McNeil

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

WILLIAM MCNEIL, JR.,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25-cv-1058-MMH-PDB

OFFICER D. BOWERS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant T.K. Waters’ Motion to

Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 27; Motion), filed January 5, 2026. In the Motion,

Defendant Sheriff Thomas Kevin Waters (Sheriff Waters) seeks dismissal

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)) of the

claims brought against him in Count II of Plaintiff’s Complaint for Damages

(Doc. 1; Complaint), filed September 10, 2025. Plaintiff, William McNeil, Jr.,

timely filed a response in opposition to the Motion. See Plaintiff’s Response to

Defendant T.K. Waters’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 30; Response), filed

January 20, 2026. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Legal Standard

In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

accept the factual allegations set forth in the complaint as true. See Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508

& n.1 (2002); see also Lotierzo v. Woman's World Med. Ctr., Inc., 278 F.3d 1180,

1182 (11th Cir. 2002). In addition, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in

favor of the plaintiff. See Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 705 (11th Cir. 2010).

Nonetheless, the plaintiff must still meet some minimal pleading requirements.

Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomm., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262–63 (11th Cir. 2004)

(citations omitted). Indeed, while “[s]pecific facts are not necessary,” the

complaint should “give the defendant fair notice of what the … claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per

curiam) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further,

the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “But where the well-pleaded facts

do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct,”

the plaintiff has failed to meet their pleading burden under Rule 8. Id. at 679.

The “plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to

relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of

the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(citations omitted); see also Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (explaining that

“[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal” (citation omitted)). Indeed,

“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions,” which simply “are not entitled

to [an] assumption of truth.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, in ruling on a

motion to dismiss, the Court must determine whether the complaint contains

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

II. Background1

On February 19, 2025, Defendant Officer D. Bowers of the Jacksonville

Sheriff’s Office (JSO) conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle McNeil was driving

without headlights and without wearing a seatbelt. See Complaint ¶ 8.

“As … Bowers approached the driver’s side window of [McNeil’s] vehicle,

[McNeil] opened his door to indicate that his window was damaged and inquired

about the reason for the traffic stop.” Id. ¶ 9. Bowers told McNeil that Bowers

stopped him because McNeil was not wearing a seatbelt and did not have his

1 In considering the Motion, the Court must accept all factual allegations in the

Complaint as true, consider the allegations in the light most favorable to McNeil, and accept

all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from such allegations. See Hill v. White, 321 F.3d

1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Okaloosa Cnty., 21 F.3d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1994).

As such, the facts recited here are drawn from the Complaint and may well differ from those

that ultimately can be proved.

headlights on in inclement weather. Id. ¶ 10. But “there was no inclement

weather.” Id. Because McNeil was concerned about Bower’s truthfulness given

the stated reasons for the traffic stop, McNeil requested that a supervisor be

called. Id. ¶ 11. Bowers then put his hand on his firearm and ordered McNeil to

exit his vehicle. Id. ¶ 12. McNeil shut and locked his door but “made no effort to

escape.” Id. And he continued to ask for a supervisor. Id.

Other officers, including Defendant Officer D. Miller, arrived at the

location of the traffic stop. Id. ¶ 13. McNeil told Miller the reason Bowers gave

him for the stop and why he had requested a supervisor. Id. Notably, when

McNeil explained that it was not raining, Miller agreed. Id. Then, “[w]hile

another officer had his firearm aimed directly at” McNeil, Bowers broke

McNeil’s driver’s side window. Id. ¶ 15. Bowers then “struck [McNeil] in the

face.” Id. And “Miller … released [McNeil’s] seatbelt and removed [him] from

the vehicle.” Id. ¶ 16.

Although McNeil was not resisting or presenting a threat, Bowers struck

him in the face again. Id. Bowers, Miller, and another officer forced McNeil to

the ground. Id. ¶ 17. While McNeil lay prone with his hands behind his back,

Bowers “struck [his] head against the pavement, leading to a laceration of the

chin, a laceration of the lip, a fractured tooth, and a clinically diagnosed

traumatic brain injury.” Id. And, “Miller delivered four close hand strikes to

[McNeil’s] back.” Id. Several other officers on the scene witnessed these events

and, although they had “both the opportunity and the requisite training and

skills to intervene and stop” Bowers and Miller, they did not do so. Id. ¶¶ 18,

19.

