Opinion

Lumumba

Court: District Court, W.D. Washington
Filed: Apr 13, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.4%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

AT TACOMA

FRANCISCA AJAI NDETA LUMUMBA, Case No. 3:25-cv-05381-TMC

Plaintiff, ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS

PIERCE COUNTY; PIERCE COUNTY

JAIL; PIERCE COUNTY SHERIFF'S

OFFICE; NAPHCARE INC; MULTICARE

HEALTH SYSTEM; JOSHUA PILAND;

ALEX UTI; JOHN DOES 1-10; JANE DOES

1-5,

Defendants.

16 I. INTRODUCTION

17 This case arises from the arrest and detention of self-represented Plaintiff Francisca Ajai

18 Ndeta Lumumba in January 2025. Before the Court are several motions. There are three motions

19 to dismiss Ms. Lumumba’s third amended complaint, each submitted by a different set of

20 Defendants: the first by Pierce County, Pierce County Jail Administration, Pierce County

21 Sheriff’s Office, and Deputies Joshua Piland and Alex Uti (collectively “Pierce County

22 defendants”), Dkt. 72; the second by MultiCare Health System (“MultiCare”) and Alexandra

23 Brown (collectively “MultiCare defendants”), Dkt. 74; and the last by NaphCare Inc.

24 (“NaphCare”). Dkt. 75. Also before the Court is Ms. Lumumba’s motion to amend her complaint

1 for the fourth time, filed while the three motions to dismiss the third amended complaint were

2 pending. Dkt. 94.

3 Ms. Lumumba’s motion to amend her complaint is GRANTED, making her proposed

4 fourth amended complaint the operative complaint. After analyzing the three motions to dismiss

5 in light of the newly operative complaint, the Court also orders the following. The Pierce County

6 defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 72, is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. NaphCare’s

7 motion to dismiss, Dkt. 75, is GRANTED. The MultiCare defendants’ motion to dismiss,

8 Dkt. 74, is GRANTED. Further leave to amend will not be granted.

9 II. BACKGROUND1

A. Facts

On September 15, 2024, Ms. Lumumba was in a “catastrophic single-vehicle accident.”

Dkt. 94-1 at 4. She was “fully ejected from the vehicle,” and later found “unconscious,

unresponsive, and face-down on the roadway.” Id. at 4–5. As a result of the accident,

Ms. Lumumba suffered “severe traumatic brain injury, diffuse axonal injury, multiple cervical

spine fractures, rib fractures, facial fractures, dysphagia, impaired cognition, and profound

mobility limitations.” Id. at 5.

After several weeks in the hospital, Ms. Lumumba entered a rehabilitation facility for

“continued 24-hour nursing care and therapy services, as she remained medically fragile and

unable to safely live independently.” Id. at 5–6. She was discharged from the facility on

November 27, 2024, when she was unable to pay for her continued stay. Id. at 6. On December

6, 2024, Ms. Lumumba visited her primary care doctor, who prescribed her sertraline. Id.

1 The Court accepts all allegations within the fourth amended complaint as true and draws all

23 reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party when evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.

Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir.

24 2014).

1 On January 1, 2025, Ms. Lumumba “remained medically fragile, necessitating significant

2 care and precautions.” Id. The newly prescribed sertraline caused Ms. Lumumba to become

3 “confused, disoriented, agitated, and unable to regulate her emotions or safely care for herself.”

4 Id. at 7. Her family “observed a sudden and alarming change in her behavior” and called 911

5 “seeking medical assistance, not law-enforcement intervention.” Id. The 911 caller informed

6 dispatch that Ms. Lumumba was dealing with a “medical and psychiatric crisis rather than

7 criminal conduct,” and the “call was made solely because her condition deteriorated and urgent

8 medical support was needed.” Id. The 911 caller mentioned that Ms. Lumumba “grabbed a

9 knife,” but clarified that he “took the knife away from her.” Id.

10 EMS personnel and five Pierce County Sheriff’s Office deputies responded to the call,

11 including Deputies Piland and Uti. Id. at 10. Upon their arrival, Ms. Lumumba was seated on the

12 floor against the wall, unarmed, “unable to stand or walk without assistance, disoriented,

13 neurologically impaired, and visibly in pain.” Id. Deputies pulled Ms. Lumumba by her arms,

14 twisting her upper body to force her onto a chair. Id. at 11.

15 Deputy Piland asked Ms. Lumumba for the knife mentioned in the 911 call, which a

16 family member handed to him. Id. The family member repeatedly told Deputy Piland that “no

17 domestic violence incident had occurred,” and “begged him to stop escalating the situation.” Id.

18 Deputies Piland and Uti arrested Ms. Lumumba, using physical force despite her visible fragility,

19 that “impacted her spine, injured hand, and existing wounds, caused intense pain and prompted

20 [Ms. Lumumba] to cry out.” Id. at 13. Deputy Piland “mischaracterized [Ms. Lumumba’s]

21 involuntary neurological symptoms . . . as ‘non-compliance’ and ‘refusal,’ despite being clearly

22 informed . . . that she could not stand or walk” due to her injuries. Id. at 11.

