Stephens

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

LARRY STEPHENS, an

individual,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-709-JES-DNF

THE SCHOOL BOARD OF LEE

COUNTY, FLORIDA, a

political subdivision of

the State of Florida,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of the Motion

for Temporary Reinstatement (Doc. #25) filed on December 19, 2025

by Plaintiff Larry Stephens (“Stephens”). Defendant School Board

of Lee County, Florida (“School Board”) filed a Response in

Opposition on January 26, 2026. (Doc. #28.) With leave of the

Court, Stephens and the School Board filed Replies on January 28,

2026 and February 9, 2026, respectively. (Docs. ##31, 34.) For

the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part

and denied in part.

I.

Stephens began his employment as a Chief Operations Officer

with the School District of Lee County (“the School District”) on

July 3, 2023. (Doc. #1 at ¶ 6.) As Chief Operations Officer his

responsibilities included “overseeing facilities, transportation,

procurement, construction projects, and other operational

functions critical to the [District’s] mission of educating

students.” (Doc. #25-1 at ¶ 4.) Until April 9, 2024, Stephens’s

supervisor was Dr. Christopher Bernier (“Dr. Bernier”), the

superintendent of the District. (Doc. #1 at ¶ 8.)

According to the Complaint, beginning in October or November

of 2023, Dr. Bernier subjected Stephens to “a pattern of abuse.”

(Id. at ¶ 8.) On April 4, 2024, Stephens engaged in statutorily

protected activity by submitting a signed, written whistleblower

complaint to the District’s Lighthouse hotline service. (Id. at

¶ 20.) In the Lighthouse complaint Stephens detailed, inter alia,

Dr. Bernier’s racial discrimination, harassment, and mismanagement

of public funds. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Dr. Bernier resigned as

superintendent shortly thereafter, and Stephens’ annual contract

was renewed for the 2024-25 school year despite Dr. Bernier’s prior

statement that he intended not to renew it. (Id. at ¶ 23.)

Stephens’ complaint was investigated by an outside law firm, which

substantiated many of his allegations. (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25.)

In November 2024, Dr. Denise Carlin (“Dr. Carlin”) was sworn

in as the newly elected superintendent of the School District.

(Id. at ¶ 26.) Dr. Carlin was aware of Stephens’ official

whistleblower complaint and had stated her intentions not to renew

his contract if she was elected. Dr. Carlin did not renew

Stephens’s contract, whose last day of employment was June 30,

2025. (Id. at ¶¶ 26-27.)

On August 11, 2025, Stephens filed a Complaint (Doc. #1) in

federal court against the School Board for (1) retaliation in

violation of the Family & Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), (2)

retaliation in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and (3)

retaliation in violation of the Florida Public Sector

Whistleblower Act (“FWA”) (Id. at ¶¶ 78-93). In the instant Motion

for Temporary Reinstatement, Stephens requests that the Court

temporarily reinstate his employment with the School District

pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(9)(f) of the FWA. (Doc. #25.)

II.

The relevant portion of the FWA prohibits public employers

from taking retaliatory action against an employee “who discloses

information to an appropriate agency alleging improper use of

governmental office, gross waste of funds, or any other abuse or

gross neglect of duty on the part of an agency, public officer, or

employee.” Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(2). The FWA is remedial and

should be given liberal construction in favor of granting access

to its remedies. Irven v. Dep't of Health & Rehab. Services, 790

So. 2d 403, 405 (Fla. 2001).

The FWA provides that relief for a violation “must include”

certain action. Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(9)(a)-(f). Under §

112.3187(9)(f) the relief “must include”

[t]emporary reinstatement to the employee's former

position or to an equivalent position, pending the final

outcome on the complaint, if an employee complains of

being discharged in retaliation for a protected

disclosure and if a court of competent jurisdiction or

the Florida Commission on Human Relations, as applicable

under s. 112.31895, determines that the disclosure was

not made in bad faith or for a wrongful purpose or

occurred after an agency's initiation of a personnel

action against the employee which includes documentation

of the employee's violation of a disciplinary standard

or performance deficiency.