Sheriff Waters is the “Sheriff of the Consolidated City of Jacksonville and

Duval County” (the City).2 Id. ¶ 6. As such, Sheriff Waters “is a policy maker

for [the City].” Id. ¶ 23. According to McNeil, “[the City], in conjunction

with [Sheriff] Waters, enforces a policy/custom that allows its officers to utilize

unwarranted and excessive physical force against an individual who poses no

immediate threat to the officer or to others, a practice commonly referred to as

‘distractionary blows.’” Id. ¶ 20; see also id. ¶ 62. And, “[the City], in conjunction

with [Sheriff] Waters, maintains a policy that allows its officers to refrain from

reporting instances of force when the physical force applied to an individual did

not lead to, or was claimed to have led to, any injury.” Id. ¶ 21; see also id. ¶ 62.

This policy encourages officers to use illegal or excessive force free from the

obligation to report it and unafraid of any consequences. Id. ¶ 21; see also id.

¶ 62. “[T]his policy [also] permits an officer” to assault an individual “without

2 The City of Jacksonville and Duval County are consolidated and “are governed under

the Charter of the Consolidated Government of the City of Jacksonville, which established a

mayor-city council form of government.” See Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Harris,

647 F.3d 1093, 1096 n.2 (11th Cir. 2011).

the obligation to report” the assault. Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶ 62. McNeil says

“[t]he policymakers … determined the[se] customs, practices, and policies.” Id.

¶ 64. And their “failure to stop” the “customs, practices, and policies … were

intentional choices.” Id. According to McNeil, the “policies enacted by the [City],

in conjunction with [Sheriff] Waters, were instrumental in the infringement of

[his] constitutional rights.” Id. ¶ 22; see also id. ¶ 64 (stating that the “customs,

practices, and/or policies caused, were proximate causes or, and/or were

producing causes of all damages referenced herein”).

In a footnote to an unnumbered introductory section of his Complaint,

McNeil alleges that Bowers “did not report Use of Force 1 in his Response to

Resistance Report[.]” Id. at 3 n.1. McNeil does not define “Use of Force 1” or

“Response to Resistance Report.” See generally id. Despite this, McNeil goes on

to allege that when Bowers was asked why he did not report “Use of Force 1,”

Bowers “explained he considered his use of the distraction strike as a tool and

did not consider it as the deployment of force.” Id. at 3 n.1.3 According to McNeil,

“JSO rarely finds that its officers have violated the use-of-force policy.” Id. ¶ 63.

3 By including these allegations in a footnote to an unnumbered introductory section,

McNeil not only makes it more difficult for Defendants to respond to the allegations, he also

violates Rule 10(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b) (“A party must state its claims or defenses in

numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.”).

McNeil’s counsel are admonished to comply with all applicable Rules when making future

filings.

Out of 424 investigations into complaints of excessive use of force between 2022

and 2024, JSO “upheld” only three complaints. Id.

McNeil brings his claims in two counts. In Count I, he brings Fourth

Amendment excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. § 19834 against Bowers and

Miller in their individual capacities. Id. ¶¶ 27–44.1.5 In Count II, he brings

municipal liability claims under Monell6 against the City and Sheriff Waters,

in his individual capacity, contending they caused the officers’ alleged unlawful

use of force. Id. ¶¶ 44.2–65.7 Bowers, Miller, and the City filed answers to the

Complaint. See Answer and Affirmative Defenses of Defendants Bowers and

Miller (Doc. 23), filed December 29, 2025; Defendants Consolidated City of

Jacksonville and Duval County’s Answer and Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 26;

The City’s Answer), filed January 5, 2026.8

4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, “Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law[.]” Id.

