Dixon

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

BRENDA DIXON,

Plaintiff, Case No.: 5:25-cv-00421-WFJ-PRL

v.

OFFICER EUGENE REED III,

WARDEN SHELLY BAKER,

Defendants,

________________________________/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Defendants Officer Eugene Reed

(“Officer Reed”) and Warden Shelly Baker’s (“Warden Baker”) motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s complaint and incorporated memorandum of law (Doc. 17). Ms. Dixon

filed a response in opposition. (Doc. 19). For the reasons stated below, the Defendants’

motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

For purposes of this motion, the Court accepts Ms. Dixon’s factual allegations

as true. While she was sleeping in her bunk on the morning of October 7, 2024, Officer

Reed entered Ms. Dixon’s cell at Lowell Correctional Institute – Annex (“Lowell CI”).

(Doc. 1 at 5). Ms. Dixon’s head and body were covered by her hijab. Id. Officer Reed

allegedly stood over Ms. Dixon and “snatched” the hijab, removing it from her. Id. at

5–6. Before he removed the hijab, Officer Reed made contact with Ms. Dixon’s left

breast and gave it “a slight squeeze.” Id. at 5. Officer Reed then told Ms. Dixon’s

cellmate that “She didn’t see anything” and he left the cell. Id. at 6. Ms. Dixon then

yelled “I’m going to report you to the O.I.C.” Id. Officer Reed turned around with his

hand near his pepper spray canister and ordered Ms. Dixon to go to the foyer. Id. Ms.

Dixon was ordered to put her hands on the wall and to submit to hand restraints. Id.

Officer Reed first put leg shackles on Ms. Dixon “so rough” that both ankles were cut

and bled. Id. Ms. Dixon was then put in handcuffs that were so tight they cut off

circulation to both hands. Id. Ms. Dixon began screaming to the officer in the control

room for help to no avail. Id. Officer Reed left and locked Ms. Dixon in the foyer. Id.

Sergeant Conklin and then Captain Santiago arrived at the foyer sometime later.

Id. at 7. They told Ms. Dixon to calm down and sent her to medical. Id. Ms. Dixon

attempted to file a Prison Rape Elimination Act (“PREA”) report with the triage nurse

during her evaluation. Id. Sergeant Conklin told Ms. Dixon she could file the report

after she arrived in confinement. Id. The nurse documented Ms. Dixon’s injuries and

Ms. Dixon was sent to the S-Dorm holding cell. Id. Ms. Dixon attempted to report the

PREA incident to eleven different prison staff members, but all of them ignored her

and would not initiate the PREA protocol. Id. While she was still in the holding cell

Captain Santiago threatened to spray Ms. Dixon in the mouth after Ms. Dixon

questioned why Captain Santiago didn’t believe her accusations. Id.

Three days after the incident with Officer Reed, Ms. Dixon was able to report

the PREA incident. Id. She claims that none of the staff knew how the process worked

or what to do. Id. Ms. Dixon blames Warden Baker for her failure to train the staff on

this process. Id.

Officer Reed filed a “falsified disciplinary report” against Ms. Dixon for

disorderly conduct and she was given a 30-day canteen restriction. Id. at 8. In

November 2024, Ms. Dixon was transported to Homestead Correctional Institution.

Id. On March 1, 2025, she was transported back to Lowell CI for a CAT scan. Id. Since

Ms. Dixon has been back at Lowell CI, Officer Reed has verbally abused, taunted, and

intimidated her. Id. Ms. Dixon claims that she was “done with medical” in March but

remained at Lowell CI. Id. at 9. Ms. Dixon claims that Warden Baker failed to protect

her by allowing Ms. Dixon to remain on the compound considering her history with

Officer Reed. Id.

Ms. Dixon sues Officer Reed and Warden Baker, alleging that their conduct

violated the Eighth Amendment.1 Id. at 5. Liberally construed, the complaint alleges

that (1) Officer Reed violated the Eighth Amendment by sexually abusing Ms. Dixon,

(2) Officer Reed violated the Eighth Amendment by using excessive force on Ms.

Reed, and (3) Warden Baker violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect Ms.

