Wandell

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

KEITH L. WANDELL,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:23-cv-2446-TPB-CPT

DEPUTY CASBARRO,

Defendant.

____________________________________/

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Keith L. Wandell, proceeding pro se, sues Deputy Robert Casbarro in his

individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for federal civil rights violations

that occurred while Wandell was a detainee at the Manatee County Jail.1 He

proceeds on his Second Amended Complaint. (Doc. 32) He alleges that on June

22, 2023, Casbarro violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by utilizing

excessive force against him while escorting him through the jail.

Before the Court are cross motions for summary judgment. For the

reasons explained herein, Casbarro is entitled to judgment as a matter of law

on Wandell’s excessive force claim.

1 Wandell remains in custody at the Manatee County Jail and awaits trial in State v.

Wandell, No. 2019-CF-2149 (Fla. 12th Jud. Cir.). See Manatee County Sheriff’s Office

Arrest Inquiries at https://www.manateesheriff.com/arrest_inquiries/ (last accessed

May 29, 2026).

I. Background

On July 9, 2019, Wandell was arrested pursuant to a warrant and

transported to the Manatee County jail on suspicion of lewd and lascivious

molestation of a minor. (Doc. 53-1 at 14, Wandell’s deposition) Because of the

nature of the charges pending against Wandell, he was placed in protective

custody. (Doc. 53-2 at 2, Casbarro’s affidavit) Pursuant to the Sheriff’s policies,

inmates that are in protective custody are required to be restrained with both

leg shackles and handcuffs whenever they are outside of their assigned dorms.2

(Id.)

On June 22, 2023, Casbarro was informed that Wandell needed to be

escorted from his dorm to the intake and release section of the jail so he could

be transported to court. (Doc. 53-2 at 2) After retrieving Wandell from the

dorm, Casbarro applied leg shackles and handcuffs to Wandell. (Id.) He then

escorted Wandell and another inmate to the intake and release area. (Doc. 53-

1 at 23; Doc. 53-2 at 2)

2 This fact is established by Casbarro’s affidavit. (Doc. 53-2 at 2) In his response to

Casbarro’s summary judgment motion, Wandell states that “Defendant by choice and

not because of any existing or written policy that requires inmates in ‘G’ dorms to

wear hand or leg restraints for common escorts in secure areas of the jail, applied

hand and leg restraints on the Plaintiff for the escort.” (Doc. 55 at 1) However,

assertions in Wandell’s unsworn response alone are insufficient to create a factual

dispute regarding the Sheriff’s policy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A) (“A party

asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion

by: citing to particular parts of materials in the record[.]”

Wandell’s case against Casbarro is premised on three actions allegedly

taken by Casbarro while escorting Wandell through the jail. (Doc. 53-1 at 7)

Wandell alleges that (1) Casbarro applied his leg shackles too loosely causing

injury to his ankles (id. at 7); (2) Casbarro repeatedly shoved Wandell (id.); and

(3) Casbarro once slapped Wandell in the back of the head (id.).

Wandell brought this lawsuit against Casbarro because wants “to see

[Casbarro] punished.” (Id. at 50) Wandell seeks to recover $6.00 in

compensatory damages, which represents the cost to replace two pairs of socks

that were soiled by his ankle injuries. (Doc. 32 at 5; Doc. 53-1 at 51) He also

seeks to recover $199,994.00 in punitive damages to punish Casbarro for

shoving and slapping him. (Doc. 32 at 5; Doc. 53-1 at 51–52)

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A properly supported motion for

summary judgment is only defeated by the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

A moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there are no

genuine issues of material fact. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., 357 F.3d

1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004). When the moving party has discharged its burden,

the nonmoving party must then designate specific facts showing the existence

of genuine issues of material fact. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d

590, 593–94 (11th Cir. 1995). If there is a conflict between the parties’

allegations or evidence, the nonmoving party’s evidence is presumed to be true

and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the nonmoving party’s favor.

Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003).

The standard for cross-motions for summary judgment is not different

from the standard applied when only one party moves for summary judgment.

Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005),

abrogated in part by Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024). The Court

must consider each motion separately, resolving all reasonable inferences

against the party whose motion is under consideration. Id. ‘“Cross-motions for

summary judgment will not, in themselves, warrant the court in granting

summary judgment unless one of the parties is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law on facts that are not genuinely disputed.’” United States v.

Oakley, 744 F.2d 1553, 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (quoting Bricklayers Int’l Union,

Local 15 v. Stuart Plastering Co., 512 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1975)).

III. Analysis

A. Casbarro’s Motion for Summary Judgment3

Wandell’s claims are based on three actions allegedly taken by Casbarro

that constituted excessive force: (1) that Casbarro improperly applied leg

shackles, causing injury to his ankles; (2) that Casbarro shoved Wandell while

escorting him to a transportation vehicle; and (3) that Casbarro slapped

Wandell in the back of the head after Wandell returned from court. In his

motion for summary judgment, Casbarro acknowledges that a factual dispute

exists regarding those allegations and does not seek summary judgment

challenging the veracity of Wandell’s allegations. (Doc. 53 at 1–2) Rather,

Casbarro moves for summary judgment on the grounds that, accepting

Wandell’s version of the events as true, i.e., that Casbarro applied Wandell’s

leg shackles too loosely and shoved and slapped Wandell, Casbarro is

nevertheless entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly

established that his alleged actions arose to the level of a constitutional

violation. (Id.)

3 Casbarro filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. 53), Wandell filed a response

(Doc. 55), and Casbarro filed a reply (Doc. 56). Next, Wandell filed an unauthorized

“Response to Defendant’s Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment.” (Doc. 57) Casbarro moves to strike Wandell’s unauthorized sur-reply.

(Doc. 58) Wandell did not respond to the motion to strike. Because the Court does not

permit two opportunities to oppose the same motion, Casbarro’s motion to strike

Wandell’s unauthorized sur-reply is GRANTED. See Local Rule 3.01, M.D. Fla., and

the Clerk is directed to STRIKE Wandell’s filing at docket 57.

“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for individual public

officials performing discretionary functions insofar as their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Loftus v. Clark-Moore, 690 F.3d 1200,

1204 (11th Cir. 2012). To receive qualified immunity, an official must first

“establish that he or she acted within the scope of discretionary authority when

the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Robinson v. Sauls, 46 F.4th 1332, 1340

(11th Cir. 2022). Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the plaintiff

to show that (1) the defendant violated a constitutional right, and (2) this right

was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 1340–41.

Wandell alleges that “while working for the Manatee County Sheriff’s

Office . . . Casbarro . . . during a routine escort . . . intentionally applied [leg

restraints] incorrectly . . . and battered plaintiff by pushing and shoving [him]

to make [him] walk faster . . . and . . . slapped[him] in the head.” (Doc. 32 at

4–5) The parties do not dispute that Casbarro was acting within his

discretionary authority as a corrections officer when he allegedly applied force

while escorting Wandell through the jail. Therefore, the burden shifts to

Wandell to show that qualified immunity is inappropriate. See Alcocer v. Mills,

906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018).

“[O]nly decisions of the United States Supreme Court, [the Eleventh

Circuit Court of Appeals], or the highest court in a state can ‘clearly establish’

the law.” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Gates

v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018)). “Because only clearly

established law gives an officer fair notice that [his] conduct was unlawful, . . .

the contours of the constitutional right at issue ‘must be sufficiently clear [so]

that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that

right.’” Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1240 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739).

“[A] right can be clearly established in one of three ways.” Id. Wandell

must point to either “(1) case law with indistinguishable facts, (2) a broad

statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law, or (3)

conduct so egregious that a constitutional right was clearly violated, even in

the total absence of case law.” Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1240 (citations and

quotations omitted).

As a pretrial detainee, Wandell’s excessive force claim is governed by the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Kingsley v. Hendrickson,

576 U.S. 389, 391 (2015). “To establish a claim for excessive force in the

Fourteenth Amendment context, ‘a pretrial detainee must show only that the

force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.’”