5 In the Complaint, McNeil includes two successive paragraphs numbered “44.” See

Complaint at 16–17. The Court refers to the first as “44.1” and the second as “44.2.”

6 See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (holding that municipalities

and other subdivisions of states are “persons” under § 1983).

7 McNeil’s paragraph numbering jumps from ¶ 44 to ¶ 61. See Complaint at 17. There

are no paragraphs 45–60. See generally id.

8 In the Complaint, McNeil references “Exhibit A,” see Complaint ¶ 62, but he does not

attach any exhibits, see generally id.

III. Discussion

In the Motion, Sheriff Waters argues that the claim against him is due to

be dismissed because McNeil fails to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible

claim for supervisory liability. See Motion at 4–5.9 In the Response, McNeil does

little more than restate contentions he makes in the Complaint. See generally

Response. In a conclusory fashion and with almost no citation to authority,

McNeil simply points to paragraphs 21, 22, 23, and 62 of the Complaint and

states that Sheriff Waters is individually liable. See id. at 2–4.10

As a preliminary matter, McNeil’s framing of his claim requires

clarification. In the caption of the Complaint, McNeil identifies as a Defendant

“Sheriff … Waters, in his individual capacity as Sheriff of [the City][.]” See

Complaint at 1. But a single § 1983 claim against a natural person can only be

brought against the person in his individual capacity or as the holder of an

official role—not both. To bring a claim against Sheriff Waters in both his

individual capacity and as the Sheriff of the City is to bring two separate claims

against him: an individual capacity claim and an official-capacity claim. McNeil

jumbles the distinction between these two claims. He consistently refers to his

9 Sheriff Waters does not argue that he is entitled to qualified immunity. See generally

Motion.

10 The arguments McNeil raises in the Response are so perfunctory and unsupported

by citations to legal authority that he nearly concedes the issues.

claim against Sheriff Waters as an individual capacity claim. See Complaint at

1, ¶ 6; Response at 2, 4. Yet he states that his claim is against Sheriff Waters

“in his individual capacity as Sheriff of the City,” see Complaint at 1, and that

“[Sheriff] Waters … is an entity, corporate and political, duly organized under

the laws of the State of Florida,” id. ¶ 6. Moreover, he characterizes his claim

as a Monell claim, id. ¶ 44.2, even though Monell claims are § 1983 claims

against local governmental entities and there is no such thing as a Monell claim

against a natural person in his individual capacity, see Gatchel v. Henry Cnty.,

No. 1:22-CV-03284-VMC-JKL, 2023 WL 6216529, at *4 (N.D. Ga. June 20,

2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 12090228 (N.D. Ga. Oct.

12, 2023) (holding that Monell “does not provide an avenue” for individual

liability).11

Ultimately, determining which of these claims McNeil attempts to bring

is not necessary because, no matter how the ambiguities are resolved, McNeil’s

claim against Sheriff Waters is due to be dismissed. To the extent McNeil brings

a Monell claim against Sheriff Waters in his individual capacity, see Complaint

¶ 44.2 (“Sheriff … Waters … is liable for all damages referenced in these

11 The Court notes that although decisions of other district courts are not binding, they

may be cited as persuasive authority. See Stone v. First Union Corp., 371 F.3d 1305, 1310

(11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, “[a]lthough a district court would not be bound to follow any

other district court’s determination, the decision would have significant persuasive effects”).

pleadings … pursuant to Monell[,] 436 U.S. 658[,] … and its progeny.”), his

claim is due to be dismissed because a Monell claim is a claim against a local

governmental entity, not a natural person in his individual capacity. See Wilcox

v. Andalusia City Schs. Bd. of Educ., 660 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1183–84 (M.D. Ala.

