Opinion

Horner

Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
Filed: May 6, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

6 AT SEATTLE

CHANEL HORNER,

8 CASE NO. 2:24-cv-01488-RSL

Plaintiff,

10 ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO

CITY OF SEATTLE; OFFICER ROBERT DISMISS

11 STROZIER; and LINCOLN TOWING

ENTERPRISES, INC.,

Defendants.

15 This matter comes before the Court on the motion to dismiss filed by defendants

City of Seattle and Officer Robert Strozier (Dkt. # 17); plaintiff Chanel Horner’s response

(Dkt. # 22); and the reply filed by defendants City of Seattle and Officer Robert Strozier

19 (Dkt. # 30). Having reviewed the motions and related declarations (Dkts. # 23, # 24), as

20 well as the record herein, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss as explained below.1

I. Background

Plaintiff Chanel Horner’s complaint alleges the following facts: In September 2022,

plaintiff was “unemployed, financially destitute, and . . . living in her vehicle, a bus.” Dkt.

26 1 Defendant Lincoln Towing Enterprises, Inc. has not filed a motion to dismiss. Therefore, none of plaintiff’s claims

are dismissed as to Lincoln Towing.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 1

1 # 1-2 at ¶¶ 15–16. Plaintiff’s bus runs only on natural gas. Id. at ¶ 17. “In late August or

early September of 2022, Horner learned that on September 15, 2022, the City of Seattle

intended to do a sweep of all vehicles parked on the 5000 block of Colorado Avenue

5 South, in Seattle, Washington.” Id. at ¶ 20. Plaintiff was living on that block, in her bus,

6 during the first half of Sept. 2022 and intended to move her bus prior to the City of

Seattle’s “sweep” on Sept. 15, 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 22–23. However, on the evening of Sept. 14,

2022, plaintiff discovered that her bus had run out of natural gas. Id. at ¶ 24.

10 Early in the morning of Sept. 15, 2022, plaintiff contacted an organization that helps

11 unhoused individuals and asked for help. Id. at ¶ 25. The organization, known as REACH,

agreed to send a tow truck to pick up plaintiff’s bus and take it to a nearby compressed

natural gas station. Id. at ¶¶ 25–26. Delivery of compressed natural gas “was not possible.”

15 Id. Meanwhile, a Seattle Police Department Parking Enforcement Officer, Robert Strozier,

16 “told Horner that a city tow truck was on the way and that if it got there before the private

tow truck, the city tow truck was going to tow her bus away.” Id. at ¶ 29.

Lincoln Towing is under contract with the City of Seattle to provide vehicle towing

services and is “an agent of the City of Seattle.” Id. at ¶ 8. Before any private tow truck

21 arrived, a tow truck from Lincoln Towing arrived. Id. at ¶ 23.

When the Lincoln Towing tow truck arrived, Horner asked Strozier if he could

23 simply wait for a private tow truck to arrive, or, if he could not do that, if he

would direct Lincoln Towing to tow the bus to the nearby compressed gas

24 station. Strozier refused both requests saying that Lincoln Towing had to tow

it and that it had to be towed to a Lincoln Towing impound lot.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 2

1 Id. Lincoln Towing impounded plaintiff’s bus and towed it away “[a]t the direction

of Officer Strozier.” Id. at ¶ 33.

Plaintiff visited three Lincoln Towing impound lots later that day in an effort

5 to get her bus back. Id. at ¶ 34. At the first one, plaintiff’s bus was not there and,

6 when plaintiff asked how she could request a hearing to contest the impound, she

was told “by a Lincoln Towing employee” that it was too late in the day to do that

and the employee did not know how plaintiff could make a hearing request. Id. at

10 ¶¶ 35–36. At the second lot, a Lincoln Towing employee told plaintiff that “she did

11 not have a fax machine and could not submit a request for an expedited hearing.”

Id. at ¶ 37. At the third lot, plaintiff found her bus and “was told that she could not

make any request for an impound hearing because she was not the registered owner

15 of the vehicle.” Id. at ¶ 38.

16 “Despite Defendants City’s and Lincoln Towing’s insistence that she was not

entitled to any judicial hearing to review the lawfulness of the seizure and impound

of her bus, Horner eventually succeeded in obtaining an impound hearing in Seattle

Municipal Court.” Id. at ¶ 48. That hearing occurred on April 11, 2023, about seven

21 months after the impound. Id. at ¶ 49. By then, plaintiff’s bus had already been

returned to plaintiff, having been released to her by Lincoln Towing on Nov. 9,

2022, about two months after the impound, at the request of plaintiff’s attorney. Id.

at ¶ 39. “When the bus was returned to her, Horner discovered that many items of

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 3

1 her property had been stolen” and “the bus had been damaged.” Id. at ¶¶ 42–47. At

the April 11, 2023 impound hearing:

[T]he judge ruled that the impound of Horner’s bus had been “improper.” . . .

4 The court ruled that Officer Strozier “did not consider reasonable alternatives”

5 to an impound, as required by the U.S. Constitution, the Washington State

Constitution, and decisions of the Washington Supreme Court. The Court also

6 ruled that a reasonable alternative was in fact “actually available.”

Consequently, the court ruled “that the impound was improper and unlawful.”

