The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 SILVESTRE ESTRADA, et al., Case No.: 22-cv-00373-AJB-BJW
12 Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
13 v. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
15 Defendant.
16
17 I.
18 THE ACTION
19 This is an Action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) arising from the
20 shooting death of Silvestre Estrada Vargas (“Estrada” or the “Decedent”) on May 14, 2021.
21 At approximately 10:13 p.m. that evening, Estrada picked up two undocumented
22 migrants and led United States Border Patrol Agents (“Agents”) on a high-speed pursuit
23 on State Route 94 (“SR 94”). The pursuit ended at a Circle K gas station in Campo,
24 California, where three Agents fired five rounds into Estrada’s vehicle. Estrada was struck
25 and killed by one of the bullets.
26 The Plaintiffs in this Action are the Estate of Estrada—which brings suit by Silvestre
27 Estrada, the Decedent’s minor son, who is represented by Emily Prieto, Silvestre Estrada’s
28 Court-appointed Guardian ad Litem and mother; Francisco Madariaga; and Jaime
1 Madariaga-Gonzalez. Francisco Madariaga and Jaime Madariaga-Gonzalez (collectively,
2 the “Madariagas”) were the two undocumented migrants who the Decedent picked up.
3 Plaintiffs allege that the Agents unreasonably used deadly force to stop Estrada’s
4 vehicle, causing (1) the wrongful death of Estrada; (2) assault/battery of Estrada;
5 (3) assault of the Madariagas; and (4) the negligent use of force.
6 The United States is the Defendant in this Action. The United States denies
7 Plaintiffs’ allegations and contends that the Agents’ use of force was reasonable under the
8 totality of the circumstances.
9 II.
10 JURISDICTION AND VENUE
11 The Court has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). Venue is
12 proper in the Southern District of California because all conduct giving rise to the claims
13 alleged in the Complaint occurred in San Diego County.
14 III.
15 THE PROCEEDINGS
16 The case was tried solely before the Court in a trial held from April 2, 2026, through
17 April 14, 2026.
18 The issues tried and the elements of each claim are set out in the Court’s Pretrial
19 Order. (Doc. No. 82.)
20 Following the trial, and upon review of the testimony and documentary evidence,
21 the agreed facts, the arguments of counsel, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court now
22 makes the following findings based on the credible evidence and the reasonable inferences
23 to be drawn therefrom. These findings were based upon a preponderance of the credible
24 evidence.
25 The Court’s analysis of Plaintiffs’ claims distills down to whether the Agents’ use
26 of force was reasonable.
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1 The United States shall be liable . . in the same manner and to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
2
interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.
3
If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the law of the place where
4
the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or has been construed
5 to provide, for damages only punitive in nature, the United States shall be
liable for actual or compensatory damages, measured by the pecuniary injuries
6
resulting from such death to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the
7 action was brought, in lieu thereof.
8
9 28 U.S.C. § 2674.
10 California law applies because the underlying acts occurred in California. Under
11 California law, the Fourth Amendment’s excessive force standard applies to claims for
12 wrongful death and assault and battery by law enforcement officers. Brown v. Ransweiler,
13 171 Cal. App. 4th 516, 527 (2009). Courts must “consider[] the totality of the
14 circumstances surrounding any use of deadly force” for a negligence claim. Hayes v.
15 County of San Diego, 57 Cal. 4th 622, 639 (2013). This is “broader than federal Fourth
16 Amendment law, which tends to focus more narrowly on the moment when deadly force
17 is used.” Id.
18 “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the
19 perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of
20 hindsight. . . . [T]he question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’
21 in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying
22 intent or motivation.” Martinez v. County of Los Angeles, 47 Cal. App. 4th 334, 343 (1996)
23 (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989)). Triers of fact “must recognize
24 that peace officers are often forced to make split-second judgments, in tense circumstances,
25 concerning the amount of force required.” Brown, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 527–28.