§ 112.3187(9)(f), Fla. Stat.

Thus, to obtain a temporary reinstatement the employee must

show that “’1) prior to termination the employee made a disclosure

protected by the statute; 2) the employee was discharged; and 3)

the disclosure was not made in bad faith or for a wrongful purpose,

and did not occur after an agency's personnel action against the

employee.’” Dep't of Children & Families v. Herstein, 399 So. 3d

384, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 2025) (quoting State, Dept. of Transp. v.

Florida Com'n on Human Relations, 842 So. 2d 253, 255 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2003)). The personnel action in the third element requires

that “an agency's initiation of a personnel action against the

employee” “includes documentation of the employee's violation of

a disciplinary standard or performance deficiency.” Fla. Stat. §

112.3187(9)(f).

III.

Stephens asserts that the FWA protects both his April 24,

2025, complaint and his participation in the investigation of that

complaint. (Doc. #25 at pp. 5-12.) For purposes of the motion,

the School Board does not contest that Stephens made protected

disclosures under the FWA. (See Doc. #28.)

Stephens also asserts that he was discharged within the

meaning of the FWA when his contract was not renewed for the 2025-

2026 school year. (Doc. #25 at pp. 13-14.) The School Board does

not contest that Stephens was discharged when he was informed on

April 21, 2025, that his contract would not be renewed for the

2025-2026 school year.

The School Board contends, however, that Stephens is

statutorily disqualified from temporary reinstatement because: (1)

his April 4, 2024, whistleblower disclosure “was made in bad faith

or for a wrongful purpose;” and (2) “his disclosure occurred after

the District had initiated personnel action against him and there

is documentation of performance deficiency.” (Doc. #28 at pp. 1,

12-13.)

A. Bad Faith or Wrongful Purpose of Disclosure

The School Board initially focuses on the wrong conduct,

asserting that “Plaintiff’s Motion should fail as it was made in

bad faith and/or for a wrongful purpose.” (Doc. #28 at p. 13.) As

discussed earlier, the FWA provides for temporary reinstatement

“if an employee complains of being discharged in retaliation for

a protected disclosure and if a court of competent jurisdiction .

. . determines that the disclosure was not made in bad faith or

for a wrongful purpose.” § 112.3187(9)(f), Fla. Stat. (emphasis

added.) It is not the motion which must not be made in bad faith

or for a wrongful purpose, but Plaintiff’s protected disclosure.

Stephens agrees that a temporary reinstatement is only

available if the disclosures were not made in bad faith or for a

wrongful purpose, but asserts that his actions were taken in good

faith and for a proper purpose. (Doc. #25 at pp. 14-15.) The FWA

does not define the term “bad faith”, but Florida law has defined

“bad faith” in related contexts. For example, Fla. Stat. § 768.28

precludes liability in tort for a state government employee unless

the employee “acted in bad faith or with malicious purpose . . ..”

Fla. Stat. § 768.28(9)(a). The phrase ‘bad faith,’ as used in

section 768.28(9)(a), has been “equated with the actual malice

standard.” Parker v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents ex rel. Fla.

State Univ., 724 So. 2d 163, 167 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998) (citation

omitted). See also Aguirre v. Seminole Cnty., 158 F.4th 1276,

1311 (11th Cir. 2025) (noting that Florida courts equate bad faith

with the actual malice standard.); Barr v. Denmark, No. 24-12075,

2024 WL 4969270, at *3 (11th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024)(same). Another

Florida court defines “bad faith” as “[t]he opposite of ‘good

faith’, generally implying or involving active or constructive

fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another . . . or sinister

motive . . . [contemplating] a state of mind affirmatively

operating with a furtive design or some motive of interest or ill

will.” Bosso v. Neuner, 426 So. 2d 1209, 1212 (Fla. 4th DCA

1983)(quoting Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. at p. 176.)