Ireland v. Prummell, 53 F.4th 1274, 1297 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Kingsley,

576 U.S. at 396–97). Considerations bearing on the reasonableness or

unreasonableness of force include “the relationship between the need for the

use of force and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s injury;

any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; the

severity of the security problem at issue; the threat reasonably perceived by

the officer; and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting.” Kingsley, 576 U.S.

at 397. A court “must also account for the ‘legitimate interests that stem from

[the government’s] need to manage the facility in which the individual is

detained,’ appropriately deferring to ‘policies and practices that in th[e]

judgment’ of jail officials ‘are needed to preserve internal order and discipline

and to maintain institutional security.’” Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.

520, 540 (1979)).

As a preliminary matter, Casbarro argues that Wandell cannot prevail

by simply showing that Casbarro harbored an express intent to punish him.

(Doc. 53 at 8–9) The Court agrees. “[A]n express intent to punish alone, coupled

with an objectively reasonable use of force, can[not] sustain an excessive-force

claim.” Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1249 and n.15 (explaining that the circuit court

has not “read Kingsley to preserve (or create) the possibility of an excessive-

force violation, even in circumstances where the use of force is objectively

reasonable, on the ground that some sinister purpose is allegedly afoot”)

(citations and alterations omitted). Wandell must show more than Casbarro’s

intent to punish him by applying excessive force. He must show that force

applied was objectively unreasonable. “The appropriate standard for a pretrial

detainee’s excessive force claim is solely an objective one.” Kingsley, 576 U.S.

at 397.

1. Leg shackles

For purposes of ruling on Casbarro’s summary judgment motion, the

Court believes Wandell’s version of the events and views these additional facts

in the light most favorable to him, see Stephens v. DeGiovanni, 852 F.3d 1298,

1315 (11th Cir. 2017) (explaining that, when considering a summary judgment

motion, a court must “reconstruct the events in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party and determine whether the officer’s use of force was

excessive under those circumstances”):

Upon return to the jail, although Wandell complained about his leg

shackles to Casbarro, Casbarro “reattached the shackles again in an extremely

loose [manner] or in the largest setting possible.” (Doc. 53-1 at 25 and 32)

Wandell’s ankles were bleeding “too much” and “all the way to [his] feet[.]”

(Doc. 53-1 at 26 and 30)

Wandell first sought medical treatment for his ankles “[a]t the very next

med pass,” which was later that evening. (Id. at 38) A nurse looked at

Wandell’s ankles, noted that Wandell had blisters from the shackles, and gave

him bandages and a bottle of antibiotic ointment. (Id. at 39–40;

Doc. 55-1 at 10) Wandell himself applied the bandages to his ankles. (Doc. 53-

1 at 50) For fourteen days, Wandell received fresh bandages from several

different nurses. (Id. at 40; Doc. 55-1 at 8) It took about ten weeks for Wandell’s

blisters to completely heal. (Doc. 53-1 at 41)

In his summary judgment motion and reply, Casbarro argues that the

minor injuries to Wandell’s ankles, which healed without the treatment of a

physician, are insufficient as a matter of law to support an excessive force

claim. (Doc. 53 at 9–10; Doc. 56 at 3–5) Wandell responds that, regardless of

whether the shackles were applied too loosely or too tightly, his injuries were

“far greater than minimal and required daily treatments and bandage changes

for more than two weeks.” (Doc. 55 at 4)

Casbarro is entitled to qualified immunity on Wandell’s claim that his

improper application of leg shackles constituted excessive force. Wandell fails

to point to any law which permits an excessive force claim based on restraints

that were applied improperly and did not result in a severe or permanent

injury. In fact, the law is clearly established for the opposition proposition: that

the application of restraints will not support an excessive force claim absent a

showing of a severe and permanent injury. See Stephens, 852 F.3d at 1326 n.30

(no excessive force claim arising from officer leaving plaintiff “handcuffed for

almost three hours in handcuffs that were too tight” which caused “headaches,

backpain, and loss of sensation in his right hand”); Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d

1253, 1258 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000) (granting qualified immunity to officer based

on allegations of improper application of restraints when plaintiff had only

“minor bruising that quickly disappeared without treatment”).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wandell, the loosely-

applied shackles caused blisters to develop on his ankles, which bled “too

much” and “all the way to [his] feet[.]” (Doc. 53-1 at 26 and 30) Wandell sought

and received medical attention from nurses in the form of bandages and

ointment that he applied to his own ankles. His ankles required bandages for

two weeks and did not completely heal for ten weeks. Nevertheless, Wandell’s

injuries are simply insufficient to show that the application of force was

objectively unreasonable. “[O]nly the most exceptional cases will permit an

excessive force claim on the basis of handcuffing alone.” Sebastian v. Ortiz, 918

F.3d 1301, 1312 (11th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases). Indeed, “[p]ainful

handcuffing, without more, is not excessive force in cases where the resulting

injuries are minimal.” Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1352 (11th Cir.

