Hrachova

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

OCALA DIVISION

IRYNA HRACHOVA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 5:09-cv-95-PRL

DENVER DEWAYNE COOK,

Defendant.

ORDER

In February 2009, Plaintiff Iryna Hrachova, individually and on behalf of her

daughter, Zhanna Hrachova initiated this action against Denver Dewayne Cook for specific

performance of an Affidavit of Support, Form I-864, signed by Defendant on Plaintiff’s

behalf. By signing the form, Mr. Cook agreed “to provide the sponsored immigrant(s)

whatever support is necessary to maintain the sponsored immigrant(s) at an income that is

at least 125 percent of the Federal poverty guidelines.”

A non-jury trial was held on October 28, 2009. Shortly thereafter, on November 3,

2009, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order finding that Ms. Hrachova

was entitled to judgment against Mr. Cook in the sum of $103,197.44 for past support

accumulated between August 1, 2001, and November 3, 2009. (Doc. 44). The Court further

found that Mr. Cook was required to continue to support Ms. Hrachova at 125% of the

current federal poverty level until such time as the obligation expires by law. Judgment was

entered the next day consistent with the Order. (Doc. 45).

This case now centers on Ms. Hrachova’s seventeen-year quest to collect the

judgment that she claims now exceeds $180,000, with additional support and accrued

interest. In her efforts to collect the judgment, Ms. Hrachova has obtained various writs of

garnishment, including one against Empower Retirement and another issued to Truist Bank

in Eustis, Florida. The Court held a hearing on May 20, 2026, during which the issues

relating to these writs were discussed.1

I. Empower Retirement

On October 15, 2025, Ms. Hrachova filed a motion for writ of garnishment against

Empower Retirement (Doc. 91), which the Court granted. (Doc. 95). The Clerk issued the

writ on October 21, 2025 (Doc. 96), and it was served on January 15, 2025. (Doc. 104). On

January 29, 2026, Mr. Cook filed a motion for an extension of time and to dissolve the writ.

(Doc. 105). The Court granted the extension until March 27, 2026. (Doc. 106). On February

4, 2026, Ms. Hrachova filed a motion for default, final default judgment, and order to

disburse funds held by Empower in the amount of $6,587.83. (Doc. 107). Ms. Hrachova

attached a letter that she received from Empower advising that Mr. Cook’s IRA account,

which was opened on December 29, 2023, has a total account value of $6,587.83 (as of

market close on January 21, 2026). On March 24, 2026, Keith Petrochko, Esq., appeared on

behalf of Mr. Cook and filed an answer and request for hearing (Doc. 115), affidavit of Mr.

Cook (Doc. 113), and an exhibit list (Doc. 114).

Mr. Cook claims exemption from garnishment as to the funds held in his IRA

account pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 222.21. Mr. Cook has offered evidence that the funds in the

IRA held with Empower Retirement consist entirely of a direct rollover from his former

employer’s retirement plan—i.e., the Vann Gannaway Chevrolet, Inc. 401(k) Retirement

Plan (also held with Empower Retirement). Further, Mr. Cook has offered evidence that

1 The hearing was set to address Mr. Cook’s verified claim of exemption as to the Empower

Retirement writ. However, the Court also heard argument related to the Truist Bank writ.

since the rollover, he has not deposited any additional funds into the account, nor has he

commingled the retirement funds with any personal or non-exempt assets.

Funds in a 401(k) account are exempt pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 222.21, and a direct

transfer of retirement funds between tax-exempt accounts does not affect their exempt

status. See In re Maxwell, No. 6:09-BK-3480-ABB, 2009 WL 3381185, at 1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.

Oct. 5, 2009). Florida courts have recognized that “‘the purpose of [§ 222.21] is to confer on

retirement plans a broad exemption from the claims of creditors’ and the Florida Legislature

‘made the policy decision that it should protect the assets of IRA’s and pension plans.’”

Kearney Construction Co. LLC v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America, No. 8:09-cv-

1850-T-30TBM, 2017 WL 4277164, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 16, 2017) (quoting Dunn v.

Doskocz, 590 So. 2d 521, 522, n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). Thus, under Florida law, Mr.

