The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DUSTIN KENNEY and
JILL KENNEY, as parents and
natural guardians of D.K., a minor,
Plaintiffs,
v. Case No.: 2:25-cv-786-SPC-KRH
COLLIER COUNTY SCHOOL
BOARD, JORGE BADILLO, and
ASHLEY COLOMA,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants Jorge Badillo, Ashley Coloma, and the
Collier County School Board’s (“Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 41).
Plaintiffs Dustin and Jill Kenney, on behalf of their minor child, D.K.,
responded. (Doc. 45). For the reasons below, the Court grants the motion.
This is a civil rights action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 D.K. was a
twelve-year-old student at a Collier County school. He pranked another
student by taking the student’s cell phone and placing it in another student's
backpack. Unable to locate his phone, the student filed a complaint that his
1 The Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in the
light most favorable to” Plaintiffs. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th
Cir. 2009).
cell phone was missing. Less than a day later, the phone was returned
undamaged. D.K. never intended to steal or permanently deprive the student
of his cell phone.
As a result of the complaint, Badillo and Coloma (assistant principals at
the school) questioned D.K. on school property about the incident without his
parents’ knowledge or consent. Badillo and Coloma stated they knew D.K. had
not committed a crime. Nevertheless, the Collier County Sheriff’s Office
arrested D.K. for felony grand theft. A petition was filed against D.K. in
juvenile court, alleging he was delinquent for committing felony grand theft.
During the criminal prosecution, Badillo and Coloma failed to disclose to the
state court that D.K. was merely participating in a prank.
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs bring a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against
Badillo and Coloma, claiming they violated D.K.’s Fourth Amendment rights
(count II) and a vicarious liability claim against the Collier County School
Board (“School Board”) (count II). (Doc. 38). Defendants move to dismiss both
claims. (Doc. 41).
To survive a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint
must allege “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Bare
“labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action,” do not suffice. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
A district court should dismiss a claim when a party does not plead facts that
make the claim facially plausible. See id. at 570. A claim is facially plausible
when a court can draw a reasonable inference, based on the facts pled, that the
opposing party is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
This plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
In count II, Plaintiffs allege Badillo and Coloma violated D.K.’s Fourth
Amendment right to procedural due process by restraining D.K. against his
will and subjecting him to interrogation without his parents’ knowledge and
consent. (Doc. 38 ¶¶ 23–25). Although this claim fails for several reasons, the
simplest is qualified immunity, which Badillo and Coloma raise. (Doc. 41).
“Qualified immunity offers complete protection for government officials
sued in their individual capacities if their conduct ‘does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1346 (11th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). When a government
official operated within the scope of his discretionary authority, the plaintiff
bears the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that qualified immunity is not
appropriate.” Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir.
2006) (quoting Lumley v. City of Dade City, 327 F.3d 1186, 1194 (11th Cir.
2003)).
The parties do not dispute that Badillo and Coloma acted within the
scope of their discretionary authority. So Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving
both (1) that Badillo and Coloma violated a statutory or constitutional right
and (2) that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct. Acosta v. Miami-Dade Cnty., 97 F.4th 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 2024).
Plaintiffs fall well short of establishing Badillo and Coloma violated
D.K.’s clearly established rights. The only case Plaintiffs cite involves a clearly
established First Amendment right, which has no bearing on this Fourth
Amendment case. (See Doc. 45 at 3 (citing Williams v. Alabama State Univ.,
102 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 1997)). Making matters worse, Williams found
qualified immunity applied and dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint. Id. at
1183–84). So it is unclear what citing to Williams was supposed to accomplish.
Plaintiffs argue that Badillo and Coloma’s “seizure” of D.K. was unreasonable
given they had no reasonable belief D.K. had committed a crime. But, the
Court previously found probable cause existed for D.K.’s arrest. (Doc. 37 at 8–
11). Because Plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a violation of a clearly established
constitutional right, Badillo and Coloma are entitled to qualified immunity,
and the Court dismisses count II with prejudice.
As for the vicarious liability claim against the School Board (count J),
because Badillo and Coloma are not liable, it follows that the School Board is
not vicariously liable either. See Hernandez v. Sosa, No. 11-21479-CIV, 2012
WL 4148890, at *7 (S.D. Fla. July 9, 2012) “Under Florida law, where an agent
or employee is found to have no liability, then a judgment cannot stand against
the principal or employer on the basis of vicarious liability or respondeat
superior.” (citation and quotations omitted)). So the Court dismisses count I
with prejudice.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 41) is GRANTED.
2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to deny all pending motions as moot,
terminate any deadlines, and close the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this May 26, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies: All Parties of Record