Reed from Officer Reed. See id. As relief, Ms. Dixon seeks punitive and compensatory

damages “for the total amount [of] $250,000.00”, court costs, and an “Injunction

order” directing Warden Baker to train all staff in PREA Standards, set up a response

1 The complaint does not specify under what capacity the Defendants are being sued. Because

Defendants, in their official capacities, are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, see

Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), the Court will proceed as if Defendants

are being sued in their individual capacities.

team for PREA victims, and to enforce PREA. Id. at 6, 10. Plaintiff also seeks to be

transferred to the Western United States for her safety and protection. Id. at 10.

II. Standard of Review

A complaint withstands dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) if the alleged facts state a claim for relief that is “plausible on its face.” Ashcroft

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). This standard does not require detailed factual allegations but demands more

than an unadorned accusation. Id. All facts are accepted as true and viewed in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.

2008). Consideration should be limited “to the well-pleaded factual allegations,

documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters judicially noticed.”

La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).

III. Analysis

Officer Reed and Warden Baker move to dismiss the complaint, arguing (1) Ms.

Dixon failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim, (2) qualified immunity bars Ms.

Dixon’s Eighth Amendment claims, and (3) Ms. Dixon’s request for punitive damages

must be dismissed. (Doc. 17). After careful review, the Court concludes that Ms.

Dixon states a plausible Eighth Amendment claim against Officer Reed for sexual

abuse. At this stage of the litigation, Officer Reed is not entitled to qualified immunity

for the alleged sexual misconduct. Ms. Dixon fails, however, to state an Eighth

Amendment claim based on Warden Baker’s failure to protect. Finally, 18 U.S.C. §

3626(a)(1)(A) does not require dismissal of Ms. Dixon’s punitive damages requests at

the pleading stage.

A. Eighth Amendment – Sexual Abuse

“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for individual public officials

performing discretionary functions ‘insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.’” Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Sherrod

v. Johnson, 667 F.3d 1359, 1363 (11th Cir. 2012)). To receive qualified immunity, an

official must first “establish that he or she acted within the scope of discretionary

authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Robinson v. Sauls, 46 F.4th 1332,

1340 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Hardigree v. Lofton, 992 F.3d 1216, 1223 (11th Cir.

2021)). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to “show that: (1)

the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established

at the time of the alleged violation.” Id. at 1340–41 (Holloman ex rel. Holloman v.

Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)). Thus, a motion to dismiss on qualified

immunity grounds “will be granted if the ‘complaint fails to allege the violation of a

clearly established constitutional right.’” St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334,

1337 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Ms. Dixon does not dispute that Officer Reed acted within the scope of his

discretionary authority at all relevant times. (See Doc. 1). Accordingly, the Court

considers whether the complaint sufficiently alleges that Officer Reed violated Ms.

Dixon’s clearly established constitutional rights by subjecting her to sexual abuse.

“[S]evere or repetitive sexual abuse of a prisoner by a prison official can violate

the Eighth Amendment.” Sconiers v. Lockhart, 946 F.3d 1256, 1266 (11th Cir. 2020)

(citation omitted). Sexual abuse of “a prisoner by a prison official in violation of the

Eighth Amendment occurs when the prison official, acting under color of law and

without legitimate penological justification, engages in a sexual act with the prisoner,

and that act was for the official's own sexual gratification, or for the purpose of

humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner.” DeJesus v. Lewis, 14 F.4th 1182,

1196 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2)). “At a minimum, those sexual acts

include intentional sexualized touching underneath clothing, such as fondling or

penetration; coerced sexual activity; combinations of ongoing harassment and abuse;

and exchanges of sexual activity for special treatment or to avoid discipline.” Id.

(citation omitted). Other types of conduct may qualify as sexual assault depending on

the facts of the case. Id. at 1197. This “may include conduct that does not require any

physical contact with a prisoner.” Id. at 1197 n.14.

For conduct that does not satisfy the foregoing definition of “sexual assault,” a

contextual, fact-specific analysis is applied to determine whether the conduct qualifies

as sexual assault. Id. at 1196 n.12; id. at 1197 n.15. In other words, whether the conduct

qualifies as a sexual assault for Eighth-Amendment purposes “depend[s] on the facts

of a given situation.” Id. at 1197.

The Eleventh Circuit has expressly stated that in a case involving an allegation

of sexual assault, it is within a fact-finder's purview to “consider things like whether

the alleged conduct is of a sexual nature; whether the alleged sexual assault did in fact

occur; and whether the prison official intended to sexually gratify himself or acted for

the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning the prisoner.” Id. at 1197. Ms.

