McDonald

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

CHAD MCDONALD,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:26-cv-207-KKM-TGW

KURT A. HOFFMAN,

in his official capacity,

Defendant.

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ORDER

Former Sarasota County Sheriff’s Office (SCSO) detective Chad

McDonald brings claims against Sheriff Kurt Hoffman, in his official capacity,

for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair

dealing, violation of McDonald’s procedural due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment, and promissory estoppel. See Am. Compl. (Doc. 15).

Hoffman moves to dismiss McDonald’s complaint for failure to state a claim

and as barred by sovereign immunity. Mot. (Doc. 17). Because McDonald fails

to allege a federal constitutional violation, I grant Hoffman’s motion with

respect to that claim but otherwise remand the remaining state law claims for

adjudication in state court.

I. BACKGROUND

While employed by the SCSO as a detective, McDonald interviewed a

female to learn whether she had information relevant to a homicide

investigation. Am. Compl. ¶ 6. The female’s former boyfriend filed a complaint

alleging that McDonald “and/or his lieutenant,” who was present at the

meeting, “got the female drunk and tried to have sex with her.” Id. ¶ 9. In

August 2023, the SCSO initiated an Internal Affairs investigation and placed

McDonald on administrative leave. Id. ¶ 10. On November 28, 2023, McDonald

“attended a pre-disciplinary hearing with SCSO Human Resources” and was

terminated two days later, on November 30, 2023. Id. ¶ 13.

McDonald “was entitled to a Career Service Appeals Board to challenge

the termination decision.” Id. The Board was to be comprised of five

individuals: two chosen by McDonald, two chosen by Hoffman, and one chosen

by the first four selected individuals. See id. On December 1, 2023, McDonald

“met with Detective Sarah Sanchez who volunteered” to serve on the Board,

and he spoke to two other individuals, “both of whom expressed concern for

their jobs if they sat on the Board.” Id. ¶ 14. That same day, Sanchez reported

to McDonald “that she had been subjected to intimidation by supervisors

within SCSO who told her that her participation . . . would be looked upon as

opposition towards [Sheriff Hoffman] and would not be in her best interest.”

Id. ¶ 15. According to McDonald, “he knew that the Board would be stacked

against him and there was no way for him to prevail.” Id. ¶ 16.

On December 1, 2023, McDonald “agreed to waive the Career Service

Appeals Board in return for acceptance of his resignation” by “sign[ing] a

resignation letter nunc pro tunc to November 29, 2023,” the day before his

termination. Id. ¶¶ 17–18; see Ex. A (Doc. 15-1). In the letter, McDonald

represented that, “for both parties to avoid any further administrative action

with respect to this cause,” he “inten[ded] to waive further procedural steps

and expressly waive all rights to judicial review of or to otherwise challenge or

to contest the validity of any facts presented and/or conclusions of general

orders.” Ex. A at 1. McDonald’s letter further stated: “With your acceptance of

my resignation, I waive my right to pursue an appeal with the Career Service

[Appeals] Board and waive my right to any future civil remedies.” Id.

McDonald’s counsel then emailed the letter to the SCSO’s General

Counsel, Julie Herd, writing “Please advise that you received this letter. Please

confirm if/when the Sheriff accepts.” Ex. A at 3. Herd first “confirm[ed] receipt

of [McDonald’s] letter,” explaining that the SCSO was “taking it under

advisement.” Id. at 3. Less than twenty minutes later, Herd replied that

“Sheriff Hoffman has accepted Mr. McDonald’s resignation letter,” and

attached a countersigned copy. See id. at 2.

On December 6, 2023, “after the deadline to request a Career Service . . .

Appeals Board had expired,” the SCSO “informed [McDonald] that SCSO’s

stance, specifically Hoffman’s stance, was that [McDonald] remained

terminated, not resigned.” Am. Compl. ¶ 20. According to McDonald, the SCSO

reasoned that “his resignation letter was ‘accepted’ only as an addition to his

personnel file and that their previous communication was not indicative of any

agreement to change the status of his departure from SCSO in exchange for

his promise not to pursue a Career Service Appeals Board.” Id. ¶ 21. The SCSO

classified McDonald as “terminated” in an Internal Affairs report dated

December 21, 2023, and in “documentation sent to the Florida Department of

Law Enforcement regarding his departure from SCSO.” Id. ¶ 22. Because of

this classification, McDonald claims he is “essentially ‘unhir[]able.’ ” Id.