Cook’s IRA funds are exempt from garnishment. Nevertheless, Ms. Hrachova filed an

objection arguing that she is entitled to garnish Mr. Cook’s IRA to collect her federal

judgment. (Doc. 121).

As an initial matter, Ms. Hrachova claims that her objection is timely, based on her

notice of unavailability filed on February 17, 2026, in which she requested an opportunity to

respond to any filings by Mr. Cook until May 6, 2026. (Doc. 110). The Court did not grant

this request. Even so, Ms. Hrachova did not file her objection until May 18, 2026. Thus, it

was untimely, and the writ should be dissolved on the basis alone. Pursuant to Florida law:

Upon the filing by a defendant of a sworn claim of exemption and request for

hearing, a hearing will be held as soon as is practicable to determine the validity of

the claimed exemptions. If the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney does not file a sworn

written statement that answers the defendant's claim of exemption within 8 business

days after hand delivering the claim and request or, alternatively, 14 business days if

the claim and request were served by mail, no hearing is required and the clerk must

automatically dissolve the writ and notify the parties of the dissolution by mail.

Fla. Stat. §77.041(3).

Moreover, even if timely, Ms. Hrachova’s objection is not well-taken. The Court has

reviewed the cases cited by Plaintiff and finds that they do not support her position that Mr.

Cook’s IRA account is subject to garnishment in this proceeding.

The genesis of Plaintiff’s argument is Mr. Cook’s prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy case—

In re Cook, 473 B.R. 468 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012)—in which the bankruptcy court determined

that the federal court judgment pursuant to the Affidavit of Support was a “domestic support

obligation” under the bankruptcy code §101 and was excepted from discharge pursuant to 11

U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). The bankruptcy code defines “domestic support obligation” as a debt

owed to or recoverable by a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, in the nature of

alimony, maintenance, or support, whether or not so designated. 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A). The

debt must have been established on or before the date of the bankruptcy by reason of a

separation agreement, divorce decree, property settlement, order of court

record, or determination of non-bankruptcy law. Plaintiff has cited no case applying the

phrase “domestic support obligation” outside of the bankruptcy context.

Nevertheless, Plaintiff argues that the designation as a “domestic support obligation”

by the bankruptcy court, allows her to garnish Mr. Cook’s IRA in this non-bankruptcy

proceeding. Plaintiff again turns to the bankruptcy code which provides an exemption for

IRA accounts but also creates an exception for domestic support obligations. To that end,

Plaintiff cites In re Crum, 414 B.R. 103, 110–11 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009). The dispute in Crum

occurred during the debtor’s chapter 7 bankruptcy case, where his former wife sought to

liquidate exempted assets to collect a domestic support obligation (i.e., alimony and child

support). Id. at 105–06, 108, 110–11. The bankruptcy court held that while the debtor’s IRA

accounts were generally exempt under § 522 from the claims of his pre-petition creditors, the

accounts were not exempt from the claims of his former spouse for a domestic support

obligation.

At the most basic level, Plaintiff’s reliance on Crum and these provisions from

Chapter 5 of the bankruptcy code (i.e., §§ 522 and 523) is misplaced. Indeed, by its express

terms, Chapter 5 only “appl[ies] in a case under chapter 7, 11, 12 or 13 of this title.” 11

U.S.C. § 103(a). Accordingly, while Plaintiff’s arguments might be persuasive in a

bankruptcy proceeding, they are not applicable in this case.

Moreover, even if Mr. Cook’s IRA could be garnished for child support or alimony

obligations under Florida law—and Plaintiff does not make this argument—the federal

judgment is neither. Indeed, as Plaintiff has acknowledged, courts have held that the

obligation pursuant to Form I-864 is a federal obligation that exists separately from rights

that exist under state law for child support or alimony. See Brown v. Brown, 700 F.Supp.3d

402 (E.D. Va. 2023) (holding that while the property settlement agreement in the divorce

proceedings may restrict the wife’s right to seek support or maintenance under Maryland

state law, the federal obligation the husband incurred under the Form I-864 existed

separately and could not be excused by the wife). Indeed, Mr. Cook has already paid the

$29,467.64 in alimony awarded to Ms. Hrachova in the state court divorce proceedings. In

re Cook, 473 B.R. 468, 471 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2012). And based on a review of the state

court docket, Mr. Cook filed his “Petition for Dissolution of Marriage with No Children”

and thus, no child support was awarded.2

2 The divorce case which was filed in Lake County, Florida—No. 35-2000-DR-003552-

AXXX-XX— can be accessed at https://courtrecords.lakecountyclerk.org

Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Cook’s IRA account with Empower ending in

0101 is exempt from garnishment under Florida law. In addition, Ms. Hrachova’s objection

to the exemption is untimely. The writ of garnishment issued to Empower Retirement (Doc.

