The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
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AT SEATTLE
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10 ISAAC NSEJJERE MAYANJA, CASE NO. C25-0429JLR
11 Plaintiff, ORDER
v.
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CITY OF SHORELINE, et al.,
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Defendants.
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15 I. INTRODUCTION
16 Before the court are: (1) Defendant the City of Shoreline’s (the “City”) motion for
17 summary judgment (City MSJ (Dkt. # 41); City Reply (Dkt. # 49)); (2) Defendants City
18 Prosecutor Sarah Roberts and City Victim Coordinator Alyssa Schultz-Banchero’s
19 (together, “Individual Defendants”) motion for summary judgment (Defs. MSJ (Dkt.
20 # 43); Defs. MSJ Reply (Dkt. # 52)); and (3) pro se Plaintiff Isaac Nsejjere Mayanja’s
21 second motion for partial summary judgment (Pl. MSJ (Dkt. # 36); Pl. MSJ Reply (Dkt.
22 # 39)). The City opposes Mr. Mayanja’s motion (Pl. MSJ Resp. (Dkt. # 37)), and Mr.
1 Mayanja opposes the City’s motion and Individual Defendants’ motion (City MSJ Resp.
2 (Dkt. # 48); Defs. MSJ Resp. (Dkt. # 47)). The court has considered the parties’
3 submissions, the relevant portions of the record, and the governing law. Being fully
4 advised,1 the court GRANTS the motions for summary judgment filed by the City and the
5 Individual Defendants and DENIES Mr. Mayanja’s motion for partial summary
6 judgment.
7 II. BACKGROUND
8 This matter arises from the City’s prosecution of Mr. Mayanja for an alleged
9 felony assault against his then-wife, former Defendant Michelle Rene Mayanja. (See
10 generally Am. Compl. (Dkt. # 7).) Although Mr. Mayanja was originally convicted of
11 the criminal charge, his conviction was later reversed, he was granted a new trial, and the
12 City ultimately dismissed the charges against Mr. Mayanja. (See generally id.) The
13 court sets forth the relevant factual and procedural background below.
14 A. Factual Background
15 On June 13, 2022, Mr. Mayanja was charged with assault in the fourth degree –
16 domestic violence after allegedly assaulting Ms. Mayanja. (See 9/24/25 Roberts Decl.
17 (Dkt. # 32) ¶ 3, Ex. 2 (criminal complaint); see also City Ans. (Dkt. # 16) ¶ 10.) A
18 criminal trial court found probable cause for the charge at Mr. Mayanja’s arraignment on
19 July 11, 2022. (See 9/24/25 Murphy Decl. (Dkt. # 30) ¶ 3, Ex. B (motion and order to
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1 No party requests oral argument, and the court finds that oral argument would not assist
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it in the disposition of the motions. See Local Rules W.D. Wash. LCR 7(b)(4).
1 dismiss Mr. Mayanja’s criminal case (“Dismissal”)) at 1.) A jury found Mr. Mayanja
2 guilty of assault in the fourth degree on February 14, 2023. (Id. ¶ 2, Ex. A (jury verdict).)
3 Mr. Mayanja subsequently moved for a new trial, alleging, in relevant part, that
4 the City had suppressed potentially exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v.
5 Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). (See 9/3/25 Mayanja Decl. (Dkt. # 26-1) ¶ 2, Ex. A
6 (“Order Granting New Trial”) at 1.) The trial court granted the motion on September 14,
7 2023. (Id. at 15.) The trial court held that the City did not commit a Brady violation
8 because the records Mr. Mayanja alleged had been suppressed “were always in the care,
9 custody[,] and control of the Defense.” (Id. at 13; see also id. at 9 (concluding that no
10 Brady violation occurred because the “evidence [] was provided by the defense to the
11 prosecution”).) The trial court, however, granted Mr. Mayanja a new trial based on the
12 alleged suppression during trial of “medical records, text messages, emails, and other
13 documents and photographs[.]” (Id. at 11-13.) The trial court explained that when Mr.