Dixon claims that Officer Reed gave her left breast a slight squeeze when it appeared

that she was sleeping. (Doc. 1 at 5). Officer Reed then threatened Ms. Dixon’s

cellmate, saying “She didn’t see anything.” Id. at 6. Taken as true, these allegations

plausibly suggest that Officer Reed subjected Ms. Dixon to a sexual act for his “own

sexual gratification.” DeJesus, 14 F.4th at 1196. Alternately, the breast squeeze,

coupled with Officer Reed’s snatching of Ms. Dixon’s hijab, plausibly suggests that it

performed “for the purpose of humiliating, degrading, or demeaning” her. Id. Because

the Court must accept Ms. Dixon’s facts as true and view them in the light most

favorable to her, she has stated a plausible Eighth Amendment claim based on Officer

Reed's alleged sexual assault.

The question thus becomes whether “at the time of the alleged conduct,” Officer

Reed violated “clearly established law.” Mikko v. City of Atlanta, 857 F.3d 1136, 1146

(11th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The answer to that question is yes, assuming, as

the Court must, that Ms. Dixon's allegations are true. “A plaintiff may show that a

right was ‘clearly established’ through: ‘(1) case law with indistinguishable facts clearly

establishing the constitutional right; (2) a broad statement of principle within the

Constitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitutional right; or (3)

conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in the total

absence of case law.’” Prosper v. Martin, 989 F.3d 1242, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Perez v. Suszczynski, 809 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2016)).

A “broad statement of principle” controls here. Id. “[T]here is no question that

[Ms. Dixon] had a clearly established right to be free from sexual abuse while

incarcerated.” Bridges v. Poe, 155 F.4th 1302, 1313 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).

And every reasonable prison official would have known that the conduct alleged in

the complaint—squeezing an inmate’s breast for the official’s own sexual gratification

or to humiliate, degrade or demean the inmate—violated the right to be free from

sexual abuse. See DeJesus, 14 F.4th at 1196. Thus, at this early stage of the litigation,

Officer Reed is not entitled to qualified immunity for the sexual abuse he allegedly

inflicted on Ms. Dixon.

B. Eighth Amendment – Excessive Force

“Painful handcuffing, without more, is not excessive force in cases where the

resulting injuries are minimal.” Rodrguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.

2002) (citing Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1257–58 (11th Cir. 2000)). Here, Ms. Dixon

claims that Officer Reed “put the leg shackles on so rough, that both ankles, by the

heels, sustained cuts that bleed [sic]” and “lock[ed] each [handcuff] past the last notch”

which “cut off circulation to both hands, causing bruising, swelling, pain, and

numbness.” (Doc. 1 at 6). Ms. Dixon does not allege how long she was restrained, nor

does she allege that she made anyone aware that the cuffs were too tight. See Doc. 1 at

6–7. “[O]nly the most exceptional circumstances will permit an excessive force claim

on the basis of handcuffing alone.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918 F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir.

2019). The facts as alleged by Ms. Dixon do not rise to this exceptional level. Ms.

Dixon has failed to state a claim of excessive force.

C. Eighth Amendment – Failure to Protect

The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to “take reasonable measures

to guarantee the safety of the inmates,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)

(quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–527 (1984)), but this does not make them

“guarantor[s] of . . . prisoner[s’] safety,” Purcell ex rel. Est. of Morgan v. Toombs Cnty.,

Ga., 400 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2005). As such, prison officials are not

constitutionally liable for every inmate attack. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832. Instead, it is a

“prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an

inmate [that] violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828 (citations omitted). The

Eleventh Circuit has explained the requirement of deliberate indifference to a

substantial risk of serious harm as follows:

To succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, a plaintiff must satisfy three

elements. First, the plaintiff must show that [he] was “incarcerated under

conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm.” [Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 834]. Second, the plaintiff must show that the “prison official had a

sufficiently culpable state of mind,” amounting to “deliberate

indifference.” Id. Third, and finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate

causation—that the constitutional violation caused [his] injuries. Caldwell

v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1099 (11th Cir. 2014).

Cox v. Nobles, 15 F.4th 1350, 1357–58 (11th Cir. 2021) (citations modified).