2023) (“Monell liability and § 1983 supervisory liability are not the same

thing.”); Gatchel, 2023 WL 6216529, at *4. And to the extent McNeil brings a

Monell claim against Sheriff Waters in his official capacity as Sheriff, the claim

is due to be dismissed as duplicative of his Monell claim against the City

because the Sheriff of the City is the same legal entity as the City. See Vineyard

v. Cnty. of Murray, 990 F.2d 1207, 1210 n.3 (11th Cir. 1993) (“For liability

purposes, a suit against a public official in his official capacity is considered a

suit against the local government entity he represents.” (citation omitted));

Cook ex rel. Est. of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe Cnty., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th

Cir. 2005) (holding that a claim against a Florida county sheriff in his official

capacity is a claim against the county); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764,

776 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming directed verdict in favor of officers in their

official capacities when the municipality was also a named defendant in order

to avoid redundancy and confusing the jury); C.P. ex rel. Perez v. Collier Cnty.,

145 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1091 (M.D. Fla. 2015) (dismissing official capacity claims

against two deputies when the plaintiff also sued the county and the sheriff in

his official capacity).12 Accordingly, McNeil’s claim against Sheriff Waters in his

individual capacity can be brought only as a regular § 1983 claim, and the Court

will evaluate it as such rather than as a municipal liability claim under

Monell.13

Now to the merits. The Eleventh Circuit has stated:

“Supervisory officials are not liable under section 1983 on the basis

of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Belcher[,] 30 F.3d [at]

1396 … (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “The

standard by which a supervisor is held liable in her individual

capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous.”

Gonzalez [v. Reno], 325 F.3d [1228,] 1234 [(11th Cir. 2003)]

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Supervisory

liability occurs either when the supervisor personally participates

in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is a causal

connection between actions of the supervising official and the

12 The viability of a Monell claim against the City is not before the Court at this stage

of the litigation because the City filed an answer. See generally The City’s Answer.

13 Often, the analysis of an individual capacity claim under § 1983 premised on

supervisory liability and of a Monell claim will be largely similar. See Greason v. Kemp, 891

F.2d 829, 837 (11th Cir. 1990) (“Although we are not here concerned with municipal liability,

the analysis used in those cases is applicable to the case at hand, in which we must determine

whether quasi-policymakers have been deliberately indifferent in their supervision of

subordinates.”). However, there are key differences, so properly identifying the claim is

essential. For example, qualified immunity is a defense to an individual capacity claim, see

Belcher v. City of Foley, 30 F.3d 1390, 1395, 1401 (11th Cir. 1994), but not to a Monell claim,

see Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472–73 (1985). Additionally, an individual capacity claim

requires showing the defendant’s personal involvement, see Keith v. DeKalb Cnty., 749 F.3d

1034, 1048 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that for an individual capacity claim for supervisory

liability to succeed, “[the plaintiff] must show that the [supervisor] had subjective knowledge

of a risk of serious harm to [the plaintiff] and that he recklessly disregarded that risk”),

whereas a plaintiff can establish a Monell claim without showing personal involvement by any

particular person, see Brandon, 469 U.S. at 472 (in an official capacity claim, the court

“equate[s] the actions of the [official] … with the actions of the [municipal entity] itself”). And,

an official capacity claim will remain against the office when the officeholder changes, whereas

an individual capacity claim will remain against the individual even if the individual leaves

the office. Id. at 470–71.

alleged constitutional deprivation.” Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d

667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990).

“The necessary causal connection can be established ‘when a

history of widespread abuse puts the responsible supervisor on

notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he fails to

do so.’” Cottone [v. Jenne], 326 F.3d [1352,] 1360 [(11th Cir. 2003)]

(citation omitted). “The deprivations that constitute widespread

abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official must be obvious,

flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated

occurrences.” Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. A plaintiff can also establish

the necessary causal connection by showing “facts which support

an inference that the supervisor directed the subordinates to act

unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully

and failed to stop them from doing so,” Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235,

or that a supervisor’s “custom or policy … resulted in deliberate

indifference to constitutional rights,” Rivas v. Freeman, 940 F.2d

1491, 1495 (11th Cir. 1991).

Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008), overruled on other

grounds as recognized by Randall, 610 F.3d at 709 (rejecting the application of

a heightened pleading standard for § 1983 cases involving qualified immunity);

see also Keith, 749 F.3d at 1047–48. In sum,

To state a claim against a supervisory defendant, the plaintiff

must allege (1) the supervisor’s personal involvement in the

violation of his constitutional rights, (2) the existence of a custom

or policy that resulted in deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, (3) facts supporting an inference that the

supervisor directed the unlawful action or knowingly failed to

prevent it, or (4) a history of widespread abuse that put the

supervisor on notice of an alleged deprivation that he then failed

to correct. See [West v. Tillman, 496 F.3d 1321, 1328–29 (11th Cir.

2007)] (listing factors in context of summary judgment). A

supervisor cannot be held liable under § 1983 for mere negligence

in the training or supervision of his employees. Greason[,] 891 F.2d

[at] 836–37[.]

Barr v. Gee, 437 F. App’x 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).14

Here, McNeil relies on the policy theory, contending he alleges sufficient

facts to make it plausible that Sheriff Waters “exhibit[ed] a deliberate

indifference to a recognized or apparent risk of constitutional injury arising

from the polic[ies].” See Response at 3. “A policy is a ‘decision that is officially

adopted by the law enforcement agency, or created by an official of such rank

that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf of the law enforcement

agency.’” Myrick v. Fulton Cnty., 69 F.4th 1277, 1299 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting

Christmas v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th 1348, 1356 (11th Cir. 2022)) (alterations

adopted). Importantly, if a plaintiff relies on the existence of a custom or policy

to establish supervisory liability, the plaintiff generally

“must point to multiple incidents, or multiple reports of prior

misconduct by a particular employee.” [Piazza v. Jefferson Cnty.,

923 F.3d 947, 957 (11th Cir. 2019)] (citation omitted). And

allegations of a single incident of unconstitutional conduct cannot

state a claim for supervisory liability, even when the conduct

involves several subordinates. Id. at 957–58.

14 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent; however, they

may be cited in this Order when the Court finds them persuasive on a particular point. See

McNamara v. GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P.

32.1; 11th Cir. R. 36–2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but they

may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1254 (11th Cir. 2022).15 If the challenged policy

is facially constitutional, the plaintiff must “show that the defendant had actual

or constructive notice of a flagrant, persistent pattern of violations.” Goebert v.

Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007). As to causation, “[a] supervisor

can be held liable for implementing or failing to implement a policy that causes

his subordinates to believe that they can permissibly violate another’s

constitutional rights if the subordinates then do so based on that belief.”

Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1256; see also Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1299 (explaining that

supervisory liability under a policy theory requires the plaintiff to show that

“the unconstitutional act ‘[was] carried out pursuant to the alleged policy’”

(quoting Christmas, 51 F.4th at 1356)).

For the purposes of resolving the Motion, the Court will assume that

McNeil adequately alleges that Bowers and Miller used unconstitutionally

excessive force. See Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234 (“For purposes of this

opinion, … we will assume, without deciding, that the alleged conduct by the

agents on the scene … constituted excessive force and deprived plaintiffs of

15 The plaintiff need not identify multiple incidents of unconstitutional conduct when

the alleged policy is facially unconstitutional. Myrick, 69 F.4th at 1299. McNeil does not

contend that the policies he alleges caused his injuries are facially unconstitutional. See

generally Complaint; Response.

their Fourth Amendment rights[.]”).16 Upon review, the Court readily concludes

that McNeil fails to adequately allege that Sheriff Waters is himself liable for

these acts under the policy theory of supervisory liability.

McNeil’s allegations as to the existence of any policy are almost entirely

conclusory. He states that “[the City], in conjunction with [Sheriff] Waters,

enforces a policy/custom that allows its officers to utilize unwarranted and

excessive physical force against an individual who poses no immediate threat

to the officer or to others, a practice commonly referred to as ‘distractionary

blows.’” See Complaint ¶ 20. The only factual content in this allegation is that

there exists within JSO a practice in which officers use physical force against

individuals who pose no immediate threat to others. The remaining

statements—that the City, “in conjunction with [Sheriff] Waters,” “enforces”

this practice of “unwarranted and excessive physical force” as “a

policy/custom”—are conclusory assertions that the Court disregards when

evaluating the sufficiency of the Complaint. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680–81