26 Delving into each of Plaintiffs’ claims, Claim One alleges that the United States,
27 acting through the Agents, caused the death of Silvestre Estrada Vargas through the
28 wrongful use of deadly force. (Doc. Nos. 8 ¶¶ 12–17; 82 at 4.) “Claims that police officers
1 used excessive force in the course of a[] . . . ‘seizure’ . . . are analyzed under the
2 reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”
3 Brown, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 527 (quoting Munoz v. City of Union City, 120 Cal. App. 4th
4 1077, 1102 (2004)). “The question is whether a peace officer’s actions were objectively
5 reasonable based on the facts and circumstances confronting the peace officer.” Id. (citing
6 Munoz, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1102). “Where [an] officer has probable cause to believe that
7 [a] suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is
8 not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force.” Tennessee v.
9 Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Put another way, “where a suspect threatens an officer with
10 a weapon . . . , the officer is justified in using deadly force.” Smith v. City of Hemet, 394
11 F.3d 689, 704 (9th Cir. 2005).
12 Claims Two and Three allege that the United States, acting through the Agents,
13 assaulted and battered the Decedent and assaulted the Madariagas. (Doc. Nos. 8 ¶¶ 18–25;
14 82 at 8, 10–11.) “A state law battery claim is a counterpart to a federal claim of excessive
15 use of force. In both, a plaintiff must prove that the peace officer’s use of force was
16 unreasonable.” Brown, 171 Cal. App. 4th at 527 (quoting Munoz, 120 Cal. App. 4th at 1102
17 n.6). Similarly, “the underlying basis of the officers’ alleged liability [for assault] is the
18 assertion that the[] officers unreasonably used . . . force.” Koussaya v. City of Stockton, 54
19 Cal. App. 5th 909, 932 (2020).
20 Lastly, Claim Four alleges that the United States, acting through the Agents, acted
21 negligently in using force to seize the Decedent and the Madariagas. (Doc. Nos. 8 ¶¶ 26–29;
22 82 at 14–15.) Like the assault and battery claims, “the underlying basis of the officers’
23 alleged liability, whether for intentional tort or negligence, is the assertion that the[]
24 officers unreasonably used . . . force.” Koussaya, 54 Cal. App. 5th at 932 (emphasis added).
25 Thus, the Court must analyze whether the Agents’ use of force was reasonable or
26 not to address the Plaintiffs’ four claims.
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1 IV.
2 FINDINGS OF FACT
3 Any finding of fact which is more appropriately a conclusion of law is to be deemed
4 as such.
5 The following facts were admitted by the parties (Doc. No. 101) and are adopted by
6 the Court:1
7 1. On May 14, 2021, at approximately 10:13 p.m., Agents engaged in the pursuit
8 of a vehicle driven by Estrada.
9 2. The vehicle driven by Estrada was a silver 2020 Nissan 4DR, Silver, License
10 Plate No. CA8RAM551.
11 3. The pursuit began in an area known as Zuellner’s on SR 94 and ended in the
12 area adjacent to the Circle K gas station on SR 94 in Campo, California.
13 4. Estrada’s vehicle had two passengers—Plaintiff Francisco Madariaga and
14 Plaintiff Jaime Madariaga-Gonzalez.
15 5. Other Agents, using surveillance technology, observed Estrada pick up
16 Plaintiff Francisco Madariaga and Plaintiff Jaime Madariaga-Gonzalez on the
17 shoulder of SR 94 immediately before the pursuit began.
18 6. The Madariagas were both undocumented migrants with Mexican citizenship
19 who had crossed the border days before.
20 7. Estrada was a U.S. citizen.
21 8. The primary pursuit vehicle was a fully marked Border Patrol 2020 Chevrolet
22 Tahoe (SUV), License Plate No. M07747, with no passengers.
23 9. The secondary pursuit vehicle was a fully marked Border Patrol 2020
24 Chevrolet Silverado (Truck), License Plate No. K05818, with no passengers.
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1 The Court has made minor, stylistic edits to these stipulated facts. These edits are not intended to
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1 10. The drivers of the pursuit vehicles were, respectively, Agent Robert Godreau
2 (“Agent Godreau”) and Agent Christoper Baker (“Agent Baker”).
3 11. During the pursuit, the Border Patrol pursuit vehicles activated their service
4 vehicle lights and sirens.
