The opinion
1
2
3
4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
6 SAN JOSE DIVISION
7
8 THE BULLIS-PURISSIMA Case No. 24-cv-08527-VKD
ELEMENTARY SCHOOL,
9
Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
10 DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’
v. MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND
11 AMENDED COMPLAINT
SANTA CLARA COUNTY BOARD OF
12 EDUCATION, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 24
Defendants.
13
14 Plaintiff The Bullis-Purissima Elementary School, operator of Bullis Charter School
15 (“BCS”), brings this action against defendants the Santa Clara County Board of Education
16 (“SCCBOE”) and the Santa Clara County Office of Education (“SCCOE”), asserting three claims
17 for violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the equal protection clause of the
18 Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Dkt. No. 23. After the Court granted
19 defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s first amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) with
20 leave to amend, BCS timely filed a second amended complaint (SAC), the operative pleading. See
21 Dkt. Nos. 21, 23.
22 Defendants move to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the
23 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 24. BCS opposes the motion. Dkt. No. 25. The
24 Court heard oral argument on the motion on January 27, 2026. Dkt. No. 35.1 Upon consideration
25 of the moving and responding papers and the oral arguments presented, the Court grants in part
26 and denies in part defendants’ motion to dismiss.
27
1 I. BACKGROUND
2 According to the SAC, plaintiff The Bullis-Purissima Elementary School operates BCS, a
3 TK-8 public charter school located within the geographic boundaries of the Los Altos School
4 District and authorized by SCCBOE. Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 2. BCS alleges that it is “the highest-
5 performing public school in Santa Clara County.” Id.
6 BCS asserts that, despite its high level of performance, over the past six years, SCCBOE
7 has subjected it to “adverse treatment, deprivation of rights under the law, and ongoing
8 harassment” because BCS’s student population does not have a racial and ethnic makeup that
9 reflects the population of the school district as a whole. Id. ¶¶ 24-27. In particular, BCS alleges
10 that SCCBOE has sent “numerous letters” to BCS “falsely accusing” it of excluding students on
11 the basis of race. Id. ¶ 24. BCS asserts that SCCBOE does not subject any of the other fourteen
12 charter schools operating within Santa Clara County to this level of scrutiny and that the “adverse
13 treatment” BCS complains of stems from SCCBOE’s “opinion” that “BCS has enrolled too many
14 Asian students and too few Hispanic students . . . .” Id. ¶ 25.
15 On June 3, 2024, BCS sought renewal of its charter for a seven-year term. Id. ¶ 26. BCS
16 alleges that its charter should have been unconditionally renewed, given BCS’s high level of
17 performance. Id. ¶¶ 2, 26. However, on August 4, 2024, SCCOE informed BCS that “there
18 continues to be underrepresentation of some historically underserved student groups at [BCS]”
19 and that BCS therefore would receive only “conditional approval.” Id. ¶ 26. On August 26, 2024,
20 SCCBOE held a meeting to discuss BCS’s charter renewal petition where SCCOE “indicated that
21 approval of BCS’[s] renewal petition . . . was not warranted because BCS has not ‘fully achieved
22 being reflective of the district’ with regard to racial and ethnic makeup . . . .” Id. ¶ 27. Defendants
23 ultimately decided to renew BCS’s charter for a period of five years with conditions, including the
24 requirement that BCS enter into a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) with defendants. Id.
25 ¶ 29.
26 BCS appealed defendants’ decision to the State Board of Education, which dismissed the
27 appeal on the basis that BCS’s charter had been renewed conditionally, not outright denied. Id.
1 ¶ 31. On November 15, 2024, BCS’s board approved a version of the MOU suggested by SCCOE
2 staff. Id. ¶ 32. However, this version of the MOU was voted down by SCCBOE on November
3 20, 2024, allegedly because it contained the following language: “Charter School contends that
4 factual evidence did not support any finding that Charter School excluded any student who wished
5 to attend, and disagrees with and objects to the Conditions . . . .” Id. ¶¶ 31-32. SCCBOE
6 approved a revised version of the MOU that did not contain this language at its December 18,
7 2024 meeting, a version that BCS contends contained “even more changes . . . beyond the
8 conditions SCCBOE set for renewal on August 27, 2024.” Id. ¶ 34. BCS signed the MOU but
9 asserts that it “executed [this] MOU under . . . protest.” Id. After the execution of the MOU, on
10 January 9, 2025, defendants confirmed with the California Department of Education that BCS’s
11 charter had been renewed through June 30, 2030. Id.
