Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

GILBERT WASHINGTON,

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. 8:25-cv-1122-MSS-SPF

PRIMERICA LIFE INSURANCE

COMPANY and

THE HONORABLE STEVEN D.

MERRYDAY,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court without

Prepaying Fees or Costs, construed to the Court as a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

(Doc. 2). Upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1), Crossclaim (Doc. 2), and request to

proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be

denied, the Complaint dismissed, and the Crossclaim stricken.

I. Background

This is one of many cases brought in this District against Defendants Primerica Life

Insurance Company and the Honorable Steven D. Merryday regarding the life insurance

policy of Plaintiff Gilbert Washington’s mother, Patricia Ann Washington. The first case was

DeBose v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., No. 8:24-cv-2433-SDM-NHA (M.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2024). After

Judge Merryday dismissed the action without prejudice because Plaintiff Angela Debose did

not comply with the court’s directive to obtain counsel because a pro se party may not represent

an estate in which there are multiple beneficiaries, id. at (Doc. 34), the later cases followed

and included Judge Merryday. See Washington v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., et al., No. 8:25-cv-

1080-TPB-AEP (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2025) (dismissed May 28, 2025); Harris v. Primerica Life

Ins. Co., et al., No. 8:25-cv-1121-WFJ-SPF (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2025) (dismissed July 16, 2025,

for failure to prosecute); Washington v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., et al., No. 8:25-cv-1123-WFJ-SPF

(M.D. Fla. May 1, 2025) (Judge Merryday dismissed on July 11, 2025, but the case remains

pending); Washington v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., et al., No. 8:25-cv-1124-KKM-LSG (M.D. Fla.

May 1, 2025) (dismissed May 16, 2025, for failure to pay the court’s filing fee or seek in forma

pauperis status); Harris v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., et al., No. 8:25-cv-1160-JLB-NHA (M.D. Fla.

May 5, 2025) (remains pending). The instant action is apparently Gilbert Washington’s only

case against Primerica and Judge Merryday.

Like in the other actions, Plaintiff, a Florida resident, files suit against Primerica, an

insurance company with an address in Florida, for failing to pay the proceeds from Ms.

Washington’s life insurance policy. (Doc. 1 at 4). He seeks damages from Primerica for this

breach of contract claim. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff also asserts that Judge Merryday, “acting under

the color of state law . . . violated the civil rights of Angela Washington Debose” by denying

her due process rights and access to the courts in another case Debose brought in which Judge

Merryday found her to be a vexatious litigant.1 (Id.). He seeks injunctive relief against Judge

Merryday that “refrain[s] him or remove[s] him from this case[.]” (Id. at 5). Plaintiff raises

the same claims against Primerica and Judge Merryday in his Crossclaim. (Doc. 2).

II. Legal Standard

1 In dismissing the claims against Judge Merryday from one of the cases associated with this one,

Judge Barber provided an insightful summary of Ms. DeBose’s lengthy history with courts in this

District. Washington v. Primerica Life Ins. Co., et al., No. 8:25-cv-1080-TPB-AEP, at (Doc. 2) (M.D. Fla.

May 1, 2025).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court may, upon a finding of indigency, authorize the

commencement of an action without requiring the prepayment of fees or security therefor. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). When an application to proceed in forma pauperis is filed, the court must

review the case and dismiss it sua sponte if the court determines the action is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). A suit is

frivolous when it is “without any merit in fact or law.” Selensky v. Alabama, 619 F. App’x 846,

848 (2015).2 Where a district court determines from the face of the complaint that the factual

allegations are baseless or the legal theories are without merit, the court may conclude that

the case has little or no chance of success and dismiss the complaint before service of process.

Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993).

The phrase “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” has the same

meaning as the nearly identical phrase in Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See

Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The language of section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) tracks the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and we will

apply Rule 12(b)(6) standards in reviewing dismissals under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).”).

Namely:

To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must state a “plausible”

claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, ––––, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949,

173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). This requires sufficient “factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

the misconduct alleged.” Id. at ––––, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Although we must

accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, we need not apply this

rule to legal conclusions. Id. at ––––, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Furthermore, the

factual allegations must go beyond “naked assertions” and establish more

than “a sheer possibility” of unlawful activity. Id. at ––––, 129 S.Ct. at 1949

2 Unpublished opinions of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals are not considered binding

precedent; however, they may be cited as persuasive authority. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

(quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). In other words, the

“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct.

1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

Azar v. Nat'l City Bank, 382 F. App’x 880, 884 (11th Cir. 2010).

And under Rule 8(a)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed

factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-

harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell, 550 U.S. at 555).

Dismissal is also appropriate if, upon review, the complaint is found to lack subject

matter jurisdiction. Cafaro v. Wyllins, No. 8:10-cv-1836-T-30EAJ, 2010 WL 3747868, at *1

(M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 3747837 (M.D. Fla.

Sept. 22, 2010). Finally, in reviewing a complaint, courts hold pro se pleadings to a less

stringent standard and, therefore, construe the complaint more liberally. Tannenbaum v. United

States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent

standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”).

