The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
TAMPA DIVISION
TONY DACOSTA GREENIDGE,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 8:25-cv-927-KKM-TGW
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
REVENUE et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Tony DaCosta Greenidge alleges a decades-long
conspiracy involving multiple state agencies, employees, banks, and private
citizens with the goal of depriving him of his inheritance through improper
child-support enforcement, identity theft, and the murder of his mother. Five
of the defendants move to dismiss. For the reasons below, I dismiss all federal
claims against all parties, and all state-law claims against the government
defendants. Because I lack jurisdiction and otherwise decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, dismissal is without prejudice as to all but the
Florida agency employees. I deny Greenidge’s motion for sanctions and motions
for default judgment as moot. I deny the New York Office of Temporary and
Disability Assistance’s motion to strike as moot.
I. BACKGROUND
Greenidge, a New York resident, claims to be “the rightful heir” to the
$1.2 million estate of his mother, Coral Greenidge. See Third Amended
Complaint (TAC) (Doc. 70) ¶¶ 4, 20–21; Compl. (Doc. 1) ¶ 21. Greenidge is the
co-executor of Coral’s estate, along with his half-sister Suzette Sobers
Hyndman. TAC ¶ 14; Compl. ¶ 9. According to Greenidge, Suzette is “the
mastermind” of a “criminal enterprise” that seeks “to deprive [Greenidge] of
his inheritance through fraudulent child support enforcement, identity theft,
and ultimately the murder of Coral Greenidge.” TAC ¶¶ 14, 22. The allegations
break down into roughly two categories, state child support enforcement and
wrongdoing by private individuals and banks targeting Coral.
As to the first category, Greenidge alleges that the Florida Department
of Revenue (FL DOR) conspired with Suzette, Misty Lyn Flowers Leach—
whom Greenidge describes as “the purported mother of [his] alleged
children”—and Misty’s relative, Michelle L. Flowers, to violate Greenidge’s
civil rights through a “fraudulent child support case.” TAC ¶¶ 6, 10, 290–296.
According to Greenidge, the conspiracy began in 2006 when the FL DOR began
child support proceedings, which ultimately led to an “unsigned and invalid”
family support order. See TAC ¶¶ 26, 73. Greenidge’s state-action claims arise
out of Florida’s, New York’s, and Georgia’s efforts to enforce the order and
collect child support payments. See TAC.
The second series of allegations are against natural persons and banks.
Greenidge accuses Suzette and Ryan Hyndman and Dr. Hirendrakumar Dave
of participating in the murder of Coral in 2023, TAC ¶¶ 228–247, and alleges
wrongdoing by HSBC Bank USA and GEICO Insurance Company related to
efforts to steal and launder money from Coral’s estate, TAC ¶¶ 255–267.
Greenidge filed this action on April 14, 2025. See Compl. The initial
complaint brought claims only against the FL DOR, its employees, and Flowers
Leach. See id. I dismissed the complaint as a shotgun pleading with leave to
amend because the complaint failed to connect any facts to the several federal
statutes listed and was “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts
not obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” See (Doc. 4) (quoting
Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1322 (11th Cir.
2015)).
Greenidge filed an amended complaint, and eventually moved to file a
second amended complaint, see (Doc. 34), which the Court granted, (Doc. 46),
directing Greenidge to file a single complaint with “all claims and parties.”
Greenidge did so, and added as defendants several natural persons, multiple
banks, as well as New York and Georgia state agencies. See Second Amended
Complaint (Doc. 47). This Court dismissed the complaint as a shotgun pleading
and granted leave to file a third amended complaint, see (Doc. 48), which
Greenidge did out of time, see (Doc. 53). Still, I accepted it, and later directed
Greenidge to re-file the document because it was missing significant portions
of text, see (Doc. 67).
In the operative complaint, Greenidge names fifteen defendants and
brings thirty-seven counts. See TAC. He sues the FL DOR under Section 1983
(due process) (Count I), for common law abuse of process (Count IX), and for
conspiracy to violate civil rights under Section 1985 (Count XXXVII). In
addition to the FL DOR, the Section 1985 conspiracy claim is also brought
against Suzette, Misty, and Michelle. He sues the New York Department of
Taxation and Finance under Section 1983 (due process) (Count VI), 28 U.S.C
§ 1738B (Count VIII), and for false imprisonment (Count XIII). He sues the
Georgia Department of Human Services under Section 1983 (due process)
(Count V), 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (Count VIII), for false imprisonment (Count XIV),
and for evidence tampering (Count XXVI). He sues FL DOR employees in their
individual capacities under Section 1983 (due process) (Counts II–IV) and the
New York Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance (NY OTDA) under
Section 1983 (due process) (Count VII).