23 When the Deputies attempted to place Ms. Lumumba into their patrol car, she

24 “repeatedly tried different turns but physically could not go in and sit upright due to her cervical-

1 spine injuries, neurological deficits, and open wounds.” Id. at 14. Deputy Piland insisted on

2 Ms. Lumumba sitting upright in the patrol vehicle, but it was impossible for her. Id.

3 Ms. Lumumba was ultimately transported to the jail, in severe pain, by sitting sideways across

4 the rear bench of the patrol vehicle. Id.

5 When she arrived at Pierce County Jail, Ms. Lumumba struggled to exit the patrol car and

6 was placed on the floor while waiting to complete her medical intake. Id. at 15. A NaphCare

7 nurse informed a jail sergeant that Ms. Lumumba was “medically unstable, unable to walk,

8 recently hospitalized, and required hospital evaluation.” Id. Pierce County Jail policy requires

9 “immediate rejection of individuals who are medically unstable, unable to ambulate, recently

10 hospitalized, or presenting with neurological impairment.” Id. Ms. Lumumba was then visited by

11 Brown, MultiCare’s Designated Crisis Responder (“DCR”), who evaluated Ms. Lumumba for

12 involuntary treatment under Washington’s Involuntary Treatment Act (“ITA”). Id. at 4, 15.

13 Brown determined that involuntary commitment was inappropriate for Ms. Lumumba, and

14 “instruct[ed jail] staff to proceed with custodial processing” of Ms. Lumumba. Id. at 16.

15 B. Procedural history

16 Ms. Lumumba initiated this case on May 5, 2025. Dkt. 1. Ms. Lumumba moved for leave

17 to file her first amended complaint several days later, Dkt. 7, and while that motion was pending,

18 she moved for leave to file her second amended complaint. Dkt. 9. Leave to file the second

19 amended complaint was granted on June 5, 2025. Dkt. 11.

20 The Pierce County defendants and NaphCare moved to dismiss the second amended

21 complaint on August 5, 2025. Dkts. 38, 39. Three weeks later, and before briefing for the two

22 motions to dismiss had concluded, Ms. Lumumba moved for leave to file her third amended

23 complaint. Dkt. 48. The MultiCare defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint

1 on October 2, 2025. Dkt. 65. The Court granted Ms. Lumumba’s motion for leave to file the third

2 amended complaint and denied the three pending motions to dismiss as moot. Dkt. 68.

3 Defendants have renewed the three motions to dismiss based on the allegations in the

4 third amended complaint. Dkts. 72, 74–75. Ms. Lumumba moved for leave to file her fourth

5 amended complaint soon after. Dkt. 94.

6 III. DISCUSSION

A. The Court grants Ms. Lumumba’s motion for leave to file her proposed

fourth amended complaint.

Before considering the three motions to dismiss Ms. Lumumba’s third amended

complaint, the Court must determine whether to grant Ms. Lumumba leave to file her fourth

proposed amended complaint.

1. Legal standard

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only

with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave

when justice so requires.” The Court must apply this policy “with extreme liberality.” Eminence

Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1051 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Owens v. Kaiser Found.

Health Plan, Inc., 244 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2001)). The Court has discretion to grant or deny a

request to amend but must provide justification when it denies a request. Foman v. Davis, 371

U.S. 178, 182 (1962). A motion to amend under Rule 15(a)(2) “generally shall be denied only

upon showing of bad faith, undue delay, futility, or undue prejudice to the opposing party.”

Chudacoff v. Univ. Med. Ctr. of S. Nev., 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Foman,

371 U.S. at 182. “In exercising this discretion, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose

of Rule 15 to facilitate decision on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.”

United States v. Webb, 655 F.2d 977, 979 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Chudacoff, 649 F.3d at 1152.

1 2. Ms. Lumumba’s motion for leave to file her fourth proposed amended complaint

is GRANTED.

Ms. Lumumba argues that she should be granted leave for several reasons. First, the

proposed complaint improves readability, clarifying and reorganizing the allegations in “a clearer

and more linear manner.” Dkt. 94 at 2–3. Second, the proposed complaint includes new

information clarifying “policies, medical decisions, and custodial practices,” that Ms. Lumumba

could not obtain before. Id. at 3. Third, the request is not made in bad faith, and granting leave

would not prejudice Defendants or cause undue delay. Id. at 3–4. The only opposition comes

from the MultiCare defendants. Dkt. 96. They argue that further amendment would be futile

because the proposed fourth amended complaint carries the same legal flaws as the third

amended complaint. Id. at 3–5.

The Court grants Ms. Lumumba leave to amend for four reasons. First, leave is

appropriate given Ms. Lumumba’s pro se status. “[T]he Ninth Circuit has indicated that leave to

amend should be liberally granted for pro se litigants in particular.” Leishman v. Wash. Att’y

Gen.’s Off., No. 2:20-CV-00861-RAJ, 2022 WL 14142372, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 23, 2022).

Second, there is no indication of bad faith on Ms. Lumumba’s part. Third, the case remains in its

early stages, as discovery has not started. Therefore, leave would not prejudice Defendants. Nor

is there any indication of undue delay. Finally, although the fourth amended complaint remains

quite long, Ms. Lumumba has provided a clearer summary of the underlying factual allegations,

removed unnecessary parties from the caption, and removed six causes of action. Accordingly,

the fourth proposed amended complaint is now the operative complaint.