14 Mayanja mentioned the records during cross-examination, the City claimed it had never
15 received the records and asked the court to suppress them, and defense counsel admitted
16 he had not produced the records. (Id. at 11-12.) The trial court excluded the records
17 from evidence at trial based on these representations. (Id.) As it turned out, however, the
18 City had received the records from Mr. Mayanja by email before it made its charging
19 decision, but the email had been marked as spam and never opened. (Id. at 9; see 9/24/25
20 Roberts Decl. ¶ 11, Ex. 10 at 5-6.) The trial court concluded that the suppression of the
21 records during trial was “fundamentally unfair” because some of the records were
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1 potentially exculpatory and granted Mr. Mayanja’s motion for a new trial. (Order
2 Granting New Trial at 15.)
3 In the lead-up to Mr. Mayanja’s re-trial, the defense served a subpoena on the City
4 Prosecutor’s office seeking notes and emails created by the City’s Victim Coordinator,
5 Ms. Schultz-Banchero, and the City moved to quash the subpoena. (See 9/3/25 Mayanja
6 Decl. ¶ 12, Ex. L (“Second Criminal Court Order”) at 1; see also id. ¶ 13, Ex. M (City’s
7 opposition to production of its prosecutor’s file).) On September 19, 2024, after
8 conducting an in camera review, the trial court ordered the City to produce the
9 documents. (See Second Criminal Court Order at 3.) The trial court signed Mr.
10 Mayanja’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, but added to the proposed
11 order an explanation that it had reviewed the notes and emails and determined that they
12 were not attorney work product. (Id.) Finding that the documents were discoverable and
13 included exculpatory information to which Mr. Mayanja was entitled, the trial court
14 ordered that the notes and emails be disclosed to the defense. (Id.) At the end of the
15 order, the trial court stated, “This ruling is per Maryland v. Brady and CrRLJ 4.72 and the
16 cases reviewed and presented in briefing by the parties.” (Id.) The City gave Mr.
17 Mayanja access to review the evidence in compliance with the order. (9/3/25 Mayanja
18 Decl. ¶ 14, Ex. N (“Roberts RFA Ans.”) at RFA No. 5.)
19 On November 7, 2024, the City moved to dismiss its case against Mr. Mayanja
20 with prejudice. (See generally Dismissal.) The City explained that it sought dismissal
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2 CrRLJ 4.7 governs discovery in criminal proceedings in courts of limited jurisdiction.
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See Wash. CrRLJ 4.7.
1 because (1) litigation relating to the dissolution of the Mayanjas’ marriage required Mr.
2 Mayanja to undergo certain treatment and be subject to an order prohibiting contact—the
3 same outcomes the City and Ms. Mayanja sought from the criminal matter; (2) Ms.
4 Mayanja preferred not to go through the stress of another jury trial given the relief
5 provided in the dissolution proceedings; (3) the Mayanjas’ adult daughter, who testified
6 during the first trial, was unwilling to participate in a second trial; and (4) one of the
7 primary officers who investigated the assault passed away and could no longer testify.
8 (Id. at 1-2; see 1/16/26 Roberts Decl. (Dkt. # 45) ¶ 4 (explaining the reasons the City
9 moved to dismiss its case against Mr. Mayanja.) The trial court granted the motion the
10 same day. (See generally Dismissal.)
11 B. Procedural Background
12 Mr. Mayanja initiated this action on March 11, 2025. (IFP Mot. (Dkt. # 1).) In his
13 original complaint, Mr. Mayanja alleged civil rights claims against the City, Ms. Roberts,
14 Ms. Schultz-Banchero, prosecutors Carmen McDonald and Emma Vetter, Ms. Mayanja,
15 and unnamed Doe defendants for suppressing evidence in violation of Brady; malicious
16 prosecution; fraud; manifest negligence; and conspiracy to deprive him of his
17 constitutional rights. (See generally Compl. (Dkt. # 4).) United States Magistrate Judge
18 S. Kate Vaughan granted Mr. Mayanja in forma pauperis status and recommended that
19 this court review Mr. Mayanja’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). (IFP Order
20 (Dkt. # 3).) Following that review, the court dismissed Mr. Mayanja’s complaint with
21 limited leave to amend. (See 4/1/25 Order (Dkt. # 6) (dismissing Mr. Mayanja’s Brady
22 claims against the Individual Defendants and his manifest negligence claim without leave
1 to amend, but allowing Mr. Mayanja leave to amend his municipal liability, malicious
2 prosecution, fraud, and conspiracy claims).)
3 Mr. Mayanja timely filed an amended complaint. (See Am. Compl.) After a
4 second § 1915(e)(2)(B) review, the court dismissed Mr. Mayanja’s fraud, conspiracy,
5 equal protection, and manifest negligence claims against all Defendants, along with his
6 malicious prosecution claims against Ms. Schultz-Banchero and Ms. Mayanja. (5/16/25
7 Order (Dkt. # 8); see also 9/18/25 Order (Dkt. # 27) (clarifying that these dismissals were
8 with prejudice).) The court allowed two of Mr. Mayanja’s claims to proceed: (1) a 42
9 U.S.C. § 1983 substantive due process claim against the City and the Individual
10 Defendants, and (2) a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the City and Ms.
11 Roberts. (5/16/25 Order at 14-15.) The City and the Individual Defendants answered the
12 amended complaint. (See City Ans.; Roberts/Banchero Ans. (Dkt. # 20).)