8 Id. at ¶¶ 50 – 51.

9 The record before the Court shows that plaintiff filed suit in King County

Superior Court on Sept. 9, 2024, claiming, in ten separate causes of action, that

defendants’ impoundment of plaintiff’s bus violated Washington State law and

13 deprived plaintiff of her federal and state constitutional rights. Dkt. # 1-2. Plaintiff’s

14 lawsuit also sought to “permanently enjoin Defendants from impounding vehicles

when a reasonable alternative to impound exists as required under the Washington

State and U.S. Constitutions, except as under such conditions as the Court may

18 require.” Id. Plaintiff’s case was removed to this Court on Sept. 18, 2024. Dkt. # 1.

19 II. Discussion

A. Pleading Standard Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)

The question for the Court on a motion to dismiss is whether the facts alleged in the

23 complaint sufficiently state a “plausible” ground for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

24 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In the context of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

“accept factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 4

1 most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519

F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). The Court’s review is generally limited

to the contents of the complaint. Campanelli v. Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir.

5 1996). “We are not, however, required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits

6 attached to the Complaint or matters properly subject to judicial notice, or allegations that

are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.”

Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).

10 To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

[]Twombly, 550 U.S. [at 570]. A plausible claim includes “factual content

12 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” U.S. v. Corinthian Colls., 655 F.3d 984,

991 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

14 Under the pleading standards of Rule 8(a)(2), a party must make a “short and

15 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). . . . A complaint “that offers ‘labels and conclusions’

or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”

17 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus,

“conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to

defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th

19 Cir. 2004).

Benavidez v. Cty. of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 (9th Cir. 2021). In addition, the

22 factual allegations in a complaint “must be enough to rise above the speculative level.”

23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 at 555 (2007). Finally, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper

“only where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to

support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 5

1 B. First Cause of Action: Conversion

The parties’ disagreement over this claim is not whether the claim rests on

sufficient facts, but instead whether the claim fails as a matter of law. Dkts. # 17 at 11:7;

5 # 22 at 9:21; # 30 at 4:14. Plaintiff claims that by impounding her bus, defendants City of

6 Seattle and Robert Strozier “committed the tort of conversion by unjustifiably and willfully

interfering with Plaintiff’s possession of her property.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 7:23. Defendants

argue that because the impoundment of plaintiff’s bus was authorized under Seattle

10 Municipal Code 11.30.60, the impoundment was lawful and therefore cannot constitute

11 conversion. Dkt. # 30 at 6:5–8. See also Judkins v. Sadler-Mac Neil, 61 Wash. 2d 1, 3

(1962) (“A conversion is the act of wifully interferring [sic] with any chattel, without

lawful justification, whereby any person entitled thereto is deprived of the possession of

15 it.”) (emphasis added).

16 Plaintiff’s argument in support of the conversion claim centers on a Seattle

Municipal Court judge’s finding that while plaintiff “committed” the parking infraction

that triggered the impoundment of her bus under SMC 11.30.60A, the impoundment of

plaintiff’s bus was unreasonable. Dkts. # 22 at 10:5; # 23 at 126–127. Plaintiff then argues

21 that “binding Washington precedent . . . holds that if an impound is unreasonable then it is

per se unconstitutional.” Dkt. # 22 at 10:14–15. Put another way, the legal theory behind

plaintiff’s conversion claim is that “the municipal court’s finding of unreasonableness

automatically established that the impound of Horner’s bus was unlawful because it did

26 not comport with [Washington State] constitutional guarantees” (specifically Wash. Const.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 6

1 art 1, § 7, “No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without

authority of law”). Id. at 11:12–16. Therefore, “[s]ince the impound was determined to be

unlawful, automatically it was also an actionable conversion.” Id. See also Dkt. # 23 at

5 123–127 (Seattle Municipal Court judge citing City of Seattle v. Long, 198 Wash.2d 136

6 (2021) and State v. Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 (2019)).2

In Long, the Washington State Supreme Court considered the City of Seattle’s 2016

impoundment, also under SMC 11.30.60, of a truck that Steven Gregory Long was living

10 in at the time of the impoundment. 198 Wash.2d 136 at 142–3, 156 (2021). In Long, as

11 here, plaintiff did not question the constitutionality of SMC 11.30.60 or the lawfulness of

the impound under the terms of SMC 11.30.60. Instead, Mr. Long, like petitioner here,

challenged “the city’s failure to consider alternatives to impoundment.” Id. at 156. SMC

15 11.30.60 does not require the consideration of alternatives to impoundment. But Mr. Long,

16 like petitioner here, alleged that the failure to consider alternatives to impoundment in the

course of the impound made the impound an unreasonable seizure under Wash. Const. art

1, § 7. In other words, Mr. Long, like petitioner here, argued that a violation of Wash

Const. art 1, § 7 during the process of impoundment can retroactively make an

21 impoundment under SMC 11.30.60 unlawful.3

25 2 The transcript of the Seattle Municipal Court hearing that is offered by plaintiff at Dkt. # 23 is incorporated into

plaintiff’s complaint by reference. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).