The remainder of the claims allege state-law torts against natural
persons and banks, including Suzette, Dante, and Ryan Hyndman, Dr.
Hirendrakumar Dave, HSCBC Bank USA, N.A., and GEICO Insurance
Company.1 See TAC. The counts include common law abuse of process,
malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence,
fraud, defamation, witness intimidation, evidence tampering, wrongful death,
conversion, and unjust enrichment. See id.
Greenidge invokes federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and “supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367.” Id. ¶¶ 1–2. He does not invoke diversity jurisdiction. See id. Nor does
he allege the defendants’ citizenship. See TAC ¶¶ 4–19.
The FL DOR, Florida state employees, the NY OTDA, and Michelle
Flowers move to dismiss all claims against them. (Docs. 54, 77, 90, 104). Misty
answered the complaint. Flowers Leach Ans. (Doc. 16). The remaining
defendants have not appeared. The clerk entered default against Suzette,
Ryan, and Dante Hyndman, see (Docs. 97–99), and the Magistrate Judge
denied Greenidge’s motion for default against Dr. Hirendrakumar, see (Doc.
122).
1 Greenidge also filed “supplemental allegations” of violations of federal fraud,
conspiracy, and identity theft statutes. See (Doc. 107). I do not address these claims,
which Greenidge attempted to add without leave in violation of Rule 15.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This
pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it
demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and
conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice
if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff must
plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Evaluating plausibility is “a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do
not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’ ” Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Likewise, “the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id. at 678. “[A] court considering a motion to
dismiss can choose to begin by identifying” when a pleading is merely a “legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation” and thus “not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Id. at 678–79.
III. ANALYSIS
The Third Amended Complaint is a shotgun pleading in that Greenidge
alleges multiple violations under a single count. See, e.g., TAC ¶¶ 25–31.
Nonetheless, I evaluate the claims in the interest of finality.
As a general matter, many (if not all) of the claims are conclusory and
vague. While courts “hold pro se pleadings to a less stringent standard,” Terry
v. McGee, No. 25-12825, 2026 WL 1257293, at *1 (11th Cir. May 7, 2026) (per
curiam), they “must still suggest that there is at least some factual support for
a claim,” id. (quoting Waldman v. Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.
2017)). A court “cannot act as de facto counsel or rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading to sustain an action.” Id. (quoting Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d
903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020)).
I grant the motions to dismiss in part, except for Michelle Flowers’s
motion, which I deny as moot. I grant the FL DOR’s and NY OTDA’s motions
in part in that I dismiss all claims without prejudice because I lack jurisdiction.
I grant the employees’ motion in full. I sua sponte dismiss all claims against
the Georgia Department of Human Services and the New York Office of
Taxation and Finance without prejudice as frivolous. Likewise, I sua sponte
dismiss the Section 1985 claim without prejudice as against the private
defendants. Last, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the
remaining state law claims, which are all against private parties.
A. Florida Department of Revenue
Greenidge brings three counts against the FL DOR, Count I under
Section 1983, Count XXXVII under Section 1985, and Count IX under the
common law for “abuse of process.” The factual allegations for Counts I and IX
mirror one another. See id. ¶¶ 25–33, 78–83. Greenidge alleges that the FL
DOR “initiated and maintained a fraudulent child support case against [him]
beginning in 2006.” Id. ¶ 26. He also avers that it “failed to credit payments
made directly to Misty Flowers,” “created a fictitious ‘arrears’ balance in [his]
child support account,” improperly suspended his passport, and “coordinated
with other state agencies (Georgia, New York) to suppress [him] across state
lines.” Id. ¶¶ 6, 27–33. For the Section 1985 claim, the only factual allegations
that mention the FL DOR are that it generally conspired with the other
defendants and that it listed Suzette as an interested party in its disclosure
form. See id. ¶¶ 290, 294–95.
The FL DOR moves to dismiss the claims against it based on the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine, sovereign immunity, and the statute of limitations, among
other grounds. See FL MTD (Doc. 54). I grant the motion.