(holding that allegations that a person “was the ‘principal architect’” of a policy

and that another person “was ‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing” the

16 The Court notes that although McNeil disagrees with one of Bowers’s stated reasons

for pulling him over, see Complaint ¶¶ 10, 11, 13, 14 (alleging that Bowers stated that he

pulled McNeil over for failing to use headlights in inclement weather even though it was not

raining), he does not contend that his initial stop, Bowers’s command for him to exit his

vehicle, or his arrest were unlawful. See generally id.; Response.

policy were “bare assertions … and not entitled to be assumed true”). Looking

at what remains, McNeil fails to allege what makes this practice a “policy,”

whether Sheriff Waters knew about the practice or was personally involved in

developing or enforcing it, and whether Sheriff Waters knew about any prior

instances of officers applying unconstitutionally excessive “distractionary

blows.” The mere existence of the practice does not suffice to state a claim for

supervisory liability, particularly considering that McNeil does not allege facts

supporting an inference of the practice’s prevalence or even what the practice

consists of in anything but the most general terms.

McNeil’s allegations as to the reporting policy are similarly insufficient

and laden with conclusory statements that the Court must disregard. See

Complaint ¶ 21 (“[The City], in conjunction with [Sheriff] Waters, maintains a

policy that allows its officers to refrain from reporting instances of force when

the physical force applied to an individual did not lead to, or was claimed to

have led to, any injury.”). As with the “distractionary blows” policy, McNeil

alleges no facts as to Sheriff Waters’s relationship to the reporting policy. See

generally Complaint. McNeil’s theory appears to be that Sheriff Waters is

personally responsible for the policy simply by virtue of his position, see id. ¶ 23

(“[Sheriff] Waters is a policy maker for the [City].”), but to accept that theory

would amount to imposing vicarious liability, which § 1983 forbids, see Belcher,

30 F.3d at 1396. Additionally, McNeil fails to connect this purported policy to

Bowers’s and Miller’s conduct. McNeil does not allege that Miller failed to report

his use of force, see generally Complaint, and McNeil’s allegations as to

Bowers’s report are ambiguous such that they do little to support his claim, see

id. at 3 n.1.

In the end, McNeil has not nudged his allegations of Sheriff Waters’s

liability for the two policies from “‘conceivable’ to ‘plausible,’” as Iqbal demands.

See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); McCullough v.

Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1334–35 (11th Cir. 2018) (disregarding as conclusory the

allegations that a mayor and chiefs of police “adopted” and “administered” a

purportedly unlawful policy and noting that the plaintiff did not allege any facts

as to “the significance of their titles, their individual roles in the [scheme], their

personal interactions or familiarity with [jailees], their length of service, their

management policies, or any other characteristics that would bear on whether

they knew about’ the scheme that they allegedly operated” (quoting Franklin v.

Curry, 738 F.3d 1246, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2013)) (alterations in original)); see

also Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1235–36, abrogated on other grounds by Randall,

610 F.3d at 707–10 (disregarding as conclusory the allegations of an individual’s

responsibility for a challenged policy under a pleading standard now overruled

on other grounds). And, even if McNeil’s allegations were not deficient in the

ways just described, his claim against Sheriff Waters would still fail because he

alleges only a single incident and does not contend that the policies are facially

unconstitutional. See Ingram, 30 F.4th at 1254; see generally Complaint;

Response. Thus, and in the absence of any other allegations to support a

plausible inference of causation, McNeil fails to plausibly allege that the stated

policies caused the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. See Myrick, 69

F.4th at 1299. The Motion is due to be granted.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

1. Defendant T.K. Waters’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Doc. 27) is

GRANTED.

2. Plaintiff, William McNeil, Jr.’s claims against Sheriff Waters are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate Sheriff Waters as

a Defendant in this action.

DONE AND ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida this 3rd day of June,

2026.

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD

United States District Judge

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Copies to:

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