On December 4, 2025, McDonald sued Hoffman in state court, alleging

claims for breach of contract, violation of procedural due process, defamation,

and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Compl. (Doc.

1-1). Hoffman timely removed the case to federal court, invoking this Court’s

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on McDonald’s federal constitutional

claim. See Notice of Removal (Doc. 1) ¶¶ 4–5. McDonald then filed an amended

complaint, dropping his defamation claim but adding a claim for promissory

estoppel. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51–60. Hoffman moves to dismiss the complaint,

see Mot., and McDonald opposes, Resp. (Doc. 20).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” This

pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it

demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and

conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will

not do.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Nor does a complaint suffice

if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must

plead sufficient facts to state a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim is facially plausible when a “plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint’s factual

allegations are accepted “as true” and construed “in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff.” Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008).

III. ANALYSIS

Hoffman moves to dismiss the entirety of McDonald’s complaint,

including both his state and federal claims.

Hoffman first argues that McDonald fails to state a claim for breach of

contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing

because the parties never assented to the same terms, and thus never formed

an express contract. See Mot. at 6–9. According to Hoffman, McDonald’s

purported contract “would constitute a violation of the Sheriff’s legal

responsibility to maintain his agency’s public records.” See id. at 9–12; see also

§ 119.021(1), Fla. Stat. In the alternative, Hoffman argues that Florida “has

not waived sovereign immunity for implied breach of contract claims under

Fla. Stat. § 768.28.” Id. at 12; see id. at 16–19 (arguing that sovereign

immunity bars McDonald’s claim for promissory estoppel). As for the due

process claim, Hoffman avers that McDonald fails to state a claim because

McDonald knew of his right to appeal his termination yet failed to avail himself

of that opportunity. Id. at 14–16.

A. Count II: Procedural Due Process

Because McDonald’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim provides

the jurisdictional hook for this case, I start there. And I agree with Hoffman

that McDonald’s complaint fails to state a claim for any constitutional

violation.

Suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, McDonald alleges that he “possessed a

constitutionally protected liberty and/or property interest in public

employment,” and that SCSO, “through its policies, customs, practices, and/or

acts of final policymakers and through trickery and sabotage, deprived

[McDonald] of this protected interest without providing constitutionally

required procedural protections.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34–35. McDonald asserts

that Hoffman “threaten[ed] and/or intimidat[ed] at least one of his selectees

for the Board,” causing McDonald to “g[i]ve up his right to pursue” an appeal

“in exchange for acceptance of his resignation.” Id. ¶ 37. After McDonald’s

deadline to appeal had passed, Hoffman “reneged on [his] agreement to accept

[McDonald’s] resignation nunc pro tunc,” thereby “eliminat[ing] [McDonald’s]

ability to have a Board hear his appeal of his termination.” Id. ¶ 38.

To state a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim, a

plaintiff must allege “(1) a deprivation of a constitutionally-protected property

interest; (2) state action; and (3) constitutionally-inadequate process.” Spencer

v. Benison, 5 F.4th 1222, 1232 (11th Cir. 2021) (citation modified). “The process

that a state provides is both that employed by the government entity whose

action is in question and the remedial process that state courts would provide

if asked.” Randel v. Rabun Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 21-12760, 2022 WL 1195655,

at *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 22, 2022) (per curiam) (citing Horton v. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 202 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000)). Importantly, even “[w]hen a

state procedure is inadequate,” the state does not violate the plaintiff’s due

process right “unless and until the state fails to remedy that inadequacy.”

McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc), abrogation on

other grounds recognized by Littlejohn v. Sch. Bd. of Leon Cnty., 132 F.4th

1232, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2025). For that reason, “that [the plaintiff] failed to

avail himself of the full procedures provided by state law . . . does not

constitute a sign of their inadequacy.” Id. at 1565 (citation modified). Rather,

“[t]he plaintiff’s need to seek state remedies is a requirement to state a

procedural due process claim.” Randel, 2022 WL 1195655, at *2 (citing Cotton

v. Jackson, 216 F. 3d 1328, 1331 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2000)).