96) is hereby dissolved, and the restrained funds shall be promptly released. Ms. Hrachova’s

motion for judgment as to the IRA funds held by Empower Retirement is denied. (Doc.

107)

II. Truist Bank Writ of Garnishment

On October 21, 2025, the Clerk issued a writ of garnishment to Truist Bank in Eustis,

Florida. (Doc. 96). On January 14, 2026, Truist Bank filed its answer to the writ. (Doc.

102). Truist Bank states that it is in doubt as to whether any indebtedness or property in its

possession or control is required by law to be included in the Answer or retained. Truist

Bank identified two accounts: one ending in 2195 and one ending in 7620. Truist retained

$100.00 from the account ending in 2195 pursuant to Fla. Stat. §§ 77.06(3) and 77.19. Truist

Bank claims that the account ending in 7620 is fully protected under 31 CFR § 212, which

protects accounts from garnishment when a federal benefit payment has been directly

deposited and neither the United States or a State child support enforcement agency has

attached or included a Notice of Right to Garnish Federal Benefits. In addition, Truist Bank

demands that Ms. Hrachova pay its counsel the statutory $100.00 attorney’s fee pursuant to

Fla. Stat. § 77.28.

On February 6, 2026, Ms. Hrachova filed a motion for extension of time to respond,

to which she attached her proposed “Reply to Truist Banks Answer to Writ of

Garnishment.” (Doc. 109). The Court will grant Ms. Hrachova’s motion (Doc. 109) to the

extent that her reply (Doc. 109-1) is deemed timely filed.

In her reply, Ms. Hrachova advises that she provided Truist notification in writing

that the federal benefit protections do not apply to this garnishment. Truist, however, would

not change its Answer because, in its view, although 31 C.F.R. §212 does not protect federal

benefits if a Notice is attached, that exception “only” applies if the Notice is from the

United States or a state child support enforcement agency, which, in this case, it was not.

Dissatisfied with this position, Ms. Hrachova asks the Court to compel Truist Bank

to (a) disclose the account type and balances for account ending in 7620; (b) identify and

retain any funds in account 7620; and (c) produce documents sufficient to show any federal

benefit tagging or the review applied and the basis for concluding that funds are exempt.

Also, she asks that the Court confirm that the $100 held from account 2195 is held under the

Writ for Plaintiff and is not subject to setoff for Truist’s § 77.28 fee claim.

On February 23, 2026, Ms. Hrachova also filed a motion for issuance of a subpoena

to Truist Bank, seeking account statements for account 7620 for the six months before

service of the writ of garnishment and the two months after. (Doc. 111). And on May 18,

2026, she filed a motion to compel, asking the Court to require Truist Bank to provide

information requested by the subpoena and to require Mr. Cook to complete the Fact

Information Sheet. (Doc. 120). Plaintiff then filed a motion for final judgment against Truist

in the amount listed in the writ of garnishment ($180,461.23) for “willful non-compliance to

disclose nature and amounts of defendant’s account ending 7620.” (Doc. 122). Plaintiff then

filed an amended motion for judgment. (Doc. 124).

Turning first to the account ending in 2195, Truist Bank is holding $100.00, and Mr.

Cook has not claimed any exemption. Thus, Ms. Hrachova would be entitled to final

judgment in the amount of $100.00. However, Fla Stat. § 77.28 provides in pertinent part:

On rendering final judgment, the court shall determine the garnishee's costs and

expenses, including a reasonable attorney fee, and in the event of a judgment in favor

of the plaintiff, the amount is subject to offset by the garnishee against the defendant

whose property or debt owing is being garnished.

Accordingly, the $100.00 to which Ms. Hrachova is entitled is properly offset by Truist’s

costs and expenses in the amount of $100.00.