2002) (citing cases). The non-permanent injuries to Wandell’s ankles, which

did not require treatment from a physician but rather the self-application of

bandages and ointment, cannot support an excessive force claim. See Gold v.

City of Miami, 121 F.3d 1442, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997) (granting qualified

immunity when officers applied handcuffs “too tightly” for twenty minutes

because he “suffered only skin abrasions for which [the plaintiff] did not seek

medical treatment”).

Wandell has not come forward with materially similar cases that precede

the events of June 22, 2023, that stand for the proposition that Casbarro’s

actions were unlawful. See Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402, 1406 (11th Cir.

1998) (“Any case law that a plaintiff relies upon to show that a government

official has violated a clearly established right must pre-date the officer’s

alleged improper conduct, involve materially similar facts, and truly compel

the conclusion that the plaintiff had a right under federal law.”) Accordingly,

Casbarro is entitled to qualified immunity on Wandell’s claim that his

application of leg shackles constituted excessive force.

2. Shoving and slapping

For purposes of ruling on Casbarro’s summary judgment motion, the

Court again believes Wandell’s version of the events and views these additional

facts in the most favorable to him:

While escorting Wandell from his dorm, Casbarro shoved Wandell seven

or eight times. (Doc. 53-1 at 36) Each time he shoved Wandell, Casbarro

uttered a derogatory comment, including “keep moving, speed up, walk faster,

you piece of shit, you faggot, you chomo.”4 (Id. at 36) Casbarro’s shoving of

4 Wandell argues that Casbarro’s comments amount to verbal and sexual

harassment, sexual discrimination, and hate speech. (Doc. 55 at 5) To the extent

Wandell attempts to argue that Casbarro’s comments amount to a constitutional

violation, such claim fails. As the Court explained in its earlier screening order,

“threatening, demeaning, or abusive comments do not rise to the level of a

constitutional violation.” (Doc. 8 at 5, dismissing any claim against Casbarro based

upon unprofessional conduct and verbal abuse)

Wandell did not cause him to fall to the ground, and it did not cause him

injuries. (Id. at 37)

Later, after he returned from court, Casbarro slapped Wandell’s head

one time with an open palm. (Id. at 38) While slapping him on the head,

Casbarro taunted Wandell by saying three or four times, “I will put my hands

on you.” (Id. at 37) Casbarro’s slapping of Wandell’s head was painful but it

did not cause any injuries. (Id.)

In his summary judgment motion and reply, Casbarro argues that his

conduct of shoving and slapping Wandell, while improper and unprofessional,

amounts to de minimis force and does not implicate the protections of the

Constitution, especially because the use of force did not cause any injury. (Doc.

53 at 11; Doc. 56 at 3–5) In response, Wandell argues that Casbarro rendered

him “completely defenseless by mechanical restraint, verbally harass[ing] him

and physically batter[ing] him causing lasting physical and mental injury . . .

for sadistic gratification and a means to punish him.” (Doc. 55 at 5)

Casbarro is entitled to qualified immunity on Wandell’s claim that his

conduct of shoving and slapping Wandell constituted excessive force. “[T]his

Circuit has established the principle that the application of de minimis force,

without more, will not support a claim for excessive force[.]” Nolin, 207 F.3d at

1257. “This is because the right to [restrain a detainee] necessarily carries with

it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof, and the

typical [restraint] involves some force and injury.” Sebastian, 918 F.3d at 1308

(quotations omitted). “In the Fourteenth Amendment context[,] . . . [t]here is,

of course, a de minimis level of imposition with which the Constitution is not

concerned.” Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1251 (quotation omitted). “[The] de minimis

principle reflects the reality that not everything that stinks violates the

Constitution.” Id. (quotations and alterations omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wandell, Casbarro

shoved Wandell seven or eight times and once slapped him in the back of the

head, all while he was restrained with shackles and handcuffs. However, the

circuit court has recognized that such use of force is de minimis and does not

violate the Constitution. See Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552, 1559

(11th Cir. 1993) (ruling that although pushing a handcuffed plaintiff against a

wall “might . . . be[] unnecessary,” it is not “plainly unlawful”); McCall v.

