Patterson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

CHARLES R. PATTERSON,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:23-cv-557-TJC-LLL

SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT

OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

ORDER

I. Status

Petitioner Charles R. Patterson, an inmate of the Florida penal system,

initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ

of Habeas Corpus. Doc. 1. Petitioner challenges a state court (Suwannee

County, Florida) judgment of conviction for trafficking in a controlled

substance. He is serving a 30-year prison sentence. Respondent filed a Response

with exhibits. Doc. 9.1 Although afforded the opportunity, Petitioner did not file

a Reply. Doc. 12. This case is ripe for review.2

1 The Court will cite exhibits by document and page number as assigned by the Court’s

electronic case management system.

2 “In a habeas corpus proceeding, the burden is on the petitioner to establish the need

for an evidentiary hearing.” Jones v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 1299, 1318

(11th Cir. 2016) (citing Chavez v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 647 F.3d 1057, 1060 (11th

Cir. 2011)). “In deciding whether to grant an evidentiary hearing, a federal court must

II. Governing Legal Principles

A. Standard Under § 2254

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)

governs a state prisoner’s federal habeas corpus petition. Ledford v. Warden,

Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016)

(explaining AEDPA deference), abrogation in part on other grounds recognized

by Smith v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 67 F.4th 1335, 1348 (11th Cir. 2023).

“The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a

guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and

not as a means of error correction.” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34,

38 (2011)).

The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court

decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner’s claims on the merits. Marshall

v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court

need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court’s decision

to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86,

consider whether such a hearing could enable an applicant to prove the petition’s

factual allegations, which, if true, would entitle the applicant to federal habeas relief.”

Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (citation omitted). “It follows that if the

record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or otherwise precludes habeas relief,

a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing.” Id. The Court finds that

“further factual development” is unnecessary. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1275

(11th Cir. 2003). Thus, an evidentiary hearing will not be conducted.

100 (2011). When the state court’s adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied

by an explanation,

the federal court should “look through” the unexplained

decision to the last related state-court decision that

does provide a relevant rationale. It should then

presume that the unexplained decision adopted the

same reasoning. But the State may rebut the

presumption by showing that the unexplained

affirmance relied or most likely did rely on different

grounds than the lower state court’s decision, such as

alternative grounds for affirmance that were briefed or

argued to the state supreme court or obvious in the

record it reviewed.

Wilson v. Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125-26 (2018).

When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claims on the merits, a

federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court’s adjudication of

the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly

established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United

States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of

the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),

(2). A state court’s factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted

“by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).

AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for

evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that

state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.”

Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal

quotation marks omitted). “A state court’s

determination that a claim lacks merit precludes

federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could

disagree on the correctness of the state court’s

decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101

(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “It bears

repeating that even a strong case for relief does not

mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was

unreasonable.” Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S.

63, 75 (2003)). The Supreme Court has repeatedly

instructed lower federal courts that an unreasonable

application of law requires more than mere error or

even clear error. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S.

12, 18 (2003); Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75 (“The gloss of

clear error fails to give proper deference to state courts

by conflating error (even clear error) with

unreasonableness.”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,

410 (2000) (“[A]n unreasonable application of federal

law is different from an incorrect application of federal

law.”).

Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) (parallel

citations omitted).

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel. That right is denied when a defense counsel’s

performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and thereby

prejudices the defense.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (per curiam)

(citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). To establish ineffective assistance, a person must

show that: (1) counsel’s performance was outside the wide range of reasonable,

professional assistance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the

challenger in that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the

proceeding would have been different absent counsel’s deficient performance.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

The two-part Strickland test applies to challenges to the validity of guilty

pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,

58 (1985). The petitioner must still show that counsel’s performance was

deficient. See id. at 56-59; Lynch v. Sec’y Fla. Dept. of Corr., 776 F.3d 1209,

1218 (11th Cir. 2015). To establish prejudice, however, the petitioner “must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he

would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill,

474 U.S. at 59 (footnote omitted); Lynch, 776 F.3d at 1218.

There is no “iron-clad rule requiring a court to tackle one prong of the

Strickland test before the other.” Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir.

2010). Since both prongs of the two-part Strickland test must be satisfied to

show a Sixth Amendment violation, “a court need not address the performance

prong if the petitioner cannot meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa.” Id.

(citing Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000)). As stated in

Strickland, “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of

lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should

be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697.

Further, “[t]he question is not whether a federal court believes the state

court’s determination under the Strickland standard was incorrect but whether

that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher threshold.”

Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009) (internal quotation marks

omitted). If there is “any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied

Strickland’s deferential standard,” then a federal court may not disturb a state-

court decision denying the claim. Richter, 562 U.S. at 105. Thus, “[s]urmounting

Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356,

371 (2010). “Reviewing courts apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s

representation was ‘within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.’” Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1262 (11th

Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). “When this presumption is

combined with § 2254(d), the result is double deference to the state court ruling

on counsel’s performance.” Id. (citing Richter, 562 U.S. at 105).

III. Factual Background and Procedural History

On February 15, 2017, Petitioner agreed to sell two ounces of cocaine to a

confidential informant (CI) with the Suwannee County Sheriff’s Office. Doc. 9-

1 at 35, 186-87. Before the sale took place, officers conducted a “traffic stop” of

Petitioner’s vehicle. Id. at 187. Petitioner was driving, and his girlfriend sat in

the passenger seat. Id. at 35. Officers found 38 grams of cocaine on the

girlfriend’s person. Id. Petitioner admitted to law enforcement, however, that

the cocaine “was his.” Id. One week earlier, Petitioner had sold cocaine to the

CI. Id. at 28. That transaction was captured “on videotape.” Id.

Based on the cocaine recovered on February 15, Petitioner was charged

with trafficking in a controlled substance (28 grams or more but less than 200

grams). Id. at 110. That offense “carr[ied] a maximum sentence of 30 years in

prison and a minimum mandatory sentence of three years.” Williams v. State,

184 So. 3d 623, 625 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). Shortly after his arrest, Petitioner

signed a form stating that the “nature of the charge(s)” and “the maximum

penalty therefor” had been “explained to” him. Doc. 9-1 at 30.

On the morning of trial, the prosecutor announced on the record that the

State had “made [Petitioner] a plea offer of 90 months in the Department of

Corrections, to run concurrent with” a 40-month sentence Petitioner had begun

serving for an unrelated charge of possession of a controlled substance. Doc. 9-

2 at 9; Doc. 9 at 3 n.3. According to the prosecutor, Petitioner “rejected that and

countered with a completely concurrent sentence that would end” when he

finished serving his 40-month sentence. Doc. 9-2 at 9. The prosecutor noted that

the State had rejected Petitioner’s counteroffer and filed a notice of intent to

seek habitual-felony-offender (HFO) sentencing. Id. As the prosecutor pointed

out, Petitioner faced a maximum sentence of life imprisonment if the court

found that he qualified as an HFO. Id.

The court asked Petitioner whether he was “made aware of th[e] plea

offers.” Id. at 10. He said, “Yes, sir.” Id. The court then asked, “[I]s it your

position that you reject their offer, and since they didn’t accept yours, you’re

ready for trial?” Id. Petitioner responded, “Yes, sir,” and confirmed that he had

had “sufficient time” to consider the State’s offer. Id. The court reiterated that

if he qualified as an HFO, Petitioner faced a maximum of life in prison, “but not

mandatory life.” Id. at 11.

After a break in the proceedings, defense counsel stated that Petitioner

had decided to plead guilty without “any sort of plea agreement.” Id. at 11-12.

The prosecutor announced that the State no longer sought HFO sentencing. Id.

at 40. During the plea colloquy, Petitioner stated that he understood the

“maximum penalty” for “trafficking in cocaine” was 30 years’ imprisonment. Id.

at 13. He also agreed that the offense carried a “minimum mandatory of three

years in prison.” Id. And he confirmed that he had not “been promised anything

at all in order to get [him] to enter [the plea], other than having a lawful

sentence imposed.” Id. at 15.

The court and the parties reviewed the sentencing scoresheet, which

indicated a “lowest permissible prison sentence” of 137.513 months. Id. at 15-

16. The court explained to Petitioner that if it accepted his open plea, he faced

“up to 30 years in prison, that’s the maximum, the minimum would be, we’ll call

it 12 years in prison, . . . unless I find that there’s a reason for departure.” Id.

at 17. Petitioner said he understood. Id. at 17-18. The court accepted the plea

as “freely and voluntarily made.” Id. at 22.

Petitioner ultimately received a sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment. Id.

at 45. The court explained that Petitioner had “13 [prior] drug offenses,”

including convictions for sale of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to

distribute. Id. at 44. Indeed, Petitioner had previously served ten years in

prison for the latter offense. Id. at 31-32. The court also noted that while he was

“out on bond” in this case, Petitioner was arrested for possession of cocaine and

resisting an officer without violence. Id. at 32, 43. Based on these facts, the court

declined to “giv[e] [Petitioner] any sort of leniency or mitigation.” Id. at 43-44.

