Opinion

Court: District Court, E.D. California
Filed: Feb 2, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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NATHAN BARR, No. 2:23-cv-02319 WBS AC

Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

15 DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

AUTOZONERS, LLC; AUTOZONE, SUMMARY JUDGMENT

16 INC.; DWAYNE JOHNSON, and

DOES 1 to 100, inclusive,

Defendants.

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21 Plaintiff Nathan Barr brought this employment

22 discrimination action under California’s Fair Employment &

23 Housing Act, Cal. Gov. Code § 12940, et seq. (“FEHA”), against

24 defendants Autozoners, LLC and AutoZone, Inc. (together,

25 “Autozone”); Dwayne Johnson; and Does 1 to 100, inclusive.

26 (Docket No. 1-1.) Defendants now move for summary judgment, or,

27 in the alternative, partial summary judgment. (Docket No. 24.)

1 Plaintiff Nathan Barr began working as a customer

service representative at Autozone in March 2022. (Docket No. 1-

1 (“Compl.”) at 6.) Relevant to his claims here, plaintiff is a

gay, African American man. (Id. at 7.)

In or around April 2022, Barr and his supervisor,

Dwayne Uhl1, were engaged in a conversation regarding food.

(Id.) During this conversation, Uhl, a “Caucasian male,”

allegedly told Barr that he “kn[ew] [Barr’s] kind likes

watermelon.” (Id.) Barr was “deeply offended” by Uhl’s comment.

(Id.)

Shortly thereafter, Barr reported Uhl’s comment to a

manager, Tyra Mariscal, who responded by stating “oh that’s just

how [Uhl] jokes.” (Id.; Docket No. 24-1 at 6.) Uhl continued to

make inappropriate remarks: Upon overhearing a conversation Barr

was having with another coworker regarding his boyfriend, Uhl

allegedly “looked at Barr with disgust” and said “ew, you’re gay,

you’re not supposed to be gay.” (Compl. at 7.) Barr reported

this incident to Mariscal, too. (Id. at 8.)

On another occasion, Barr was discussing with his

coworkers how he was unable to eat due to a toothache. (Id.)

Uhl interjected by saying “well I know you can eat some fried

chicken or watermelon.” (Id.) In distress, Barr reported this

comment to Mariscal, who informed him that he could take the rest

1 In his complaint, plaintiff refers to his supervisor as

“Dwayne Johnson.” (See Compl.) Defendants refer to “Dwayne

Johnson” as “Dwayne Uhl” in their motion for summary judgment

27 (see Docket No. 24-1), and plaintiff in turn refers to “Dwayne

Johnson” as “Dwayne Uhl” in his opposition (see Docket No. 26.)

28 The court refers to plaintiff’s supervisor as “Dwayne Uhl.”

1 of the day off and agreed to pay him for the remainder of his

shift. (Id.)

Lastly, Barr alleges that, while he was standing at a

cash register, Uhl told him that he “look[s] like [he] would have

a cousin named Shaniqua.” (Id.)

After receiving “no response from his supervisors”

regarding his complaints of Uhl’s comments, on July 6, 2022, Barr

wrote a letter detailing the “harassment he had been subjected

to” to district manager Devin Galyean. (Id.) Barr also

discussed Uhl’s comments with Galyean directly; during this

conversation, Barr stated that he would be willing to transfer to

Autozone locations in South Sacramento. (Docket No. 26 at 13.)

Galyean, in turn, emailed human resources manager Isaac Chavez

about Uhl’s behavior. (Id.)

Barr alleges that, after complaining of Uhl’s

misconduct to Galyean, he was involuntarily transferred to an

Autozone store in Folsom, California, with a longer commute to-

and-from his residence. (Compl. at 8; Docket No. 26 at 15.) He

requested Galyean to reassign him to a more convenient Autozone

location, but after “waiting for weeks” for such a transfer, he

was “forced to resign from his position at Autozone.” (Compl. at

8.) The instant action followed.

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper “if the pleadings, the

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

1 R. Civ. P. 56(c). A material fact is one that could affect the

outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit

a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's

favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248

(1986).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial

burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact, which they can satisfy by presenting evidence that negates

an essential element of the non-moving party's case. See Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

“Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the

non-moving party must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own

affidavits, or by ‘the depositions, answers to interrogatories,

and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Burch v. Regents of Univ.

of California, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1125 (E.D. Cal. 2006)

(Shubb, J.) (quoting Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324).