To start, McDonald likely lacks a protected property interest in his

position with the SCSO. See Perez v. City of Opa-Locka, 629 F. Supp. 3d 1164,

1180 (S.D. Fla. 2022) (finding that Florida law “does not provide law

enforcement officers with a property interest or expectancy of continued

employment, employment, or appointment as a law enforcement officer.”

(quoting § 112.532(4), Fla. Stat.)).1

1 Both parties also assume that McDonald held a property interest in his reputation.

Compare Mot. at 14–16, with Resp. at 6–7. To be sure, “when an employer publishes

a false and stigmatizing statement about an employee in connection with her

discharge, due process requires a meaningful opportunity to clear one’s name—

through what is called a ‘name-clearing hearing,’ upon request—whether before or

after the termination or publication.” Johnston v. Borders, 36 F.4th 1254, 1272 (11th

Cir. 2022) (quoting Buxton v. City of Plant City, 871 F.2d 1037, 1046 (11th Cir. 1989)).

“To recover, a plaintiff must show that (1) a false statement, (2) of a stigmatizing

nature, (3) attending a governmental employee’s discharge, (4) was made public,

(5) by the governmental employer, (6) without a meaningful opportunity for an

employee name clearing hearing.” Id. (citation modified). McDonald cannot claim that

he lacked a meaningful opportunity for a hearing that he did not pursue. In any event,

he fails to allege the other required elements of a defamation-based due process claim.

Even assuming a valid property interest, McDonald cannot claim that

state procedures were inadequate when he failed to avail himself of those same

procedures. As required by Florida law, McDonald received notice of the

internal affairs investigation, a pre-disciplinary hearing, and written notice of

his termination. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9–10, 13; see also § 112.532(1)–(4), Fla.

Stat. (explaining the rights of Florida law enforcement officers while under

internal investigation). Then, as McDonald alleges, Florida law entitled him

“to a Career Service Appeals Board to challenge the termination decision.”2 Id.

¶ 13; see § 112.532(2), Fla. Stat. But McDonald never pursued his appeal to the

Board. Although McDonald claims “that the Board would be stacked against

him,” Am. Compl. ¶ 16, he never alleges that any of his selected individuals

were precluded from serving on the Board, let alone that the Board refused to

hear his appeal, see id. (alleging only that McDonald “feared retaliation”

against his selected Board members). In other words, McDonald’s argument

that “the Board was hopelessly stacked against him due to . . . coercion,” Resp.

2 The availability of Board review is also potentially fatal to McDonald’s theory that

Hoffman is liable in his official capacity under Monell v. Department of Social Services

of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), which requires that Hoffman be the final

policymaker, see Morro v. City of Birmingham, 117 F.3d 508, 510 (11th Cir. 1997).

“Generally, the existence of a reviewing body suffices to find that an official whose

decisions are subject to review was not a final policymaker.” Lopez v. Gibson, 770 F.

App’x 982, 992 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); see Maschmeier v. Scott, 508 F. Supp.

2d 1180, 1183 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“[I]t is clear that the Sheriff was not the final

policymaker. The Civil Service Board had the legal authority to review and reverse

the Sheriff’s termination decision, and its decision is binding on the Sheriff.”), aff’d,

269 F. App’x 941 (11th Cir. 2008).

at 7, “is not equivalent to a public entity refusing to provide a process for

[McDonald] to dispute his termination,” Tracy v. Fla. Atl. Univ. Bd. of Trs., No.

9:16-CV-80655, 2016 WL 7242140, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2016) (rejecting

employee’s procedural due process claim that the termination hearing

available to him was an “illusion,” and explaining that “even if Defendants

were biased against Plaintiff, such bias, if known, must be raised at the due

process hearing”) (citing McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1562)).

McDonald also did not pursue the state court procedures available to

challenge the Board’s purported bias, further dooming his claim at this stage.

On this front, “after the [Civil Service Appeals Board] rules, the [Board’s]

decision is then further reviewable by a Florida circuit court under Rule

9.030(c)(3).” Burge v. Wells, No. 8:24-CV-2955-VMC-CPT, 2025 WL 3537617,

at *10 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2025) (citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(c)(3)); see also

Puglia v. Nienhuis, No. 8:22-CV-1954-VMC-CPT, 2023 WL 8543778 (M.D. Fla.

Dec. 11, 2023) (explaining that the plaintiff “could then have sought

mandamus relief in state court” if the Board declined to hear his appeal).