5 12. During the pursuit, Estrada’s vehicle at times swerved in and out of the
6 eastbound and westbound lanes of SR 94, and at times was driving over 80
7 miles per hour (“MPH”).
8 13. At one point during the pursuit, Estrada’s vehicle yielded near an area known
9 as “Zuellner’s” on SR 94 eastbound. When Agents Godreau and Baker
10 approached the vehicle, it sped off.
11 14. The length of pursuit was approximately four miles and lasted approximately
12 six minutes.
13 15. During the pursuit, the Madariagas were frightened and believed they might
14 get into an accident.
15 16. Ultimately, Estrada’s vehicle entered an area known as Zuellner’s on SR 94
16 that contains a Circle K gas station. Estrada’s vehicle pulled into the Circle K
17 gas station.
18 17. In addition to the pursuit vehicles, also arriving on-scene around the time
19 Estrada entered the Circle K gas station were the following fully marked
20 Border Patrol vehicles: 1) a 2016 Jeep Wrangler (SUV), License Plate No.
21 M62677, with no passengers; 2) a 2018 Chevrolet Tahoe (SUV), License Plate
22 No. M87627, with no passengers; and 3) a 2020 Jeep Wrangler (SUV),
23 License Plate No. M08716, with no passengers.
24 18. While in the Circle K parking lot area, Estrada continued driving and hit a
25 curb, causing damage to his vehicle.
26 19. At approximately 10:19 p.m. the vehicle came to a stop in the Circle K parking
27 lot area.
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1 20. Various Agents exited their vehicles, and approached Estrada’s car, with their
2 firearms drawn while yelling various commands.
3 21. After Estrada’s vehicle had come to a stop, the vehicle began to move forward.
4 22. Agents Godreau and Alba and Agent David Mathews (“Agent Mathews”)
5 discharged their firearms.
6 23. Agent Godreau fired three shots.
7 24. Agent Alba fired one shot, which struck and killed Estrada.
8 25. Agent Mathews fired one shot.
9 26. Agent Luis Perez (“Agent Perez”), Agent Baker, and Watch Commander Lou
10 Patch (“WC Patch”) were also on scene when Agents Godreau, Alba, and
11 Mathews discharged their firearms.
12 27. Estrada died after being struck by a bullet shot by Agent Alba.
13 28. Silvestre Estrada, a minor, through his guardian ad litem, Emily Prieto, is the
14 natural born son of the Decedent and therefore has standing to bring a
15 wrongful death claim pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure 377.60.
16 29. Silvestre Estrada, a minor, through his guardian ad litem, Emily Prieto, is the
17 natural born son of the Decedent and therefore has standing to bring survival
18 claims on behalf of the decedent Silvestre Estrada Vargas pursuant to
19 California Code of Civil Procedure § 377.32.
20 The parties, by and through their respective attorneys, stipulated as follows:
21 30. Greg B. Pizzaro, M.D., was not deposed in this case. If Dr. Pizarro were called
22 as a witness at trial, he would testify to the following:
23 a. Dr. Pizarro is a Medical Examiner with the San Diego County Medical
24 Examiner’s Department. He performed the autopsy of Silvestre Vargas
25 Estrada on May 16, 2021.
26 b. The decedent was Silvestre Vargas Estrada, a 26-year-old Hispanic
27 male born on June 30, 1994. He was formally identified by fingerprint
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1 comparison conducted by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection on
2 May 16, 2021. He was pronounced dead at 12:20 a.m. on May 15, 2021.
3 c. Dr. Pizarro would testify consistently with his signed Medical
4 Examiner’s Autopsy Report for Silvestre Vargas Estrada, M.E. Case
5 No. 2021-01605, marked as Exhibit 7 and located at ESTRADA-
6 USAO-000158-000170.
7 31. The San Diego County Medical Examiner’s Office conducted a toxicology
8 analysis using its ABFT-accredited laboratory, which yielded the following
9 results:
10 a. Methamphetamine: 0.72 mg/L (positive) in antemortem blood.