With the newly operative complaint, the Court maintains subject matter jurisdiction.

Several claims concern federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dkt. 94-1 at 2. The

1 Court maintains supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) as

2 they are related to federal claims. Id. at 2–3.

3 B. Motions to dismiss

4 The Court must next consider the fate of the three pending motions to dismiss the

5 formerly operative complaint, Ms. Lumumba’s third amended complaint.

6 When a newly operative complaint is filed while a motion to dismiss is pending, “it

7 generally moots the motion to dismiss.” Brown v. Bos. Sci. Corp., No. 2:21-CV-01519-LK, 2022

8 WL 766926, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2022). If the newly operative complaint is

9 “substantially identical” to the formerly operative complaint, however, it “will not moot the

10 pending motion to dismiss.” Id. (quoting Oliver v. Alcoa, Inc., No. C16-0741JLR, 2016 WL

11 4734310, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 12, 2016)). If the newly operative complaint maintains the

12 same issues raised in the motion to dismiss, a court can consider the motion in light of the newly

13 operative complaint. Bossart v. County of King, No. 2:25-CV-00975-JNW, 2025 WL 2084411,

14 at *1 (W.D. Wash. July 24, 2025).

15 Here, except for the subtraction of six claims and the renumbering of the remaining

16 claims, the newly operative complaint is substantially identical to Ms. Lumumba’s third

17 amended complaint. Accordingly, the newly operative complaint does not moot the Defendants’

18 three motions to dismiss. Therefore, the Court will consider the three motions to dismiss in light

19 of the new operative complaint. Additionally, because Ms. Lumumba is proceeding in forma

20 pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to screen the newly operative

21 complaint and consider whether it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”

22 1. Legal standard

A party’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is governed by Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court may dismiss a complaint that fails to

1 present an identifiable legal theory or provide sufficient facts to support a valid legal theory.

2 Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010).

3 A complaint does not need “detailed” facts to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, Bell Atl.

4 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), but it must contain facts that, if “accepted as true,”

5 can plausibly support a claim “on its face.” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773 (9th Cir.

6 2022) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, (2009)). A claim is plausible “on its face” if

7 the facts provided allow the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for

8 the alleged misconduct. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Additionally, if a plaintiff is pro se,

9 the Court “‘construe[s] the pleadings liberally’ and ‘afford[s] the [plaintiff] the benefit of any

10 doubt.’” Id. at 774 (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)). But the Court

11 does not assume the truth of legal conclusions presented as facts, see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555,

12 and mere conclusory statements are not enough to support a claim. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “A

13 liberal construction of a pro se complaint . . . does not mean that the court will supply essential

14 elements of a claim that are absent from the complaint.” Boquist, 32 F.4th at 774 (citing Litmon

15 v. Harris, 768 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014)).

16 “[I]n a case alleging the same claim[s] against multiple defendants, there must be specific

17 allegations explaining what each defendant allegedly did wrong, rather than general allegations

18 asserted against them as a group.” Trusov v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., No. 3:23-CV-77-SI, 2023

19 WL 6147251, at *2 (D. Or. Sept. 20, 2023); see Evans v. Sherman, No. 1:19-cv-00226-DAD-

20 BAM (PC), 2020 WL 1923176, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2020) (noting that a plaintiff who

21 “simply lumps all defendants together . . . makes it impossible for the Court to draw the

22 necessary connection between the actions or omissions” of the various defendants); In re Nexus

23 6P Prods. Liab. Litig., 293 F. Supp. 3d 888, 908 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (“Plaintiffs must identify what

24 action each Defendant took that caused Plaintiffs’ harm, without resort to generalized allegations

1 against Defendants as a whole.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re iPhone

2 Application Litig., No. 11-MD-02250-LHK, 2011 WL 4403963 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011)));

3 Wright v. City of Santa Cruz, No. 13–cv–01230–BLF, 2014 WL 5830318, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov.

4 10, 2014) (“These allegations are inadequate because they lump all defendants together and fail

5 to allege the factual basis for each defendant’s liability.”).

6 2. Claims against Pierce County’s sub-units

7 The Court dismisses all claims against the no-longer-captioned Defendants “Pierce

8 County Jail Administration,” “Sheriff’s Office,” and “911 Dispatch.” See Dkt. 69 at 1; Dkt. 94-1

9 at 1. Of the Pierce County-related parties, only Pierce County and Deputies Piland and Uti

10 remain listed as Defendants in the operative complaint. Dkt. 94-1 at 1. Units of Pierce County

11 are not capable of being sued. Nolan v. Snohomish County, 59 Wn. App. 876, 883, 802 P.2d 792

12 (1990) (“[I]n a legal action involving a county, the county itself is the only legal entity capable of

13 suing and being sued.”); see RCW 36.32.120(6).

14 3. Count one: “Monell Liability (42 U.S.C. § 1983)”

This Section 1983 claim, under a Monell theory, is made against Pierce County,

NaphCare, and MultiCare. Dkt. 94-1 at 19. Ms. Lumumba alleges that the three entities

“maintained widespread, longstanding, and well-settled customs, policies, and failures to train

that were the moving force behind” violations of her rights to be free from unreasonable seizure,

to adequate medical care, to safe conditions of confinement, and not to be detained on fabricated

or medically false information. Id.