Shortly after sentencing, Petitioner moved to withdraw his plea. Doc. 9-1

at 143. The court denied the motion. Id. at 200-02. Petitioner appealed, and the

First District Court of Appeal affirmed without a written opinion. Doc. 9-5 at 3-

4. This federal habeas petition followed. Doc. 1.

IV. Analysis

Petitioner raises two grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id.

at 5-7. Respondent argues that both grounds are procedurally defaulted, but

the Court need not reach that issue because they fail on the merits. See Dallas

v. Warden, 964 F.3d 1285, 1307 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[A] federal court may skip

over the procedural default analysis if a claim would fail on the merits in any

event.”); Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1215 (11th Cir. 2011) (“When relief

is due to be denied even if claims are not procedurally barred, we can skip over

the procedural bar issues, and we have done so in the past.”).

A. Ground One

Petitioner argues that his guilty plea was involuntary because counsel

“misled [him] into believing that he had no viable defense.” Doc. 1 at 6.

According to Petitioner, counsel should have told him that “he could not legally

be found guilty where the drugs were found in [his girlfriend’s] possession.” Id.

Petitioner notes that during the sentencing hearing, his girlfriend claimed that

“the drugs belonged to her.” Id. He also states that at some unspecified time, he

“denied any ownership of the drugs.” Id. Had counsel explained that the law of

possession gave him “a viable defense for trial,” Petitioner allegedly would not

have pleaded guilty. Id.

This claim fails for lack of prejudice. To show prejudice in the plea context,

a petitioner must establish “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to

trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. The “strong societal interest in finality has special

force with respect to convictions based on guilty pleas.” Lee v. United States,

582 U.S. 357, 368-69 (2017). Thus, “[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely

because of post hoc assertions from [the petitioner] about how he would have

pleaded but for his attorney’s deficiencies.” Id. at 369. Instead, the petitioner

must “convince the court that a decision to reject [a] plea [] would have been

rational under the circumstances.” Diveroli v. United States, 803 F.3d 1258,

1265 (11th Cir. 2015). Where, as here, “the alleged error of counsel is a failure

to advise the [petitioner] of a potential . . . defense to the crime charged, the

resolution of the ‘prejudice’ inquiry will depend largely on whether the . . .

defense likely would have succeeded at trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59.

Petitioner fails to show that he had a viable defense to the trafficking

charge. To support a trafficking conviction, the State must prove that the

defendant “actively or constructively possessed” at least 28 grams of cocaine.

Greenwade v. State, 124 So. 3d 215, 220 (Fla. 2013). As explained above,

Petitioner arranged to sell two ounces of cocaine to a CI. Doc. 9-1 at 35, 186-87.

The CI dealt “[e]xclusively” with Petitioner. Id. at 187-88. Indeed, one week

earlier, Petitioner had sold the CI cocaine in a transaction that was captured

“on videotape.” Id. at 28. Before the second sale took place, officers conducted a

traffic stop of Petitioner’s vehicle. Id. at 187. He was driving, and his girlfriend

was in the passenger seat. Id. at 35. Officers located 38 grams of cocaine on the

girlfriend’s person. Id. Petitioner admitted to law enforcement, however, that

the cocaine “was his.” Id.

As this summary makes clear, the evidence of Petitioner’s guilt was

overwhelming. Petitioner nonetheless contends that he “could not legally be

guilty” because “the drugs were found in [his girlfriend’s] possession.” Doc. 1

at 6. But the State need not prove actual possession to secure a trafficking

conviction; constructive possession will suffice. Hernandez v. State, 56 So. 3d

752, 758 (Fla. 2010). Constructive possession occurs when the defendant has

“knowledge of the contraband” and “the ability to exercise dominion and control

over” it. Thompson v. State, 416 So. 3d 436, 438 (Fla. 2d DCA 2025). Petitioner

confessed that the cocaine belonged to him—an admission consistent with his

prearranged deal to sell two ounces of cocaine to the CI. Doc. 9-1 at 35, 186-87.

This evidence was sufficient to prove that Petitioner knew about the cocaine

and could exercise “dominion and control” over it. Thompson, 416 So. 3d at 438;

see also United States v. Graham, 123 F.4th 1197, 1282 (11th Cir. 2024)

(constructive possession established where, among other things, defendant

admitted “during his post-arrest interrogation that the drugs were his”).

Petitioner notes that, at sentencing, his girlfriend claimed that “the drugs

belonged to her.” Doc. 1 at 6. But given her “close relationship” to Petitioner—

she is the mother of his child—it is unlikely that a jury would find her to be “a

credible witness.” Slade v. Florida, No. 23-cv-61710, 2024 WL 728081, at *7

(S.D. Fla. Feb. 22, 2024); see also Gensinger v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:18-cv-

2824-KKM-JSS, 2022 WL 685661, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2022) (no prejudice

from failure to call petitioner’s girlfriend as a witness because she “would have

. . . suffered impeachment for bias given her romantic relationship with” him).

