

1 limitations. Gamble v. City of Seattle, 431 P.3d 1091, 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 2018) (citation

2 omitted).

3 As explained in Section III(B)(2)(c) supra, Plaintiff has not put forth sufficient evidence

4 to show that her “Adjustment Disorder and Anxiety” (see Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3) qualifies as a

5 disability under the WLAD. Even assuming it did, her failure to accommodate claim fails for

6 two reasons. First, there is no evidence that Plaintiff gave RI notice of her disability that would

7 give rise to RI’s duty to accommodate. “The duty of an employer reasonably to accommodate an

8 employee’s handicap does not arise until the employer is ‘aware of [the employee’s] disability

9 and physical limitations.’” Goodman v. Boeing Co., 899 P.2d 1265, 1269 (1995) (citation

10 omitted). “The employee bears the burden of giving the employer notice of the disability.” Id.

11 At that point, the employer’s “burden to take ‘positive steps’ to accommodate” the employee

12 kicks in. Id. (citation omitted).

13 Here, Plaintiff’s communication with RI in the lead-up to her return from leave did not

14 make RI “aware of [Plaintiff’s] disability and physical limitations.” Id. at 1269 (citation and

15 quotation marks omitted). She inquired three times about her employment status (Dkt. No. 44 at

16 4, 24, 28) and asked about the investigation into Giles (id. at 27), but did not explain to RI what

17 her disability was or how it limited her ability to do her job. At the hearing, Plaintiff explained

18 she was trying to be a good employee by expressing her excitement about returning but appeared

19 to concede she did not give RI notice of a disability. Instead, Plaintiff hangs her hat on the fact

20 that she was never given an opportunity to provide medical documentation before she was

21 terminated. As the Court sees it, there is nothing in the record that indicates RI was notified of a

22 disability that substantially limited Plaintiff at any point while Plaintiff prepared to return to

23 work. This alone is fatal to Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim.

1 Second, the accommodations Plaintiff requests are not proper accommodations, and

2 Plaintiff points to no legal authority to support her position. Washington looks to the ADA in

3 interpreting the WLAD, see Kumar v. Gate Gourmet Inc., 325 P.3d 193, 197 (Wash. 2014) (en

4 banc), which defines “reasonable accommodation” as including:

5 (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable

by individuals with disabilities; and

(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a

7 vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate

adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the

8 provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations

for individuals with disabilities.

42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A), (B); see also WASH. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS – CIVIL § 330.34,

6A WASH. PRAC. (7th ed. 2022) (defining a reasonable accommodation as one that “enables the

proper performance of the essential job functions” or “enables the enjoyment of equal benefits,

privileges, or terms and conditions of employment that are available to employees without

disabilities”). Plaintiff’s request for information about the process of returning to work and her

request for information about Giles’s investigation (see Dkt. No. 59 at 14) are not requests that

would modify Plaintiff’s job duties to accommodate a disability, make RI’s facilities more

accessible to Plaintiff, or enable equal terms or conditions of employment.

IV CONCLUSION

Plaintiff’s motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) (Dkt. No. 59) is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (based

solely on Plaintiff taking leave) SHALL be reinstated. The remainder of Plaintiff’s claims

remain DISMISSED with prejudice. The Parties SHALL confer and submit a joint status report

by May 26, 2026, informing the Court of their upcoming availability for trial through the

remainder of the year so the Court may issue a new scheduling order.

1 The Clerk is directed to calendar this event.

2 The Court will also separately consider Defendants’ motion to exclude the expert

3 testimony of Tyson Bailey and Luke Fischer and the related briefing (Dkt. Nos. 35, 49, 54) in the

4 context of Plaintiff’s remaining claim. The Clerk is directed to re-note the motion to exclude

5 (Dkt. No. 35) for June 1, 2026.

7 Dated this 12th day of May 2026.

David G. Estudillo

10 United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.