Under Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658

(1978), a plaintiff must prove: “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which

[s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to

deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the policy is the moving

1 force behind the constitutional violation.” Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th

2 Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130

3 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir.1997)). The Court will consider the claim against each Defendant in turn.

4 a) MultiCare

5 Ms. Lumumba alleges that “MultiCare maintained a widespread custom of substituting

6 psychiatric clearance for medical clearance to support law enforcement’s booking decisions.”

7 Dkt. 94-1 at 29. In support of its motion to dismiss count one, MultiCare makes several

8 arguments. First, Ms. Lumumba misunderstands the MultiCare defendants’ role in the January 1,

9 2025 incident, as Brown was there simply to evaluate Ms. Lumumba for detention under the

10 ITA. Dkt. 74 at 9. Second, Ms. Lumumba fails to allege specific facts to support her “generic

11 allegations regarding unconstitutional policies, customs, or practices.” Id. Third, MultiCare, as

12 an entity, can only be found liable under Section 1983 if MultiCare itself caused the

13 constitutional violation. Id.

14 For several reasons, the Court finds that Ms. Lumumba has not sufficiently pled count

15 one against MultiCare. First, the claim against MultiCare stems from Brown’s decision as a DCR

16 on “whether to admit, discharge, release . . . or detain a person for evaluation and treatment.”

17 RCW 71.05.120(1). Her determination was to not involuntarily detain Ms. Lumumba. Dkt. 90 at

18 3. There is no plausible allegation that Brown made the decision to detain Ms. Lumumba on

19 criminal charges. Nor are there are any plausible allegations that a policy of MultiCare’s caused

20 Brown’s actions. Second, this claim concerns a single instance, and the allegations provided do

21 not fit within any exception to allow Monell liability for a single act. Benavidez v. County of San

22 Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1154 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[G]enerally, a single instance of unlawful conduct

23 is insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under section 1983.”). Accordingly, the

24 Court grants MultiCare’s motion to dismiss count one with prejudice.

1 b) NaphCare

2 Ms. Lumumba alleges that NaphCare “initially rejected [her] for booking” after

3 identifying various disqualifying health issues, then “contradicted its own findings” by “failing

4 to demand hospital transport,” and “allowing booking to proceed.” Dkt. 94-1 at 28–29. She

5 concludes that “[t]hese customs” resulted in her “medical deterioration, pain, respiratory distress,

6 and neurological decline and collapse” the following day. Id. at 29.

7 In support of its motion to dismiss count one, NaphCare makes several arguments. First,

8 Ms. Lumumba simply makes conclusory assertions that NaphCare maintained a custom without

9 describing “with any sufficient particularity” the custom “she purports to allege as controlling”

10 or how it relates to the decision-making process of Pierce County Sheriffs in arresting her or

11 providing her medical care after she was booked into Pierce County Jail. Dkt. 92 at 4. Second,

12 Ms. Lumumba does not provide “sufficient factual allegations regarding any personal

13 participation by a medical staff member or others to support her Monell claim.” Id. Third, even if

14 Ms. Lumumba showed a custom or practice, she cannot “show that the allegations were anything

15 more than a random act or single instance of misconduct.” Id. at 5.

16 The Court finds that Ms. Lumumba has not sufficiently pled this claim against NaphCare.

17 Ms. Lumumba has not alleged a custom or policy of NaphCare’s that caused her alleged injury.

18 As explained above, this claim concerns a single instance, and the allegations provided do not fit

19 within an exception to allow Monell liability for a single act. Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1154.

20 Accordingly, the Court Grants NaphCare’s motion to dismiss count one with prejudice.

21 c) Pierce County

Ms. Lumumba alleges that Pierce County “maintained a longstanding custom in which

deputies routinely overrode medical-rejection decisions,” and “continuing with jail booking of

medically unstable detainees” despite Pierce County policy requiring otherwise. Dkt. 94-1 at 24–

1 25. Pierce County argues that this claim should be dismissed because Ms. Lumumba identifies

2 “no policy or custom attributable to Pierce County, much less a causal link between any policy

3 or custom and the alleged constitutional violation.” Dkt. 72 at 15.

4 The Court grants Pierce County’s motion to dismiss count one with prejudice.

5 Ms. Lumumba provides only conclusory statements regarding Pierce County’s “longstanding

6 custom” of overriding “medical-rejection decisions,” without allegations to suggest that such an

7 override happened outside the January 1, 2025 incident. Dkt. 94-1 at 24–25. This claim concerns

8 a single instance, and the allegations provided do not fit within an exception to allow Monell

9 liability for a single act. Benavidez, 993 F.3d at 1154.

10 4. Count two: “Declaratory Denial of Qualified Immunity, ADA ‘Immunity, and

State-law Immunities.”

The Court construes this “count,” not as a separate claim, but as an argument against

Defendants’ potential assertion of immunity against other counts in her complaint.