Beginning with Rooker-Feldman, the “doctrine bars cases brought by
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments
rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district
court review and rejection of those judgments.” Mignott v. State Bar of Ga.
Found., Inc., 146 F.4th 1095, 1098 (11th Cir. 2025) (citation modified).
The FL DOR avers that Greenidge’s “grievances stem exclusively from
the state court child support case,” and that, “[b]y challenging his child support
payments, [Greenidge] is effectively asking this Court to review and overturn
the final judgment of a state court.” FL MTD at 5. The argument reaches too
far. Rooker-Feldman “does not block claims that require some reconsideration
of a decision of a state court if the plaintiff presents some independent claim,
albeit one that denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached in a
case to which he was a party.” Behr v. Campbell, 8 F.4th 1206, 1212 (11th Cir.
2021) (citation modified).
Although Greenidge is vague regarding the specific actions that underlie
his claims, he seeks money damages based on the FL DOR’s “initiat[ing] and
maintain[ing]” the case. See TAC; id. (Prayer for Relief). Under Eleventh
Circuit precedent, this relief does not entail “review and rejection of a state
court judgment,” and Rooker-Feldman does not bar his claims. Behr, 8 F.4th at
1214 (“[C]laims that seek only damages for constitutional violations of third
parties—not relief from the judgment of the state court—are permitted [by
Rooker-Feldman].”) (citation modified). Further, Greenidge does not maintain
that the state court itself broke the law such that his “due process challenge
boils down to a claim that the state court judgment itself caused him
constitutional injury.” See Efron v. Candelario, 110 F.4th 1229, 1237 (11th Cir.
2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1958 (2025) (citation modified). What is more,
Greenidge disavows any allegation of wrongdoing that occurred before the
state court judgment. See Resp. to FL MTD (Doc. 59) at 2. Rooker-Feldman
does not preclude my review.
Next, I dismiss all claims based on sovereign immunity. See FL MTD at
6. “States may not be sued in federal court unless they consent to it in
unequivocal terms or unless Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power,
unequivocally expresses its intent to abrogate the immunity.” Schultz v.
Alabama, 42 F.4th 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
The FL DOR correctly argues that sovereign immunity applies to
Greenidge’s Section 1983 and Section 1985 claims under the Eleventh
Amendment. See FL MTD at 6. “Congress has not abrogated Eleventh
Amendment immunity in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, or 1985 cases, and Florida
has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal civil rights
actions.” Henry v. Fla. Bar, 701 F. App’x 878, 880 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
Greenidge does not dispute that his claims are barred under the
Eleventh Amendment. See Resp. to FL MTD at 2. Instead, he attempts to
amend his complaint by seeking “prospective relief” under Ex Parte Young. See
Resp. to FL MTD at 2; TAC (Prayer for Relief) (seeking monetary damages
without mention of injunctive relief). A plaintiff cannot amend a complaint in
a response brief. See Hawkins v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 8:24-CV-437-
KKM-AAS, 2026 WL 874152, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2026). Even if
Greenidge sought leave to amend, I would deny the request as unwarranted
and futile. Greenidge already sought injunctive relief in previous complaints
and dropped the request. See, e.g., Am. Compl. (Doc. 5) at 14–15 (asking the
Court to order the removal of passport restrictions and direct the FL DOR to
correct child support records). Ex Parte Young relief cannot be sought against
a state agency. See Schultz, 42 F.4th at 1314 (explaining that Ex Parte Young
claims are only permitted against state officials). The third amended complaint
does not identify any impending enforcement action. Last, to the extent
Greenidge might seek injunctive relief against already-pending actions, I
would invoke Younger abstention. See Jimenez v. Wizel, 644 F. App’x 868, 871
n.2 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (declining to provide injunctive relief from a
state-court order “suspending time-sharing with his children” because “[t]he
state judicial proceedings remain ongoing, implicate important state interests
in the family, and there remains adequate opportunity for [the plaintiff] to
raise his constitutional challenges throughout the ongoing proceedings as well
as the state appellate courts”); cf. Higdon v. Fulton County, 746 F. App’x 796,
801 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (explaining that a district court could not
“bar the state court from entering additional orders in [a plaintiff’s] divorce
and custody case” because “district courts are barred from restraining ongoing
state civil proceedings” under Younger abstention).
