Roberts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

TAMPA DIVISION

DEVAUN ROBERTS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 8:26-cv-1226-WFJ-CPT

CITY OF TAMPA, et al.,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

Before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Devaun Roberts’s amended civil-rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 4). Because Mr. Roberts is a prisoner suing

government officials, the Court is required to screen the amended complaint and dismiss it

if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. After careful review, the Court concludes that the amended complaint

must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Shortly after midnight on April 23, 2022, Mr. Roberts was a passenger in a vehicle

in Tampa, Florida. (Doc. 4 at 9, 22). Officers J. Ramos and D. Williams initiated a traffic

stop after observing that the vehicle was traveling “without any lights on.” (Id. at 22). The

driver “refused to stop,” leading police on a “high-speed chase.” (Id. at 9). The vehicle

ultimately came to a stop after “police vehicles” “ramm[ed]” into it. (Id.) The officers

removed Mr. Roberts from the front passenger seat. (Id.) Officer Ramos proceeded to

search the vehicle, recovering a handgun on the “floorboard” “under the front passenger

seat.” (Id.) Mr. Roberts told the officers “that the vehicle was not his and denied ever

knowing there was a firearm under the front passenger[] seat.” (Id.) Nevertheless, the

officers arrested Mr. Roberts for carrying a concealed firearm. (Id. at 10).

Mr. Roberts was booked into jail. (Id.) He was “forced to consume ill food that

caused him to vomit,” and he was “forced to fight on numerous occasions with inmates

just to use the phone.” (Id. at 11). Approximately one week after his arrest, Mr. Roberts’s

attorney persuaded the prosecutor to drop the concealed-carry charge because the State

“could not prove that the firearm was in [Mr. Roberts’s] control.” (Id.) Mr. Roberts was

released from custody on May 2, 2022. (Id. at 12).

Based on these allegations, Mr. Roberts sues Officers Ramos and Williams for false

arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution. (Id. at 5). He also sues the City of

Tampa, the Tampa Police Department, and Mayor Jane Castor, alleging that they

“allow[ed]” the officers to arrest Mr. Roberts without probable cause and “commence a

prosecution . . . on false charges.” (Id.) Mr. Roberts seeks $5 million in compensatory

damages, $2 million in punitive damages, and a “declaration” that his constitutional rights

were violated. (Id. at 13).

The amended complaint must be dismissed because, even accepting Mr. Roberts’s

allegations as true, the officers had probable cause to arrest him for carrying a concealed

firearm. “An arrest without a warrant and lacking probable cause violates the Constitution

and can underpin a § 1983 claim, but the existence of probable cause at the time of arrest

is an absolute bar to a subsequent constitutional challenge to the arrest.” Brown v. City of

Huntsville, Ala., 608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Osborne v. Am. Multi

Cinema, Inc., 348 F. App’x 535, 538 (11th Cir. 2009) (“The existence of probable cause

creates an absolute bar to [plaintiff’s] complaints of false arrest and false imprisonment,

and defeats his claims for malicious prosecution.” (citation omitted)). “Probable cause

exists where the facts within the collective knowledge of law enforcement officials, derived

from reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to cause a person of reasonable

caution to believe that a criminal offense has been or is being committed.” Brown, 608 F.3d

at 734. “[P]robable cause requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal

activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1327

(11th Cir. 2009).

At the time of Mr. Roberts’s arrest, Florida law made it a third-degree felony to

“carr[y] a concealed firearm on or about [one’s] person.” Fla. Stat. § 790.01(2) (2022).

“For a firearm to be concealed, it must be (1) on or about the person and (2) hidden from

the ordinary sight of another person.” Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349, 354 (Fla. 1981). A

firearm is on or about a person if it is “physically on the person or readily accessible to

him. This generally includes the interior of an automobile and the vehicle’s glove

compartment, whether or not locked.” Id.; see also Bailey v. State, 442 So. 2d 385, 386

(Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (“A firearm is on or about one’s person if it is in close proximity to

him within his easy reach.”). Likewise, “[t]he term ‘ordinary sight of another person’

means the casual and ordinary observation of another in the normal associations of life.”

Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 354. “Ordinary observation by a person other than a police officer

does not generally include the floorboard of a vehicle, whether or not the weapon is wholly

or partially visible.” Id.

Here, Mr. Roberts was a passenger in a vehicle that led police on a high-speed chase.

(Doc. 4 at 9). When the chase ended, Mr. Roberts was removed from the front passenger

seat. (Id.) Officer Ramos searched the vehicle and found a handgun on the “floorboard”

“under the front passenger seat.” (Id.) The gun was “readily accessible with a round in the

chamber and 9mm rounds in the magazine.” (Id. at 22). These facts were “sufficient to

cause a person of reasonable caution to believe that” Mr. Roberts was carrying a concealed

firearm. Brown, 608 F.3d at 734; see also J.E.S. v. State, 931 So. 2d 276, 280 (Fla. 5th

DCA 2006) (evidence sufficient to support conviction for carrying concealed firearm

where defendant “was seated in the backseat of the car and the gun was on or about his

person and readily accessible to him under the front seat”). Therefore, the officers had

probable cause to arrest Mr. Roberts.

Mr. Roberts appears to contend that probable cause was lacking because he “denied

ever knowing there was a firearm under the front passenger[] seat.” (Doc. 4 at 9). But

“probable cause does not require officers to rule out a suspect’s innocent explanation.”

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 61 (2018); see also Washington v. Rivera, 939

F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2019) (an officer need not “explore or eliminate every

theoretically plausible claim of innocence” to have probable cause). Mr. Roberts also

alleges that the charge was eventually dropped. (Doc. 4 at 11). But that fact is “of no

consequence” to the probable cause determination. L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49 F.3d 679, 685

(11th Cir. 1995) (“The existence of probable cause is an absolute bar to this § 1983 action.

The fact that all charges against the plaintiffs were eventually dismissed for one reason or

another is of no consequence to this determination.” (citation omitted)); see also Hernandez

v. Wells, No. 8:21-cv-1488-KKM-TGW, 2022 WL 1607190, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May 20,

2022) (“[Plaintiff] alleges that the State Attorney’s Office decided to abandon the charge

on which [he] was arrested. But those decisions are immaterial for determining whether

the officer had probable cause... .”).

Because the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Roberts, the amended

complaint must be dismissed. See Osborne, 348 F. App’x at 538 (“The existence of

probable cause creates an absolute bar to [plaintiff's] complaints of false arrest and false

imprisonment, and defeats his claims for malicious prosecution.” (citation omitted)).

The Court previously identified the deficiencies in Mr. Roberts’s allegations and

gave him an opportunity to amend his complaint. (Doc. 3). Nevertheless, the amended

complaint fails to state a viable claim. Because further amendment would be futile, the

Court declines to grant Mr. Roberts another opportunity to amend. See Woldeab v. Dekalb

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th Cir. 2018) (“Where a more carefully drafted

complaint might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the

complaint before the district court dismisses the action with prejudice.”).

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Mr. Roberts’s amended complaint (Doc. 4) is

DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against Mr. Roberts

and to CLOSE this case.!

DONE and ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on May 18, 2026.

meee,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Mr. Roberts mentions the conditions of his confinement at the county jail, but it does not appear that he

intends to assert claims based on those allegations. The dismissal of this action is without prejudice to Mr.

Roberts’s right to pursue (in a new action) any cognizable claims based on jail conditions.

5.