According to the School Board, Stephens’ allegations and

admissions demonstrate his bad faith and wrongful purpose because:

(1) Stephens’ first protected disclosure was untimely; (2)

Stephens had a “furtive design,” as demonstrated by his failure to

attach his Timeline document to the motion, his Declaration, or

the Complaint; and (3) Stephens made “several misrepresentations”

as established by inconsistencies between his Declaration and his

Timeline. (Doc. #28 at pp. 1, 13-16.) The Court is not convinced.

(1) Delay in Making Protected Disclosure

The School Board first argues that Stephens did not file a

protected disclosure until nine days after he was informed on March

26, 2024, that Dr. Bernier intended to terminate his employment.

The School Board argues that the nine-day delay establishes

Stephens’ bad faith and improper purpose. (Doc. #28, pp. 3, 14.)

A nine-day delay is clearly insufficient to infer bad faith or

wrongful purpose. King v. State of Florida, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1157,

1164 (N.D. Fla. 2009)(rejecting argument that approximate three

month delay was evidence of bad faith “because there are many

explanations as to why an employee might wait to file official

complaints against his employer.”) While an undue delay in filing

a protected disclosure may establish bad faith or wrongful purpose,

the nine days here does not come close to establishing either.

The School Board also argues that “Plaintiff had been informed

by Dr. Bernier of many performance deficiencies over at least the

eight (8) months prior to his whistleblower complaint/disclosure.”

(Doc. #28 at p. 3 n.4.) The School Board asserts Stephens “waited

for months to submit his whistleblower complaint/disclosure –

doing so only after being informed of his impending termination.”

(Id. at 15.) This delay, the School Board argues, “does not

satisfy the good faith (and/or wrongful purpose) standard” under

the statute. (Id.)

The School Board does not indicate what a reasonable period

of time would have been in this case, and does not argue that

Stephens missed any applicable statute of limitations. Nothing

about Stephens taking what he perceived as abusive conduct by Dr.

Bernier for eight months allows a reasonable inference of bad faith

or wrongful purpose. Accordingly, the Court is not convinced that

the delays identified by the School Board evince that Stephens

acted in bad faith or for an improper purpose.

(2) “Furtive Design”: Failure to Attach Timeline

The School Board asserts that Stephens had a “furtive design,”

as demonstrated by his failure to attach his Timeline document to

the motion, his Declaration, or the federal Complaint and by his

several misrepresentations. (Doc. #28 at pp. 15-17.) The School

Board does not expound on the parameters of its perceived “furtive

design.”

It is difficult to see how the evidentiary Timeline document

could have properly been attached to a Complaint filed in federal

court. While the Timeline could certainly have been attached to

the Declaration or the motion, the failure to do so does not

suggest to the Court any “furtive design” which would be supportive

of either bad faith or wrongful purpose. The alleged

misrepresentations are addressed below.

(3) Misrepresentations By Stephens

The School Board asserts that Stephens made “several

misrepresentations,” as established by inconsistencies between his

Declaration and his Timeline, which support findings of bad faith

and wrongful purpose. The falsities, as the School Board sees it,

were that Stephens said he consistently had good reviews from

others, but the Timeline indicated Dr. Bernier made specific (and

frequent) criticism of his performance. (Doc. #28 at pp. 16-17.)

Stephens argues that his disclosures “contain no material

omissions or falsehood, were both objectively and subjectively

reasonable, and were vindicated by thorough investigation,” and

that his participation in the subsequent investigation confirms

his good faith. (Doc. #25 at p. 15.) He argues that each of his

significant allegations was “substantiated by the independent

investigation, corroborated by multiple witnesses, or supported by

documentary evidence.” (Id. at pp. 15-16.) Additionally, Stephens

argues that the specificity of his disclosures is a “hallmark of

good faith.” (Id. at p. 19.)

Even if there are inconsistencies which may be characterized

as misrepresentations, the Court finds nothing which would

disqualify Stephens or establish bad faith or wrongful purpose.

The School Board’s reliance on Vickaryous v. Mason Classical Acad.,

Inc., No. 2:21-CV-903-JLB-NPM, 2022 WL 4463560 (M.D. Fla. Sept.