The FL DOR invokes immunity with respect to all claims, but does not
make a specific argument regarding immunity for the common law “abuse of
process” claim. To the extent (if any) that sovereign immunity does not bar the
claim, dismissal is warranted because the claim is frivolous. “A claim for abuse
of process relies upon the use of the courts by private parties.” Mika v. Rollins
Coll., No. 6:25-CV-1110-JSS-RMN, 2026 WL 679128, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11,
2026) (emphasis added) (citation modified). Greenidge attempts to sue the
state for abuse of its own processes.
I dismiss all counts against the FL DOR (Counts I, IX, and XXXVII)
without prejudice.
B. NY OTDA
Greenidge sues the New York Office of Temporary and Disability
Assistance (NY OTDA) under Section 1983 for violating “due process” (Count
VII). He alleges that it “participated in a jurisdictional shell game to avoid
federal court scrutiny,” contests its jurisdiction, and conclusorily claims that it
deprived him “of due process and equal protection.” See TAC ¶¶ 67–69. The NY
ODTA moves to dismiss on multiple grounds, including sovereign immunity.
See NY MTD (Doc. 90). I grant the motion in part and dismiss Count VII
without prejudice. See Bell v. Kaleida Health, No. 25-366-CV, 2025 WL
2938354, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2025) (“New York has not waived its sovereign
immunity for damages under § 1983.”). Greenidge seeks “leave to amend to
substitute the proper state official for prospective relief.” Resp. to NY MTD
(Doc. 91) at 1. I deny the request for the same reasons I would deny leave to
amend the claims against the FL DOR.
C. Florida State Agency Employees
Greenidge sues FL DOR employees Andreia Harris, Quianna Maxwell,
and Kwanzaa Goodwin (the employees) in their individual capacities, alleging
that they “participated in maintaining the fraudulent child support case,”
though he does not explain how. TAC ¶¶ 35, 42, 48. The only specific action
alleged is that Harris violated the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) “by faxing [Greenidge’s] Social Security number”
to a bank in 2017. Id. ¶ 36.
The employees move to dismiss based on Greenidge’s failure to comply
with Court deadlines, failure to state a claim, the statute of limitations, and
qualified immunity. See Harris MTD (Doc. 77).
Greenidge untimely responded to the motion without seeking leave. See
Resp. to Harris MTD (Doc. 58). Although Greenidge previously contested the
employees’ statute of limitations argument, see (Doc. 21) at 2, he does not raise
any objection in the instant response, see Resp. to Harris MTD. Instead, he
insists that qualified immunity is unwarranted based on a new factual
allegation that a Child Protective Services (CPS) worker (who might or might
not work for the state of Florida) attempted to coerce a nonparty in 2025. See
id. at 2–3. How the allegation relates to Greenidge is unclear, but Greenidge
insists that “discovery will further illuminate the role of each individual CPS
worker.” Id. at 3.
Dismissal of the claims with prejudice is appropriate for multiple
reasons. Both this Court and the defendants (in previous motions to dismiss)
put Greenidge on notice of the need to make specific, nonconclusory
allegations. See, e.g., (Doc. 14) at 11. The only specific allegation is the
disclosure of his social security number in 2017. See TAC ¶ 36. This falls
outside the statute of limitations, whether it is two or four years. See Cadle v.
Judd, No. 8:25-CV-2790-KKM-SPF, 2026 WL 1004604, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr.
14, 2026), certification granted, judgment modified, No. 8:25-CV-2790-KKM-
SPF, 2026 WL 1429356 (M.D. Fla. May 21, 2026).
Even if the statute of limitations did not bar Greenidge’s claims,
dismissal would still be justified because Greenidge plainly fails to state his
claims, which are conclusory, implausible, and frivolous. See Harris MTD at 7,
11. Greenidge provides no specific allegations of wrongdoing other than the
HIPAA violation, which has no discernable connection to this suit. See id. at
13. Greenidge does not allege that the employees failed to credit payments—
only the FL DOR as a whole. But even if he had, the allegations of a conspiracy
beginning in 2006 to deprive Greenidge of an inheritance following the death
of his mother that occurred seventeen years later are implausible. See TAC.
Even assuming there was a failure to credit support payments, Greenidge “has
alleged no facts that plausibly support the inference that the defendants were
collectively” targeting him, “as opposed to the ‘obvious alternative explanation’
that they were simply” unaware of the payments that Greenidge—per his own
allegations—made directly to Flowers. TAC ¶ 86; Cisneros v. Petland, Inc., 972
F.3d 1204, 1212 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567) (citation
modified); see also Saunders v. Neighborhood Rest. Partners, LLC, No. 8:25-
CV-985-KKM-NHA, 2026 WL 437286, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 17, 2026) (granting
motions to dismiss based in part on implausibility).