11 b. Amphetamine: 0.05 mg/L (methamphetamine metabolite) in
12 antemortem blood.
13 c. Alcohol (Ethanol): Not detected.
14 d. All other drugs of abuse screened (benzodiazepines, cannabinoids,
15 cocaine metabolites, fentanyl, methadone, opiates, oxycodone,
16 phencyclidine, zolpidem, buprenorphine, carisoprodol): Not detected.
17 32. Michelle Robison was not deposed in this case. If Ms. Robison were called a
18 witness at trial, she would testify to the following:
19 a. Ms. Robison is a Forensic Evidence Technician (ID #6300) with the
20 San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Regional Crime Laboratory.
21 b. On May 14, 2021, at 2339 hours, Ms. Robison was contacted by the
22 Sheriff’s Communications Center and asked to respond to 31474 State
23 Highway 94, in Campo, for a briefing in connection with an officer-
24 involved shooting.
25 c. On May 15, 2021, at 0109 hours, Ms. Robison arrived at 31474 State
26 Highway 94. She met with Forensic Evidence Technician Sharilyn
27 Chapin, Criminalist Lauren Sautkulis, Detective Robert Powers
28 (“Detective Powers”), and other Sheriff’s personnel, Border Patrol
1 personnel, and FBI personnel. Following a briefing, Detective Powers
2 requested Ms. Robinson respond to the Border Patrol Station in Campo
3 to assist with processing subjects. She departed at 0203 hours.
4 d. Ms. Robison would testify consistently with her signed Laboratory
5 Services Report, SDSD Case No. 21120434, marked as Exhibit 204,
6 and located at ESTRADA-USAO-000216-000243.
7 33. Sharilyn Chapin was not deposed in this case. If Ms. Chapin were called as a
8 witness at trial, she would testify to the following:
9 a. She is a Forensic Evidence Technician (ID #5189) with the San Diego
10 County Sheriff’s Department Regional Crime Laboratory.
11 b. On May 14, 2021 at 2310 hours, Ms. Chapin was contacted by the
12 Sheriff’s Communications Center and asked to respond to 31474 State
13 Highway 94, in Campo, for a briefing in connection with an officer-
14 involved shooting.
15 c. Ms. Chapin would testify consistently with her 2 signed Laboratory
16 Service Reports, SDSD Case No. 21120434, marked as Exhibit 202 and
17 located at ESTRADA-USAO-000195-000210, and Exhibit 203 and
18 located at ESTRADA -USAO-000265-000277.
19 34. Scott Hoopes was not deposed in this case. If Mr. Hoopes were called as a
20 witness, he would testify to the following:
21 a. Mr. Hoopes is a Criminalist III (#6686) with the San Diego County
22 Sheriff’s Department Regional Crime Laboratory.
23 b. He was asked by Detective R. Powers to perform the following
24 services: weapon operability, cartridge case examination, and bullet
25 examination.
26 c. Mr. Hoopes would testify consistently with his signed Laboratory
27 Services Report, SDSD Case No. 21120434, marked as exhibit 11 and
28 located at ESTRADA-USAO-000299-304.
1 35. If Matthew Delgado were called as a witness at trial, he would testify to the
2 following:
3 a. He was employed at the Subway restaurant located at 31471 SR-94 in
4 Campo—a building within the Circle K parking lot.
5 b. He was working at the time of the incident in issue in this trial.
6 c. While working he captured video footage on his cell phone of the
7 incident, which footage is marked as Exhibit 14 and located at
8 ESTRADA-USAO-002096-vid_20210514_221832114.mp4.
9 d. The video in Exhibit 14 fairly and accurately depicts part of what Mr.
10 Delgado saw that evening.
11 36. If Agent Jordan Gerber (“Agent Gerber”), United States Customs and Border
12 Protection, were called to testify:
13 a. Agent Gerber would testify consistently with the declaration he
14 provided to this Court under ECF No. 45-3, and Bates No. MSJ_256
15 (hereinafter, “Gerber declaration”). The parties stipulate that the
16 contents of the Gerber declaration can be admitted as substantive
17 evidence and may be read into the record. The parties waive all
18 objections to the Gerber declaration’s admission and consideration by
19 the Court as substantive evidence during the trial in the instant case.