3 The lead attorney for petitioner in this matter was also the lead attorney in Long.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 7

1 The Long court described a two-step process for determining whether Wash. Const.

art 1, § 7 has been violated. Id. at 156. “First, we determine whether the action complained

of disturbs one’s private affairs.” Id. Where, as here and in Long, the action does disturb a

5 person’s private affairs, “we look to a second inquiry: whether authority of law justifies the

6 intrusion.” Id. “Most relevant to this case,” the Long court stated, “a vehicle may be

lawfully impounded in the course of enforcing traffic regulations if the driver committed a

traffic offense for which the legislature has expressly authorized impoundment.” Id. at 156

10 (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019)). The Long court further stated that where

11 “no probable cause exists to seize the vehicle and a reasonable alternative to impoundment

exists, it is unreasonable to impound the vehicle.” Id. at 157 (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d

451 at 459 (2019) (emphasis added). Villela, in turn, makes clear that “enforcing traffic

15 regulations if the driver committed a traffic offense for which the legislature has expressly

16 authorized impoundment” is equivalent to having probable cause, in the sense that both

independently allow a vehicle to be “lawfully impounded.” 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459

(2019). Applying the holdings of Long and Villela to the facts of this case, where petitioner

does not contest the constitutionality of SMC 11.30.60 or the commission of the traffic

21 offense that triggered impoundment of her bus under SMC 11.30.60, the Court finds that

petitioner’s bus was “lawfully impounded” and that “authority of law justifie[d] the

intrusion” into petitioner’s rights under Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7.4 Long, 198 Wash.2d 136

4 Petitioner and defendants disagree as to whether lawfulness and reasonableness are “separate” inquiries in the

context of a vehicle impound. See Dkts. # 17 at 13:3; # 22 at 12. But in arguing that lawfulness and reasonableness are

not “separate” inquiries, and that unreasonableness under Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7 “automatically” establishes the

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 8

1 at 156 (2021) (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019)). To the extent that the

Seattle Municipal Court judge in this matter viewed the holdings of Long and Villela

differently, that view is not binding on this Court on a motion to dismiss arising out of the

present complaint.5 6 Given this Court’s finding that the impound here was lawful, plaintiff

6 cannot pursue a conversion claim. Id. See also Potter v. Washington State Patrol, 165

Wash.2d 67, 75, 69 (2008) (conversion claim allowed for unlawful impound where state

impound policy “exceeded the agency’s statutory authority”); Est. of Rogers by & through

unlawfulness of an otherwise lawful impound, petitioner incompletely quotes Villela. Dkt. # 22 at 10:14–16. Petitioner

12 presents the “binding” holding of Villela as being that if “a reasonable alternative to impound exists, then it is

unreasonable to impound a citizen’s vehicle.” Id. In fact, the full sentence from Villela reads as follows: “However, if

13 there is no probable cause to seize the vehicle and a reasonable alternative to impound exists, then it is unreasonable to

impound a citizen’s vehicle.” 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019) (quoting State v. Tyler, 177 Wash.2d 690, 698 (2013)).

14 The full sentence shows Villela is contrasting situations in which “there is no probable cause” with Villela’s

immediately preceding discussion of situations in which “[a] vehicle may be lawfully impounded”—including “in the

15 course of enforcing traffic regulations if the driver committed a traffic offense for which the legislature has expressly

authorized impoundment.” Id. The Long court restated this holding. 198 Wash.2d 136 at 157 (2021) (citing Villela,

16 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019)). Therefore, the issue here is not whether lawfulness and reasonableness are separate

inquiries. The issue here is that under Long and Villela, the reasonableness inquiry only comes up “if there is no

17 probable cause to seize the vehicle.” 198 Wash.2d 136 at 157 (2021); 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019). As already

discussed, Villela makes clear that “enforcing traffic regulations” that result in an impound is like having probable

18 cause in the criminal context, in that both scenarios allow the vehicle to be “lawfully impounded” without considering

whether “a reasonable alternative to impoundment exists.” 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019) (quoting State v. Tyler, 177

Wash.2d 690, 698 (2013)).

5 Plaintiff is incorrect that in this proceeding the Court must take as true “the municipal court’s determination that

20 the impoundment was unreasonable.” Dkt. # 22 at 10:5–6. Plaintiff is also incorrect that defendants conceded as

much. Id. What defendants actually stated is correct: “At this stage the Court must take as true that the Municipal

21 Court found the impoundment of Plaintiff’s vehicle to be unreasonable . . . .” Dkt. # 17 at 13:5–6. The fact of the

municipal court’s finding does not constrain this Court’s independent judgment as to whether plaintiff has presented a

22 cognizable legal theory for the conversion claim presented in this matter. Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir.

2001).

23 6 Contrary to plaintiff’s contention, the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not relevant here. See Dkt. # 22 at 4 n.3

(arguing that “[t]he municipal court’s determination that the impound was unlawful cannot be relitigated in this

24 court.”). As discussed above, the issue here is whether plaintiff committed a traffic offense for which a legislative

body “expressly authorized impoundment.” Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 at 156 (2021) (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 at

25 459 (2019)). If so, plaintiff’s bus was “lawfully impounded.” Id. The Seattle Municipal Court judge found plaintiff

“committed” the underlying violation of SMC 11.72.330 that triggered the impound of plaintiff’s bus under SMC

26 11.30.60A. Dkt. # 23 at 126–127. That decision by the Seattle Municipal Court judge is not being relitigated here,

making the doctrine of collateral estoppel irrelevant to this Court’s analysis of plaintiff’s first cause of action.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 9

1 Cullen v. State, 200 Wash. App. 1066, *5 (2017) (conversion claim not allowed where

impound pursuant to unchallenged state statute “was lawful.”).