26, 2022) (Vickaryous II) is unpersuasive due to the significant

factual differences in Vickaryous II. The Court finds that

Stephens has sufficiently shown that the disclosures were not made

in bad faith or for a wrongful purpose.

B. Personnel Action and Its Documentation

To qualify for temporary reinstatement under the FWA, a

plaintiff must establish that his whistleblower disclosure did not

occur “after an agency’s initiation of a personnel action against

the employee which includes documentation of the employee’s

violation of a disciplinary standard or performance deficiency.”

Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(9)(f). Stephens argues that this means

written documentation must exist, but none does. (Doc. #25 at pp.

13-14.)

The School Board contends that Stephens fails to establish

this requirement because his protected disclosure occurred after

his deficiencies were documented – by Stephens himself in his

Timeline document. (Doc. #28 at pp. 19-20.) The School Board

does not point to any documentation created by it or its agents or

employees (other than Stephens). Although the Timeline was

authored by Stephens, the School Board argues that §

112.3187(9)(f)’s plain language does not mandate that such

documentation be drafted by the employer, only that some form of

documentation exists to substantiate the performance issues. The

School Board views the timeline drafted by the aggrieved employee

as sufficient to meet the statutory threshold. (Id.)

The Court must interpret statutory language in light of its

overall structure and the logical relationship between its parts.

See Ham v. Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, 308 So. 3d 942, 946

(Fla. 2020) (noting that Florida Courts “follow the ‘supremacy-

of-text principle’—namely, the principle that ‘[t]he words of a

governing text are of paramount concern, and what they convey, in

their context, is what the text means.’”); Justice v. Guerrero-

Justice, 403 So. 3d 375, 378 (Fla. 3d DCA 2025) (same). But the

School Board’s reading of the statute asks the Court to ignore the

provision's context and text.

Section 112.3187(9)(f)’s plain language refutes the School

Board’s interpretation because the provision requires “an agency's

initiation of personnel action against the employee which includes

documentation of the employee's violation of a disciplinary

standard or performance deficiency.” Fla. Stat. § 112.3187(9)(f).

Because the statute refers to the “agency’s initiation,” the entire

process — including the documentation — must be an act of the

agency.

The Court concludes that the timeline of events authored by

Stephens to support his claims of misconduct by Dr. Bernier is

insufficient to constitute written documentation pursuant to

Section 112.3187(9)(f). Without agency documented performance

deficiencies, the facts on this record do not support the School

Board’s assertion that Stephens’s disclosures were made following

a personnel action “which includes documentation of the employee's

violation of a disciplinary standard or performance deficiency.”

The School Board identifies no agency documentation, other than

its assertion that Stephens’ own diary-like notations qualify

under the statute. Thus, Stephens has met his burden of showing

facts which support his claim for temporary reinstatement under

the FWA.

In its Reply (Doc. #34), the School Board asserts that the

personnel action occurred when Dr. Bernier told Stephens that he

intended to terminate Stephens’ employment with the School Board.

(Id. at p. 6.) The Court doubts that this statement of intent

constitutes a personnel action for purpose of the statute. After

all, a teacher with an annual contract may be dismissed during the

term of the contract only for just cause. See § 1012.335(4), (5),

Fla. Stat. Although the matter was initially placed on the School

Board’s calendar, neither Dr. Bernier nor the School Board followed

through with the intended termination. In any event, the School

Board has not provided the Court with any adequate agency-authored

written documentation from that meeting to support the purported

personnel action.

C. Timing of Temporary Reinstatement

Stephens asserts that his temporary reinstatement should be

made retroactive until June 30, 2025, the date of his last

employment with the School Board, or December 19, 2025, the date

the Motion was filed. The Court finds no basis to do either.

Temporary reinstatement shall be effective as of the date of this

Opinion and Order.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Reinstatement (Doc. #25) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The School Board shall

temporarily reinstate Larry Stephens as Chief Operations Officer

or to an equivalent position, effective as of the date of this

Opinion and Order, pending the final outcome of the complaint.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 20th day of

May 2026.

VAY ee DH

E. STEELE

SHNIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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