20 During the trial, the parties also agreed on the following facts:
21 37. According to JDPower, the 2020 Nissan Altima is a sedan measuring
22 approximately 16 feet (192.9 inches) in length, 6 feet (72.9 inches) in width
23 (without mirrors), and 4.725–4.79 feet (56.7 to 57.5 inches) in height. (Doc.
24 No. 108.)
25 38. The Court took Judicial Notice, at the joint request of the parties, that the
26 vehicle speed of five MPH converts to 7.33333 feet per second, and that the
27 vehicle speed of four MPH converts to 5.86667 feet per second. This is based
28 on a calculation of 1.466 feet per second per MPH. (Doc. No. 110.)
1 The Court further finds, based on a preponderance of the credible evidence, the
2 following:
3 39. After hitting the curb at Circle K (supra ¶ 18) in the area where Agent
4 Godreau’s vehicle was parked, Estrada reversed until he was blocked by a
5 Border Patrol vehicle driven by Agent Perez. Estrada stopped (supra ¶ 20).
6 Estrada’s vehicle was surrounded by Agents and their vehicles at this point.
7 40. Estrada’s vehicle suffered significant passenger-side, front-end damage from
8 the collision with the curb, although it was still drivable.
9 41. The Agents, including Agent Godreau; witness Brian Moreno; and the
10 Madariagas all believed the chase was over.
11 42. Pursuant to their training, the Agents approached the vehicle (supra ¶ 20) and
12 maintained a perimeter (“boxing in”) around the suspects to avoid a “bail out,”
13 where the vehicle occupants could escape on foot. Bail outs were something
14 Agents experience in their regular duties.
15 43. Agent Perez was generally behind the stopped vehicle, Agent Alba and WC
16 Patch were on the vehicle’s passenger side, and Agent Godreau approached
17 from the curb in front of the vehicle on his way to arrest the driver on the
18 driver’s side. Agent Mathews was on the driver’s side of the vehicle on the
19 other side of a barbed wire fence.
20 44. Estrada’s vehicle remained stopped in front of Agent Perez’s vehicle for four
21 seconds as the Agents approached while yelling commands to Estrada, whose
22 driver’s side window was open. The four-second interval is based on Stephen
23 Plourd’s reconstruction using videos of the event.
24 45. After being stopped for the four seconds, Estrada revved the 3400 pound, six-
25 foot-wide vehicle’s engine, making a loud pitched “whine” described as
26 “pedal to the metal,” and then accelerated forward at four to five MPH for 1.6
27 seconds, before Agent Godreau opened fire. Agent Alba fired .03 seconds
28 later, and all shots, including Agents Mathews’, ceased within 1.1 seconds
1 after the first. Neither Agent Perez nor WC Patch fired as they had no clear
2 shot. Agent Perez believed Agent Godreau was going to be hit by Estrada’s
3 vehicle.
4 46. The vehicle traveled between 5.86 and 11.7 feet at a speed between four to
5 five MPH in the 1.6 seconds that the vehicle moved toward Agent Godreau.
6 According to Stephen Plourd, Agent Godreau was 8 to 12 feet in front of the
7 vehicle.
8 47. Under the totality of the circumstances, Agent Godreau felt in imminent
9 danger of great bodily harm or death as the vehicle suddenly accelerated and
10 approached him. This officer’s actions were “objectively reasonable” in light
11 of the facts and circumstances confronting him.
12 48. As Agent Godreau fired, he backed away from the vehicle, and the vehicle
13 turned left in the direction of Agent Mathews. Agent Godreau’s three shots
14 struck the windshield but did not hit any of the vehicle’s occupants.
15 49. Agent Alba believed Agent Godreau was in imminent danger as the vehicle
16 headed forward and fired the shot that struck and killed Estrada. Like Agent
17 Godreau’s actions, Agent Alba’s actions were objectively reasonable under
18 the totality of the circumstances.