The legal theory behind plaintiff’s conversion claim therefore fails because,

5 contrary to plaintiff’s argument, any unreasonableness in the impoundment of plaintiff’s

6 bus does not “automatically” establish that the impoundment was unlawful in these

circumstances, where “authority of law justifie[d] the intrusion” into petitioner’s rights

under Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7. Dkt. # 22 at11:12–16. See also Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 at

10 156 (2021) (citing Villela, 194 Wash.2d 451 at 459 (2019)); SMC 11.30.60. As a result,

11 the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s conversion claim because it lacks a “cognizable legal

theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

C. Second and Third Causes of Action: Deprivation of Right to be Free

15 from Warrantless and Unreasonable Seizures Under the Fourth

16 Amendment

Although plaintiff’s complaint does not state that her claimed violations of the

United States Constitution are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), plaintiff’s response to defendants’ motion to dismiss appears

21 to confirm that plaintiff is bringing Monell claims under Section 1983. See Dkts. #1; # 17

at 14; # 22 at 21:13–14. Therefore, the Court will analyze plaintiff’s second and third

causes of action, as well as plaintiff’s other claims of federal constitutional violations, as

being brought under Section 1983 and Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 10

1 Cities may be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations committed

by their officers. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018. To establish such

liability, Plaintiffs must prove “(1) [they were] deprived of a constitutional

3 right; (2) the municipality had a policy; (3) the policy amounted to deliberate

indifference to [their] constitutional right; and (4) the policy was the moving

4 force behind the constitutional violation.” Lockett v. County of Los Angeles,

5 977 F.3d 737, 741 (9th Cir. 2020). A municipal policy can be, among other

things, “a failure to train [or] supervise.” Horton by Horton v. City of Santa

6 Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 603 (9th Cir. 2019).

Jones v. City of N. Las Vegas, 150 F.4th 1030, 1039 (9th Cir. 2025). On the second

and third causes of action, plaintiff contends that defendants “deprived Plaintiff of

10 her Fourth Amendment right” to be free from warrantless and unreasonable seizures

11 “by seizing her vehicular home.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 8.

1. The City of Seattle’s Policy or Lack Thereof

Defendants argue that these and all of plaintiff’s other claims of federal

15 constitutional violations must be dismissed as a matter of law as to the City of

16 Seattle “because there is not a single allegation contained in the complaint that

Officer’s Strozier’s decision to impound Plaintiff’s vehicle was performed pursuant

to an unconstitutional City policy, and there is no allegation that the City made a

deliberate or conscious choice not to train its officers.” Dkt. # 30 at 13:17–20. See

21 also Jones, 150 F.4th 1030 at 1039 (9th Cir. 2025). While there is no question that

the impound of plaintiff’s bus constituted a seizure “within the meaning of the

Fourth Amendment,” Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 863 (9th Cir.

2005), upon review of plaintiff’s complaint, the Court agrees with defendants that

26 the complaint lacks any allegation that the impound was performed pursuant to a

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 11

1 City of Seattle policy or was caused by a lack of City of Seattle policy. Dkt. # 1-2.

“In this circuit, a claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to

withstand a motion to dismiss ‘even if the claim is based on nothing more than a

5 bare allegation that the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy,

6 custom, or practice.’” Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621,

624 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th

Cir.1986)). Here, even in places in plaintiff’s complaint where an allegation of that

10 sort would logically arise (such as Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 29, 31, 32), the complaint does

11 not include any allegation, bare or otherwise, that Officer Strozier’s challenged

actions conformed to a City of Seattle policy, custom, or practice—or were caused

by the lack of a policy. Dkt. # 1-2. Plaintiff does offer some allegations concerning

15 City of Seattle policy in her response to the present motion to dismiss, stating that

16 testimony at the impound hearing showed “the City did not have a standardized or

uniform policy of refusing to wait past 9 a.m. for a privately arranged tow truck to

arrive,” Dkt. # 22 at 15:13–15, and that Seattle’s failure to have a policy to guide

officer discretion as to when to impound a vehicle “violated Horner’s Fourth

21 Amendment rights” because “[i]f Seattle had had a similar policy, then presumably

Officer Strozier would have followed it and no violation of the Fourth Amendment

would ever have occurred,” Dkt. # 22 at 21:1–12. But in plaintiff’s complaint there

is no similar argument, much less any “bare allegation” along these lines. Karim-

26 Panahi, 839 F.2d 621 at 624 (9th Cir. 1988). On a motion to dismiss, the Court’s

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 12

1 review is generally limited to the contents of the complaint. Campanelli v.

Bockrath, 100 F.3d 1476, 1479 (9th Cir. 1996). Therefore, as to the City of Seattle

the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s second and third causes of action as a matter of

5 law. Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

6 2. Qualified Immunity

As to Officer Strozier, defendants argue that plaintiff’s claims of warrantless and

unreasonable seizure, and all of plaintiff’s other claims of federal constitutional violations,

10 must be dismissed under the doctrine of qualified immunity. Dkt. # 17 at 21:13. “Qualified

11 immunity balances two important interests––the need to hold public officials accountable

when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Martinez v. City of

15 Clovis, 943 F.3d 1260, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 2019).

16 [O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity under § 1983 unless (1) they

violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of

their conduct was “clearly established at the time.” Reichle v. Howards, 566

18 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012). “Clearly established”

means that, at the time of the officer's conduct, the law was “ ‘sufficiently

19 clear’ that every ‘reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ ”

is unlawful. al–Kidd, supra, at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In

21 other words, existing law must have placed the constitutionality of the

officer’s conduct “beyond debate.” al–Kidd, supra, at 741, 131 S.Ct. 2074.

This demanding standard protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those

23 who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106

S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986).