13 On September 3, 2025, Mr. Mayanja filed his first motion for partial summary
14 judgment against the City and Ms. Roberts. (See 1st MSJ (Dkt. # 26).) The court denied
15 Mr. Mayanja’s motion after concluding that he had failed to establish, as a matter of law,
16 that (1) Ms. Roberts was not protected by prosecutorial immunity and (2) the City was
17 subject to municipal liability for his § 1983 substantive due process and malicious
18 prosecution claims. (See generally 11/4/25 Order (Dkt. # 35).)
19 Mr. Mayanja filed his second motion for partial summary judgment on December
20 9, 2025. (See Pl. MSJ.) In his second motion, Mr. Mayanja argues only that the City is
21 subject to municipal liability as a matter of law; he no longer argues that he is entitled to
22 judgment as a matter of law on Ms. Roberts’s prosecutorial immunity. (See generally id.)
1 The City moved for summary judgment on January 15, 2026 (see City MSJ), and the
2 Individual Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on January 16, 2026 (see
3 Defs. MSJ). All three motions are now fully briefed and ripe for decision.
4 III. ANALYSIS
5 Below, the court begins by setting forth the standard of review for motions for
6 summary judgment, then considers the parties’ motions. In doing so, the court is mindful
7 that Mr. Mayanja is proceeding pro se and, therefore, the court must construe his filings
8 liberally. See McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1055 (9th Cir. 1992). Nevertheless, a
9 pro se litigant must follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants. See,
10 e.g., Briones v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 381 (9th Cir. 1997).
11 A. Standard for Summary Judgment
12 Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party shows that there is no
13 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
14 law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the case.
15 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1985). A genuine dispute of
16 material fact exists if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict
17 for the nonmoving party. Id.
18 The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the
19 court of the basis for the motion and identifying portions of the pleadings, depositions,
20 answers to interrogatories, admissions, or affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a
21 triable issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where
22 the movant seeks summary judgment on a claim or defense on which the nonmovant
1 bears the burden of persuasion at trial, “the moving party must either produce evidence
2 negating an essential element of the nonmoving party’s claim or defense or show that the
3 nonmoving party does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry its
4 ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz
5 Companies, Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If, however, the moving party
6 bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party must “come forward with
7 evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted
8 at trial.” C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th
9 Cir. 2000) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
10 If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
11 party to identify specific facts from which a factfinder could reasonably find in the
12 nonmoving party’s favor. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. “A party asserting that a fact cannot
13 be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of
14 materials in the record[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A).
15 The court is “required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light
16 most favorable to the [nonmoving] party.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007)
17 (internal quotations omitted). It may not weigh evidence or make credibility
18 determinations. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. “Where the record taken as a whole
19 could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine
20 issue for trial.’” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
21 Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).
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1 B. Threshold Issue: Mr. Mayanja’s Requests for Admission to the City
2 Mr. Mayanja asserts that the court must deem his second set of requests for
3 admission to the City (“City RFAs”) admitted because the City failed to timely respond
4 to them. (Pl. MSJ at 3 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3)); see 12/9/25 Mayanja Decl. (Dkt.
5 # 36-1) ¶ i, Ex. A (“City RFAs”).) The court disagrees.
6 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(a)(3), a request for admission is deemed
7 admitted unless the party to whom the request was directed serves an answer or objection
8 within 30 days after being served with the request. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3). Mr.
9 Mayanja represents that he served the City RFAs by email on November 5, 2025,
10 “pursuant to the parties’ electronic service agreement” (12/9/25 Mayanja Decl. ¶ i), but
11 the City failed to answer the RFAs until December 30, 2025 (Pl. MSJ Reply at 5).3
12 The City, however, asserts that it never entered into a written electronic service
13 agreement with Mr. Mayanja. (2/12/26 Murphy Decl. (Dkt. # 50) ¶ 4); see Fed. R. Civ. P.
14 5(b)(2)(E) (providing that a party may serve a paper electronically by “filing it with the
15 court’s electronic-filing system or sending it by other electronic means that the person
16 consented to in writing”) (emphasis added). As a result, according to the City, Mr.