Because this is Greenidge’s third amended complaint, I dismiss Counts
II, III, and IV with prejudice.
D. New York Department of Taxation and Finance and the
Georgia Department of Human Services
The remaining government defendants are the New York Department of
Taxation and Finance (NY DTF) and the Georgia Department of Human
Services, which Greenidge accuses of furthering the fraudulent scheme by
enforcing the Florida child support order. See Counts VI, VIII, XIII, XIV, XXVI.
The allegations include failing to credit child support payments, TAC
¶ 74, suspending his license without due process, id. ¶ 54, issuing “a
fraudulent warrant based on identity theft,” id. ¶ 61, and that Greenidge “was
confined or restrained without legal justification,” id. ¶¶ 122, 127. The false
imprisonment allegations are based on alleged “warrants and suspensions that
restricted [Greenidge’s] liberty,” and suspension of Greenidge’s driver’s license.
Id. ¶¶ 120, 128.
I sua sponte dismiss without prejudice all claims against both agencies
for failure to prosecute and frivolousness. See Vega v. Kahle, No. 23-12065,
2025 WL 3540349, at *5 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025) (per curiam) (“[O]ur
precedent establishes that a court may exercise its inherent power to dismiss
a suit without giving the party who brought the case notice and an opportunity
to respond if amending the complaint would be futile, or the complaint is
patently frivolous.”) (citing Surtain v. Hamlin Terrance Found., 789 F.3d 1239,
1248 (11th Cir. 2015)).
First, it appears that Greenidge failed to properly serve the defendants.
“Service on a state or on a state-created governmental organization may be
effected by following the pertinent state’s service-of-process rules or by
‘delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to its chief executive
officer.’ ” Ryzhov v. Fla., 861 F. App’x 301, 303 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 4(j)).
Greenidge purported to serve both agencies via certified mail addressed
to each agency. See Proof of Service (Doc. 74) at 3–4. Neither state permits
service in this manner. See Swanson v. Georgia, No. CV 121-020, 2022 WL
193726, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 20, 2022) (explaining that “neither Rule 4 nor
Georgia law allows service by certified mail” and that Georgia law requires
that claims against the state be delivered to the Georgia governor); Sutter v.
Dibello, No. 18-CV-817(SJF)(AKT), 2021 WL 930459, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,
2021) (“[T]o effect service on a [New York] state agency, a party must follow
one of two methods[,] either: (i) personally serve the chief executive of that
agency or his or her designee; or (ii) serve the chief executive by certified mail,
return receipt requested and personally serve the attorney general or an
assistant attorney general at the attorney general’s office.” (citation modified)).
This Court has repeatedly reminded Greenidge of his obligations to serve
process under Rule 4. See (Docs. 7, 49).
Even if Greenidge had effected service, dismissal would still be
appropriate. The claims are conclusory, vague, and frivolous for reasons
including those explained in Subsection C. Likewise, any failure to credit
payments appears to be based on the allegation against the FL DOR. And
Greenidge provides no plausible, non-conclusory basis for the false
imprisonment claims or evidence tampering. Cf. Fla. Evergreen Foliage v. E.I.
DuPont De Nemours & Co., 470 F.3d 1036, 1042 (11th Cir. 2006) (affirming a
district court’s denial of leave to amend and explaining that “[t]he liberal
amendment policy of Rule 15(a) does not countenance . . . the use of the federal
courts as a forum for testing alternate legal theories”). Counts VI, VIII, XIII,
and XIV are dismissed without prejudice.
E. Section 1985 Claim
I sua sponte dismiss without prejudice Count XXXVII for conspiracy to
violate civil rights under Section 1985 as to all remaining defendants because
it is frivolous and I lack subject matter jurisdiction.
Greenidge alleges that Suzette, Flowers Leach, Michelle Flowers, and
the FL DOR “conspired to deprive [Greenidge] of his civil rights” through “child
support fraud.” TAC ¶ 290. Greenidge alleges that “Suzette orchestrated the
fraud, as admitted by Tahra: ‘Aunti Su told her,’ ” id. ¶ 291, that Misty and
Suzette conspired to “maintain the fraudulent child support case,” id. ¶ 292,
and that “[a]ll agencies coordinated with Suzette” to “facilitate the theft of the
$1.2 Million+ estate,” id. ¶ 295.