II. Plaintiff’s FEHA Claims

Plaintiff brings four claims against defendants under

FEHA: (1) discrimination on the bases of race/color and sexual

orientation; (2) hostile work environment on the bases of

race/color and sexual orientation; (3) retaliation for engaging

in protected activity; and (4) failure to prevent discrimination,

retaliation, and harassment. (Docket No. 1-1.) Defendants move

for summary judgment on each claim. (Docket No. 24.)

a. Discrimination Claim

To establish a prima facie case for discrimination

1 under FEHA, Barr “must provide evidence that (1) he was a member

of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position he

sought or was performing competently in the position he held, (3)

he suffered an adverse employment action, such as termination,

demotion, or denial of an available job, and (4) some other

circumstance suggests discriminatory motive.” Guz v. Bechtel

Nat. Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 355, 8 P.3d 1089, 1113 (2000).

The parties dispute whether Barr suffered an adverse

employment action. (Compare Docket No. 24-1 at 10-16 with Docket

No. 26 at 25-27.) An adverse employment action is one that

“materially affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of

employment.” Jones v. Lodge at Torrey Pines P'ship, 42 Cal. 4th

1158, 1168, 177 P.3d 232 (2008) (citation modified). “An adverse

employment action is not limited to ‘ultimate’ employment acts,

such as hiring, firing, demotion or failure to promote, but also

includes the entire spectrum of employment actions that are

reasonably likely to adversely and materially affect an

employee's job performance or opportunity for career

enhancement.” Washington v. California City Correction Ctr., 871

F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1028 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (Ishii, J.) (citation

modified). That said, “the mere fact that an employee is

displeased by an employer's act or omission does not elevate that

act or omission to the level of a materially adverse employment

action.” Thomas v. Dep't of Corr., 77 Cal. App. 4th 507, 511, 91

Cal. Rptr. 2d 770 (2000).

Barr argues that Autozone’s alleged failure to transfer

him to a different store location and constructive discharge from

1 his position constitute adverse employment actions. (See Docket

No. 26 at 25-27.) He also alleges that the reduction in work

hours he experienced after he complained of Uhl’s behavior

constitutes an adverse employment action. (See Compl. at 8.)

None of Barr’s theories avails.

i. Transfer

Barr states in his opposition to Autozone’s motion for

summary judgment that “issues of fact” exist as to whether he was

“offered a transfer” and “contacted about a transfer.” (Docket

No. 26 at 26.) But Barr admits at least twice that he was

transferred to a different Autozone location, which he worked at

for one day. (Compl. at 8; Docket No. 26-2 at 17.)

It is difficult to conceive of how this transfer to

another location – which Barr himself requested – constitutes an

adverse employment action. While Barr complains that the

Autozone store to which he was transferred to was “very

inconvenient” (Docket No. 26 at 15), this store was a mere 2.3

miles farther from Barr’s residence than his preferred store

(Docket No. 26-2 at 17-18), and Barr does not argue that his

responsibilities were in any way diminished upon his transfer.

See, e.g., McRae v. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 142 Cal. App. 4th

377, 393, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 325 (2006) (“A transfer is not an

adverse employment action when it is into a comparable position

that does not result in substantial and tangible harm.”); Nidds

v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1996)

(declining to find adverse employment action where employee was

transferred to service route including “allegedly high-crime”

1 area); cf. E.E.O.C. v. Sw. Furniture of Wisconsin, LLC, 703 F.

Supp. 2d 971, 975 (D. Ariz. 2010) (in Title VII context, “an

increase in commute resulting from a transfer does not, in and of

itself, constitute an adverse employment action.”)2.

Accordingly, Barr has failed to establish that his

transfer constituted an adverse employment action.

ii. Constructive Discharge

Barr next argues that his constructive discharge from

Autozone constituted an adverse employment action. To “establish

a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove, by .

. . [a] preponderance of the evidence . . ., that the employer

either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working

conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of

the employee's resignation that a reasonable employer would

realize that a reasonable person in the employee's position would

be compelled to resign.” Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 7 Cal.

