Clendenin

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 WESLEY C. BATTEN, Case No. 1:23-cv-00890-FRS (BAM) (PC)

12 Plaintiff, SCREENING ORDER FINDING PLAINTIFF

MAY PROCEED ON COGNIZABLE

13 v. CLAIMS

14 CLENDENIN, et al., (ECF No. 1)

15 Defendants.

16

17

18 Plaintiff Wesley C. Batten (“Plaintiff”) is a civil detainee appearing pro se and informa

19 pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Individuals detained pursuant to

20 California Welfare and Institutions Code § 6600 et seq. are civil detainees are not prisoners

21 within the meaning of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136, 1140

22 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on June 12, 2023, is before the Court for screening.

23 (ECF No. 1.)

24 I. Screening Requirement and Standard

25 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

26 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

27 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous

28 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary

1 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

2 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

3 pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

4 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

5 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as

7 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

8 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

9 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires

10 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable

11 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret

12 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully

13 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility

14 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

15 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

16 Plaintiff is currently housed at Coalinga State Hospital in Coalinga, California, where the

17 complaint are alleged to have occurred. Plaintiff names as defendants: (1) Stephanie Clendenin,

18 Director of the Department of State Hospitals (“DSH”); (2) Brandon Price, Executive Director of

19 the Department of State Hospitals Coalinga (“DSH-C”); (3) Dr. Cory Fulton, Chief Psychologist,

20 DSH-C; (4) Dr. Scott Van de Putte, Senior Psychologist Supervisor, DSH-C; and (5) Frank Maul,

21 Chief of Rehab Therapy, DSH-C. All defendants are sued in their official capacities only.

22 Plaintiff alleges that he is held under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (“SVPA”) as a

23 civil detainee patient of DSH-C. Plaintiff is a participant in the Sex Offender Treatment Program

24 (“SOTP”). SOTP includes adjunct groups clinically recommended in treatment plans.

25 All SOTP groups are psychotherapy groups, and DSH-C clinical staff have repeatedly

26 stressed that the primary facilitator be licensed and trained to perform psychotherapy. The co-

27 facilitator must be in the process of getting their license. These facilitator requirements are also

28 consistent with the State of California’s Business and Professions Code and the Board of

1 Psychology relating to the licensure and practice of the delivery of psychotherapy services to

2 individuals or groups in exempt settings. It is also consistent with California Code of Regulations

3 Title 22, which requires that a licensed acute mental health facility like DSH-C, shall employ a

4 psychologist, licensed to practice psychology, and if they are not licensed then they must be

5 directly supervised by a person with a license to practice psychology. The former status quo and

6 pattern and practice at DSH-C was that for every SOTP core module group and adjunct group,

7 there would be one licensed Psychologist who was the lead and the co-facilitator would either be

8 a licensed clinical social worker or a behavioral specialist. Adjunct groups would be assigned the

9 same way, except if the group focused on leisure, then a Rehab Therapist (“RT”) would be the

10 lead.

11 A Behavioral Specialist (“BS”) is not licensed to practice psychology and is directly

12 supervised by a Program Director, who is a Psychiatric Technician (“PT”) licensed to be

13 employed as a PT. RTs are not licensed and are supervised by individual RT Program Directors

14 and answer to Defendant Maul, the Chief of Rehab Therapy.

15 Plaintiff has been made aware that on or about August 2022, DSH-C had employed over

16 42 licensed psychologists. As of the date of Plaintiff’s complaint, there were less than 12 to

17 provide psychotherapy services for approximately 1,350 mental health patients. Plaintiff asserts

18 that Defendants have violated the constitution and directly harmed Plaintiff by permitting Rehab

19 Therapists and Behavioral Specialists to deliver sex offender specific treatment to Plaintiff and to

20 facilitate and co-facilitate SOTP groups, substantially departing from generally accepted

21 professional standards of care.

22 Plaintiff has been harmed by Defendants’ acts and omissions in continuing this unlawful

23 practice, as he has questioned which treatment groups to enroll in given the limited psychologists

24 facilitating SOTP at the facility, Plaintiff’s facilitators have not been able to discuss or interpret

25 Plaintiff’s alleged mental disorder, are not permitted to discuss symptom maintenance, address

26 topics such as institutional remission, and have diverted these subjects stating they are not

27 qualified to talk about it. Plaintiff has been provided treatment over the years with no clinical

28 continuity. The RTs and BSs fail to properly document and update Plaintiff’s treatment plans,

1 and there are no psychologists to directly supervise them in treatment teams. Defendants permit

2 RTs and BSs to document interdisciplinary psychology notes in relation to Plaintiff’s treatment

3 group progress and they are permitted to document in Plaintiff’s medical record without training,

4 education, or supervision, to interpret Plaintiff’s progress and mental status, and to interpret the

5 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (“DSM”) used by licensed psychologists to diagnose and treat

6 persons with mental health disorders. Defendants permit RTs and BSs to determine if Plaintiff is

7 ready to advance to further modules of the SOTP and offer their “professional” clinical

8 interpretation of Plaintiff’s progress, harming Plaintiff because courts have often excluded

9 testimony of non-psychological staff treating sex offenders and have deemed them not qualified

10 as an expert witness or trained professionals in the field of treating sexual abusers.

11 Defendants have abdicated their responsibility to ensure the facility is properly staffed and

12 that treatment team services are consistent and in compliance with state law. Plaintiff is harmed

13 by Defendants’ acts and omissions because treatment interventions were delayed, interfered with,

14 and only exacerbated the risks of insufficient mental health programming due to lack of staff.

