The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LUCIANA L. MELO,
Plaintiff,
25 Civ. 8601 (KPF)
-v.-
Order of Service
GOOGLE LLC,
Defendant.
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA, District Judge:
Plaintiff Luciana L. Melo, of Tuckahoe, New York, brings this action pro
se and asserts claims of retaliation and employment discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. She seeks unspecified damages, as
well as unspecified injunctive and declaratory relief, and she sues her former
employer Google LLC (“Google”). The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint as
asserting claims of retaliation, as well as race, sex, and national-origin based
employment discrimination under Title VII, claims of retaliation and race based
employment discrimination under Section 1981, claims of retaliation and
disability based employment discrimination under the ADA, claims of
retaliation and interference with medical leave under the Family and Medical
Leave Act of 1993, as well as claims of retaliation and race, sex, national-origin,
and disability based employment discrimination under the New York State and
New York City Human Rights Laws.1
0F
1 The Court notes that, after she filed her complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion for the
appointment of pro bono counsel. (Dkt. #7).
By order dated October 22, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to
proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees.2 The
1F
Court directs service on Google and denies Plaintiff’s motion for the
appointment of pro bono counsel (Dkt. #7) without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing
an application for the Court to request pro bono counsel at a later date.
DISCUSSION
A. Service on Google
Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, she is
entitled to rely on assistance from the Court and the United States Marshals
Service (“USMS”) to effect service.3 Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6
2F
(2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall
issue and serve all process … in [IFP] cases.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (the court
must order the USMS to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP).
To allow Plaintiff to effect service on Google through the USMS, the Clerk
of Court is instructed to fill out a USMS Process Receipt and Return form
(“USM-285 form”) for Google. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue
a summons for Google and deliver to the USMS all the paperwork necessary for
the USMS to effect service of a summons and the complaint on Google.
2 Because Plaintiff’s IFP application reveals the full names of Plaintiff’s minor children,
the Court has directed the Clerk of Court to restrict electronic access to that document. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.2(a)(3) (requiring court submissions that refer to minor children to refer to the
children using only their names’ initials).
3 Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that a
summons be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP
and could not have effected service until the Court reviewed the complaint and ordered that a
summons for Google be issued. The Court therefore extends the time to serve Google until 90
days after the date that a summons for Google issues.
If a summons and the complaint are not served on Google within 90 days
after the date that a summons for Google is issued, Plaintiff should request an
extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir.
2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff’s responsibility to request an extension of
time for service).
Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if her address changes, and the
Court may dismiss this action if she fails to do so.
B. Motion for the appointment of pro bono counsel
The Court must deny Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of pro bono
counsel. The IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915, provides that courts “may request
an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(1). Unlike in criminal actions, in civil actions, there is no requirement
that courts supply indigent litigants with counsel. See Hodge v. Police Officers,
802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986). Instead, courts have “[b]road discretion” when
deciding whether to grant an indigent litigant’s request for pro bono
representation. Id. Even if a court does believe that a litigant should have a
free lawyer, under the IFP statute, a court has no authority to “appoint”
counsel, but instead, may only “request” that an attorney volunteer to
represent a litigant. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S.
296, 301-10 (1989). Moreover, courts do not have funds to pay counsel in civil
matters. Courts must therefore grant applications for pro bono counsel
sparingly, and with reference to public benefit, in order to preserve the
“precious commodity” of volunteer-lawyer time for those litigants whose causes
are truly deserving. Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 172-73 (2d
Cir. 1989).
In Hodge, the Second Circuit set forth the factors that a court should
consider in deciding whether to grant an indigent litigant’s request for pro bono
counsel. 802 F.2d at 61-62. Of course, the litigant must first demonstrate
that she is indigent, for example, by successfully applying for leave to proceed
IFP. The court must then consider whether the litigant’s claim “seems likely to
be of substance”—“a requirement that must be taken seriously.” Id. at 60-61.
If these threshold requirements are met, the court must next consider such
factors as:
the indigent’s ability to investigate the crucial facts, whether
conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will
be the major proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent’s
ability to present the case, the complexity of the legal issues[,] and
any special reason in that case why appointment of counsel would
be more likely to lead to a just determination.
Id. at 61-62; see also Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172 (listing factors courts should
consider, including litigant’s efforts to obtain counsel). In considering these
factors, district courts should neither apply bright-line rules nor automatically
deny the request for counsel until the application has survived a dispositive
motion. See Hendricks v. Coughlin, 114 F.3d 390, 392-93 (2d Cir. 1997).
Rather, each application must be decided on its own facts. See Hodge, 802
F.2d at 61.
Here, it is too early in the proceedings for the Court to assess the merits
of this action. Thus, the Court cannot, at this stage of the litigation, consider
abovementioned factors. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for
the appointment of pro bono counsel (Dkt. #7) without prejudice to Plaintiff’s
filing an application for the Court to request pro bono counsel at a later date.
CONCLUSION
The Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of pro bono
counsel (Dkt. #7) without prejudice to Plaintiff’s filing an application for the
Court to request pro bono counsel at a later date. The Clerk of Court is
directed to terminate the pending motion at docket entry 7.
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to mail an information package to
Plaintiff.
The Court also directs the Clerk of Court to: (1) issue a summons for
Google; (2) complete a USM-285 form for Google; and (3) deliver all documents
necessary to effect service of a summons and the complaint on Google to the
USMS.
The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from
this Order would not be taken in good faith and, therefore, IFP status is denied
for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438,
444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he
seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 9, 2025
New York, New York
KATHERINE POLK FAILLA
United States District Judge
SERVICE ADDRESS FOR DEFENDANT
Google, LLC
111 Eighth Avenue
New York, New York 10011