5. Count three: “Fabrication of Evidence and Misclassification of Medical Crisis”

The claim is made under “42 U.S.C. § 1983 [(“Section 1983”)] – Fourteenth Amendment

Due Process; RCW 40.16.030 False Records ADA Title II; Section 504.” Dkt. 94-1 at 40. This

claim is made against the “Deputies,” however, the factual allegations discuss only Deputy

Piland’s mischaracterization of Ms. Lumumba’s circumstances. Id. at 11, 40. As a result, the

Court construes this as a Section 1983 claim, alleging that Deputy Piland violated

Ms. Lumumba’s right to due process when he “falsely classified [her] sertraline-induced medical

crisis as a domestic violence incident, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.” Id. at 40.

An investigator who “deliberately mischaracterizes” facts in their investigative report

“commits a constitutional violation.” Spencer v. Peters, 857 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010)). “To

1 prevail on a § 1983 claim of deliberate fabrication, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the defendant

2 official deliberately fabricated evidence and (2) the deliberate fabrication caused the plaintiff’s

3 deprivation of liberty.” Id. A plaintiff may establish causation by showing that

4 (a) the act was the cause in fact of the deprivation of liberty, meaning that the injury

would not have occurred in the absence of the conduct; and (b) the act was the

5 “proximate cause” or “legal cause” of the injury, meaning that the injury is of a

type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of the conduct in question.

Id.

Ms. Lumumba has sufficiently pled count three against Deputy Piland. She alleges that

he misclassified her “neurological crisis as domestic violence,” and his “fabricated narratives

regarding danger, ‘refusal,’ and the knife” caused “the resulting unlawful seizure, use of force,

and denial of medical care.” Dkt. 94-1 at 12, 41. The arrest occurred despite Ms. Lumumba’s

“voluntary surrender of the sertraline bottle,” “visible . . . cervical brace,” “inability to

ambulate,” and family informing Deputy Piland that “[t]his is a medication reaction,” not a

domestic incident. Id. at 40–41. Accordingly, the Court denies Deputy Piland’s motion to

dismiss count three.

6. Count four: “Equal Protection (Racial Discrimination)”

This claim is made under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 44.

Ms. Lumumba alleges that Defendants “intentionally subjected [her]—a Black woman with well-

documented disabilities— to harsher, more dangerous, and systematically disparate treatment

than similarly situated non-Black detainees with comparable or lesser medical needs,” when they

“ignore[d her] medical instability,” “book[ed] her despite clear contraindications for custody,”

“escalate[d] her as a threat despite no weapon or violent conduct,” and “den[ied] her disability-

related accommodations.” Id. at 44–45. The Court construes this as a claim against Deputies

Piland and Uti.

1 The Court finds that this count has not been sufficiently pled. Ms. Lumumba provides

2 only conclusory statements insufficient to state a plausible claim of race discrimination. She does

3 not provide factual allegations that the Deputies’ actions were grounded in racial discrimination.

4 McMillan v. Togus Reg’l Off., Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 120 F. App’x 849, 852 (2d Cir. 2005)

5 (“Conclusory allegations of racial discrimination are insufficient to maintain a § 1983 action.”).

6 Accordingly, count four is dismissed with prejudice.

7 7. Count five: “Excessive Force By Deputies”

8 This claim is made under “42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Fourth & Fourteenth Amendments; Equal

9 Protection Clause; Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Section 504 of the

10 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.” Dkt. 94-1 at 45. Ms. Lumumba alleges that she was the

11 victim of “excessive and objectively unreasonable” force when Deputy Piland “intentionally

12 applied physical force to [her] wounds and healing IV site, causing worsening injury, increased

13 pain, and subsequent need for surgical intervention.” Id. at 47. The Court construes this claim as

14 an excessive force claim under Section 1983 against Deputies Piland and Uti.

15 In support of their motion to dismiss count five, the Deputies make several arguments.

16 First, Deputy Uti is not mentioned in the relevant allegations. Dkt. 72 at 10; see Dkt. 94-1 at 46–

17 47. Second, the allegations that Deputy Piland manhandled Ms. Lumumba and applied an

18 unspecified degree of force to her body are not enough to show that his contact was excessive.

19 Dkt. 72 at 10–11. Third, the Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity because Ms. Lumumba

20 has not “identified a specific law that was violated,” nor were they “aware [Ms. Lumumba]

21 suffered from any medical condition.” Id. at 11–13.

22 Preliminarily, the Court grants the motion to dismiss count five against Deputy Uti with

23 prejudice, as the allegations relevant to this count do not mention him.

1 The defense of qualified immunity protects “government officials . . . from liability for

2 civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

3 constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald,

4 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). To resolve a claim of qualified immunity, courts must consider two

5 steps. “First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has alleged or shown make out

6 a violation of a constitutional right.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009) (internal

7 citations omitted). “Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court must decide

8 whether the right at issue was ‘clearly established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged

9 misconduct.” Id. The Court may exercise discretion “in deciding which of the two prongs of the

10 qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the

11 particular case at hand.” Id. at 236.

12 Ms. Lumumba has satisfied the first step, as she has alleged a violation of a constitutional

13 right. “The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making an arrest to use only an amount

14 of force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing them.” Blankenhorn v.