17 Mayanja’s purported service of the City RFAs by email on November 5, 2025, was not
18 effective under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5. (2/12/26 Murphy Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)
19 Instead, the City argues that Mr. Mayanja did not properly serve the City RFAs pursuant
20 to Rule 5 until December 9, 2025, when he attached them as an exhibit to his second
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3 The court presumes that Mr. Mayanja’s reference to 12/30/26 in his reply is a
22 typographical error.
1 motion for summary judgment and served them through CM/ECF. (Id. ¶¶ 3-6.) The City
2 then served its objections and answers to the City RFAs on Mr. Mayanja on December
3 30, 2025, within Rule 36(a)(3)’s 30-day limit. (Id. ¶ 2, Exs. A, B; id. ¶ 6; see 12/30/25
4 Murphy Decl. (Dkt. # 38) ¶ 2(A), Ex. A (“City RFA Ans.”).)
5 Although Mr. Mayanja insists that the City RFAs must be deemed admitted
6 because the City’s answers were long overdue, he presents no evidence that he and the
7 City ever entered into a written electronic service agreement pursuant to Rule 5(b)(2)(E).
8 (See generally Pl. MSJ Reply; City MSJ Resp.; Defs. MSJ Resp.) Accordingly, Mr.
9 Mayanja did not properly serve the City RFAs on the City pursuant to Rule 5 until
10 December 9, 2025. As a result, the court concludes that the City’s answers to the City
11 RFAs were timely and denies Mr. Mayanja’s request to deem the City RFAs admitted.
12 C. Motions for Summary Judgment
13 To succeed on his § 1983 claims against the Individual Defendants, Mr. Mayanja
14 must show that he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created
15 by federal statute, and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under
16 color of state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). To
17 suceeed on his § 1983 claims against the City, Mr. Mayanja must establish that the City is
18 subject to municipal liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,
19 436 U.S. 658 (1978), which requires him to “show that a ‘policy or custom’ led to [his]
20 injury” and that the policy or custom “reflects deliberate indifference” to constitutional
21 rights. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc)
22 (first quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, and then quoting City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris,
1 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989)). In either case, the first step in evaluating a § 1983 claim is to
2 identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S.
3 266, 271 (1994).
4 Here, Mr. Mayanja asserts that (1) the City and the Individual Defendants violated
5 his substantive due process rights by suppressing evidence in violation of Brady and
6 (2) the City and Ms. Roberts violated his Fourth Amendment rights by subjecting him to
7 malicious prosecution. The court concludes that City and the Individual Defendants have
8 met their burden to establish that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these
9 claims.
10 1. Mr. Mayanja cannot show that Defendants violated Brady
11 To establish a Brady violation, Mr. Mayanja must prove that (1) the allegedly
12 suppressed evidence was favorable to him as the defendant, (2) the prosecution
13 suppressed the evidence, and (3) the evidence is material, meaning it may have affected
14 the outcome of the trial. 373 U.S. at 87.
15 Mr. Mayanja asserts that the Second Criminal Court Order directing the City to
16 produce Ms. Schultz-Banchero’s victim coordinator notes and emails establishes, as a
17 matter of law, that Defendants violated Brady by failing to produce potentially
18 exculpatory documents during the proceedings leading up to his re-trial. (See, e.g., Pl.
19 MSJ Reply at 2 (stating that the Second Criminal Court Order “clearly and
20 unambiguousy holds that defendant violated both Brady & CrRLJ 4.7”); see also City
21 MSJ Resp. at 5 (“It is factually accurate that plaintiff’s substantive due process claim is
22 premised on the acknowledged indispensable 2nd criminal court Order and supporting
1 Exhibits which express plaintiff’s actual innocence.”); Defs. MSJ Resp. at 1 (referring to
2 Mr. Mayanja’s motion for summary judgment and response to the City’s motion for
3 summary judgment as establishing that Defendants’ substantive due process violation is a
4 “foregone conclusion[]”).) The Second Criminal Court Order, however, does no such
5 thing. Nothing in that order holds that Defendants actually committed a Brady violation
6 or otherwise violated Mr. Mayanja’s constitutional rights. Instead, the order states the
7 trial court’s conclusion that the City was required to disclose Ms. Schultz-Banchero’s
8 notes and emails during discovery because they were not protected work product and
9 were potentially exculpatory under Brady. (Second Criminal Court Order at 3.) There is
10 no evidence that the City failed to comply with that order; to the contrary, Ms. Roberts
11 represents that the City provided Mr. Mayanja’s counsel access to the evidence, and Mr.