D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). Here, plaintiff argues that the applicable

26 Fourth Amendment principles were clearly established at the time Officer Strozier

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 13

1 impounded plaintiff’s bus. Dkt. # 22 at 19:1. Further, plaintiff argues that “Seattle

has clearly been aware of these principles since the Price district court denied its

motion for summary judgment in a class action case challenging car impounds

5 nearly 20 years ago.” Id. at 19:22–25 (citing Price v. City of Seattle, No. C03-

6 1365P, 2005 WL 1189585, at *2, 4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2005)).

The relevant holding of Price does not support plaintiff’s argument that the

unlawfulness of Officer Strozier’s conduct in impounding plaintiff’s bus was clearly

10 established.

11 The decision to impound a car “must meet the strictures of the Fourth

Amendment,” which requires that the impound must be reasonable. U.S. v.

Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 351 (7th Cir.1996). Outside of criminal investigations,

13 the police may reasonably impound a car when necessary for “community

caretaking” purposes, such as protecting public safety and providing for the

efficient movement of traffic if the car is creating a traffic hazzard or to prevent

15 theft of abandoned cars. “The authority of the police to seize and remove from

the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and

convenience is beyond challenge.” South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364,

17 368-69, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976).

Price, No. C03-1365P, 2005 WL 1189585, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 1, 2005).

Plaintiff’s bus was parked on a public street, “the 5000 block of Colorado Avenue

21 South, in Seattle, Washington.” Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 20, 22. Attached to plaintiff’s

22 complaint is a Seattle Municipal Court judgment from plaintiff’s April 11, 2023,

impound hearing finding that plaintiff committed the underlying violation of SMC

11.72.330 (parking in violation of posted signs) that triggered the impound of

26 plaintiff’s bus under SMC 11.30.60A. Dkt. # 1-2 at 14. See also Dkt. # 23 at 126–

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 14

1 127. Plaintiff’s complaint does not contest that her bus was parked in violation of

posted signs. Dkt. # 1-2. As Price stated, “The authority of the police to seize and

remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and

5 convenience is beyond challenge.” No. C03-1365P, 2005 WL 1189585, at *2 (W.D.

6 Wash. Mar. 1, 2005) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368-69

(1976)).

It is true that “[a] seizure conducted without a warrant is per se unreasonable

10 under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and

11 well delineated exceptions,” and that under the “community caretaking” exception,

the fact that an impoundment was conducted pursuant to a city ordinance “does not,

in and of itself, determine the reasonableness of the seizure under the Fourth

15 Amendment . . . .” Miranda, 429 F.3d 858 at 862, 864 (9th Cir. 2005). Based on

16 this, plaintiff argues that Officer Strozier’s conduct was unreasonable in that Officer

Strozier “refused to wait” for the arrival of a tow truck hired by a third party. Dkt.

# 1-2 at 2:23.7 However, plaintiff’s complaint also alleges that Officer Strozier

suggested that if the privately hired tow truck got there before the city-contracted

7 Plaintiff’s claim that defendants City of Seattle and Officer Strozier also engaged in an “unreasonably prolonged

23 seizure” by holding plaintiff’s vehicle for fifty-five days after the impoundment, Dkt. # 22 at 18, fails because the

facts plausibly alleged by plaintiff only support the reasonable inference that Lincoln Towing held plaintiff’s vehicle

24 for fifty-five days after the impoundment. Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged any non-conclusory facts that would

support a reasonable inference that the City of Seattle or Officer Strozier were participants in the decision to hold

25 plaintiff’s vehicle at Lincoln Towing’s impound lot for fifty-five days after impoundment. Dkt. # 1-2. Therefore, as to

the claim of “unreasonably prolonged seizure” against defendants City of Seattle and Officer Strozier, plaintiff has not

26 sufficiently alleged an actual violation of a constitutional right under either the Monell test or the qualified immunity

test. See Monell, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018).

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 15

1 tow truck, then the privately hired tow truck could take plaintiff’s bus. Id. at ¶ 29. In

the end, the city-contracted tow truck arrived first and Officer Strozier chose not to

wait for the privately hired tow truck. Id. at ¶¶ 32, 33. Thus, the particular

5 circumstances of this case involve a specific question concerning reasonableness:

6 When (1) a vehicle that a person is living in is parked in violation of a city traffic

regulation, (2) impoundment of that vehicle is a legal consequence of violating the

city traffic regulation, and (3) the person living in the vehicle states that a tow truck

10 hired by a third party is coming at some point in the future, is it unreasonable for a

11 city parking enforcement officer to decline to wait for the privately hired tow truck

to arrive before impounding the vehicle? The cases cited by plaintiff do not answer

this specific question, and they certainly do not establish a legal principal that

15 “clearly prohibit[ed] the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before

16 him.” Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 at 63 (2018). See Dkt. # 30 at 11:16–12:4.

In Miranda, the court found that under the “special circumstances” of that

case, which involved a car parked in its owner’s driveway, the power to seize

vehicles under the “community caretaking” doctrine did not apply. 429 F.3d 858 at

21 860 (9th Cir. 2005). But here, unlike Miranda, plaintiff’s bus was parked on a

public street in violation of the Seattle Municipal Code. Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 20, 22. See

also Dkt. # 23 at 126–127. As the Miranda court made clear, where the purpose of

an impoundment is to “remove a vehicle left in a public location where it creates a

26 hazard,” that impoundment it proper. Id. at 865 n.6. See also id. at 864 (“In their

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 16

1 ‘community caretaking’ function, police officers may impound vehicles that

‘jeopardize public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.’”) (citing

Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368–69 (1976)). Accord U.S. v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d

5 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2012). On the reasonableness issue, in Colorado v. Bertine the

6 Court made clear that in the Fourth Amendment context, the reasonableness of a

government activity “does not necessarily or invariably turn on the existence of

alternative ‘less intrusive’ means.” 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987) (quoting Illinois v.