15 City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 477 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7–8

16 (1985)). To determine whether a specific use of force was reasonable, courts must balance “the

17 nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the

18 countervailing government interests at stake.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)

19 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8). It is not a “precise” standard,

20 but it “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including

21 the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of

22 the officers or others, and whether [she] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest

23 by flight.” Id. Ms. Lumumba alleges that she was not resisting when Deputy Piland used

24 “physical force.” Dkt. 94-1 at 13. She further alleges that this force was used despite: (1) Deputy

1 Piland being told that this was a medical crisis, not a crime; and (2) her “visible disability,

2 cervical instability, open wounds, and post-coma neurological impairment.” Id. at 11–13. This

3 force ultimately “impaired the normal communication pathways between the brain, spinal cord,

4 and peripheral nerves, producing slowed processing, delayed motor response, impaired

5 coordination, dysphagia-related airway distress, and episodic loss of balance.” Id. at 13. Pierce

6 County has an interest in using pain compliance techniques to aid one’s arrest, see Forrester v.

7 City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1994); however, the “nature and quality” of this

8 intrusion of Ms. Lumumba’s Fourth Amendment right significantly outweighs that interest.

9 Therefore, Ms. Lumumba has sufficiently alleged that Deputy Piland’s use of force was

10 unreasonable under the circumstances and violated her Fourth Amendment rights.

11 Ms. Lumumba has also satisfied the second step, as “the right at issue was ‘clearly

12 established’ at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. In 2007,

13 the Ninth Circuit held in Blankenhorn v. City of Orange that “force is only justified when there is

14 a need for force.” 485 F.3d 463, 481 (9th Cir. 2007). A reasonable officer would therefore be on

15 notice that using force to carry out an arrest of someone who poses no threat, is not suspected of

16 a serious crime, is not actively resisting, and is in a medical crisis would violate the Fourth

17 Amendment. See id. With the state of the law “clearly established” at the time of

18 Ms. Lumumba’s arrest, Deputy Piland is not entitled to qualified immunity as to count five at

this time.2

20 The Court finds that Ms. Lumumba has successfully pled an excessive force claim

21 against Deputy Piland. Accordingly, Deputy Piland’s motion to dismiss count five is denied.

23 2 This does not remain static. As more evidence related to the use of force and the circumstances

of Ms. Lumumba’s arrest are produced, the Court’s analysis of qualified immunity may change.

1 8. Count [six]: “Disability Discrimination”3

2 This claim is made under the “Americans with Disabilities Act [(“ADA”)], 42 U.S.C.

3 § 12132; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, [and] 29 U.S.C. § 794.” Dkt. 94-1 at 48.

4 Ms. Lumumba alleges that the Defendants booked her “despite medical instability,” administered

5 “contraindicated medications,” withheld “essential life-sustaining medications for nearly thirty-

6 nine (39) hours, despite clear medical necessity and known chronic conditions,” misclassified her

7 medical crisis as “psychiatric,” and interpreted her disability symptoms as “non-compliance.” Id.

8 at 49–50. The Court construes this claim as a claim under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

9 against Pierce County and NaphCare.

10 “Courts in this Circuit have found the elements of a claim under the Rehabilitation Act

11 identical to those of a claim under the ADA.” Melegh v. Emily Program, P.C., No. 2:23-CV-

12 01458-RAJ, 2024 WL 4277849, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 24, 2024). Title II of the ADA provides

13 that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded

14 from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public

15 entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In the context of

16 arrests, an entity may be liable for two types of Title II claims:

17 (1) wrongful arrest, where police wrongly arrest someone with a disability because

they misperceive the effects of that disability as criminal activity; and (2)

18 reasonable accommodation, where, although police properly investigate and arrest

a person with a disability for a crime unrelated to that disability, they fail to

19 reasonably accommodate the person’s disability in the course of investigation or

arrest, causing the person to suffer greater injury or indignity in that process than

20 other arrestees.

3 The operative complaint repeats the number five in its numeration of counts. Dkt. 94-1 at 48. In

24 this order, the Court uses the correct numeration of the counts.

1 Ivchenko v. City of Scottsdale, No. 20-17463, 2021 WL 4739642, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 12, 2021)

2 (quoting Sheehan v. City & County of San Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d

3 in part on other grounds, City & County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015)).

4 Pierce County argues that Ms. Lumumba “articulates no facts to support her conclusory

5 statement that she was subjected to discrimination . . . as a result of her disability.” Dkt. 89 at 4.

6 The Court disagrees. Ms. Lumumba has successfully pled the first type of Title II claim against

7 the County. She alleges that she was arrested because Pierce County Deputies misperceived her

8 medical crisis and reaction to sertraline as a domestic violence incident. Dkt. 94-1 at 10–12.

9 Ms. Lumumba has also successfully pled the second type of Title II claim against the County by

10 alleging that deputies failed to reasonably accommodate her disability in their arrest and booking

11 procedures in ways that exacerbated her injuries. Id. at 49–50. Accordingly, the Court denies

12 Pierce County’s motion to dismiss count six.

13 NaphCare argues that Ms. Lumumba’s claim fails because the ADA and Rehabilitation

14 Act “prohibit[] discrimination because of disability, not inadequate treatment for disability,” and

15 are not a remedy for medical malpractice. Dkt. 75 at 12 (quoting Simmons v. Navajo County, 609

16 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 2010), overruled in part on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los

17 Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016)). The Court agrees, as the allegations against NaphCare,

18 such as the administration of medication to Ms. Lumumba, see Dkt. 94-1 at 49–50, relate to

19 whether NaphCare’s provision of medical care was acceptable, not a failure to accommodate her

20 disability in the arrest and booking process. Accordingly, the Court grants NaphCare’s motion to

21 dismiss count six with prejudice.