12 BCS’s first amended complaint asserted one claim for violations of Title VI of the Civil
13 Rights Act of 1964. Dkt. No. 10. After the Court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant
14 to Rule 12(b)(6) with leave to amend, BCS timely filed its SAC in which it asserts three claims
15 against SCCOE and SCCBOE: one claim asserting violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
16 of 1964, and two claims asserting violations of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
17 Amendment. See Dkt. Nos. 21, 23. BCS seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, compensatory
18 damages,2 and attorneys’ fees and costs. Dkt. No. 23 at 30-32.
19 II. LEGAL STANDARD
20 A. Rule 12(b)(1)
21 A Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss challenges a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction.
22 Such a challenge may be made either on the face of the pleadings (a “facial attack”) or by
23 presenting extrinsic evidence (a “factual attack”). Warren v. Fox Family Worldwide, Inc., 328
24 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). “In a
25
26
2 At the motion hearing, BCS asserted that claim 3 is distinct from claims 1 and 2 because claim 3
seeks compensatory damages. Dkt. No. 35. However, the SAC reflects that BCS’s request for
27
compensatory damages is limited to its Title VI claim (claim 1). Compare Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 43 (claim
1 facial attack, the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on
2 their face to invoke federal jurisdiction. By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes
3 the truth of the allegations that, by themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe
4 Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).
5 Because defendants’ arguments focus on the sufficiency of the SAC’s allegations, the
6 Court construes defendants’ motion as a facial attack on BCS’s standing. As such, the record is
7 limited to the complaint and materials that may be judicially noticed. See Hyatt v. Yee, 871 F.3d
8 1067, 1071 n.15 (9th Cir. 2017). Additionally, the Court must accept well-pled allegations of the
9 SAC as true, draw all reasonable inferences in BCS’s favor, and determine whether its allegations
10 are sufficient to support standing. See id. As the party asserting federal subject matter
11 jurisdiction, BCS bears the burden of establishing its existence. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
12 Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994).
13 B. Rule 12(b)(6)
14 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of
15 the claims in the complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is
16 appropriate where there is no cognizable legal theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to
17 support a cognizable legal theory. Id. (citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696,
18 699 (9th Cir. 1988)). In such a motion, all material allegations in the complaint must be taken as
19 true and construed in the light most favorable to the claimant. Id.
20 However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
21 conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and “[f]actual
22 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
23 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). Moreover, the Court is not required to
24 “‘assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in the form of factual
25 allegations.’” Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 17-cv-06064-LHK, 2018 WL 1471939, at *3
26 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2018) (quoting Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per
27 curiam)). Nor does the Court accept “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted
1 1055 (9th Cir. 2008).
2 Rule 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
3 pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that the “[f]actual allegations
4 must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555
5 (citations omitted). However, only plausible claims for relief will survive a motion to dismiss.
6 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A claim is plausible if the facts pled permit the court to draw a reasonable
7 inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Id. A plaintiff does not have to
8 provide detailed facts, but the pleading must include “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-
9 unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. at 678.
10 III. DISCUSSION
11 Defendants challenge all claims in the SAC for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
12 Dkt. No. 24 at 4-12. In addition, defendants challenge BCS’s standing to assert its third claim on
13 behalf of Asian students and applicants. Id. at 12-13. In connection with its opposition to the
14 motion, BCS requests judicial notice of two documents. Dkt. No. 25-1. The Court first addresses
15 BCS’s request for judicial notice before considering defendants’ arguments for dismissal of the
16 SAC.
17 A. BCS’s Request for Judicial Notice
18 BCS requests judicial notice of two documents: (1) a May 5, 2021 SCCBOE meeting
19 agenda, and (2) an August 2, 2023 SCCBOE meeting agenda. Dkt. No. 25-1 at 2. BCS also
20 requests that the Court take judicial notice of the “the fact that all County Board actions requiring
21 a racial or other population ‘cure’ were pertaining and directed to BCS and no other charter
22 school.” Id. At the hearing, defendants stated that they do not object to the Court taking judicial
23 notice of the two documents. Dkt. No. 35.
24 Federal Rule of Evidence 201 states that “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not
25 subject to reasonable dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources
26 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2); see also Khoja v.