4th 1238, 1251, 876 P.2d 1022, 1029 (1994). “[T]he standard by

which a constructive discharge is determined is an objective one—

the question is whether a reasonable person faced with the

allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of

employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.”

Id. at 1248 (citation modified).

“An employee may not simply ‘quit and sue,’ claiming to

2 “Claims of discrimination under FEHA and Title VII may be

assessed under the same standards, because Title VII and FEHA

operate under the same guiding principles.” Eaglesmith v. Ray,

No. 2:11-cv-00098 JAM, 2011 WL 4738338, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 6,

27 2011) (citing Kohler v. Inter-Tel Technologies, 244 F.3d 1167,

1172-73 (9th Cir. 2001)). Case law interpreting Title VII is

28 thus relevant here.

1 have been constructively discharged”; instead, “[t]he facts must

support a finding that the resignation was ‘coerced,’ rather than

‘simply one rational option for the employee.’” Vasquez v.

Franklin Mgmt. Real Est. Fund, Inc., 222 Cal. App. 4th 819, 827,

166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 247 (2013) (quoting Turner, 7 Cal. 4th at

1246). Further, to establish constructive discharge, “[a]

plaintiff must allege that the discriminatory conduct was severe

and pervasive, not just offhand comments or isolated incidents.”

Hwang v. Nat'l Tech. & Eng'g Sols. of Sandia, LLC, No. 20-cv-

08551 SK, 2022 WL 3566444, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2022),

aff'd, No. 22-16396, 2024 WL 208139 (9th Cir. Jan. 19, 2024).

Barr alleges that, on four occasions, Uhl made racist

or homophobic comments towards him at work. (See generally

Compl.). While Uhl’s comments are reprehensible, these

“separate, isolated incidents are insufficient to create such

intolerable working conditions needed to sustain a constructive

discharge claim,” Rizvanovic v. Amazon.com Servs., LLC, No. 1:21-

CV-01804 JLT CDB, 2024 WL 1886495, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30,

2024), especially when viewed in conjunction with Barr’s

subsequent transfer to a location free from Uhl (see Compl. at

8).

Moreover, the facts do not support that Barr’s

resignation was “coerced,” instead of “simply one rational

option.” See Vasquez, 222 Cal. App. 4th at 827. On July 12,

2022 -- six days after he complained of Uhl’s comments to Galyean

-- Barr was hired by Goodwill for a full-time position at a

higher hourly salary than he received at Autozone. (Docket No.

1 26-2 at 6, 19-20.) Barr ceased showing up for shifts at any

Autozone location the following day. (Id. at 20.) Considered

together, these facts suggest that Barr’s resignation was not

“coerced”; rather, Barr selected the “rational option” of

resigning from his employment at Autozone for a higher-paying job

elsewhere. See Vasquez, 222 Cal. App. 4th at 837.

Accordingly, Barr has not established that he was

constructively discharged from his position at Autozone.

iii. Reduction in Hours

In his complaint, Barr briefly alleges that after he

raised concerns about Uhl’s comments, his work hours were

reduced. (Compl. at 8.) While “[a] reduction in work hours may

constitute an adverse employment action,” Violan v. On Lok Senior

Health Servs., No. 12–cv–05739 WHO, 2013 WL 6907153, at *7 (N.D.

Cal. Dec. 31, 2013) (collecting cases), Barr admits that his work

hours regularly varied and that he incurred his peak work hours

shortly after complaining of Uhl’s behavior. (Docket No. 26-2 at

21-22.) Thus, any alleged fluctuation in Barr’s work hours did

not constitute an adverse employment action here.

Because Barr has failed to establish an adverse

employment action, his discrimination claim fails. See Guz, 24

Cal. 4th at 355; see also Brown v. New York Life Ins. Co., 147 F.

App'x 640, 642 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming district court’s

dismissal of FEHA discrimination claim because plaintiff suffered

no adverse employment action).

b. Hostile Work Environment Harassment Claim

“To establish a prima facie case of harassment,” Barr

1 must show that “(1) []he is a member of a protected class; (2)

[]he was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment

was based on h[is] protected status; (4) the harassment

unreasonably interfered with h[is] work performance by creating

an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5)

defendants are liable for the harassment.” Galvan v. Dameron

Hosp. Assn., 37 Cal. App. 5th 549, 563, 250 Cal. Rptr. 3d 16, 28

(2019). The parties dispute only whether Barr has shown that the

conduct he experienced amounted to a hostile work environment.