10 Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983)). The Mirdanda court restated that particular

11 holding from Bertine as follows: “An officer, acting within the scope of his or her

community care-taking function, is not required to consider ‘the existence of

alternative less intrusive means’ when the vehicle must in fact be moved to avoid

15 the creation of a hazard or the continued unlawful operation of the vehicle.” 429

16 F.3d 858 at 865 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff argues that here, the reasonableness of

the impoundment of plaintiff’s bus should indeed turn on the existence of

alternative, less-intrusive means. Dkt. # 22 at 13:23–14:3.

The facts plead [sic] here show that if Officer Strozier had simply agreed to

wait for the privately arranged tow truck, the private tow would have arrived

21 and Horner’s bus would have been removed from the street block to be cleaned

long before Strozier’s regular shift ended. Thus, Strozier’s insistence on

impounding Horner’s bus served no conceivable purpose and therefore it

23 violated the Fourth Amendment.

24 Id. Plaintiff’s argument thus returns us to the specific question raised by the

particular circumstances of this case: When (1) a vehicle that a person is living in is

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 17

1 parked in violation of a city traffic regulation, (2) impoundment of that vehicle is a

legal consequence of violating the city traffic regulation, and (3) the person living

in the vehicle states that a tow truck hired by a third party is coming at some point

5 in the future, is it unreasonable for a city parking enforcement officer to decline to

6 wait for the privately hired tow truck to arrive before impounding the vehicle?

Without minimizing the importance of that question, the Court finds that the

answer is not, and was not at the time, “clearly established” by any caselaw cited by

10 plaintiff. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 at 63–64 (2018). What was—and is—clearly

11 established is that where an officer is impounding a vehicle pursuant to law and a

reasonable belief that the vehicle poses a hazard, that officer is not required to

consider alternative, less-intrusive means to impoundment (including the alternative

15 means available here: waiting for the arrival of a private tow truck hired by a third

16 party). Miranda, 429 F.3d 858 at 865 n.6 (9th Cir. 2005). Therefore, as a matter of

law, Officier Strozier is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s second and

third causes of action, and as a result plaintiff’s second and third causes of action

will be dismissed as to Officer Strozier. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 at 63–64 (2018);

21 Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Below, the Court will analyze the

additional claims of qualified immunity in the context of other causes of action.

D. Fourth Cause of Action: Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7

“Washington courts have consistently rejected invitations to establish a cause of

26 action for damages based upon constitutional violations ‘without the aid of augmentative

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 18

1 legislation [.]’ Blinka v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 109 Wash. App. 575, 591 (2001). In

plaintiff’s response, she makes clear that this cause of action under Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7

is intertwined with her first cause of action, the conversion claim. Dkt. # 22 at 24:20. For

5 the reasons explained supra (II.B), the Court will be dismissing plaintiff’s conversion

6 claim. Plaintiff has provided no argument or authority in support of this Court creating a

cause of action based upon violations of Wash. Const. art. 1, § 7, and in any event

invitations of that sort have been “consistently rejected” by Washington State courts.

10 Blinka, 109 Wash. App. 575 at 591 (2001). Therefore, the Court will dismiss plaintiff’s

11 fourth cause of action because it lacks a “cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729

at 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

E. Fifth Cause of Action: Deprivation of Eighth Amendment Right to be

15 Free from Excessive Fines

16 Plaintiff claims that defendants “violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment right to be

free from Excessive Fines by impounding and withholding her home.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 8. But

Plaintiff does not plead that she was forced to pay any fine at all as a result of the

impoundment. Dkt. # 1-2. See U.S. v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327–28 (1998) (fine

21 means “payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense.”). Defendants state that

“when Plaintiff prevailed at her impound hearing, she was no longer liable for the storage

and towing fees, and the City assumed liability.” Dkt. # 17 at 20:14–15. Plaintiff does not

contest this. Dkt. # 22. See also Dkt. # 23 at 129 (Seattle Municipal Court judge waiving

26 $47 payment owed by plaintiff). Thus, plaintiff has not demonstrated a violation of her

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 19

1 Eighth Amendment rights.8 That means the issue of Officer Strozier’s qualified immunity

is moot as to this claim. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018). Therefore, plaintiff’s fifth

cause of action will be dismissed with prejudice as to defendants City of Seattle and

5 Officer Robert Strozier due to “an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a

6 cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

F. Sixth Cause of Action: Wash. Const. art. 1, § 14

Plaintiff claims that defendants “deprived Plaintiff of her article 1, section 14 right

10 to be free from Excessive Fines by impounding and withholding her home.” Dkt. # 1-2 at

11 8. Given that the language of Wash. Const. art. 1, § 14 “is identical to” the language of

U.S. Const. amend. VIII, the Washington State Supreme Court has held that the two

provisions are “coextensive for the purposes of excessive fines.” Long, 198 Wash.2d 136

15 at 158–59 (2021). As the Long court further explained, the excessive fines clause “limits

16 the government’s power to extract payments.” Id. (quoting Austin v. United States, 509