Indeed, the girlfriend testified that she could not “remember” who sold her the

cocaine, nor could she recall “who [she was] selling it to.” Doc. 9-1 at 184. She

also told the court that “what [Petitioner] did was wrong and he’s realizing

that.” Id. at 183.

Given the weaknesses in the girlfriend’s testimony, Petitioner cannot

show that a possession defense “likely would have succeeded at trial.” Hill, 474

U.S. at 59. With no viable defense to the trafficking charge, there is no

“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s [alleged] errors, [Petitioner] . . .

would have insisted on going to trial.” Id.

B. Ground Two

Petitioner contends that counsel’s “misadvice” caused him to reject the

90-month plea offer. Doc. 1 at 9. Counsel allegedly told Petitioner that “if he

entered an open plea, the sentencing judge would impose a more lenient

sentence than” the 90 months “offered by the prosecution.” Id. at 10. Moreover,

counsel allegedly “failed to advise Petitioner that an open plea would subject

him to a 30-year sentence.” Id. But for counsel’s “misadvice,” Petitioner

allegedly “would have accepted” the 90-month offer. Id.

This claim lacks merit. “During plea negotiations defendants are entitled

to the effective assistance of competent counsel.” Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156,

162 (2012). When a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process,

“the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice was within

the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.” Hill, 474

U.S. at 56. Review of counsel’s actions is “highly deferential,” and “a court must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range

of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Additionally, the “representations of the defendant . . . at [a plea] hearing, as

well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a

formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceedings.” Blackledge v.

Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).

According to Petitioner, counsel promised that if he entered an open plea,

the court “would impose a sentence of less than” 90 months. Doc. 1 at 10. But

this allegation contradicts Petitioner’s sworn statement at the plea hearing. The

court asked Petitioner, “Have you been promised anything at all in order to get

you to enter [the plea], other than having a lawful sentence imposed?” Doc. 9-2

at 15. Petitioner answered, “No, sir.” Id. This sworn statement carries “a strong

presumption of verity,” Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 74, and Petitioner “bears a

heavy burden to show [it was] false,” United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168

(11th Cir. 1988). He has not met his burden. Indeed, Petitioner offers nothing

beyond his own “conclusory statements” to support his allegation about

counsel’s promise. Winthrop-Redin v. United States, 767 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th

Cir. 2014).

Petitioner separately alleges that he did not know an open plea “would

subject him to a 30-year sentence”—the maximum penalty for trafficking in

cocaine. Doc. 1 at 10. But shortly after his arrest, Petitioner signed a form

indicating that the “nature of the charge(s)” and “the maximum penalty

therefor” had been “explained to” him. Doc. 9-1 at 30. Moreover, during the plea

colloquy, Petitioner stated that he understood the “maximum penalty” for

“trafficking in cocaine” was 30 years’ imprisonment. Doc. 9-2 at 13. If Petitioner

“had been told something different by his lawyer, [he] was obligated to speak

up at the plea conference and ask the court about the discrepancy.” Jones v.

State, 680 So. 2d 585, 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). “He could not stand mute, accept

the benefits of the plea, and then collaterally attack its voluntariness on the

basis of something that should have been cleared up at the time of the plea.”

Id.; see also Malone v. State, 312 So. 3d 199, 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021) (“[B]ecause

the trial court explained that Appellant had the possibility of youthful offender

sentencing, Appellant should have spoken up to seek clarification regarding any

confusion he may have had.”); Jean-Gilles v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 8:22-cv-

674-CEH-TGW, 2024 WL 4607039, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2024) (“If Petitioner

believed that he would receive a 30-month sentence, it was incumbent upon him

to speak up during the plea colloquy and his failure to do so at that time would

have estopped him from later arguing a position contrary to statements made

in open court or in writing.”).

For these reasons, Petitioner fails to overcome the “strong presumption

that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Petition (Doc. 1) is DENIED, and this case is DISMISSED

with prejudice.

2. If Petitioner appeals, the Court denies a certificate of appealability.

Because the Court has determined that a certificate of appealability is not

warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending motions report any

motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed in this case. Such

termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.?

3. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with

prejudice, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 10th day of June,

2026.

& Cimotbeg g. Corrig on

Wy. TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN

Senior United States District Judge

3 The Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if the Petitioner makes “a

substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To

make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists

would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or

wrong, Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529

U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)

(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)). Here, after consideration of

the record as a whole, the Court will deny a certificate of appealability.

16

TpaP-2

c:

Charles R. Patterson, #G11594

Counsel of Record