(Docket Nos. 24-1 at 16-20; 26 at 16-20.)

Under FEHA, “an employee claiming harassment based upon

a hostile work environment must demonstrate that the conduct

complained of was severe enough or sufficiently pervasive to

alter the conditions of employment and create a work environment

that qualifies as hostile or abusive to employees because of

their” protected status. Miller v. Dep't of Corr., 36 Cal. 4th

446, 462, 115 P.3d 77, 87 (2005).

The California legislature amended the California

Government Code to provide that, as of January 1, 2019, “[a]

single instance of harassing conduct is sufficient to create a

triable issue regarding the existence of a hostile work

environment if the harassing conduct . . . unreasonably

interfered with the plaintiff’s work performance or created an

intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment,” and

that “[h]arassment cases are rarely appropriate for disposition

on summary judgment.” Cal. Gov. Code. §§ 12923(b), (e). In

light of these recent amendments, “[a] California appellate court

1 applying section 12923 has held that cases that focused on the

‘concerted pattern of harassment of a repeated, routine or a

generalized nature’ [are] no longer good law in determining what

conduct creates a hostile work environment on a summary judgment

motion.” Wilson v. City of Fresno, 763 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1102

(E.D. Cal. 2025) (Sherriff, J.) (quoting Beltran v. Hard Rock

Licensing, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 5th 865, 135, 315 Cal. Rptr. 842,

855 (2023)).

This is not the “rare[]” instance in which a harassment

case is “appropriate for disposition on summary judgment.” Cal.

Gov. Code § 12923(e). Uhl, a supervisor in Barr’s work

environment, told Barr that he knew Barr’s “kind likes

watermelon,” (Compl. at 7), expressed disgust at Barr being gay

and told Barr that he was “not supposed to be gay,” (id.), told

Barr that he could “eat some fried chicken or watermelon,”

(Compl. at 8), and told Barr that he “look[ed] like [he] would

have a cousin named Shaniqua,” (id.). Courts in this circuit

have declined to grant summary judgment in favor of employers on

FEHA harassment claims when confronted with similar

circumstances. See, e.g., Wilson, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 1102

(declining to grant summary judgment in favor of employer where

supervisor made several racially derogatory comments to

subordinate); Batiste v. City of Richmond, No. 22-cv-01188 AMO,

2023 WL 8191088, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2023), motion for

relief from judgment denied, No. 22-cv-01188 AMO, 2024 WL 1485843

(N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2024) (declining to grant summary judgment in

favor of employer where coworkers, including supervisor, called

1 plaintiff racially derogatory nickname multiple times); Few v.

Lenovo (United States), Inc., No. 4:20-cv-03115 KAW, 2021 WL

5973053, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2021) (declining to grant

summary judgment in favor of employer where employee made three

racially derogatory comments to African American plaintiff,

including asking him whether he liked “sweet tea with [his] fried

chicken”).

Accordingly, the court will deny Autozone’s motion for

summary judgment as to Barr’s FEHA harassment claim.

c. Retaliation Claim

FEHA’s retaliation provision provides that it is

unlawful “[f]or any employer . . . or person to discharge, expel,

or otherwise discriminate against any person because the person

has opposed any practices forbidden under this part or because

the person has filed a complaint, testified, or assisted in any

proceeding under this part.” Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(h). “To

establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must

show that []he engaged in a protected activity, that []he was

thereafter subjected to adverse employment action by h[is]

employer, and there was a causal link between the two.” Addy v.

Bliss & Glennon, 44 Cal. App. 4th 205, 217, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642,

649 (1996) (citation modified).