12 Mayanja does not rebut this assertion. (See Roberts RFA Ans. at RFA No. 5; Pl. MSJ
13 Reply; City MSJ Resp.; Defs. MSJ Resp.) Furthermore, there was no trial to be affected
14 by any alleged suppression because the City dismissed the case. Mr. Mayanja points to
15 no other evidence supporting the conclusion that Defendants suppressed material
16 exculpatory or impeaching evidence. (See generally Pls. MSJ; Pls. MSJ Reply; City MSJ
17 Resp.; Defs. MSJ Resp.; see also City MSJ Resp. at 5 (agreeing with the City that “[i]f
18 claims were based on the 1st criminal court order, they would be legally flawed and
19 meritless”).) Accordingly, because Mr. Mayanja has not met his burden to identify
20 specific facts from which a factfinder could reasonably find in his favor, Celotex, 477
21 U.S. at 324, the court grants Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Mr.
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1 Mayanja’s § 1983 substantive due process claims arising from the alleged suppression of
2 evidence in violation of Brady.4
3 2. Malicious Prosecution
4 To prevail on his malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, Mr. Mayanja “must
5 show that the defendants prosecuted [him] with malice and without probable cause, and
6 that they did so for the purpose of denying [him] equal protection or another specific
7 constitutional right.” Lassiter v. City of Bremerton, 556 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2009)
8 (quoting Freeman v. City of Santa Ana, 68 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 1995)) (internal
9 quotation marks omitted).
10 Mr. Mayanja asserts that Defendants cannot demonstrate that they had probable
11 cause to prosecute him because they “consistently with[eld] exculpatory evidence[.]” (Pl.
12 MSJ Reply at 3; see also Defs MSJ Resp. at 2 (asserting that Ms. Roberts “was made
13 aware of [new exculpatory] evidence but then suppress[ed] it”); Defs MSJ Resp. at 5
14 (asserting that Ms. Schultz-Banchero “conspired with M[s]. Roberts in suppressing” Ms.
15 Schultz-Banchero’s file).) Mr. Mayanja again relies on the Second Criminal Court
16 Order, arguing that “malicious prosecution is an openly and transparently foregone
17 conclusion” based on that order. (City MSJ Resp. at 6; see also id. (“It is factually
18 accurate that plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim is premised on the 2nd criminal court
19 Order and supporting Exhibits . . . which express plaintiff’s actual innocence.”).) As
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4 This result would be the same even if the court deemed the City’s answers to the City
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RFAs admitted. Even when viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Mayanja, the City RFAs
cannot reasonably lead to the conclusion that the City or anyone else violated Brady by
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suppressing evidence during his prosecution. (See generally City RFAs.)
1 discussed above, however, the trial court did not hold that Defendants violated Brady;
2 instead, it ordered the City to produce Ms. Schultz-Banchero’s notes and emails because
3 they were not attorney work product and were exculpatory. (See Second Criminal Court
4 Order at 3.) Furthermore, Mr. Mayanja has directed the court to no evidence of malicious
5 intent by Ms. Roberts or Ms. Schultz-Banchero, nor does he rebut Ms. Roberts’s
6 explanation that she moved to dismiss the case because the goals of the prosecution were
7 accomplished through the Mayanjas’ dissolution action and because Ms. Mayanja and
8 key witnesses were unwilling or unavailable to testify. (See Dismissal at 1-2; see
9 generally Pls. MSJ Reply; City MSJ Resp.; Defs. MSJ Resp.) Therefore, the court
10 concludes that Mr. Mayanja has not satisfied his burden to demonstrate a genuine issue of
11 material fact regarding his malicious prosecution claims and grants Defendants’ motions
12 for summary judgment on those claims.
13 Because the court has granted Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Mr.
14 Mayanja’s substantive due process and malicious prosecution claims, Mr. Mayanja
15 cannot meet his burden to demonstrate the City’s municipal liability for those claims.
16 Therefore, the court denies Mr. Mayanja’s motion for partial summary judgment on
17 municipal liability.
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20 //
21 //
22 //
1 IV. CONCLUSION
2 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the City and the Individual
3 Defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Dkt. ## 41, 43) and DENIES Mr.
4 Mayanja’s second motion for partial summary judgment (Dkt. # 36). Mr. Mayanja’s
5 claims, and this action, are DISMISSED with prejudice.
6 Dated this 28th day of April, 2026.
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A
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9 JAMES L. ROBART
United States District Judge
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