The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
RAYMOND BROWN, : CIVIL ACTION
Plaintiff :
:
v. : NO. 25-CV-6781
:
CELESTINE C. MARTIN, et al., :
Defendants :
O R D E R
AND NOW, this 1st day of July 2026, upon consideration of Plaintiff Raymond Brown’s
pro se Amended Complaint (ECF No. 9), it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. Brown’s claims are DISMISSED, in part with prejudice, and in part without
prejudice for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for the reasons
stated in the Court’s Memorandum, as follows:
a. Brown’s official capacity claims are DISMISSED, with prejudice.
b. Brown’s remining constitutional claims are DISMISSED, without prejudice.
2. Brown’s state law claims are DISMISSED, without prejudice for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction but without further leave to amend.
3. Brown may file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of
this Order. Any second amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the
second amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the second amended
complaint and shall state the basis for Brown’s claims against each defendant. The second
amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial Complaint, the
Amended Complaint, or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting his second
amended complaint, Brown should be mindful of the Court’s reasons for dismissing the claims in
his Amended Complaint as explained in the Court’s Memorandum. Brown shall not include in
his second amended complaint any claim that has been dismissed with prejudice or any claim
which has been dismissed without leave to amend granted. Upon the filing of a second
amended complaint, the Clerk shall not make service until so ORDERED by the Court.
4. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Brown a blank copy of the Court’s form
complaint for a prisoner filing a civil rights action bearing the above civil action number. Brown
may use this form to file his amended complaint if he chooses to do so.
5. If Brown does not wish to file a second amended complaint and instead intends to
stand on his Amended Complaint as pled, he may file a notice with the Court within thirty (30)
days of the date of this Order stating that intent, at which time the Court will issue a final order
dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Amended Complaint,”
and shall include the civil action number for this case. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232,
241 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice
with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to
dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951
n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703–04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
“that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise
viable claims . . . following plaintiffs’ decision not to replead those claims” when the district court
“expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the
dismissal of those claims”).
6. If Brown fails to file any response to this Order, the Court will conclude that Brown
intends to stand on his Amended Complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.1 See
1 The six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984),
is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff’s intention to stand on his complaint. See Weber,
Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that a plaintiff’s intent to stand on his complaint may be
inferred from inaction after issuance of an order directing him to take action to cure a defective
complaint).
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
NITZA I. QUIÑONES ALEJANDRO
Judge, United States District Court
939 F.3d at 241 & n.11 (treating the “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with a court order, which require assessment
of the Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 F. App’x 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes
adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the
case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 F. App’x 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per
curiam) (“Where a plaintiff’s conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or
where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing
of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175
(D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party
willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).