Gonzalez

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

CARLOS ALFREDO GONZALEZ,

Petitioner,

Case No. 2:26-cv-1491-KCD-DNF

v.

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE

SOUTH DETENTION CENTER,

US ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents.

/

ORDER

Petitioner Carlos Alfredo Gonzalez is a Cuban citizen with a final order

of removal. (Doc. 6-1.)1 He was recently detained by U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus under

28 U.S.C. § 2241. As best the Court can tell from the pro se petition, he

argues that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment as

interpreted by Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). (Doc. 1.) The

Government opposes the petition. (Doc. 6.) For the reasons below, the petition

is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

I. Background

Gonzalez was paroled into the United States in 1989 and later adjusted

his status to lawful permanent resident. (Doc. 6-3 at 2.) Between 1994 and

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

2008, Gonzalez was arrested and/or convicted of various crimes, including

serious felonies. (Id. at 3.) He was ordered removed in May 2010. (Doc. 6-1.)

But he was not deported at that time. Instead, the Government released him

on an order of supervision.

On January 27, 2026, immigration enforcement determined it was

appropriate to detain Gonzalez once more. (Doc. 6-3.) ICE intends to remove

him to Mexico. (Doc. 6-5 at 5.) On March 27, 2026, ICE attempted to remove

Gonzalez to Mexico, but he refused to dress out, leave his dorm, or board the

bus. (Doc. 6-6.)

II. Legal Framework

The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to

issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of

the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At

its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of

reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).

“Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration

detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at

*2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

III. Discussion

The Government first argues that we lack jurisdiction to address

Gonzalez’s claims under the INA. (Doc. 6 at 3-6.) This Court has already

addressed these precise arguments and rejected them for the same reasons

they fail today. See Obando-Vargas v. Assistant Dir., No. 2:26-CV-265-KCD-

NPM, 2026 WL 796804, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2026). The Court thus

turns to the merits.

The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a

noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90

days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period,

detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the

noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the

individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6).

But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to

detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems,

the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may

detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his

removal. 533 U.S. at 659. And to make that rule workable, the Court

established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is

presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the

alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of

removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the

government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v.

Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a

claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order

detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good

reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id.

Applied here, Gonzalez cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement.

ICE took him into custody on January 27, 2026. (Doc. 6-3.) Because he has

been detained for four months, he remains within the window in which his

detention is presumptively reasonable. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No.

25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v.

Dir. of Enf’t and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026

WL 261938, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case

No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025)

(finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been

detained for more than six months”). And, in any event, Gonzalez has refused

removal to Mexico, which tolls the detention period. See Akinwale, 287 F.3d

at 1052 n.4 (stating that the “removal period shall be extended ... if the alien

... acts to prevent [his] removal subject to an order of removal”); Quo Zing

Song v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 516 F. App’x 894, 899 (11th Cir. 2013) (“The six-

month period is tolled, however, if the alien acts to prevent his removal.”).

Thus, Gonzalez’s challenge to his continued detention fails. Brown v.

Gonzalez, No. 4:06CV525-RH/WCS, 2007 WL 2790585, at *8 (N.D. Fla. Sept.

23, 2007).

Gonzalez also seemingly argues that his clean supervision record

precludes ICE from revoking his release. (Doc. 1 at 7-8.) This argument fails.

He is subject to a final removal order that stands uncontested. The INA

explicitly authorizes a return to detention to effectuate such orders. 8 C.F.R.

§ 241.13(i)(2). And the government no doubt has a legitimate interest in

doing exactly that—enforcing its laws, ensuring individuals do not flee, and

protecting the public. See Malam v. Adducci, 469 F. Supp. 3d 767, 790 (E.D.

Mich. 2020). Here, the Government revoked Gonzalez’s release specifically to

enforce his outstanding removal order, gave him notice that they were doing

so, and afforded him an informal interview. Returning him to custody thus

serves a recognized, legitimate government objective and was done in

compliance with the INA.

Finally, Gonzalez alleges that he has serious medical needs that have

not been met while in custody. (Doc. 1 at 7.) To the extent this is an argument

for habeas relief, it is summarily rejected. Challenges to conditions of

confinement are not appropriately raised in the habeas context. See Vaz v.

Skinner, 634 F. App’x 778, 781 (11th Cir. 2015) (“Petitioner’s § 2241 petition

is not the appropriate vehicle for raising an inadequate medical care claim, as

such a claim challenges the conditions of confinement, not the fact or

duration of that confinement.”).

IV. Conclusion

Gonzalez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the

habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new

petition should his current detention, unimpeded, exceed the six-month

mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in

the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter

judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and

close the case.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 28, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek ose ot

United States District Judge