As discussed with regard to his discrimination claim,

Barr has failed to establish that he was subjected to an adverse

employment action at any point during his employment with

Autozone. Thus, his retaliation claim fails, too. See id.; see

also Thomas v. Spencer, 294 F. Supp. 3d 990, 1000 (D. Haw. 2018)

1 (finding plaintiff’s retaliation claim failed at summary judgment

stage due to lack of adverse employment action).

d. Failure to Prevent Claim

Autozone argues that because Barr’s discrimination,

harassment, and retaliation claims fail, “he cannot proceed on

his derivative claim for failure to prevent FEHA violations.”

(Docket No. 24-1 at 20.) A “failure to prevent” claim under FEHA

is “essentially derivative” of the underlying claim. Achal v.

Gate Gourmet, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 3d 781, 804 (N.D. Cal. 2015)

(citation modified). Correspondingly, because Barr’s harassment

claim survives, so, too, does his failure to prevent harassment

claim. See id.; see also Wilson, 763 F. Supp. 3d at 1109

(finding that because plaintiff’s FEHA retaliation and harassment

claims survived summary judgment, plaintiff’s failure to prevent

retaliation and harassment claim also survived summary judgment).

e. Punitive Damages

To obtain punitive damages on his surviving claims,

Barr must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that an

“officer, director, or managing agent” of Autozone “authorized or

ratified the wrongful conduct for which the damages are awarded

or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cal.

Civ. Code §§ 3294(a), (b). Barr argues that Galyean and Chavez

were managing agents who ratified Uhl’s wrongful conduct. (See

Docket No. 26 at 21-24.)

“Corporate liability for punitive damages depends on

the extent to which an employee exercises substantial

discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine

1 corporate policy, rather than on an employee's managerial level.”

Almanza v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 06-0553 WBS GGH, 2007 WL

2274927, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2007). Thus, to demonstrate

that an employee is a managing agent, a plaintiff seeking

punitive damages must “show that the employee exercised

substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a

corporation’s business.” White v. Ultramar, Inc., 21 Cal. 4th

563, 577, 981 P.2d 944, 954 (1999). “[M]ere supervisory status”

is insufficient. Id. at 575. Rather, a managing agent’s

decisionmaking must “determine[] corporate polic[ies],” id. at

567, that “affect a substantial portion of the company and that

are the type likely to come to the attention of corporate

leadership.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 715, 219

P.3d 749, 767 (2009), as modified (Feb. 10, 2010) (elaborating on

White, 21 Cal. 4th 563). “The question of whether a corporate

employee” constitutes a managing agent “is highly factual.”

Barrous v. BP P.L.C., No. 10-cv-02944 LHK, 2011 WL 4595205, at

*16 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2011).

At this stage, triable issues of fact remain regarding

whether Galyean or Chavez possessed the requisite “discretionary

authority” over “formal” corporate policies that “affect a

substantial portion of the company.” See Roby, 47 Cal. 4th at

715. As to Galyean, Barr argues that because the court in White

found that a manager who oversaw eight stores and sixty-five

employees was a managing agent, Galyean must also be a managing

agent because he oversaw more stores and employees and was also

tasked with enforcing corporate policy at the stores he

nnn enn nnn enn non nnn en EE I OD

supervised (Docket No. 26 at 22). See White, 21 Cal. 4th at 577.

And as to Chavez, Barr argues that he could propose changes to

certain written policies and procedures based on a statement he

made during his deposition (see Docket Nos. 26 at 23, 26-2 at

° 23), suggesting his ability to dictate corporate policies, see

° Roby, 47 Cal. 4th at 715. Further, the court observes that both

employees’ titles included the word “manager.” Cf. Barrous, 2011

WL 4595205, at *17 (noting that employee’s title as “manager,”

° among other things, “could give rise to the inference that he is

a managing agent.”).

Absent additional, factual information regarding

Galyean’s and Chavez’s precise duties and their authorities

tS inherent to such duties, the court cannot conclude that no

genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether these

employees were managing agents of Autozone. Accordingly, the

re court will deny defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to

plaintiff’s punitive damages claim.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Docket No. 24) be, and the same hereby is,

20 GRANTED as to plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants’ motion for

summary judgment (Docket No. 24) be, and the same hereby is,

DENIED as to plaintiff’s harassment, failure to prevent

28 harassment, and punitive damages claims.

°° Dated: February 2, 2026 tleom ah. A. be—~

26 WILLIAM B. SHUBB

27 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

28 15

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