U.S. 602, 609-10 (1993). A qualifying fine is “a payment to a sovereign as punishment for

some offense.” Id. (quoting Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 at 327–28 (1998)). Thus, for the

reasons already stated, see supra (II.E), plaintiff’s sixth cause will be dismissed with

21 prejudice as to defendants City of Seattle and Officer Robert Strozier due to “an absence of

25 8 As to the City of Seattle, for the reasons discussed supra (II.C.1), plaintiff’s allegation of an Eighth Amendment

violation fails for an additional reason: plaintiff’s complaint offers no allegation, “bare” or otherwise, that defendants’

26 alleged violation of the Eighth Amendment occurred pursuant to a City of Seattle policy or was caused by a lack of

City of Seattle policy. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d 621 at 624 (9th Cir. 1988); Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 20

1 sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732

(9th Cir. 2001).

G. Seventh Cause of Action: Deprivation of State and Federal

5 Constitutional Due Process

6 Plaintiff claims defendants City of Seattle and Lincoln Towing “violated Plaintiff’s

Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process by denying her a prompt post-

seizure hearing which she was entitled to under both state and federal constitutional law.”

10 Dkt. # 1-2 at 9.

11 1. Federal Constitutional Due Process

As discussed supra (II.C.1), plaintiff’s allegation of a violation of her federal

constitutional due process rights fails because plaintiff’s complaint offers no allegation,

15 “bare” or otherwise, that defendants’ alleged violation of her federal constitutional due

16 process rights occurred pursuant to a City of Seattle policy or was caused by a lack of City

of Seattle policy. Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d 621 at 624 (9th Cir. 1988); Monell, 436 U.S.

658 (1978). Even so, the Court notes that plaintiff’s complaint also contains no allegation

that defendant City of Seattle told plaintiff she was not entitled to a prompt post-seizure

21 hearing to challenge the impoundment of her vehicle—other than the complaint’s merely

conclusory description of “Defendant City’s and Lincoln Towing’s” alleged “insistence

that she was not entitled to any judicial hearing . . . .” Dkt. #1-2 at ¶ 48. See Daniels-Hall

v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010). Beyond that conclusory allegation,

26 the complaint fails to otherwise allege that the City of Seattle caused plaintiff’s post-

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 21

1 seizure hearing to occur seven months after plaintiff’s vehicle was impounded. Dkt. # 1-2.

The complaint does allege that two employees of defendant Lincoln Towing did not help

plaintiff initiate a request for a hearing and that, at one Lincoln Towing impound lot,

5 plaintiff was told she could not make a hearing request because she was not the registered

6 owner of the vehicle. Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 36–38. The complaint also alleges that Lincoln

Towing is the City of Seattle’s “agent” for towing services, id. at ¶¶ 2, 8, but the complaint

does not allege that Lincoln Towing is the City of Seattle’s agent for the purpose of

10 arranging post-seizure hearings. The Seattle Municipal Code provides for post-seizure

11 hearings within two days of receipt of a written request. SMC 11.30.120.D. See Lone Star

Sec. & Video, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 584 F.3d 1232, 1237 (9th Cir. 2009) (enacting

and publishing a statute is sufficient notice for the purposes of procedural due process)

15 (citing United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 108 (1985)). Therefore, plaintiff’s federal

16 procedural due process claim against the City of Seattle fails under Monell, 436 U.S. 658

(1978); fails to breach Officer Strozier’s qualified immunity under Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,

62–63 (2018); and shall be dismissed for lack of “sufficient facts alleged to support a

cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

21 2. State Constitutional Due Process

“Washington’s due process clause does not afford a broader due process protection

than the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re Dyer, 143 Wash. 2d 384, 394 (2001) (citing State

v. Ortiz, 119 Wash.2d 294 (1992)). Plaintiff does not argue otherwise, nor does plaintiff

26 offer any Washington State authorities in support of her state constitutional due process

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 22

1 claim. Dkt. # 22 at 21:15–22:6. Therefore, for the above-explained reasons concerning the

factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint, see supra (II.G.1), plaintiff’s state procedural

due process claim fails for lack of “sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal

5 theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

6 Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action is therefore dismissed as to defendants City of

Seattle and Officer Strozier.

H. Eighth Cause of Action: Violation of Homestead Act

10 Plaintiff claims defendants City of Seattle and Lincoln Towing “violated the

11 Washington Homestead Act by attaching her home as security for an impound debt and

threatening a forced sale of her vehicle home in violation of the Washington Constitution,

article XIX, § 1 and RCW 6.13.070.” Dkt. # 1-2 at 9. While plaintiff’s bus likely qualifies

15 as a homestead under the facts pled in plaintiff’s complaint, what triggers application of

16 the Homestead Act is an attempt to collect on a debt. Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 at 147, 152

(2021) (“The homestead act operates as a shield to protect against creditors’ actions; it is

not a sword to prevent such actions in the first instance.”). Here, as in Long, there is no

allegation of an attempt to collect on a debt owed by plaintiff (nor could there be, since, as

21 discussed above, plaintiff does not owe any debt). Id. See also Dkt. # 1-2. Nor do the facts

pled in plaintiff’s complaint plausibly allege an “attachment” that would trigger

application of the Homestead Act. “Attachment” is “the physical ‘seizing of . . . property

to secure a judgment or to be sold in satisfaction of a judgment.” Long, 198 Wash.2d 136

26 at 152 (2021) (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 157 (11th ed. 2019)). Even taking as true