15 Plaintiff is harmed because of Defendants’ failure to provide a sufficient number of clinical

16 psychologists, resulting in unlawfully stalling enrollment in treatment, treatment teams, and

17 caused Plaintiff’s treatment plan to be outdated.

18 Plaintiff alleges that each defendant is responsible for Plaintiff’s harm, and knew or

19 should have known that the facility’s staffing methodology substantially departed from generally

20 accepted professional standards of care. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ acts and omissions

21 violated Plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by subjecting Plaintiff to

22 punishment, because the condition of Plaintiff’s confinement is more restrictive than inmates in

23 county jails and prisons. Defendants did not fail to properly staff DSH-C unit 21, which holds

24 CDCR inmates, providing them with psychologists to meet their treatment group and treatment

25 team needs, monthly treatment teams with fully licensed psychologists, and treatment group

26 facilitators who were licensed psychologists, unlike what was afforded to Plaintiff.

27 Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief.

28 ///

1 III. Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process

2 Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to appropriately staff the SOTP with licensed

3 psychologists, leading to Plaintiff’s delayed and unqualified treatment.

4 “[T]he due process clause includes a substantive component which guards against

5 arbitrary and capricious government action, even when the decision to take that action is made

6 through procedures that are in themselves constitutionally adequate.” Halverson v. Skagit Cty.,

7 42 F.3d 1257, 1261 (9th Cir. 1994), as amended on denial of reh’g (Feb. 9, 1995) (quoting

8 Sinaloa Lake Owners Ass’n v. City of Simi Valley, 882 F.2d 1398, 1407 (9th Cir. 1989). States

9 are required “to provide civilly-committed persons with access to mental health treatment that

10 gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released,” and to provide “more considerate

11 treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are

12 designed to punish.” Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).

13 Although the state enjoys wide latitude in developing treatment regimens, the courts may take

14 action when there is a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment or when there

15 has been no exercise of professional judgment at all. Id. A person committed based on mental

16 incapacity has a due process right to receive “such individual treatment as will give [him] a

17 realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his . . . mental condition . . . because, absent

18 treatment, [he] could be held indefinitely as a result of [his] mental illness.” Ohlinger v. Watson,

19 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980) (internal citations omitted).

20 Although civilly detained persons must be afforded more considerate treatment and

21 conditions of confinement than convicted defendants, where specific standards are lacking, courts

22 may look to decisions defining the constitutional rights of prisoners to establish a floor for the

23 constitutional rights of persons detained under a civil commitment scheme, Padilla v. Yoo, 678

24 F.3d 748, 759 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2007),

25 vacated and remanded on other grounds by 556 U.S. 1256 (2009), and may borrow Eighth

26 Amendment standards to do so, Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128 (9th Cir. 1998); Redman v.

27 County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1441 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other grounds by 511

28 U.S. 825 (1994). But the conditions under which civil detainees are held cannot be harsher than

1 those under which prisoners are detained except where the statute itself creates a relevant

2 difference. Hydrick, 500 F.3d at 989 n.7.

3 The Due Process Clause requires that the nature and duration of the civil commitment

4 must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. Jones

5 v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 931 (9th Cir. 2004). However, civilly detained individuals can be

6 subject to restrictions that have a legitimate, non-punitive government purpose and that do not

7 appear to be excessive in relation to that purpose. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). “A

8 reasonable relationship between the governmental interest and the challenged restriction does not

9 require an exact fit, nor does it require showing a ‘least restrictive alternative.’” Valdez v.

10 Rosenbalm, 302 F.3d 1039, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The only question is

11 whether the defendants might reasonably have thought that the policy would advance its interests.

12 Id.; Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933 (9th Cir. 2004) (“due process requires that the conditions

13 and duration of confinement . . . bear some reasonable relation to the purposes for which persons

14 are committed.”)

15 Liberally construing the allegations, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim for failure to treat

16 Plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process clause, which requires states to provide

17 civilly-committed persons with access to mental health treatment that gives them a realistic

18 opportunity to be cured and released. Taking Plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, Defendants

19 have failed to provide fully licensed psychologists to facilitate Plaintiff’s SOTP groups, as

20 required by law and generally accepted professional standards, while fully staffing treatment

21 teams for CDCR inmates with licensed psychologists.

22 To prove liability for an action or policy, the plaintiff “must . . . demonstrate that his

23 deprivation resulted from an official policy or custom established by a . . . policymaker possessed

24 with final authority to establish that policy.” Waggy v. Spokane Cty. Wash., 594 F.3d 707, 713

25 (9th Cir. 2010). Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the

26 official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the

27 constitutional rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of

28 San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted),

1 abrogated on other grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). Absent properly

2 licensed psychologists to facilitate and supervise Plaintiff’s treatment, Plaintiff is left without an

3 opportunity to cure or improve his mental illness and no prospect of ever being released. These

4 facts constitute injury stemming from Defendants’ alleged policy of failure to properly staff the

5 SOTP.

6 IV. Conclusion and Order

7 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a cognizable claim against

8 Defendants Clendenin, Price, Fulton, Van de Putte, and Maul for failure to treat Plaintiff under

9 the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause due to their policy.

10 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED as follows:

11 1. This action shall proceed on Plaintiff’s complaint, filed on June 12, 2023, (ECF No. 1),

12 against Defendants Clendenin, Price, Fulton, Van de Putte, and Maul for failure to treat

13 Plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause due to their policy; and

14 2. A separate order will issue regarding service of the complaint.

15

IT IS SO ORDERED.

16

17 Dated: February 3, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28