27 Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). These reliable sources include
1 Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).
2 Accordingly, while a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record when deciding a
3 motion to dismiss, it “cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public
4 records.” Khoja, 899 F.3d at 999.
5 As the request for judicial notice of the two documents is unopposed and the documents
6 appear to be matters of public record, the Court finds that it may properly take judicial notice of
7 these documents. The Court does not take judicial notice of any disputed facts included in these
8 public records.
9 B. Claim 1: Title VI Discrimination
10 BCS contends that defendants’ treatment of the school during the charter renewal process
11 and the years preceding it violates Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Dkt. No. 23 ¶¶ 35-45.
12 Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or
13 national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
14 discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C.
15 § 2000d. To state a claim under this statute, BCS must plausibly allege that defendants are
16 (1) “engaging in racial discrimination” and (2) “receiving federal financial assistance.” Fobbs v.
17 Holy Cross Health Sys. Corp., 29 F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by
18 Daviton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 241 F.3d 1131 (9th Cir. 2001). Defendants do not
19 contend that BCS fails to allege that defendants receive federal funds; thus, the sole question is
20 whether BCS has adequately alleged racial discrimination.
21 The pleading requirements for a discrimination claim under Title VI are similar to those for
22 an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
23 306, 343 (2003) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (opinion of
24 Powell, J.)) (“Title VI proscribes only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal
25 Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.” (citation modified)). “Private parties seeking judicial
26 enforcement of Title VI’s nondiscrimination protections must prove intentional discrimination.”
27 Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 15 F.4th 1236, 1242 (9th Cir. 2021). However, at the pleading stage, a
1 plead intent. Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998); see
2 also Fobbs, 29 F.3d at 1447 (“Although the plaintiff must prove intent at trial, it need not be pled
3 in the complaint.”).
4 BCS contends that defendants subject BCS to disparate treatment based on the racial
5 composition of its student population. BCS alleges that defendants “have singled out and solely
6 targeted adverse actions at BCS” because defendants find it “unacceptable” that Asian students are
7 overrepresented at BCS. Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 39(b). BCS alleges that defendants’ disparate treatment
8 includes: (1) “harass[ment] and bull[ying]” through notices and letters alleging BCS’s
9 noncompliance with California law; (2) giving only conditional approval to BCS’s charter renewal
10 initially, despite BCS’s high level of academic performance; and (3) forcing BCS to sign an MOU
11 in order to get final approval. Id. ¶¶ 38(a)-(c), 39(a). BCS asserts that no other similarly situated
12 charter school in Santa Clara County has been subject to the same treatment. Id. ¶¶ 25, 39(d).
13 To establish a claim for disparate treatment, BCS will ultimately need to show that (1) it is
14 part of a protected class,3 (2) it was treated differently from similarly situated individuals or
15 entities, and (3) this treatment was motivated by its protected status.4 See Mandel v. Bd. of Trs. of
16 California State Univ., No. 17-cv-03511, 2018 WL 1242067, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018)
17 (citing Rashdan v. Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2014)). The group of similarly
18 situated individuals or entities “need not be similar in all respects, but they must be similar in
19 those respects relevant to the Defendants’ policy.” Olson v. California, 104 F.4th 66, 77 (9th
20 Cir.), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 382 (2024) (quoting Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d
21 1053, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014)).
22
3 For purpose of this motion, defendants do not dispute that BCS is part of a protected class with
23
respect to this claim. See Dkt. No. 24 at 6-8.
24
4 As discussed above, a showing of discriminatory intent is not required for a Title VI claim at the
pleading stage. See Aguirre v. San Leandro Police Dep’t, No. 10-cv-04364 CW, 2011 WL
25
738292, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2011) (citing Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1026) (“Unlike claims under
the Equal Protection Clause which must plead intentional discrimination, Title VI claims need
26
only allege that the defendant is engaging in discrimination, although a showing of intent is
necessary at trial.”); see also Mandel, 2018 WL 1242067, at *17 n.14 (acknowledging “that under
27
Title VI, the Ninth Circuit has held that although ‘a showing of intent is required at trial,’ for
1 Here, BCS suggests that the fourteen other charter schools authorized by SCCBOE are
2 “similarly-situated.” See Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 25. Of these schools, BCS alleges that it “has one of the
3 smallest variances between its Hispanic school population and the population of the surrounding
4 district.” Id. Yet, BCS asserts, “SSCBOE does not bully and harass those other charter schools on
5 their ‘population imbalance’ nor threaten them with non-renewal of their charters, nor
6 constructively deny their charters . . . .” Id. Indeed, BCS alleges that it was entitled to the benefit
7 of unconditional renewal of its charter for a period of seven years, given its status as a “high-
8 performing charter school.” Id. ¶ 38(a). It maintains that the reason defendants treat BCS
9 differently is that the “disproportionality [at the other charter schools] is not about too many Asian
10 students.” Id. ¶ 38(c).