III. Analysis

Upon review of Plaintiff’s filings, he appears financially eligible to proceed in forma

pauperis: He receives $1,017 in monthly social security benefits and has from $1,050 to $1,180

in monthly expenses. See (Doc. 2). Despite this, the undersigned recommends dismissal of

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Merryday with prejudice and dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims

against Primerica without prejudice with leave to file an amended complaint. The

undersigned begins with discussing the issues with the claims against Judge Merryday and

Primerica separately and then turns to the general sufficiency of the Complaint and

Crossclaim.

A. Absolute Judicial Immunity and Standing

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Merryday should be dismissed with prejudice because

he is entitled to absolute judicial immunity and Plaintiff lacks standing to bring these claims.

A judge is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for acts performed within the scope of their

judicial office. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (citing Bradley v. Fisher,

80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871)). Judicial immunity applies when “(1) the judge dealt with the

plaintiff in his judicial capacity and (2) the judge did not act in the clear absence of all

jurisdiction.” Bush v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 177 F. App’x 16, 17 (11th Cir. 2006) (alteration in

original) (citation omitted). “The immunity applies even when the judge’s conduct ‘was in

error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.’” Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d

1293, 1301 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57). “Whether a judge’s actions

were made while acting in his judicial capacity depends on whether: (1) the act complained

of constituted a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge’s chambers or

in open court; (3) the controversy involved a case pending before the judge; and (4) the

confrontation arose immediately out of a visit to the judge in his judicial capacity.” Sibley v.

Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Scott v. Hayes, 719 F.2d 1562, 1565 (11th

Cir. 1983)).

Here, construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, he alleges that Judge Merryday, while

presiding over a case in which Ms. DeBose was a party, dismissed her claims and concluded

that she was a vexatious litigant. (Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff does not allege that Judge Merryday

acted outside his judicial capacity and in “clear absence of all jurisdiction,” as required to

defeat judicial immunity. See Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000). Indeed,

setting hearings, entering orders, and striking filings in cases pending before him are normal

judicial functions. And, when DeBose appealed Judge Merryday’s vexatious litigant finding,

the Eleventh Circuit affirmed his decision. Debose v. United States, 2024 WL 489699, at *1-3

(11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024). As such, Judge Merryday is entitled to absolute judicial immunity

and the claims against him should be dismissed with prejudice. McCree v. Griffin, 2020 WL

2632329, at *1-2 (11th Cir. May 20, 2020) (holding that a judge was entitled to absolute

judicial immunity from injunctive relief and money damages where the plaintiff alleged that

the judge violated his constitutional rights by arbitrarily denying motion); Bolin v. Story, 225

F.3d 1234, 1239-40 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that federal judges are entitled to absolute

judicial immunity from injunctive relief and money damages for acts taken in their judicial

capacity unless jurisdiction is clearly absent).

Plaintiff also does not have standing to challenge the Ms. DeBose’s vexatious litigant

order. Article III of the United States Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to

actual cases and controversies. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Standing is perhaps the most

important Article III doctrine. Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262,

1273 (11th Cir. 2001). To prove standing, a plaintiff must show “(1) that he has suffered an

actual or threatened injury, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of

the defendant, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.” Harris v.

Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that he

was subject to Judge Merryday’s order or will be. As such, he does not have standing to bring

this claim. See Washington, No. 8:25-cv-1080-TPB-AEP, at (Doc. 2) (stating that the plaintiff

did not have standing to challenge Judge Merryday’s vexatious litigant order on behalf of Ms.

DeBose).

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not provide sufficient support for the Court's subject matter

jurisdiction. Actions brought pursuant to the United States Constitution, federal statutes, or

treaties enjoy federal question jurisdiction in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On the other

hand, a court can exercise diversity jurisdiction where (1) the amount in controversy exceeds

the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs; and (2) there is complete diversity

of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1); see also Morrison v. Allstate Indem. Co., 228 F.3d 1255,

1261 (11th Cir. 2000). “When jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, 28 U.S.C. §

1332, the plaintiff's complaint must specifically allege each party's citizenship, and these

allegations must show that the plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states.” Am.

Motorists Ins. Co. v. Am. Emp'rs’ Ins. Co., 600 F.2d 15, 16 (5th Cir. 1979). In other words, no

party plaintiff may be a citizen of the same state as any of the defendants. Owen Equip. &

Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). However, when an action is brought under

the United States Constitution or federal law, a court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction

over state law claims in the same case if those claims arise from the same conduct and

circumstances as the federal claims, and thus form part of the same case or controversy. 28

U.S.C. § 1367(a); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966); Palmer v. Hosp. Auth.

Of Randolph Cnty., 22 F.3d 1559, 1567-69 (11th Cir. 1994).

Here, Plaintiff’s claims against Primerica appear to be of the state law variety because

he alleges that Primerica failed to honor Ms. Washington’s life insurance policy and acted in

bad faith, which would require the Court to have diversity jurisdiction. However, because it

appears that Plaintiff and Primerica are citizens of Florida, diversity jurisdiction is

unavailable. Moreover, because Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Merryday are also

recommended to be dismissed, Plaintiff has no federal hook to trigger supplemental

jurisdiction over his claims against Primerica. It is therefore uncertain from the face of the

Complaint that the Court is permitted to exercise subject matter jurisdiction.