1 9. Counts [seven and eight]: “Common Law Assault (Washington State),” and

“Common Law Battery (Washington State).”

In count seven, Ms. Lumumba alleges that Deputy Piland threatened her with chemical

sedation, and his actions caused her “emotional trauma, humiliation, psychological distress,

exacerbation of neurological symptoms, and heightened physical instability.” Dkt. 94-1 at 53–54.

The Court construes this as an assault claim against Deputy Piland.

In count eight, Ms. Lumumba alleges that Deputy Piland forcefully handled her and, with

the help of NaphCare medical staff, compelled her to ingest a sedative that resulted in injury. Id.

at 54–55. The Court construes this as a battery claim against Deputy Piland and NaphCare.

The Court first considers the two counts against Deputy Piland. “Generally, a police

officer making an arrest is justified in using sufficient force to subdue a prisoner, however he

becomes a tortfeasor and is liable as such for assault and battery if unnecessary violence or

excessive force is used in accomplishing the arrest.” Boyles v. City of Kennewick, 62 Wn. App.

174, 176, 813 P.2d 178 (1991). Ms. Lumumba has sufficiently alleged that Deputy Piland used

excessive force to arrest her and lead her through the booking process while she suffered a

medical crisis. See supra Part III.B.5. Accordingly, the Court denies Deputy Piland’s motion to

dismiss counts seven and eight.

Next, the Court considers the battery counts against NaphCare. In support of its motion to

dismiss count eight, NaphCare makes several arguments. First, Ms. Lumumba fails to identify

which NaphCare personnel committed the alleged battery. Dkt. 92 at 6. Second, the complaint

does not provide facts to establish that a medical provider had intent to cause harmful or

offensive contact or apprehension of such contact when administering medication. Id.

“A battery is the intentional infliction of harmful or offensive bodily contact with the

plaintiff.” Sutton v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 180 Wn. App. 859, 865, 324 P.3d 763 (2014).

1 “For there to be intent to cause harmful or offensive contact, the act must be done for the purpose

2 of causing the contact . . . or with knowledge on the part of the actor that such contact . . . is

3 substantially certain to be produced.” Id. at 865–66 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

4 Garratt v. Dailey, 46 Wn.2d 197, 201–02, 279 P.2d 1091 (1955)). The complaint does not

5 sufficiently allege that NaphCare personnel had the requisite intent for battery. Accordingly, the

6 Court grants NaphCare’s motion to dismiss count eight with prejudice.

7 10. Count [nine]: “Medical Malpractice and Continuing Negligence”

8 This count is brought under RCW chapter 7.70 against the MultiCare defendants.

9 Dkt. 94-1 at 55–56. Ms. Lumumba alleges that the MultiCare defendants “provided healthcare

10 services to [her], including diagnostic evaluation, mental-health assessment, documentation, and

11 medical decision-making,” and breached their duty by misdiagnosing a brain tumor, and

12 misclassifying her “sertraline toxicity, TBI deterioration, neurological collapse, and mobility

13 impairment as ‘psychiatric.’” Id. at 56. Ms. Lumumba further alleges that she suffered

14 “[i]ncreased neurological risk and destabilization,” “[e]motional and psychological harm,” and

15 “[c]ontaminated medical records that continue to impair present and future medical treatment” as

16 a result. Id. at 57.

17 In support of their motion to dismiss, the MultiCare defendants make several arguments.

18 First, Ms. Lumumba “misunderstands” the MultiCare defendants’ role in this incident. Dkt 74 at

19 14. They contend that Brown provided no medical care as she was acting as a DCR, who simply

20 evaluates whether someone meets the criteria for detention under the ITA. Id. They conclude that

21 this count should be dismissed as a matter of law because DCRs are regulated by RCW 71.05,

22 not RCW 7.70. Id. at 15. Second, under RCW 71.05.120(1), Brown’s actions are immune from

23 liability. Dkt. 90 at 6.

1 The Court agrees. Regardless of Ms. Lumumba’s misunderstanding of Brown’s role as

2 DCR, under RCW 71.05.120(1), Brown is immune from civil liability for her decision regarding

3 detention for evaluation or treatment unless the decision was made in bad faith or with gross

4 negligence. Ms. Lumumba does not plausibly allege that Brown performed her duties in bad faith

5 or with gross negligence, and Brown ultimately decided that Ms. Lumumba did not meet the

6 criteria for involuntary treatment. Accordingly, the MultiCare defendants’ motion to dismiss

7 count nine with prejudice is granted.

8 11. Count [ten]: “42 U.S.C. § 1983 – Objective Deliberate Indifference to Serious

Medical Needs (Fourteenth Amendment)”

This claim is brought under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. Dkt. 94-1 at

58. Ms. Lumumba does not explicitly mention a specific defendant, but alleges that

“Defendants,” “[d]espite direct, undeniable notice of [her] critical medical condition,”

“demonstrated objective deliberate indifference by intentionally denying and interfering with

necessary medical care.” Id. at 60. Ms. Lumumba further alleges that “[a]ny reasonable officer or

medical provider would recognize such symptoms as requiring emergency evaluation and

ambulance transport.” Id. at 59. Given the mention of “officer” and “medical provider,” the

Court construes this count as a claim of deliberate indifference in medical treatment for a pretrial

detainee under the Fourteenth Amendment against NaphCare and Deputy Piland. The elements

of such a claim are:

(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under

20 which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial

risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available

21 measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances

would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved—making the

22 consequences of the defendant’s conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such

measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries.