11 Defendants contend that these allegations fail to state a claim for relief under Title VI. In
12 addition to pointing out that it is undisputed that BCS’s charter has been renewed through 2030
13 with the signing of the MOU, defendants argue that nothing in the California Charter Schools Act
14 (“CSA”), codified at California Education Code § 47600, et seq., entitles BCS to an unconditional
15 renewal of its charter for seven years. Dkt. No. 24 at 5-6. For these reasons, defendants argue that
16 no benefit has been withheld from BCS. Id. Defendants also argue that no inference can
17 reasonably be drawn that they have subjected BCS to disparate treatment because of the racial
18 composition of its student population. Id. at 6. Defendants contend that BCS “does not account
19 for, or even acknowledge, the other bases on which the alleged ‘adverse actions’ against it were
20 based,” such as BCS’s “underenrollment of English Learners, socioeconomically disadvantaged
21 students, and students with disabilities.” Id. at 7.
22 As discussed in its prior order, the Court finds that defendants’ argument that their actions
23 with respect to BCS’s charter renewal were motivated by factors other than race is not persuasive
24 at the pleading stage where BCS need not plead discriminatory intent for the claim to proceed.
25 See Dkt. No. 21 at 8. In addition, the Court disagrees with defendants that BCS’s disparate
26 treatment claim necessarily fails at the pleading stage because its charter was ultimately renewed
27 through 2030. BCS may suffer injury from the imposition of additional burdens by defendants
1 charter to what is required to obtain future renewals. Given SCCBOE’s oversight responsibilities
2 for charter schools within its jurisdiction, the Court seriously doubts that BCS can sustain a viable
3 Title VI claim based on allegations that SCCBOE’s criticism and questioning of BCS’s practices
4 amounts to “bullying” or “harassment.” However, the Court finds that BCS otherwise plausibly
5 alleges that it was treated differently from similarly situated schools because of the racial
6 composition of its student population.
7 Specifically, the SAC alleges that when four other charter schools authorized by SCCBOE
8 were due for charter renewal, defendants did not issue notices to cure and correct racial
9 imbalances although Asian students were underrepresented at those schools. Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 39(d).
10 The SAC further alleges that another school, Alpha Public Schools – Jose Hernandez (“APS”), is a
11 “low-performing” school with a presumption of charter denial, in contrast to the presumption of
12 charter renewal that BCS is entitled to as a “high-performing” school. Id. The SAC alleges that
13 APS received an unconditional charter renewal despite the presumption against renewal and APS
14 officials’ statements that the school “significantly exceeded the district percentage of Hispanic
15 enrollment.” Id. In addition, the SAC alleges that the MOU requires BCS, and not any other
16 schools, “to change operational provisions in its petition, modify admission preferences that are
17 otherwise lawful and customary for other schools authorized by SCCOE, and . . . maintain and
18 continue to implement a plan to achieve the racial quotas that SCCBOE demands . . . .” Id. ¶ 30.
19 At the pleading stage, the SAC plausibly alleges facts that permit the Court to draw a
20 reasonable inference that BCS was treated differently from similarly situated schools that also did
21 not enroll a student population that “achieve[s] a balance of racial and ethnic pupils . . . that is
22 reflective of the general population residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the school district”
23 because of the particular racial composition of its student population, which includes a
24 disproportionate number of students of Asian descent. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the
25 SAC states a plausible Title VI claim for disparate treatment based on race.
26 C. Claim 2: Equal Protection Clause Violation
27 BCS alleges that Section 47605(c)(5)(G) of the Education Code violates the equal
1 schools to actually achieve a racial balance that reflects proportions of students enrolled at the
2 school district in which the charter school is authorized to operate.” Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 50. An “as
3 applied” challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a claim that the operation of a statute is
4 unconstitutional in a particular case, but not necessarily in all cases, while a “facial” challenge
5 asserts that the statute may rarely or never be constitutionally applied. Erotic Serv. Provider Legal
6 Educ. & Rsch. Project v. Gascon, 880 F.3d 450, 455 (9th Cir.), amended, 881 F.3d 792 (9th Cir.
7 2018). “[T]he distinction between facial and as-applied challenges is not so well defined that it
8 has some automatic effect or that it must always control the pleadings and disposition in every
9 case involving a constitutional challenge.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S.