As for the account ending in 7620, 31 C.F.R. Pt. 212 outlines the procedure a

financial institution must take when receiving a garnishment order. As Truist Bank

explained to Ms. Hrachova, the Notice of Right to Garnish Federal Benefits must be

provided by the United States or a State child support enforcement agency using the Notice

in Appendix B to Part 212 on official organizational letterhead. In this case, no such Notice

was attached or included with the garnishment order. Accordingly, Truist was required to

follow the procedures set forth in § 212.5 and § 212.6. (31 C.F.R. §212.4(c)).

Section 212.5 outlines the procedure whereby a financial institution is required to

perform an account review. If the account review shows that a benefit agency deposited a

benefit payment into the account during the lookback period, then the financial institution

shall follow the procedures in §212.6, which governs “Rules and procedures to protect

benefits.” Pursuant to § 212.6(a):

Protected amount. The financial institution shall immediately calculate and establish

the protected amount for an account. The financial institution shall ensure that the

account holder has full and customary access to the protected amount, which the

financial institution shall not freeze in response to the garnishment order. An

account holder shall have no requirement to assert any right of garnishment

exemption prior to accessing the protected amount in the account.

And then § 212.6(c) specifically provides that “a protected amount calculated and

established by a financial institution pursuant to this section shall be conclusively considered

to be exempt from garnishment under law.”

Accordingly, Truist’s determination that the funds in the account ending in 7620 are

entirely protected is conclusive. Thus, there is no basis for Plaintiff to subpoena records or

for this Court to compel Truist to disclose additional information or produce records. As

such, Plaintiff’s motion for issuance of subpoena to Truist Bank (Doc. 111) and motion to

compel discovery from Truist Bank (Doc. 120) are denied.

Like her argument about Mr. Cook’s IRA, Ms. Hrachova contends that she is

entitled to garnish Mr. Cook’s otherwise exempt social security disability benefits to collect

the final judgment. First, Plaintiff cites to 8 U.S.C. § 1183a(c), which provides that the

remedies available to enforce an affidavit of support include any of the remedies set forth in

§§ 3201, 3203, 3204, or 3205 of Title 28. Section 3205 governs garnishment. Under federal

law, while social security disability benefits are generally exempt from execution, they are

subject to garnishment for child support and alimony. See 42 U.S.C. § 659; Johnson v. Saul,

No. 4:20-cv-942-JM-BD, 2021 WL 1035077, at 2 (E.D. Arkansas February 10, 2021);

Knickerbocker v. Norman, 938 F.2d 891 (8th Cir. 1991).

However, as discussed above—and as acknowledged by Ms. Hrachova—the Form I-

864 support obligation is a separate obligation that arises under federal law, distinct from

child support and alimony. See Brown v. Brown, 700 F. Supp. 3d 402 (E.D. Va. 2023)

(holding that while the property settlement agreement in the divorce proceedings may

restrict the wife’s right to seek support or maintenance under Maryland state law, the federal

obligation the husband incurred under the Form I-864 existed separately and could not be

excused by the wife). Indeed, as the Court explained, Mr. Cook has already paid the

alimony imposed by the state court in the divorce proceedings and no child support ordered.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s amended motion for final judgment (Doc. 124) is due to be

denied.’

However, the Court will grant Plaintiff's request to compel Mr. Cook to complete the

Florida Fact Information Sheet (Fla. R. Civ. P. Form 1.977). See, e.g., Power Rental OP CO,

LLC v. Virgin Islands Water & Power Authority, No. 3:20-cv-1015-TJC-MCR, 2023 WL

4187095 (M.D. Fla. May 31, 2023) (discussing how courts routinely grant a judgment

creditor’s request to compel the completion of the Fact Information Sheet). Mr. Cook shall

provide Ms. Hrachova a completed Fact Information Sheet on or before June 12, 2026.

DONE and ORDERED in Ocala, Florida on May 29, 2026.

[ * oh

PHILIP R. LAMMENS

United States Magistrate Judge

Copies furnished to:

Counsel of Record

Truist Bank

Empower Retirement

8515 East Orchard Rd.,

Greenwood Village, CO 80111

3 Ms. Hrachova’s initial motion for final judgment (Doc. 122) is due to terminated as moot

based on the filing of the amended motion. (Doc. 124).

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