C. Pleading Deficiencies and Crossclaim

Plaintiff’s Complaint is also an impermissible shotgun pleading. To comply with

federal pleading standards, a complaint “must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the

claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Federal

Rules also require plaintiffs to “state [their] claims . . . in numbered paragraphs, each limited

as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). “A ‘shotgun

pleading’ is one that lacks the minimum clarity, brevity, or coherence required by Rules 8 and

10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Lozano v. Prummell, No. 2:22-cv-600-JES-KCD,

2022 WL 4384176, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 22, 2022). A shotgun pleading is a type of pleading

that is not allowed, even from pro se plaintiffs. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office,

792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).

Four basic types of shotgun pleadings violate Rules 8(a), 10(b), or both: (1) a complaint

that contains multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all preceding counts;

(2) a complaint that is replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously

connected to any particular cause of action; (3) a complaint that fails to separate into different

counts each cause of action or claim for relief; and (4) a complaint that asserts multiple claims

against multiple defendants without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for

which acts or omissions or which of the defendants the claim is brought against. Id. at 1321-

23. “The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail to one degree

or another, and in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims

against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323. Shotgun pleadings

“exact an intolerable toll on the trial court’s docket, lead to unnecessary and unchanneled

discovery, and impose unwarranted expense on the litigants, the court and the court’s

parajudicial personnel and resources.” Jackson v. Bank of Am., N.A., 898 F.3d 1348, 1356-57

(11th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit has said that a

shotgun complaint may be dismissed “on that basis alone.” Id.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is the third type of shotgun pleading, comprised of all counts or

causes of action being combined into a singular paragraph. For example, to the extent the

Court can make heads or tails of Plaintiff’s allegations, it appears that he is attempting to bring

multiple causes of action against Primerica, including breach of contract, common law

insurance bad faith, and/or statutory insurance bad faith. However, he only provides a

paragraph in which he accuses Primerica of failing to pay under the life insurance policy and

engaging in bad faith of several varieties. (Doc. 1 at 4). No statutes or specific causes of

action are identified let alone used as the basis for organizing Plaintiff’s claims. Therefore,

Plaintiff does not give Defendants adequate notice of the grounds upon which his claims rest

and the Complaint should be dismissed.

Similarly, Plaintiff’s Crossclaim should be stricken. “[A] pleading may state as a

crossclaim any claim by one party against a co-party if the claim arises out of the transaction

or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action or of a counterclaim . . . .” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 13. “Courts have the inherent authority to strike improperly filed papers other than

pleadings.” Arthurs v. Global TPA, LLC, 2015 WL 13652716, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2015).

Because Primerica and Judge Merryday are not co-parties with Plaintiff, the crossclaims are

facially deficient and should therefore be stricken. See DeBose, 8:25-cv-2433, at (Doc. 55)

(striking a crossclaim where the person who filed it was not a party to the case).

IV. Conclusion

The undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Merryday be

dismissed with prejudice, the Complaint (Doc. 1) be dismissed without prejudice with leave

to file an amended complaint, and Plaintiff’s crossclaim (Doc. 2) be stricken. Although pro se

parties are often entitled to the opportunity to amend their complaints before dismissal,

Plaintiff’s claims do not appear amendable. See Jenkins v. Walker, 620 F. App’x 709, 711 (11th

Cir. 2015) (“[A] district court need not allow amendment if the amended complaint would

still be subject to dismissal.”); Cockrell v. Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007) (“Leave

to amend a complaint is futile when the complaint as amended would still be properly

dismissed or be immediately subject to summary judgment for the defendant.”) (citation

omitted). Judge Merryday is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, so any amendment to

those claims would be frivolous. Otherwise, Plaintiff should be given leave to amend his

claims against Primerica with the understanding that he cannot name Judge Merryday again

and he must address the concerns described herein.

For these reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS:

1. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) be dismissed.

2. Plaintiff’s Crossclaim (Doc. 2) be stricken.

3. Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Merryday be dismissed with prejudice.

4. Plaintiff be directed to file an amended complaint with his claim(s) against

Primerica Life Insurance Company within twenty-one (21) days of the Court’s

order of dismissal.

5. Plaintiffs Motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) be denied without prejudice

with leave to either pay the filing fee or refile amotion to proceed in forma pauperis

if he chooses to file an amended complaint.

IT IS SO REPORTED in Tampa, Florida, on March 23, 2026.

4 -~t

SEAN P. FL N =

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO PARTIES

Within fourteen days after being served with a copy of this Report and

Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to the proposed findings

and recommendations or request an extension of time to do so. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); 11th

Cir. R. 3-1. Failure of any party to timely object in accordance with the provisions of §

636(b)(1) waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on

the unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions contained in this Report and

Recommendation. 11th Cir. R. 3-1.

11