10 310, 331 (2010). Instead, the distinction matters primarily as to the appropriate remedy if a
11 constitutional violation is found. Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213, 1230 (9th Cir. 2013). Here,
12 BCS contends that “[t]he statute, as interpreted and applied by [d]efendants, is a direct command
13 to engage in the very racial discrimination the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to prohibit.”
14 See Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 57 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the Court construes BCS’s claim as an as-
15 applied challenge to Section 47605(c)(5)(G).5
16 As to equal protection, the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “no State shall ‘deny to
17 any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction
18 that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.” Cummings v. Harris, No. 14-cv-02539-
19 BLF, 2014 WL 5454200, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2014) (quoting City of Cleburne, Tex. v.
20 Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985)).
21 BCS contends that, relying on their interpretation of Section 47605(c)(5)(G), defendants
22 are forcing BCS to engage in unlawful discrimination. Specifically, BCS asserts that it will be
23 forced to use racial quotas or other prohibited race-based measures as part of its recruitment and
24 admissions process in order to “achieve” an enrolled student population with the racial
25
26
5 In its opposition, BCS states that it raises a “facial challenge to the law.” Dkt. No. 25 at 14.
However, at the motion hearing, BCS stated that it raises a facial challenge to the statute “in the
27
alternative” to its as-applied challenge. Dkt. No. 35. As neither party briefed how the statute
1 demographics demanded as a condition for the current renewal of BCS’s charter and future
2 renewals of the charter. Dkt. No. 23 ¶¶ 57, 58. BCS argues that requiring it to achieve these
3 numerical goals violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.; Dkt. No.
4 25 at 13-15.
5 Defendants do not dispute that requiring BCS to implement specific racial quotas in school
6 admissions would be unlawful. Dkt. No. 24 at 8 (citing Parents Involved in Community Schs. v.
7 Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007) and Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President
8 & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181 (2023)); see also Moyo v. Gomez, 40 F.3d 982, 985 (9th
9 Cir. 1994) (in the Title VII context, “requiring an employee to discriminate is itself an unlawful
10 employment practice.”). Defendants argue, however, that the CSA’s mandate that a charter school
11 “comply with . . . all of the provisions set forth in its charter,” including the requirement to
12 “achieve a balance of racial and ethnic pupils . . . that is reflective of the general population
13 residing within the territorial jurisdiction of the school district,” is an “aspirational requirement
14 only.” Dkt. No. 24 at 8-9 (quoting Cal. Educ. Code §§ 47605(c)(5)(G), 47610). Defendants
15 contend that BCS’s own allegations show that compliance with Section 47605(c)(5)(G) is based
16 on the steps taken to achieve a racial balance that reflects the population of the school district
17 where the charter school is located, rather than any specific outcome. Id. (citing Dkt. No. 23 ¶
18 49).
19 The briefing on defendants’ motion to dismiss reflects that the parties disagree regarding
20 what defendants require BCS to do. However, at the pleading stage the Court must accept the
21 truth of all well-pled factual allegations in the SAC and must construe those allegations in BCS’s
22 favor. Applying this standard, the Court finds that the SAC plausibly alleges that defendants’
23 application of Section 47605(c)(5)(G) requires BCS to “actually achieve” a racial balance “that is
24 reflective of the general population of the school district” in which BCS operates. See Dkt. No. 23
25 ¶¶ 48, 50. Although Section 47605(c)(5)(G), on its face, does not require the use of race-based
26 quotas, BCS has adequately alleged that the threat of charter revocation effectively requires BCS
27 to “actually achieve a racial balance” that reflects the district’s general population. Id. ¶¶ 30, 49-
1 Id. ¶ 56. If SCCBOE assesses a charter school’s compliance with its charter and MOU by looking
2 principally, or exclusively, at the school’s admissions statistics, as BCS alleges, then there is at
3 least a question of whether SCCBOE effectively requires achievement of a specific quota. See id.