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 23

1 plaintiff’s claim that the impoundment led to the attachment of plaintiff’s home “as

security for an impound debt,” that attachment would have occurred after the

impoundment, and thus could not be the reason for the impoundment. See Dkt. # 17 at

5 9:8–10. Thus, “the homestead act’s protections do not apply” to plaintiff on the facts pled

6 in her complaint. Long, 198 Wash.2d 136 at 152 (2021). Therefore, plaintiff’s eighth cause

will be dismissed with prejudice as to defendant City of Seattle due to “an absence of

sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732

(9th Cir. 2001).9

11 I. Ninth Cause of Action: Consumer Protection Act

This claim was brought only against defendants City of Seattle and Lincoln

Towing. Plaintiff, in her response, “acknowledges that the City of Seattle is not a ‘person’

15 for the purposes of the CPA and thus cannot be sued for violating the Act.” Dkt. # 22 at

16 24:17–19. Therefore, the Court will grant defendant City of Seattle’s motion to dismiss

this claim with prejudice. Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

J. Tenth Cause of Action: Negligence

Plaintiff claims that when her vehicle was in the “sole possession” of defendants

21 City of Seattle and Lincoln Towing, those defendants “negligently failed to exercise

reasonable care to protect plaintiff’s property from theft and damage, and that negligent

failure was the proximate cause of the theft of her property and of damage to her

9 In plaintiff’s response she alleges some sort of conspiracy, perhaps to violate the Homestead Act or perhaps to

26 violate a common law prohibition on damaging another person’s business. Dkt. # 22 at 23:11–24:12. These causes of

action do not appear in plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. # 1-2, and therefore will not be considered.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 24

1 property.” Dkt. #1-2 at 10. Setting aside the question of how the City of Seattle and

Lincoln Towing could each be in “sole possession” of plaintiff’s vehicle, Dkt. # 17 at

23:22–24:1, plaintiff’s complaint does not state any facts that plausibly allege the City of

5 Seattle was in “sole possession” of plaintiff’s bus when the alleged theft and damage to

6 plaintiff’s bus occurred. See Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶¶ 32–47. Although plaintiff’s complaint does

allege that Lincoln Towing “contracts with the City of Seattle to provide vehicle towing

services, and is an agent of the City of Seattle,” Dkt. # 1-2 at ¶ 8, the complaint does not

10 allege that Lincoln Towing was acting as the City of Seattle’s agent during the time

11 plaintiff’s bus was being held at Lincoln Towing’s impound lot. Plaintiff’s response to the

motion to dismiss makes no agency argument at all as it relates to negligence. Dkt. # 22 at

22:7–23:2. In addition, plaintiff’s contention that the City of Seattle was in sole possession

15 of her bus under the theory of “constructive bailment,” Dkt. # 22 at 22–23, cites no

16 Washington State law and instead relies solely on out-of-state decisions from state courts

in Illinois, South Carolina, and Florida. Those out-of-state decisions do not support

plaintiff’s argument that under the particular facts of this case the City of Seattle is a

constructive bailee.10 Thus, although plaintiff argues that these out-of-state authorities

10 See Am. Ambassador Cas. Co. v. City of Chicago, 205 Ill. App. 3d 879, 882–83 (1990) (finding the City of

23 Chicago was a constructive bailee where the Chicago Police Department impounded a car, kept the car under its

“exclusive control” at the police department’s impound lot, and during that time the car was “stolen from the

24 department’s lot.”) (italics added); Hadfield v. Gilchrist, 343 S.C. 88, 102 (Ct. App. 2000) (finding that a tow

company operator, not the City of Charleston, was a constructive bailee where his towing company, acting pursuant to

25 a City of Charleston ordinance, impounded plaintiff’s car); People v. Andrews, 6 Cal. App. 3d 428, 433 (Ct. App.

1970) (stating, in regard to the validity of inventory searches, that upon the impoundment of a vehicle the police

26 “undoubtedly become ‘an involuntary bailee of the property and responsible for the vehicle and its contents,’” but not

discussing a factual scenario similar to the one alleged here).

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 25

1 show that police “and/or” a private towing company can become constructive bailees, Dkt.

# 22 at 22:19–23:2, when applied to the facts of this case none of plaintiff’s out-of-state

authorities actually supports the police “and” a private towing company proposition.

5 Therefore, plaintiff’s tenth cause of action will be dismissed as to defendant City of

6 Seattle. Navarro, 250 F.3d 729 at 732 (9th Cir. 2001).

K. Eleventh Cause of Action: Request for Permanent Injunction

Plaintiff requests that this Court permanently enjoin the City of Seattle and Lincoln

10 Towing from engaging in the rights violations alleged in the above causes of action.

11 Because causes of action one through ten have already been dismissed, this cause of action

will be dismissed as well.

III. Conclusion

15 For all the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss filed by

16 defendants City of Seattle and Officer Robert Strozier (Dkt. # 17). Plaintiff’s motion for

partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 25) and motion to lift stay (Dkt. # 35) are therefore

STRICKEN as MOOT.

As to the causes of action that have not been dismissed with prejudice, if plaintiff

21 and her counsel believe they can, consistent with their Rule 11 obligations, remedy the

deficiencies identified in this Order, they may file a motion for leave to amend that

complies with LCR 15 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 26

2 Dated this 6th day of May, 2026.

5 Robert S. Lasnik

United States District Judge

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS - 27

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.