19 50. The witnesses’ accounts of the less-than-seven critical seconds (four seconds
20 stopped, 1.6 seconds moving toward Agent Godreau, and 1.1 seconds while
21 shots were fired) vary regarding Agent Godreau’s precise location. However,
22 the undisputed trajectories of Agent Godreau’s bullets place him in front and
23 toward the passenger side of the vehicle.
24 51. Agent Godreau’s post-incident estimate of his firing location vis-à-vis the
25 vehicle was inaccurate. The unaccounted-for shell casings do not impact the
26 Court’s ultimate findings of Godreau’s position, nor did the post-incident
27 movement of the vehicles by the Agents. Stephen Plourd’s reconstruction was
28 arrived at with confidence in his opinion, although his reconstruction was
1 impeached by an improper orientation of Estrada’s vehicle before it started to
2 move.
3 52. As Estrada’s vehicle turned towards its left and travelled toward the fence,
4 Agent Mathews fired, fearing he was in danger. Agent Mathews was 25 feet
5 away, but the vehicle was headed toward him and he believed the vehicle
6 could breach the fence and endanger him. This was an objectively reasonable
7 conclusion under the totality of the circumstances.
8 53. That the vehicle may not have been able to breach the wire fence was not
9 clearly established. It could be inferred that Estrada may have believed he
10 could breach the fence. In any event, Agent Alba shot Estrada within 1.9
11 seconds of Estrada accelerating, and no evidence establishes that Agent
12 Mathews knew that Estrada was incapacitated before Agent Mathews fired.
13 54. The applicable use of force and safety policies, often recited in the case, were
14 set forth in Exhibit 1. The relevant language found on page 6 reads in full:
15 Except where otherwise required by inspections or other
operations, Authorized Officers/Agents should avoid standing
16
directly in front of or behind a subject vehicle. Officers/agents
17 should not place themselves in the path of a moving vehicle or
use their body to block a vehicle’s path.
18
19 And
20 Authorized Officers/Agents should avoid intentionally and
unreasonably placing themselves in positions in which they have
21
no alternative to using deadly force.
22
The parties agreed that “should” is a permissive term that provides Agents
23
discretion under the circumstances of a given situation.
24
55. Neither less-than-lethal force or de-escalation methods could have been
25
employed. There was no time to utilize a baton and any impact from a baton
26
to Estrada would have been to his head and/or neck and would thus be lethal.
27
Agents are trained not to use tasers on a moving vehicle, and there was no
28
1 time to deploy a dog or a helicopter (Agent Baker had called for a helicopter
2 during the chase on SR 94). Finally, firing a pepper ball with a launcher into
3 the vehicle would also have been lethal.
4 V.
5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
6 Tragically, Mr. Estrada was shot and killed on May 14, 2021. This case ultimately
7 comes down to events that occurred within just seven seconds. After the high-speed chase
8 on SR 94, the vehicle entered the Circle K property. Estrada sped through the property
9 apparently looking for an exit. Estrada left the paved area onto a grassy/dirt area adjacent
10 to a fence separating the property from SR94. Estrada attempted to reach the property’s
11 entrance/exit, but was blocked by a high curb that Estrada crashed his vehicle into. The
12 right front end of the vehicle sustained significant damage. Unable to proceed further,
13 Estrada backed up to a point where he was blocked in by Agent Perez’s vehicle.
14 Estrada stopped the vehicle for four seconds. While the vehicle was stopped, the
15 Agents approached the vehicle because almost everyone—including the Madariagas—
16 believed the vehicle chase was over. During this time, Agent Alba approached the vehicle
17 from the passenger side, Agent Perez approached from the rear, and WC Patch was in front
18 of and to the passenger side of the vehicle. Agent Godreau was approximately eight to
19 twelve feet in front of the vehicle.
20 Although everyone else believed the vehicle chase was over, Estrada apparently
21 thought otherwise. Estrada revved the vehicle and then accelerated forward. The
22 acceleration occurred as Agent Godreau approached the vehicle. The vehicle accelerated
23 to four to five miles per hour. Within 1.6 seconds of the acceleration, Agent Godreau fired
24 the first shot. Four shots followed over the next 1.1 seconds.