4 ¶ 39(o) (alleging the MOU “mandates that BCS ‘include metrics for measuring the
5 success/effectiveness of the plan and its components,’ i.e., whether BCS has actually achieved the
6 growth of racial groups deemed by SCCOE to be ‘historically underserved.’”). “A law
7 compelling persons to discriminate against other persons because of race is a palpable violation of
8 the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .” Monterey Mech. Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 708, 710-12 (9th
9 Cir. 1997) (finding California statute that required general contractors to subcontract specific
10 percentages of work to women or minority subcontractors or demonstrate “good faith efforts” to
11 meet percentage goals violated equal protection clause); see also Moyo, 40 F.3d at 985.
12 At this stage, the Court concludes that BCS plausibly alleges that defendants require an
13 actual outcome, and not just steps to achieving a racial balance, and that these allegations are
14 sufficient to support a claim that Section 47605(c)(5)(G), as applied by defendants, violates the
15 equal protection clause.
16 D. Claim 3: Equal Protection Clause Violation
17 BCS’s third claim also alleges an equal protection violation. Dkt. No. 23 ¶¶ 61-68. The
18 SAC alleges that “the only way that BCS could improve the odds of a[] Hispanic student being
19 selected over an Asian student to fill a spot . . . is by recruiting substantially more Hispanic
20 students to make it less likely that an Asian student’s name will be drawn from the lottery.” Id.
21 ¶ 64. BCS contends that this approach “has a disparate impact on Asian students that seek to
22 attend BCS, and for whom BCS has a legal and ethical responsibility to ensure that they do not
23 face discrimination in BCS’[s] admission practices – the same for all students.” Id. ¶ 65.
24 Defendants argue that the SAC’s allegations do not state a plausible claim for relief. Dkt.
25 No. 24 at 13-14. Specifically, defendants argue, “BCS does not, and cannot, plead any facts
26 indicating that Asian BCS students or applicants are treated differently than any other similarly
27 situated students with respect to admission to BCS.” Id. at 14. BCS responds that defendants’
1 students . . . [and] on its own behalf.” Dkt. No. 25 at 16, 18. BCS argues that defendants “are
2 requiring BCS to treat student[s] differently in the recruitment process, subjecting BCS to injury
3 by the fact of being required to do so against its wishes, and face injury (as BCS has) where such
4 recruitment efforts do not actually result in the enrollment balance [d]efendants require.” Id. at 19.
5 Defendants argue that to the extent claim 3 is based on purported harm to BCS, the claim “merely
6 mirrors its Second Cause of Action.” See Dkt. No. 26 at 12. The Court agrees.
7 At the hearing, the Court observed that claims 2 and 3 appear to be indistinguishable as
8 both claims challenge defendants’ conduct as “requiring” BCS to achieve a racially balance
9 student population. Dkt. No. 35; compare Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 50 (claim 2, “The statute, as interpreted
10 and applied by [d]efendants, is a direct command to engage in the very racial discrimination the
11 Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to prohibit.”) with id. ¶¶ 63-64 (claim 3, “Defendants have
12 required that BCS achieve an increase in its Hispanic student population motivated by Defendants’
13 view that Asian students have been overrepresented and should be reduced to make way for
14 Hispanic students. . . . This approach is necessarily discriminatory in its intent and goes beyond
15 fair efforts to recruit a diverse student body through broad marketing efforts.”). When pressed,
16 BCS could not articulate any relevant distinction between the two claims to the extent that claim 3
17 (like claim 2) is asserted on BCS’s behalf. Dkt. No. 35.
18 Accordingly, the Court grants defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss claim 3 as
19 duplicative of claim 2. See M.M. v. Lafayette Sch. Dist., 681 F.3d 1082, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) (“It
20 is well established that a district court has broad discretion to control its own docket, and that
21 includes the power to dismiss duplicative claims.”).
22 To the extent BCS purports to assert claim 3 on behalf of current and prospective students
23 of Asian descent, defendants move to dismiss this claim for lack of standing pursuant to Rule
24 12(b)(1). Dkt. No. 24 at 12-13. Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts have
25 jurisdiction to decide only actual cases or controversies, U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, and BCS
26 has standing to sue if it “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged
27 conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
1 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). BCS’s injury must be both “particularized” and
2 “concrete.” A “particularized” injury is one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and
3 individual way.” Spokeo, Inc., 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1). A
4 “concrete” injury “must actually exist” and must be “real, and not abstract.” Id. at 340.