Recently, the Eleventh Circuit clarified that in accordance with Farmer, courts

in this circuit should apply the “subjective recklessness” standard as used in criminal

law when determining liability on an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

claim. See Wade v. McDade, 106 F.4th 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc). To satisfy

this standard, the plaintiff must show:

First . . . as a threshold matter, that he suffered a deprivation that was,

“objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” [Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834].

Second, . . . that the defendant acted with “subjective recklessness as used

in the criminal law,” id. at 839, and to do so he must show that the

defendant was actually, subjectively aware that his own conduct caused

a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff—with the caveat, again,

that even if the defendant “actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate

health or safety,” he “cannot be found liable under the Cruel and

Unusual Punishments Clause” if he “responded reasonably to the risk.”

Id. at 844–45.

Wade, 106 F.4th at 1262 (enumeration and emphasis omitted).

Under this standard, “liability requires consciousness of a risk.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 840. The defendant prison official “must both be aware of facts from which the

inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must

also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. As such, a prisoner-plaintiff must point to evidence

showing “the defendant prison official actually knew of a substantial risk of serious

harm, not just that he should have known.” Wade, 106 F.4th at 1257 (citation omitted).

A prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for not

appreciating that a prisoner faced a substantial risk of serious harm, even if “the risk

was obvious and a reasonable prison official would have noticed it.” Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 842 (“[A]n official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should have

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot . . . be condemned as

the infliction of punishment.”).

Thus, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, Ms. Dixon must point to

evidence permitting the reasonable inference that Warden Baker was deliberately

indifferent to conditions that were “sufficiently serious.” See Chandler v. Crosby, 379

F.3d 1278, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Conditions of confinement are

“sufficiently serious” only if they are so extreme that they expose the prisoner to “an

unreasonable risk of serious damage to his future health or safety.” Id. (citation

modified). “Showing a substantial risk of serious harm requires the prisoner to provide

evidence that there was a ‘strong likelihood’ of his injury occurring.” Visage v. Woodall,

798 F. App’x 406, 408 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Brooks v. Warden, 800 F.3d 1295, 1301

(11th Cir. 2015)). A court's consideration of whether there was a strong likelihood, as

opposed to a “mere possibility,” of an injury occurring cannot be based on “hindsight

bias.” Brooks, 800 F.3d at 1301. Moreover, isolated incidents do not satisfy the

“substantial risk” standard articulated in Farmer. Id.; see, e.g., Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1320

(“[O]ccasional, isolated attacks by one prisoner on another may not constitute cruel

and unusual punishment, [but] confinement in a prison where violence and terror reign

is actionable.”); see also Lakin v. Barnhart, 758 F.3d 66, 70–72 (1st Cir. 2014) (Souter,

J., sitting by designation) (explaining that the risk must be “substantial,” not isolated

or infrequent, and affirming summary judgment in defendants’ favor where plaintiff's

evidence did not reach the “substantial” threshold required by Farmer as “not every

risk carries an inherent threat at a substantial level”). The prisoner must demonstrate

that the complained-of condition—most commonly inmate-on-inmate violence—

resulted in so many incidents or injuries that such incidents or injuries were “the norm

or something close to it.” Marbury v. Warden, 936 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Purcell, 400 F.3d at 1322)).

Here, Ms. Dixon claims that Warden Baker failed to protect her from Officer

Reed after she returned to Lowell CI on March 1, 2025, roughly five months after the

incident in her cell and after she had been housed at Homestead CI for four months.

(Doc. 1 at 8). Specifically, Officer Reed entered the garage where Ms. Dixon and three

other inmates were standing, and Officer Reed started humming the theme song from

Nightmare on Elm Street, “One, two, Freddy’s coming for you.” Id. Ms. Dixon states

she told the escorting officers, the officers in medical, and “Mrs. Johnson” in

classifications, but not Warden Baker. Id. Ms. Dixon makes no allegations that

Warden Baker was aware that Officer Reed was allegedly verbally abusing and

taunting Ms. Dixon following her return to Lowell CI in March 2025. See id. Further,

profane, threatening, or abusive comments made by an officer to an inmate—no

matter how repugnant or unprofessional—do not, without more, rise to the level of a

constitutional violation. See Edwards v. Gilbert, 867 F.2d 1271, 1273, n.1 (11th Cir.

1989) (noting that mere verbal taunts, despite their distressing nature, directed at

inmate by jailers do not violate an inmate’s constitutional rights). Accordingly, Ms.