Ultimately, “[s]ince the Florida courts possess the power to remedy any

deficiency in the process by which [McDonald] was terminated, [he] cannot

claim that he was deprived of procedural due process.” McKinney, 20 F.3d at

1565. McDonald’s claim must therefore be dismissed because his “volitional

choice to forego available procedures, however unwise, cannot give rise to a

subsequent complaint that [he] has been ‘deprived’ of procedural protections.”

Marshall v. City of Cape Coral, 797 F.2d 1555, 1560 (11th Cir. 1986).

B. Supplemental Jurisdiction

Because I dismiss McDonald’s lone federal claim, I must decide whether

to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law

contract and promissory estoppel claims.3 Because I conclude that the balance

of relevant factors weighs against doing so, I remand the claims to state court.

“In the ordinary course, where the federal claims have been dismissed

and the case is before a federal district court solely through supplemental

jurisdiction, a court should decline supplemental jurisdiction.” Stalley v.

Cumbie, 586 F. Supp. 3d 1211, 1249 (M.D. Fla. 2022) (citing Carnegie-Mellon

Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)), aff’d, 124 F.4th 1273 (11th Cir.

2024). Before doing so, “courts engage in a two-step process: first, the district

court must confirm that it has discretion to decline under § 1367(c); and second,

it must consider whether prudential factors counsel against dismissal.” Id.

Here, I may decline supplemental jurisdiction because I “dismissed all

claims over which [the Court had] original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3);

see Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 743 (11th Cir. 2006)

3 Neither McDonald’s complaint nor Hoffman’s Notice of Removal alleges that the

parties are diverse or that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.

(“Any one of the section 1367(c) factors is sufficient to give the district court

discretion to dismiss a case’s supplemental state law claims.”).

Next, I must consider whether “judicial economy, convenience, fairness,

and comity” counsel against dismissing the remaining state counterclaims.

Ameritox, Ltd. v. Millennium Lab’y, Inc., 803 F.3d 518, 537 (11th Cir. 2015)

(citation modified); see United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726

(1966). In general, the Eleventh Circuit “encourage[s] district courts to dismiss

any remaining state claims when, as here, the federal claims have been

dismissed prior to trial.” Raney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1089 (11th

Cir. 2004) (per curiam). That is “particularly the case where the dismissal

occurs without any analysis of the merits of the state claims.” Vibe Micro, Inc.

v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (citation modified).

All four factors support declining jurisdiction in this case. First, judicial

economy favors remand. Hoffman removed this case approximately four

months ago (shortly after it was filed in state court), see Notice of Removal, and

limited resources have been expended on the litigation to date. Second,

litigating in state court appears equally convenient to the parties. Both parties

and their counsel are based in Florida and presumably can litigate as easily in

Sarasota. Third, fairness to the parties favors remand. McDonald initially

elected to file his primarily state-law claims in state court, and Hoffman

exercised his right to remove based on a federal question. Now that the federal

claim has been resolved in Hoffman’s favor, he cannot claim it is unfair to

litigate in state court. Finally, comity strongly weighs against continuing to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining claims. “State courts,

not federal courts, should be the final arbiters of state law in our federalist

system.” Ameritox, 803 F.3d at 540 (citation modified). Hoffman’s motion to

dismiss McDonald’s contract and promissory estoppel claims raises questions

about Florida’s statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, as well as whether the

SCSO’s reporting and recordkeeping obligations impact the contract formation

analysis. See Mot. at 9–13. Because the state court should resolve these purely

state law issues in the first instance, I decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction.

IV. CONCLUSION

McDonald does not allege that he availed himself of state procedures to

challenge his termination, and thus McDonald fails to state a claim for a

violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. And because economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity favor remand, I decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over McDonald’s remaining state law claims. Accordingly, the

following is ORDERED:

1. Defendant Hoffman’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 17) is GRANTED

IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

2. Count II of the Amended Complaint (Doc. 15) is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

3. The Clerk is directed to REMAND the remainder of this action to

the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, in and for

Sarasota County, Florida, and to TRANSMIT a certified copy of

this order to the clerk of that court.

4. The Clerk is further directed to TERMINATE any pending

motions and deadlines and to CLOSE this case.

ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, May 26, 2026.

athryn’Kimball Mizelle

United States District Judge

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