The only remotely non-conclusory and specific allegation is that the FL
DOR listed Suzette as an “interested party” on its Certificate of Interested
Parties and Corporate Disclosure Statement, which Greenidge insists
demonstrates “the connection between the child support fraud and the estate
theft.” Id. ¶ 293. The claim is patently without merit. The disclosure form
requires a party to list “any other person or entity that has or might have an
interest in the outcome of the action.” See (Doc. 29) at 2. Parties routinely list
other parties, and Greenidge named Michelle as a party.
Further, to prevail on a Section 1985(3) claim, a plaintiff must “allege
the defendant conspired . . . for the purpose of depriving any person or class of
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws.” Dean v. Warren, 12 F.4th 1248, 1255 (11th Cir.
2021) (citation modified). The claim must pertain to “some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Id. (quoting Bray
v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, at 267–68 (1993)).
Greenidge does not allege such animus or offer a single fact that hints at such
animus. On the contrary, any specifics he does allege are imminently personal.
See TAC. Thus, this claim is “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” See Resnick
v. KrunchCash, LLC, 34 F.4th 1028, 1035 (11th Cir. 2022) (explaining that,
“[i]n order to deprive the district court of federal question jurisdiction over [a]
claim, . . . Plaintiffs’ factual or legal support for at least one of [the claim’s]
elements [must] lacks plausible foundation, thus rendering the claim wholly
insubstantial and frivolous”).
I dismiss Count XXXVII without prejudice as to Suzette, Flowers Leach,
and Michelle Flowers.
F. Michelle Flowers
Michelle Flowers, proceeding pro se, moves to dismiss the claims against
her. See M. Flowers MTD (Doc. 104). She contests only the factual allegations
without making legal arguments. See id. Nonetheless, as explained above, I
sua sponte dismiss the Section 1985 claim, including as against her. I also
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claim against her for unjust enrichment (Count XXXVI). Accordingly,
Michelle’s motion is denied as moot.
G. Supplemental Jurisdiction
The only claims that remain are state-law torts against natural persons
and corporate entities. “Accordingly, having dismissed all federal claims, and
noting that [Greenidge] has not asserted diversity jurisdiction, I decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over [Greenidge’s] [remaining] state-law
claims.” Hyppolite v. Citi Residential Lending, Inc., No. 08-62022-CIV, 2009
WL 1109320, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2009); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the following is ORDERED:
1. The Florida Department of Revenue’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 54)
is GRANTED IN PART. Counts I, IX, and XXXVII as to the FL
DOR are DISMISSED without prejudice.
2. The New York Office of Temporary Disability Assistance’s Motion
to Dismiss (Doc. 90) is GRANTED IN PART. Count VII is
DISMISSED without prejudice. Its prior Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
81) and Motion to Strike (Doc. 124) are DENIED as moot.
Greenidge’s request for leave to amend Count VII is DENIED.
3. Andreia Harris’s, Quianna Maxwell’s, and Kwanzaa Goodwin’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 77) is GRANTED. Counts II, III, and IV
are DISMISSED with prejudice.
4. Count XXXVII is DISMISSED without prejudice as to Suzette
Sobers Hyndman, Misty Lyn Flowers Leach, and Michelle
Flowers.
5. All claims against the New York Department of Taxation and
Finance and the Georgia Department of Human Services (Counts
VI, VIII, XIII, XIV, and XXVI) are DISMISSED without prejudice.
6. The Clerk’s Entries of Default as to Dante, Ryan, and Suzette
Hyndman (Docs. 97, 98, and 99) are VACATED.
7. The remainder of the claims (Counts X—XIJ, XV—XXV, XXVII-—
XXXVI), are DISMISSED without prejudice.
8. Michelle Flowers’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 104) is DENIED as
moot.
9. Plaintiff Greenidge’s Motions for Default Judgment (Docs. 108,
109, and 110) are DENIED as moot.
10. Plaintiff Greenidge’s Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 118) is DENIED.
11. The Clerk is directed to ENTER judgment, which shall read “This
case is dismissed. Counts II, III, and IV are dismissed with
prejudice. The remaining counts are dismissed without prejudice.”
The clerk is further directed to terminate any pending motions,
hearings, and deadlines, and to CLOSE this case.
ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, June 9, 2026.
athryn’ Kimball Mizelle
United States District Judge
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