Dixon has failed to state a claim.

D. Failure to Train

Ms. Dixon claims that Warden Baker is liable for failing to train her employees.

(Doc. 1 at 6, 10). “Section 1983 allows supervisors to be held liable for failure to train

subordinates only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the

rights of persons with whom the officers come into contact.” Bridges, 155 F.4th at 1317

(citation modified). Ms. Dixon must show “that [Warden Baker] had actual or

constructive notice that a particular omission in [her] training program cause[d] [her]

employees to violate citizens’ constitutional rights, and that armed with that

knowledge [Warden Baker] chose to retain that training program.” Keith v. DeKalb

Cnty., Ga., 749 F.3d 1034, 1052 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). The bar is high—

“culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a

failure to train.” Bridges, 155 F.4th at 1317 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,

61 (2011)).

Ms. Dixon alleges that Warden Baker failed to train all staff in PREA standards.

(See Doc. 1 at 6, 7–8, 10). Ms. Dixon fails to claim that Warden Baker was aware of

this alleged lack of knowledge by her staff regarding the PREA standards and reporting

protocols. See id. She further fails plead that this was a widespread issue at the prison.

See id. Accordingly, Ms. Dixon has failed to state a claim.

E. Punitive Damages

Defendants argue that Ms. Dixon’s request for punitive damages must be

dismissed because it is statutorily barred. See Doc. 17 at 14–15. Section 3626(a)(1)(A)

provides:

(1) Prospective relief. – (A) Prospective relief in any civil action with

respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to

correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or

plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief

unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no

further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is

the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on

public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the

relief.

18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). Punitive damages are considered “prospective relief” under

§ 3626. See Johnson v. Breeden, 280 F.3d 1308, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding “punitive

damages are prospective relief”), abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

576 U.S. 389, 395 (2015). Nevertheless, Defendants’ argument that punitive damages,

as “prospective relief” under § 3626, are precluded in prisoner civil rights actions is

misguided.

While the Court is unaware of an Eleventh Circuit case that has addressed

Defendants’ specific argument here, the Court cannot disregard the Eleventh Circuit’s

long-standing recognition that punitive damages are available in prisoner civil rights

actions. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) permits claims

for punitive damages for § 1983 claims without a physical injury requirement. Hoever

v. Marks, 993 F.3d 1353, 1364 (11th Cir. 2021). And it has held “[p]unitive damages

are appropriate in § 1983 cases ‘where a defendant’s conduct is motivated by evil intent

or involves callous or reckless indifference to federally protected rights.’” Barnett v.

MacArthur, 715 F. App’x 894, 905 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting H.C. by Hewett v. Jarrard,

786 F.2d 1080, 1089 (11th Cir. 1986)). Notably, the Eleventh Circuit Civil Pattern Jury

Instructions on § 1983 damages include an instruction on awarding punitive damages.

See Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction, Civil Cases, Civil Rights—42 U.S.C. §

1983 Claims—Damages § 5.13.

The Court also finds persuasive other district court decisions explicitly finding

that § 3626(a)(1)(A) does not preclude an award of punitive damages in prisoner civil

cases. See, e.g., Wright v. Ramos, No. 3:23CV15676/LAC/ZCB, 2025 WL 542313, at

*6 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 523845 (N.D.

Fla. Feb. 18, 2025) (collecting cases); Douglas v. Jin, No. 11-0350, 2014 WL 1117934,

at *4–5 (W.D. Penn. Mar. 20, 2014) (reasoning that if Congress “intended to abolish

punitive damages in all prisoner litigation under the PLRA, it would have done so

directly, and in much plainer terms”). Thus, the Court finds that § 3626 does not

preclude a request for punitive damages in this § 1983 action, and Defendants’ Motion

is due to be denied on this issue.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is GRANTED, in part, and

DENIED, in part.

a. The Motion is GRANTED regarding Plaintiff's excessive force,

failure to protect, and failure to train claims.

b. The Motion is DENIED regarding Plaintiff's sexual assault claim

and Defendants’ punitive damages argument.

2. Within 21 days, Defendants must file an answer or otherwise respond to

the sexual assault claim in Plaintiff's Complaint.

DONE and ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, on June 11, 2026.

WILLIAM F. ots

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies furnished to:

Unrepresented Party

Counsel of Record

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