25 Under the totality of the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Agent Godreau
26 and the other Agents to believe that Estrada’s attempts to flee had ended during the four-
27 second stop. It was not unreasonable for the Agents to approach the vehicle to arrest the
28 occupants. When the vehicle accelerated forward in Agent Godreau’s direction and got
1 within mere feet from him in 1.6 seconds, Agent Godreau assessed the imminent danger
2 of serious injury or death to himself and fired. This was a reasonable use of force. The
3 Plaintiffs failed to offer credible evidence or analysis that Agent Godreau could have
4 jumped out of the way or that Agent Godreau would have been aware the vehicle would
5 have missed him. One cannot expect Agent Godreau to have gambled with his own life by
6 speculating on Estrada’s intent or planned trajectory and hopefully jumping away. Clearly,
7 Estrada gambled with his own life.
8 Agent Godreau also did not violate Customs and Border Protection policy. He
9 followed his training in approaching the vehicle to apprehend suspects after Estrada
10 crashed into the curb and stopped in front of Agent Perez’s vehicle. Agent Godreau had
11 little choice or option once Estrada revved up and then accelerated the vehicle in his
12 direction. The Madariagas and the Agents, including Agents Godreau and Alba, all noted
13 that the acceleration was a surprise.
14 All the same can be said of Agent Alba, who shot as the vehicle accelerated toward
15 Agent Godreau. Agent Alba shared the belief that the chase was over as Estrada’s vehicle
16 sat surrounded by Agents and their vehicles, all after traversing the parking lot and crashing
17 into the curb separating the unpaved area from the entrance/exit to the property. In the split
18 seconds (1.9) before he shot, Agent Alba’s assessment that the use of deadly force was
19 justified to save Agent Godreau from a serious risk of injury or death was, all in all,
20 reasonable.
21 Furthermore, Agent Mathews’ fear that he was in danger and his decision to fire
22 were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. This is especially so considering
23 Estrada’s actions during the chase, driving around the Circle K lot, and the acceleration
24 towards Agent Godreau. The use of deadly force by Agent Mathews was thus justified.
25 Plaintiffs’ notion that the Agents should have de-escalated the situation by letting
26 Estrada go and spike stripping the vehicle further down SR 94—at night and on a winding,
27 unlit country road—is untenable. The Agents had already pursued Estrada over a six-mile
28 chase, during which Estrada drove at excessive speeds, made evasive maneuvers and
1 ||exhibited poor control of his vehicle—all on a dark and winding two-lane country road
2 || with areas unprotected by safety railings. Subjecting the Madariagas, Estrada, and the
3 || Agents—along with other possible roadway travelers—to an operation like that would not
4 || have been reasonable.
5 Plaintiffs also proposed that other means to de-escalate or other methods to address
6 ||the situation with non-lethal force were available. Specifically, Plaintiffs suggested the
7 || Agents could have deployed a dog or helicopter in the parking lot or used batons, pepper
8 || ball launchers, or tasers to de-escalate or stop Estrada. None of these alternatives would
9 ||have been reasonable. First, no evidence was offered as to how the deployment of a
10 ||helicopter or a dog would have produced a different outcome, although the Court notes
11 || Agent Baker called for a helicopter during the chase on SR 94. Second, the use of a baton
12 || would have been ineffective at the distances involved and because Estrada was in a vehicle.
13 || Even if one of the Agents could have struck Estrada with a baton through the open driver’s
14 || window, likely striking him in the head or neck, such a strike would have constituted the
15 of lethal force. Third, firing a pepper ball into the vehicle would also have constituted
16 use of lethal force. Finally, using a taser against the moving vehicle would have been
17 || ineffective. If the taser somehow hit Estrada, Estrada likely would have lost control of the
18 || vehicle and potentially injured the Agents and the Madariagas.
19 VI.
20 CONCLUSION
21 Based on the foregoing, the Court FINDS for Defendant United States of America,
22 against Plaintiffs, all and each of them. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter
23 judgment for the Defendant and against Plaintiffs on all claims and causes of action.
24 IT IS SO ORDERED.
25 || Dated: April 23, 2026
27 United States District Judge
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