5 It is not entirely clear whether BCS is attempting to plead “associational standing” to sue
6 on behalf of current Asian students. “[A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its
7 members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the
8 interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim
9 asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the
10 lawsuit.” Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Defendants
11 argue that BCS cannot show that its students would have standing to sue because BCS has
12 identified no actual or imminent injury to any student, let alone Asian students specifically,
13 particularly given that any increase in the number of applicants has an identical impact on the
14 chances of admission for any individual prospective student. Dkt. No. 24 at 12. Defendants
15 further argue that the interests BCS seeks to protect—i.e., the rights of Asian students and
16 applicants—“are not germane to its purpose as an educational entity,” as the school’s mission is to
17 educate all students, regardless of race. Id. at 13.
18 BCS responds that it has standing to assert claims on behalf of its students generally
19 because defendants’ “enforcement activities against BCS ‘are expensive to defend against (taking
20 funds away from the student program) and . . . distract school staff from core educational
21 programming (taking focus away from students).’” Dkt. No. 25 at 16 (quoting Dkt. No. 23 ¶ 66).
22 According to BCS, as a result, “[s]tudents suffer an injury in fact when their school is deprived of
23 resources that would and should otherwise be available to support their education.” Id. at 16-17.
24 There are two problems with BCS’s argument. First, BCS does not purport to assert claim
25 3 on behalf of its “students generally,” but only on behalf of Asian students. Second, allegations
26 that a plaintiff has incurred costs or diverted resources are generally not sufficient to support
27 standing. As the Supreme Court has observed, a plaintiff “cannot spend its way into standing
1 Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 394 (2024) (rejecting
2 organization’s standing argument that defending against government actions “forced” it to
3 “expend considerable time, energy, and resources” and caused it to spend “‘considerable
4 resources’ to the detriment of other spending priorities”); see also Satanic Temple v. Labrador,
5 149 F.4th 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting La Asociacion de Trabajadores de Lake Forest v.
6 City of Lake Forest, 624 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2010)) (“[A]n organization ‘cannot
7 manufacture the injury by incurring litigation costs or simply choosing to spend money fixing a
8 problem that otherwise would not affect the organization at all.’”). BCS’s allegations regarding
9 litigation costs and diversion of resources do not confer standing on BCS to assert a claim on
10 behalf of its students generally, or on behalf of Asian students specifically.
11 Accordingly, to the extent BCS purports to assert an equal protection claim on behalf of
12 current or prospective students of Asian descent, the Court grants defendants’ Rule 12(b)(1)
13 motion to dismiss claim 3 for lack of standing.
14 E. Leave to Amend
15 Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend “should be freely given when justice so requires,”
16 and “the court must remain guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15 . . . to facilitate decision
17 on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127
18 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quotations and citations omitted). “The decision of whether to grant
19 leave to amend nevertheless remains within the discretion of the district court,” which may deny
20 leave to amend if allowing amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue
21 delay, or be futile, or if the party seeking amendment has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v.
22 BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
23 (1962)).
24 BCS includes an abbreviated request for leave to amend in its opposition and made a
25 similar request at the hearing. Dkt. No. 25 at 19; Dkt. No. 35. However, BCS does not explain
26 what amendments it could make to address the defects the Court describes above. The Court has
27 already given BCS one opportunity to amend, and it does not appear that BCS can amend its
] Because further leave to amend would be futile, the Court grants the motion to dismiss as to claim
2 || 3 without leave to amend.
3 || IV. CONCLUSION
4 For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants in part and denies in part defendants’
5 motion to dismiss, as follows:
6 (1) Claim 1: The motion is denied.
7 (2) Claim 2: The motion is denied.
8 (3) Claim 3: The motion is granted, and the claim is dismissed.
9 Defendants’ answer is due no later than April 3, 2026.
10 The Court will hold an initial case management conference on April 21, 2026. The
11 parties’ joint case management statement is due April 14, 2026.
%L IT IS SO ORDERED.
13 Dated: March 13, 2026
Varapvin BE, LaMarche:
Virginia K. DeMarchi
= 16 United States Magistrate Judge
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