Crosthwait, 336 F. App’x 871, 873 (11th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court’s

finding that officer’s use of force was de minimis and failed to establish

constitutional violation when officer pushed detainee out of jail’s elevator,

causing him to hit the steel cell door and fall against window, resulting in

bruising and treated with a prescription for ibuprofen); Johnson v. Moody, 206

F. App’x 880, 885 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding force was de minimis when officer

intentionally kicked metal door on plaintiff’s hand, necessitating a tetanus

shot, bandages, and non-prescription pain relievers); Nolin, 207 F.3d at 1255

(finding force was de minimis where officer grabbed and shoved plaintiff

against vehicle and kneed him in the back causing bruises to forehead, chest,

and wrists). Finally, the undisputed fact that Wandell suffered no injuries from

Casbarro’s shoving and slapping him further supports the determination that

the application of force was de minimis. See Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1251 (“[I]t

seems most important there was very little force used and essentially no harm

done.”).

Again, because Wandell has not come forward with materially similar

cases that precede the events of June 22, 2023, which stand for the proposition

that Casbarro’s actions in shoving and slapping him were unlawful, Casbarro

is entitled to qualified immunity.

B. Wandell’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Wandell separately files a motion for summary judgment and argues

that he “can produce and disclose admissible evidence to support and

corroborate every allegation in the complaint.” (Doc. 46 at 3) Casbarro

responds that Wandell’s summary judgment motion must be denied because

he fails to cite to any evidentiary materials in the record. (Doc. 51 at 2) Wandell

replies that Casbarro and his counsel are in possession of evidentiary materials

that support his claims, including his initial grievance and supervisors’

responses to the grievances.5 (Doc. 52 at 7)

Summary judgment is proper only “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party seeking summary judgment

“always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis of its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record], which it

believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine [dispute.]” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).

The moving party’s burden on a motion for summary judgment

“depend[s] on whether the legal issues . . . are ones on which the movant or the

non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial.” Fitzpatrick v. City of

Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1115 (11th Cir. 1993). “[F]or issues on which the movant

would bear the burden of proof at trial, that party must show affirmatively the

absence of a genuine [dispute] of material fact: it must support its motion with

credible evidence . . . that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not

controverted at trial.” Id. (emphasis in original) (quotation omitted). “If the

party moving for summary judgment fails to discharge the initial burden then

5 Wandell suggests the existence of a video recording of the incident or incidents. (Doc.

52 at 1) However, the evidentiary record contains no such video recording.

the motion must be denied and the court need not consider what, if any,

showing the non-movant has made.” Id. at 1116.

Wandell’s brief and conclusory summary judgment motion is not

supported by references to record evidence. Instead, it primarily consists of a

restatement of his legal claims and citations to caselaw, much of which is

inapplicable to the issues presented in this case. In his reply, Wandell attempts

to bolster his summary judgment motion by promising that he can, at some

point in the future, produce admissible evidence to support his claims.

Wandell’s motion is not supported by references to credible evidence that

would entitle him to a directed verdict on his excessive force claim if not

controverted at trial. Therefore, because he fails to discharge his initial burden

of identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine

dispute, his summary judgment motion must be denied.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons explained herein, is it ORDERED that:

1. Casbarro’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 53) is

GRANTED, and Wandell’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 46) is

DENIED.

2. Casbarro’s Motion to Strike Wandell’s Unauthorized Summary

Judgment Sur-Reply is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to STRIKE the

docket entry at 57 as an unauthorized sur-reply. See Local Rule 3.01, M.D. Fla.

3. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of Casbarro and

against Wandell, to terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and to

CLOSE this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers in Tampa, Florida, this 8rd day of

June, 2026.

TOM BARBER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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