1 Gordon v. County of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 2018). A plaintiff must show

2 “something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. (quoting Castro, 883 F.3d at 1071).

3 NaphCare argues that it cannot be liable as an entity under Section 1983 through a theory

4 of respondeat superior. Dkt. 75 at 10. The Court agrees. The Supreme Court has precluded the

5 use of respondeat superior to place Section 1983 liability onto entities. Heath v. Redbud Hosp.

6 Dist., 620 F.2d 207, 209 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

7 York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). Accordingly, the Court dismisses this count against NaphCare

8 with prejudice.

9 Deputy Piland argues that Ms. Lumumba “fails to plead facts that establish personal

10 participation, much less deliberate indifference.” Dkt. 89 at 3. But Ms. Lumumba has

11 successfully pled each element of the claim. She establishes the first and third elements by

12 alleging that Deputy Piland refused “appropriate ambulance transport to a medical facility.”

13 Dkt. 94-1 at 61. Ms. Lumumba establishes the second element as she alleges Deputy Piland

14 caused medical care to be withheld for approximately thirty-nine hours, causing her to suffer

15 “worsening physical symptoms.” Id. at 60. Lastly, the fourth element is established, because it is

16 alleged that “[t]hese intentional acts of indifference directly caused [her] injuries to worsen.” Id.

17 at 61. Accordingly, Deputy Piland’s motion to dismiss count ten is denied.

18 12. Count [eleven]: “Objectively Unreasonable & Life-Endangering Chemical

Restraint”

This claim is made under Section 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment against “[a]ll

Defendants.” Id. at 63. Ms. Lumumba alleges that “Defendants administered Hydroxyzine

Pamoate, a sedative with known risks,” as a “non-consensual chemical restraint,” which

interfered with her taking her necessary medications “for more than 39 hours, compounding her

neurological and respiratory instability.” Id. at 64–65.

1 The Court dismisses this count without prejudice as it is unclear whom this claim is

2 against. See Wright, 2014 WL 5830318, at *5 (“These allegations are inadequate because they

3 lump all defendants together and fail to allege the factual basis for each defendant’s liability.”).

4 Ms. Lumumba may seek leave to amend this claim if she learns of the identity of the intended

5 defendant. Apart from that, further leave to amend will not be granted. Ms. Lumumba has had

6 multiple opportunities to amend and further amendments would be futile. See Peramas v. Davy,

7 No. 2:25-CV-1569-JNW, 2025 WL 3657213, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 17, 2025).

8 IV. CONCLUSION

Ms. Lumumba’s motion to amend her complaint (Dkt. 94) is GRANTED, making her

proposed fourth amended complaint the operative complaint.

After analyzing the three motions to dismiss in light of the newly operative complaint,

the Court orders the following: The Pierce County defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 72, is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. NaphCare’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 75, is GRANTED.

The MultiCare defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 74, is GRANTED.

These counts are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE:

16 • All claims against “Pierce County Jail Administration,” “Sheriff’s Office,” and “911

Dispatch.”

• Count one, “Monell Liability (42 U.S.C. § 1983)),” against the MultiCare defendants,

18 NaphCare, and Pierce County.

19 • Count four, “Equal Protection (Racial Discrimination),” against Deputies Piland and

Uti.

• Count five, “Excessive Force By Deputies,” against Deputy Uti.

• Count [six], “Disability Discrimination,” against NaphCare.

• Count [eight], “Common law battery (Washington State),” against NaphCare.

• Count [nine], “Medical Malpractice and Continuing Negligence,” against the

24 MultiCare Defendants.

e Count [ten], “42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Objective Deliberate Indifference to Serious

2 Medical Needs (Fourteenth Amendment),” against NaphCare.

3 These counts are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE:

4 e Count [eleven], “Objectively Unreasonable & Life-Endangering Chemical Restraint.”

5 These counts have survived the three motions to dismiss:

6 e Count three, “Fabrication of Evidence and Misclassification of Medical Crisis,”

against Deputy Piland.

' e Count five, “Excessive Force By Deputies,” against Deputy Piland.

e Count [six], “Disability Discrimination,” against Pierce County.

e Count [seven], “Common law assault (Washington State),” against Deputy Piland.

4 e Count [eight], “Common law battery (Washington State),” against Deputy Piland.

e Count [ten], “42 U.S.C. § 1983 — Objective Deliberate Indifference to Serious

12 Medical Needs (Fourteenth Amendment),” against Deputy Piland.

13 As aresult, only Deputy Joshua Piland and Pierce County remain as Defendants to this

14 || case.

15 The Clerk is directed to send uncertified copies of this Order to all counsel of record and

16 || to any party appearing pro se at said party’s last known address.

18 Dated this 13 day of April, 2026.

54 United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.